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ABSTRACT
This thesis explores the politics of economic adjustment in South Korea and Malaysia. 
Empirically, it examines how Korea and Malaysia responded to the East Asian financial crisis. 
A widespread perception is that Korea pursued orthodox policies (the Washington consensus) 
while Malaysia used unorthodox policies (the post-Washington consensus). However, this 
interpretation exaggerates the divergence in macroeconomic adjustment policies (e.g., 
different exchange rate regime policy and their relationship with the IMF), thereby 
underestimating the ‘policy’ convergence in macroeconomic stabilisation and structural 
reform at least from late 1997 to mid-1998. For this reason, this thesis explores the 
convergence and divergence in a balanced perspective.
Theoretically, it interprets why the ‘policy’ convergence emerged between Korea and 
Malaysia from an ideational perspective. The convergence was caused, in part, by economic 
ideas -  the Washington consensus or neoliberalism -  that prevailed among both the 
international financial institutions (IFIs) and national policy makers. The consensus de­
legitimised the existing economic system by attributing the underlying causes of the financial 
crisis to structural weaknesses in the financial and corporate sectors. In addition, the 
consensus provided a far-reaching blueprint for institutional change. This is why both 
countries embraced neoliberal policies particularly in structural reform, irrespective of IMF 
interventions.
The emphasis on economic ideas does not mean that ideational approaches overlook the 
role of interests and institutions. Vested interests -  big business and organised labour -  and 
state capacity had a considerable impact on policy-making. Thus ideas-oriented approaches 
are complementary to -  rather than conflicting with -  interest-oriented and institution-oriented 
approaches.
Key Words: East Asian Financial Crisis, South Korea, Malaysia, Washington Consensus 
Policy Convergence
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NOTE ON THE TEXT
1. For Korean, Japanese, Chinese and Malaysian names, the usual convention of putting 
surname first has been adopted with some exceptions,
2. In romanising the Korean language, I have used a new system proclaimed by the Ministry 
of Culture and Tourism on 4 July 2000. With respect to the name o f political and business 
figures and the trading name of companies, I have used Korean names according to a person’s 
own preference or as they have been published in major English-speaking journals. But in the 
bibliography, I have followed the Western bibliographic style for ease of reference.
2. In the thesis, most of data and statistics are drawn from IFI publications including the IMF 
and World Bank. Others are based on the publications of central banks and finance ministries. 
With regard to financial and corporate reform, the OECD, BIS and ADB have offered a good 
deal of data. The ILO and UNDP have also analysed the social impact of the financial crises.
3. Except where otherwise indicated, this thesis reflects information available through May 
2004.
4. Unless otherwise stated, all references to dollars ($) are to US dollars.
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Chapter I 
Introduction
The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and 
when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Practical 
men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, 
are usually the slaves of some defunct economist.
John Maynard Keynes *
Society’s course will be changed only by a change in ideas. First you must reach 
the intellectuals, the teachers and writers, with reasoned argument. It will be their 
influence on society which will prevail, and the politicians will follow.
Friedrich von Hayek^
Clearly, globalisation of the financial market had enabled the West and their 
capitalists to destroy the threat to their economic and political dominance posed by 
the burgeoning tiger economies of East Asia. Cleverly, the West, aided by their 
control over the world media and the international institutions, have managed to 
put the blame for the economic collapse of these East Asian countries on the 
Government of these countries.
Mahathir Mohamad
 ^John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory o f Employment, Interest and Money (London: Macmillan, 
1973[1936]), p.383.
 ^Cited from John Blundell, Waging the War o f Ideas, second edition (London: Institute of Economic 
Affairs, 2003), p.50.
 ^Mohamad Mahathir, Globalisation and What It Really Means, New Straits Times (7 May 1999)
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1. Main Question
The East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 has provoked a number of policy and 
theoretical debates in international political economy (IPE). By and large, the debates fall 
into two broad categories: the appropriateness of IMF-supported programmes and the way in 
which the IMF imposed the programmes on the crisis-affected countries.  ^The first issue has 
been extensively discussed by economists and policy makers at the international financial 
institutions (IFIs) and national governments. The second issue has not drawn as much 
attention as the first because the role of IMF intervention has been considered to be less 
important than the content of IMF-supported programmes. ® However, the question of how the 
IMF involved in the countries is as significant as the question of whether IMF-supported 
programmes were good or bad for the countries. The reason is that economic policy is not free 
from political considerations.
Against this background, this thesis explores the politics of economic adjustment in South 
Korea (hereafter Korea) and Malaysia. It is widely believed that Korea and Malaysia 
responded to the financial crisis in a contrasting way. ’’  While Korea implemented orthodox 
policies, Malaysia employed unorthodox measures. When it comes to macroeconomic 
stabilisation, Korea stuck to a pro-cyclical policy whereas Malaysia adopted a counter-cyclical 
policy. One of the most remarkable differences lies in foreign economic policy. Korea relaxed 
most restrictions on capital account transactions, moving to a free-floating regime. In contrast.
According to the IMF, currency crisis can be defined as a sudden devaluation of a currency by 
speculative attacks or a massive reduction of foreign currency reserves in defending the value of 
currency. A financial crisis is a disruption of financial markets, which is often caused by actual or 
potential failures of financial institutions that compel the government to bail them out on a large scale,
A financial crisis is occasionally accompanied by a currency crisis, but a currency crisis does not 
necessarily evolve into a financial crisis. See IMF, World Economic Outlook (May 1998), pp.74-75,
 ^In the thesis, the crisis-affected countries are referred to as Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand.
® This tendency can be explained by the fact that most literature on the issues is written by mainstream 
(or neoclassical) economists, who base their methodologies upon mathematical models of equilibrium. 
For a discussion of the growing influence of economics in IPE, see Richard Higgott, Economics,
Politics and (International) Political Economy: The Need for a Balanced Diet in an Era of Globalisation, 
New Political Economy, Vol.4, No.l (1999); Geoffrey R. D. Underhill, State, Market, and Global 
Political Economy: Genealogy of an (Inter-?) Discipline, International Affairs, Vol.76, No.4 (October
2000); Philip G. Ceray, From ‘Iron Triangles’ to ‘Golden Pentangles’? Globalizing the Policy Process, 
Global Governance, Vol.7. No.4 (October 2001)
 ^For example, see Economist, The Lost (Half) Decade: East Asian Economies (6 July 2002)
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Malaysia imposed controls on capital outflows with the introduction of a pegged regime. With 
regard to structural policy, Korea pushed ahead with financial restructuring, the overhaul of 
corporate governance system and labour market flexibility. In Malaysia, structural adjustment 
was confined to the banking sector consolidation and the revision of corporate governance 
system.
Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad’s anti-Western rhetoric reinforces this interpretation. 
At the IMF-World Bank Annual Meeting in Hong Kong in September 1997, he accused 
George Soros of destabilising currency markets.
[T]he currency traders have become rich, veiy very rich through making other people poorer...
And when they are annoyed they destroy altogether, they can reduce us to basket cases... They will 
determine we proper or don’t . .. Currency trading is unnecessary, unproductive and immoral. It 
should be stopped. It should be made illegal... If trade is to grow then currency values must be 
linked to the economic performance of the countries concerned. *
This outspoken criticism of hedge funds was starkly contrasted with President Kim Dae 
Jung’s attitude towards George Soros. Just after the 1997 presidential election, Kim invited 
Soros to show his commitment to market-oriented reform.  ^In the inauguration in February 
1998, he declared.
The People’s government [Kim Dae Jung government] will make an effort to induce foreign 
investment as well as encouraging exports. Foreign investment is the most effective way to repay 
foreign debts, enhance the competitiveness of domestic firms and increase transparency in our 
economy.
* Mohamad Mahathir, Address at the Annual Seminar of the World Bank (20 September 1997) For 
Soros’s responses to his accusation, see Far Eastern Economic Review, Mahathir vs. Soros (2 October 
1997)
’ Wall Street Journal, Soros Expresses Interest in More Korean Investment (5 January 1998)
Dae Jung Kim, Inauguration Speech (25 February 1998)
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Based on this interpretation, Joseph Stiglitz maintains that different post-crisis economic 
growth among the crisis-affected countries can be explained by how much they took IMF 
recommendations. According to him, “Malaysia’s capital controls allowed it to recover more 
quickly, with a shallower downturn, and with a far smaller legacy of national debt burdening 
future growth... Today, Malaysia stands in a far better position than those countries that took 
IMF advice.” Among the three IMF-rescued countries, Korea’s better result was attributable 
to its selective acceptance of IMF’s prescription. For example, the government played a key 
role in financial and corporate restructuring rather than letting market mechanisms solve 
problems in the sectors. Thailand’s adherence to the IMF left the country behind Korea and 
Malaysia in terms of macroeconomic performance and progress of structural reform. In the 
case of Indonesia, inappropriate IMF policies worsened the financial crisis and contributed to 
increasing political and social turmoil.
A closer scrutiny reveals, however, that there was a considerable degree of policy 
convergence between Korea and Malaysia. At the initial stage of the crisis, both countries 
employed IMF policy recommendations in a similar way. Although Malaysia did not receive 
financial assistance from the IMF, Anwar Ibrahim -  then Deputy Prime Minister and Finance 
Minister -  followed pro-cyclical macroeconomic policy. In terms of stmctural reform, both 
governments committed themselves to financial restructuring and corporate reform. Even after 
the downfall of Anwar, there was no fundamental change although the speed of reform slowed 
in order to favour Mahathir’s cronies.
This policy convergence has not been as much appreciated in the existing literature on the 
financial crisis. Instead, much attention has been paid to the policy divergence especially in
"  Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (London: Allen Lane, 2002), p. 125.
There are some exceptions. See Donald K. Emmerson, Americanizing Asia?, Foreign Affairs, Vol.78, 
No.3 (May / June 1998); Richard Higgott and Nicola Phillips, Challenging Triumphalism and 
Convergence: the Limits of Global Liberalization in Asia and Latin America, Review o f International 
Studies, Vol.26, No.3 (July 2000); Barry K. Gills, The Crisis of Postwar East Asian Capitalism: 
American Power, Democracy and the Vicissitudes of Globalization, Review o f International Studies, 
Vol.26, No.3 (July 2000); Richard Robison, Looking Back on the Asian Crisis: The Question of 
Convergence, Asian Journal o f Social Science, Vol.31, No.2 (2003)
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foreign economic policy. The emphasis on the divergence is an obstacle to understanding the 
whole picture of economic adjustment by over-stating the role of capital controls.
For this reason, this thesis focuses on the policy convergence between Korea and 
Malaysia in the post-crisis period. The main question is what explains the policy convergence; 
in other words, what led Korea and Malaysia to adopt neoliberal economic policies? My 
argument is that economic ideas -  in particular, the Washington consensus -  was a 
determining factor that led policy makers in both countries to adopt a similar set of policy 
prescriptions to the crisis.
Economic ideas can have a causal effect on policy change. Policy failures or paradigm 
shift lead policy makers to rethink the legitimacy of an economic policy. As a result, policy 
and theoretical debates take place in the policy-making circles including high-profile 
bureaucrats and economists in think tanks and academia. In these debates, the role of 
economic ideas is important because they provide policy-making circles with theoretical 
frameworks to understand the failures and plausible solutions to them.
The impacts of economic ideas are transmitted to policy-making through discursive 
practices and social learning. First, discursive practices play a crucial role in shaping the social 
meaning of economic policies. The socially-constructed meanings influence policy-making by 
changing public opinion. Second, social learning affect policy preferences. In analysing 
economic problems, policy makers draw historical lessons from the experiences of other 
countries and international organisations that have dealt with a similar problem.
By linking economic ideas to policy outcomes, I show how the political power of the 
Washington consensus had an impact on the post-crisis economic adjustment in Korea and 
Malaysia. As a matter of fact, the consensus effectively de-legitimised the East Asian 
development model by attributing the underlying causes of the crisis to domestic economic
Until recently, few IPE studies put stress on the role of economic ideas in policy change in the 
developing world. Some exceptions are Alice H. Amsden, The Specter of Anglo-Saxonization is 
Haunting South Korea, in Lee-Jay Cho and Yoon Hyung Kim (eds.), Korea’s Political Economy: An 
Institutional Perspective (Boulder: Westview, 1994); Kathryn Sikkink, Development Ideas in Latin 
America: Paradigm Shift and the Economic Commission for Latin America, in Frederick Cooper and 
Randall Packard (eds,). International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays in the History and 
Politics o f Knowledge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997)
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vulnerabilities in the financial and corporate sectors. In addition, the consensus provided a 
well-organised guideline for economic adjustment. This is why the crisis-affected countries 
accepted IMF style policies, whether they were under the IMF-supported programmes or not.
It should be noted that ideational approaches are complementary to -  rather than 
conflicting with -  interest-oriented and institution-oriented approaches. The emphasis on 
economic ideas is not to deny the influence of interests and institutions in economic 
adjustment. Even though Korea and Malaysia were influenced by the Washington consensus, 
the pattern of economic adjustment was not the same. It means that the political influence of 
economic ideas was constrained, to a varying degree, by vested interests -  big business and 
organised labour -  and political institutions. Thus, the policy convergence (and divergence) 
cannot be properly understood without taking into consideration domestic politics and 
institutional settings.
In this thesis, I explain the impact o f economic ideas on four policy areas -  
macroeconomic stabilisation, financial restructuring, corporate reform and labour market 
flexibility -  which constitute the principal aspects of the post-crisis economic adjustment. 
First, macroeconomic stabilisation is aimed to fix immediate economic disequilibrium by 
using fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policy. Second, financial restructuring is designed to 
fix weaknesses in the financial sector by reducing non-performing loans (NPLs) and 
strengthening institutional frameworks for regulations and supervision. Third, corporate 
reform is intended to remove the underlying problems that caused the financial crisis by 
upgrading corporate governance system. Finally, labour reform is planned to make labour 
markets more flexible by changing regulations on (un) employment.
This thesis is aimed to contribute to IPE in two respects. First, there are very few 
structured comparisons of Korea and Malaysia although there are a large number of single
Peter A. Hall, The Role of Interests, Institutions, and Ideas in the Comparative Political Economy of 
the Industrialized Nations, in Mark I. Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman (eds.), Comparative Politics: 
Rationality, Culture and Structure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997)
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case studies. A common problem with the literature is that lack of uniformity in terms of 
period and methodology often fails to offer a balanced comparison among the countries. 
Another problem is that most literature focuses on a particular policy area (notably capital 
controls), thereby failing to evaluate economic adjustment as a whole. This thesis attempts 
to analyse macroeconomic stabilisation and structural reform in a coherent ft-amework.
Second, the role of economic ideas has not been properly appreciated because of the 
predominance of interest-oriented and institution-oriented approaches in the existing literature 
on the post-crisis economic adjustment. This thesis fills the void by developing an 
ideational explanation of policy change. In doing so, it provides an alternative approach to the 
post-crisis economic adjustment in Korea and Malaysia.
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2003); Sangmook Lee, The Politics of the Asian Financial Crisis in Malaysia and South Korea, Journal 
o f the Asia Pacific Economy, Vol. 9, No.l (2004)
' Some exceptions are Kanishka Jayasuriya and Andrew Rosser, Economic Orthodoxy and the East 
Asian Crisis, Third World Quarterly, Vol.22, No 3 (2001); Massimo Florio, Economists, Privatization 
in Russia and the Waning of the ‘Washington Consensus’, Review o f International Political Economy, 
Vol. 9, No.2 (Summer 2002); Yujiro Hayami, From the Washington Consensus to the Post-Washington 
Consensus: Retrospect and Prospect, Asian Development Review, Vol. 20, No. 2 (2003)
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2. The Washington Consensus and Policy Convergence: Definitions
Before addressing the main question, it is necessary to define the Washington consensus 
and policy convergence because the two concepts are often misunderstood or confused. In the 
first place, John Williamson argues that the consensus should be distinguished from market 
fundamentalism, free market ideology or neoliberalism. According to him, neoliberalism is an 
ideology that the Mont Pelerin Society founded to promote the right wing version of a liberal 
agenda, whereas the consensus was a set of policy recommendations based on empirical 
research rather than ideology. For example, the consensus did not support key pillars of 
neoliberalism: i.e., monetarism, low tax rates and the minimal state. Contrary to his 
complaint, a comparison of neoliberalism, orthodox policies and the Washington consensus 
reveals that there is no fundamental difference among them in terms of theoretical foundations. 
First, neoliberalism is a set of economic ideas that were inspired by Friedrich von Hayek 
and Milton Friedman.
[N]eoliberalism has been a political project concerned with institutional changes on a scale not seen 
since the immediate aftermath of the Second World War and a project that has attempted to 
transform some of the most basic political and economic settlements of the postwar era, including 
labor market accords, industrial relations systems, redistributive tax structures, and social welfare 
programs. Integral to these changes has been a shift away from Keynesian economic ideas, which 
emphasized the political management of aggregate demand, to a more conservative discourse based 
on monetarist, supplyside, and rational expectations theories.
Under the political leadership of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, the US and the 
UK transformed its economic structure and macroeconomic management frameworks
John Williamson, From Reform Agenda to Damaged Brand Name, Finance and Development 
(September 2003), p.l 1.
John L. Campbell and Ove Kaj Pedersen, Introduction, in John L. Campbell and Ove Kaj Pedersen, 
(eds.). The Rise o f Neoliberalism and Institutional Analysis (Princeton; Princeton University Press,
2001), p.l.
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following the economic ideas. The success of the countries prompted other industrial countries 
to undertake similar economic reform. Among others, the New Zealand case is widely 
regarded to be most comprehensive and consistent.
Second, the literal meaning of economic orthodoxy is the predominant set of economic 
ideas at any particular time. In the debate over economic development, the orthodoxy means a 
set of market-oriented policies that are reflected in IMF and World Bank conditionality. 
Orthodox policies consist of “reduction in the fiscal deficit, controls on domestic credit 
expansion and credit extended to the public sector, and establishment of a realistic exchange 
rate.”
The heterodoxy was developed by (neo) structuralists, most of whom are sympathetic to 
John Maynard Keynes and Karl Polanyi. Basically, they are very critical of IMF-style 
stabilisation, believing that market failures are more harmful than government failures.
Their policy preferences are: “ a higher priority to goals other than achieving external 
equilibrium in the short run, particularly economic growth and distributional or poverty 
alleviation goals; a more cautious and selective approach to the use of the market (though 
market mechanisms are not rejected); a questioning of the legitimacy of detailed, external 
policy intervention; and a refusal to take the international environment as given, arguing for 
greater symmetry in adjustment between North and South and for a different resolution of the 
debt crisis.”
Finally, the Washington consensus is a set of economic policy that would be good for 
developing countries particularly in Latin America in the late 1980s. According to John 
Williamson, Washington refers to the set of policies endorsed by the principal economic
Herman Schwartz, Can Orthodox Stabilization and Adjustment Work? Lessons from New Zealand, 
1984-90, International Organization, Vol.45, No.2 (Spring 1991); Lewis Evans, Arthur Grimes, Bryce 
Wilkinson and David Teece, Economic Reform in New Zealand 1984-95: The Pursuit of Efficiency, 
Journal o f Economic Literature, Vol.34, No.4 (December 1996)
Miles Kahler, Orthodoxy and Its Alternatives: Explaining Approaches to Stabilization and 
Adjustment, in Joan M. Nelson (ed.), Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics o f Adjustment in 
the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p.36. See also Hakim Ben Hammouda, 
The Political Economy o f Post-Adjustment: Towards Ne^v Theories and Strategies o f Development 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003)
Lance Taylor, Editorial: The Revival of the Liberal Creed: The IMF and the World Bank in a 
Globalized Economy, World Development, Vol.25, No.2 (February 1997)
Kahler (1990), p.52.
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institutions located in Washington DC: the US Treasury, the Federal Reserve Board, the IMF 
and the World Bank. The original version of the consensus consists of ten propositions.
Fiscal discipline
A redirection of public expenditure priorities toward fields offering both high economic 
returns and the potential to improve income distribution, such as primaiy health care, primary 
education, and infi-astructure
Tax reform (to lower marginal rates and broaden the tax base)
Interest rate liberalization 
A competitive exchange rate 
Trade liberalization
Liberalization of inflows of foreign direct investment 
Privatization
Deregulation (to abolish barriers to entry and exit)
Secure property rights.
As summarised in Table 1-1, it is hard to deny that there are some considerable 
differences. For example, neoliberalism emphasises tax cuts whereas the Washington 
consensus supports a re-direction of public expenditure. However, the differences arise from 
different historical backgrounds, not from economic philosophy. While neoliberalism emerged 
from the criticisms of Keynesianism in industrial nations where well-developed social welfare 
system was in place, the Washington consensus and the orthodoxy evolved from the debate 
over structuralism in developing countries that lacked sufficient social safety nets. Despite the 
differences, all of them share the core principles of neoliberalism: fiscal discipline, trade
It is worthwhile to note that all international economic organizations do not support the consensus. 
By and large, the IMF, World Bank, WTO, and OECD support the liberalisation and deregulation of 
finance and trade. Meanwhile, the UNDP and ILO express serious concerns about its social and 
environmental impacts on developing countries and workers. The difference reflects that each 
organisation has different mandates and provides different policy advices.
John Williamson, What Washington Means by Policy Reform, in John Williamson (ed.), Latin 
American Adjustment: How Much has Happened? (Washington D C.; Institution for International 
Economics, 1989)
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liberalisation, financial deregulation and privatisation. This is why the Washington consensus 
has become a synonym for neoliberalism in die developing world.
[Table 1-1] A Comparison of Neoliberalism, the Washington consensus and Orthodoxy
Neoliberalism wc Orthodoxy
Fiscal discipline 0 0 0
Trade liberalization 0 0 0
Privatisation 0 0 0
Anti-inflation 0 0
Financial liberalization 0 0
Tax reform 0 0
Flexible exchange regime 0 0
Property rights 0 0
Social welfare reform 0 0
Labour market reform o
In the meanwhile, the concept of convergence is one of the most controversial issues in 
the debate over globalisation. Its logic is that free transaction of goods and capital encourages 
common market rules and structure across nations. For example, many countries introduce a 
similar set of market-friendly policies -  such as tax breaks and lax regulations on environment 
and labour -  to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). Otherwise, multinational corporations 
(MNCs) would move to other countries that provide more favourable conditions.
In the debate, three different concepts of convergence -  economic, institutional and policy 
-  are discussed. The first is economic convergence. Economic historians look at
Suzanne Berger, Introduction, in Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore (eds.), National Diversity and 
Global Capitalism (Cornell University Press, 1996); Hugo Radice, Globalization and National 
Capitalisms: Theorizing Convergence and Differentiation, Review o f International Political Economy, 
Vol. 7, No.4 (Winter 2000); Suzanne Berger, Globalization and Politics, Annual Review o f Political 
Science, Vol.3 (2000); Paul Mosley, Globalisation, Economic Policy and Convergence, World 
Economy, Vol. 23, No. 5 (May 2000); Daniel W. Drezner, Globalization and Policy Convergence, 
International Studies Review, Vol.3, No.l (2001)
Robert Boyer, The Convergence Hypothesis Revisited: Globalization but still the Century of 
Nations?, in Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore (eds.). National Diversity and Global Capitalism 
(Cornell University Press, 1996)
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productivity levels and standards of living to understand the real effects of globalisation. For 
example, Jeffrey Williamson argued that a surge of trade and capital flows in the late 19* and 
the early 20* century played a part in the convergence of real wage in industrial countries.^* 
Second, institutional convergence means the harmonisation of institutional settings: financial 
system, corporate governance, social welfare, production network etc. Political economists 
examine similarities and differences among different modes of capitalisms. Finally, policy 
convergence can be defined as a tendency that increases similarities in a particular policy. A 
government can introduce a policy that proves to be effective in solving a particular problem 
in foreign countries. For example, the Thatcher government introduced US-bom monetarism, 
thereby surrendering Keynesian. Similarly, the UK administrative reform in the late 1980s 
was a benchmark for the Japanese government.
Among them, this thesis is aimed to evaluate the effect of economic ideas on policy 
convergence. The reason is that it is too early to assess economic and institutional 
convergence because these types of convergence can be measured on a large time-scale. For 
example, institutional convergence can be recognised only after an economic idea is 
embedded in state institutions and thus consolidates institutional stability. In addition, it 
should be noted that the main focus of the thesis is on policy-making rather than policy 
implementation. Even though reform policies were introduced, some of them have not yet 
fully implemented.
Jeffrey G. Williamson, Globalization, Convergence, and HisXory, Journal o f Economic History, Vol. 
56, No. 2 (June 1996)
Peter A. Hall (ed.). Varieties o f Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations o f Comparative Advantage 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) For different types of institutional settings, see also Michel 
Albert, Capitalism against Capitalism (London: Whurr, 1993); Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, 
Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities o f Governance, second 
edition (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999); Ronald Dore, Stock Market Capitalism, Welfare Capitalism: 
Japan, Germany, and the Anglo-Saxon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000);
Michael J. Oliver and Hugh Pemberton, Learning and Change in 20th-Century British Economic 
Policy, Governance, Vol. 17, No. 3 (July 2004)
Koichi Nakano, Cross-national Transfer of Policy Ideas: Agencification in Britain and Japan, 
Governance, Vol. 17, No.2 (April 2004)
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3. Research Design and Case Selection
This thesis is a comparative case study. There are three rationales for qualitative 
methodology. First, practical problems exist in applying quantitative methodology because the 
quality of data is quite often subject to controversy. In many East Asian countries, political 
and social statistics are missing or absent and the measurements of some data changed many 
times. More seriously, there is widespread scepticism over economic and financial statistics. 
Each nation has its own statistical standards that had been changed during the crisis. In this 
regard, many analysts in the private sector have reservations over the reliability of the official 
data on the financial and corporate sectors.
Second, the small N problem is an obstacle to applying quantitative methodology. Small- 
N studies are vulnerable to selection bias when they choose extreme cases. In addition, it is 
extremely difficult to draw a statistically-meaningful conclusion from a small number of cases 
in regression approaches. With respect to the East Asian crisis, there are at best four or five 
cases. The number is not large enough to generalise the empirical findings.
Finally, the impacts of economic ideas cannot be quantified without any bias because 
ideas are (inter-) subjective in essence. It is always controversial to assess how much
For a general overview of methodological issues, see John S. Odell, Case Study Methods in 
International Political Economy, International Studies Perspectives, Vo.2, No.2 (May 2001); Cameron 
G. Thies, A Pragmatic Guide to Qualitative Historical Research in the Study of International Relations, 
International Studies Perspectives, Vol.3, No.4 (November 2002); John Gerring, What Is a Case Study 
and What Is It Good for?, American Political Science Review, Vol. 98, No, 2 (May 2004)
Thorsten Beck, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer and Patrick Walsh, New Tools in 
Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions, World Bank Economic Review, 
Vol. 15, No.l (September 2001); Daniel Kaufinann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance 
Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996, 1998,2000, and 2002, World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 
18, No. 2 (2004)
One of the most controversial data is NPLs. For example, the Korean government was suspected of 
underestimating NPLs to hide the seriousness of financial distress. The same problem existed in 
Malaysia. In September 1998, the government relaxed the definition of NPLs from 3 months to 6 
months, which was regarded as an attempt to save highly-indebted financial institutions from immediate 
bankruptcy threats. This data problem applies to all of the crisis-affected countries in East Asia.
Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in 
Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994)
25
economic ideas affect policy change. For this reason, the political influence of economic 
ideas is often presented in relative -  not absolute -  terms.
One way to solve these methodological problems is a cross-cutting comparison. As shown 
in Figure 1-1, for example, Craig Parsons suggests that a comparison of two policy makers (or 
groups) with similar socio-political backgrounds in a similar position can isolate the effects of 
ideas from other effects.
[Figure 1-1] How Much Cross-Cutting Ideas Matter 37
Ideas as sole cause
Leads to outcome A Leads to outcome B
Strategy X
Actor 1
Strategy Y
Actor 2
(in same objective position)
One problem with the cross-cutting comparison lies in the selection of cases. It is very 
hard to find good examples: i.e., two countries with similar socio-economic background.
This does not imply that quantitative methodology is inappropriate for ideational approaches. For 
example, see Beth A. Simmons and Zachary Elkins, The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy 
Diffusion in the International Political Economy, American Political Science Review, Vol. 98, No.l 
(February 2004)
Craig Parsons, Showing Ideas as Causes: The Origins of the European Union, International 
Organization, Vol.56, No.l (Winter 2002), p.52.
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Another is that its logic is more counter-factual rather than causal because it assumes that if 
economic ideas were absent, the outcome would be different.
For this reason, I reverse Parsons’s cross-cutting approach to avoid the case selection 
problem. My research strategy is to highlight the political power of economic ideas by 
showing that two countries with different socio-economic backgrounds adopted a similar set 
of economic policies. In this respect, the reasoning of this approach is counter-factual. The 
impact of economic ideas is proved by rejecting the materialist proposition that different 
countries employ different economic ideas because of differences in socio-political 
circumstances and in the position in the world economy.
In this thesis, I compare Korea with Malaysia. The main reason for this choice is that the 
two countries had many differences that could have obstructed policy convergence. First of all, 
Korea adjusted to the financial crisis under IMF-supported programmes whereas Malaysia 
overcame it without IMF’s intervention. The role of the IMF in economic adjustment was very 
crucial because it had the authority to impose conditionality on countries that received 
financial assistance. Korea should follow IMF’s policy recommendation, but Malaysia had no 
legal obligation to accept them.
Second, the initial conditions of economic adjustment in Korea and Malaysia were quite 
different. Above all, the severity of the economic crises differed across the countries. Among 
them, Malaysia had favourable economic conditions -  among others, relatively low exposure 
to short-term debt -  that enabled the economy to avoid the worst scenario. And it is also 
important to note that Malaysia’s financial regulatory and corporate government ^stem s were 
more resilient than those of the others.
Finally, regime change also distinguishes Korea from Malaysia. In Korea, the Kim Young 
Sam administration was replaced with the Kim Dae Jung government in the wake of the 
financial crisis. This was the first defeat of the candidate of the ruling party in the presidential 
elections over the past three decades. However, Kim Dae Jung’s political power was limited
James D. Fearon, Coimterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science, World Politics^ 
Vol.43, No.2 (January 1991); David Sylvan and Stephen Majesk, A Methodology for the Study of 
Historical Counterfactuals, International Studies Quarterly, Vol.42, No.l (March 1998)
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because his party was not a majority in the National Assembly. Although there were 
considerable protests against the Mahathir regime in mid-1998, the Malaysian government 
managed to win the 1999 general election with a comfortable margin.
As shown in Table 1-2, there are several socio-economic differences that could affect 
policy choice. First, there was a considerable divergence between Northeast Asian capitalism 
and Southeast Asian capitalism. Prior to the crisis, Korea belonged to Northeast Asian 
capitalism that is characterised as extensive state intervention in the markets to promote 
strategic exporting industries. Meanwhile, Malaysia was classified as a rich natural resources 
model that depends on foreign direct investment (FDI). This difference is reflected in the 
manner of state intervention. Korea’s financial and corporate structures had many similarities 
to those of Japan, which were under direct and heavy state control. In Malaysia, the legacy of 
British colonialism was embedded in the financial and corporate sectors even though the 
government tried to emulate Japan’s industrialisation in the name of the ‘Look East’ policy.
Second, Korea and Malaysia had a quite different government-big business relationship. 
In Korea, the relationship was confrontational. Although benefiting from industrial policy 
during the 1970-80s, the chaebol were critical of government policy from the 1990s when 
various measures were introduced to curb their monolithic power. In Malaysia, the 
relationship was cooperative because most large conglomerates -  especially large bumiputera 
companies -  were under the sponsorship of top political leaders.
Third, Korea had a more democratic decision making process than Malaysia. Since the 
late 1980s, Korea’s pilot agencies were gradually deconstructed with the fall of military 
authoritarian regimes. At the same time, the influence of civil society substantially increased 
in some policy area such as labour, social welfare and environment. In contrast, Malaysia’s
Dwight H. Perkins, There are At Least Three Model of East Asia Development, World Development, 
Vol.22, No.4 (April 1994) For discussions about the differences between Southeast Asian and Northeast 
Asian economies, see Anne Booth, Initial Conditions and Miraculous Growth: Why is South East Asia 
Different from Taiwan and South Korea?, World Development, Vol.27, No.2 (Febmary 1999); 
Donghyun Park, The Dichotomy between Northeast Asian Capitalism and Southeast Asian Capitalism, 
Journal o f  the Asia Pacific Economy, Vol. 5, No.3 (2000)
Meredith Woo-Cumings, Economic Crisis and Corporate Reform in East Asia (New York: Council 
on Foreign Relations, 2000)
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politics was dominated by the UMNO. Although there were many factions in the ruling party, 
Mahathir’s authority was rarely challenged during his reign.
Fourth, Korea and Malaysia had different social problems. In Korea, politically significant 
confi’ontation between two regions (Kyongsang and Cholla Province) had a great impact on 
domestic politics. In the presidential and general elections, Kyongsang Province supported 
conservative parties whereas Cholla Province liberal parties (especially led by Kim Dae Jung). 
Although Korea is a multi-religious country (Buddhism, Protestantism, Catholic and 
Confucianism), there was no serious conflict between them. In Malaysia, political parties 
divided by ethnic and religion. Three major ethnics -  Malays, Chinese and Indian -have its 
own political parties. Malays are divided into two groups: moderate Islamic UMNO and 
radical Islamic PAS. Among them, Malays dominate domestic politics and its religion -  Islam 
-  influence economic and social policy.
Finally, organised labour in Korea was strong enough to engage actively in social policy 
by calling nation-wide general strikes. The role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
was also very active. In contrast, Malaysia’s trade unions were weak and their political power 
was very limited. And a large number of foreign workers in the manufacturing and 
construction industries were not fully protected.
[Table 1-2] A Brief Comparison of Korea and Malaysia
Korea Malaysia
Type of Capitalism Northeast Asian (ex-Japanese colony) Southeast Asian (ex-British colony)
State intervention Strong Moderate
Govemment-big 
business relations
Confi’ontational Cooperative
Political regime Democracy (presidency) Semi-democracy (parliament)
Party system Multi-party One hegemonic party with minor ones
Labour movement Strong Weak
Social problems Regional rivalry Ethnic-religious tensions
Jungug Choi, Ethnic and Regional Politics after the Asian Economic Crisis: A Comparison of 
Malaysia and South Korea, Democratization, Vol. 10, No.3 (Spring 2003)
Sarosh Kuruvilla and Christopher L. Erickson, Change and Transformation in Asian Industrial 
Relations, Industrial Relations, Vol. 41, No. 2 (April 2002)
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4. Outline of the Thesis
This thesis is organised into two parts. Part I explores with theoretical and historical 
backgrounds. Chapter II review competing explanations of the post-crisis economic 
adjustment. In the first place, I review the existing literature on the politics of economic 
adjustment that provides theoretical foundations to the explanations. To this end, three 
competing approaches explanations are examined: interest-oriented, institution-oriented and 
ideas-oriented. Among them, ideational approaches -  institutionalist, Neo-Gramscian and 
constructivist -  are analysed in depth to show how economic ideas affect policy change. By 
synthesising the ideational approaches, I develop an alternative explanation of policy change. 
To test the framework empirically, I suggest four working hypotheses.
Chapter HI discusses why and how the Washington consensus affected policy change in a 
historical perspective. First, I trace the development of the Washington consensus in a broader 
perspective. In particular, I emphasise that the spread of the consensus fi'om the developed 
world to developing and transition economies was accomplished by not only IFIs’ 
conditionality but also discursive practices and social learning. In the wake of the crisis, the 
Washington consensus was criticised for ill-sequenced capital account liberalisation and its 
neglect of social dimensions of economic policy. Against this background, I summarise the 
emergence of the post-Washington consensus as an alternative to the Washington consensus.
Part II is devoted to case studies. Chapter IV, V, VI and VII compare how the political 
power of the Washington consensus affected four policy areas respectively: macroeconomic 
stabilisation, financial restructuring, corporate reform and labour market reform. In reality, the 
four policies were intertwined and mutually affected each other. In particular, progress of 
structural reform was influenced by the speed of macroeconomic stabilisation. Despite this, I 
examine them separately for analytical reasons.
These empirical chapters show how different economic ideas affect policy-making by 
examining theoretical and policy debates in the countries and the IFIs. To test the hypotheses, 
the role of the IFIs, policy makers and big business in the debates was closely examined. In
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addition, the chapters look at how the political power of the Washington consensus was 
affected by political institutions.
In Chapter VIII, I summarise the major findings. First, I account for the policy 
convergence between Korea and Malaysia. Then I discuss the four hypotheses to appreciate 
the impact of the Washington consensus on the policy convergence. Finally, I explain the 
policy divergence between the two countries by examining each country’s socio-political 
settings.
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Part I
Theoretical and Historical Backgrounds
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Chapter II 
The Politics of Economic Adjustment: 
An Analytical Framework
1. Introduction
This chapter presents an analytical framework to examine the policy convergence (and 
divergence) between Korea and Malaysia with respect to policy responses to the East Asian 
financial crisis. The existing literature on the politics of economic adjustment in the crisis- 
affected countries falls into three categories; interest-oriented, institution-oriented and idea- 
oriented. Among them, I choose ideational approaches to explain the policy convergence 
between Korea and Malaysia. The reason is that interest-oriented approaches fail to capture 
the convergence and institutional approaches pay little attention to it.
In international political economy (IPE), there are three types of ideational approaches: 
institutionalist, neo-Gramscian and constructivist. Although there are methodological 
differences, the three approaches agree to the assumptions: (1) economic ideas can be an 
independent variable in a situation where there is no clear solution to a new problem or policy 
failures; (2) economic ideas are diffused by discursive practices and social learning; and (3) 
economic ideas can have an impact on policy change by redefining interests and changing 
institutional settings.
Four working hypotheses are drawn to put the political power of economic ideas to the 
empirical test. The dependent variable is the political power of economic ideas and the 
independent variables are support from external agencies, support from big business, support 
from top policy makers -  particularly finance minister and central banker, and regime type -
i.e., democratic or authoritarian.
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This chapter starts with an overview of recent literature on the politics of economic 
adjustment in the post-crisis East Asia. Then it examines three ideational approaches with 
respect to its implication for economic policy-making and institutional change. By 
synthesising these ideational approaches, an ideational explanation of policy change is 
presented. Finally, I suggest four working hypotheses for empirical test.
2. Competing Approaches to Economic Adjustment in the Post-Crisis East Asia
1) Interest-oriented Approaches
Since the 1980s when debt crises engulfed Latin American and East Asian economies, 
there has been a robust literature on the politics of economic adjustment in the developing 
world. Implicitly or explicitly, most economic analyses are based on interest-based 
explanations. They can be divided into two categories in terms of level of analysis; domestic 
social groups and transnational social forces.
First, interest-based approaches focus on the role of domestic social groups. The basic 
logic is that domestic social groups respond to economic adjustment by considering how they 
gain or suffer from it in both absolute and relative terms; political conflicts arise from the fact 
that the benefits or costs are not evenly distributed both across the social groups and over 
times. ^  This uneven distribution generates collective action problems, because social groups 
who were privileged or subsidised by the exiting system do not want to cooperate to achieve 
economic reform.
For an overview of the literature before the Asian crisis, see Stephan Haggard, Interests, Institutions 
and Policy Reform, in Anne O. Krueger, Economic Policy Reform: The Second Stage (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2000)
Jeffrey A. Frieden, Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of 
Global Finance, International Organization, Vol.45, No.4 (Autumn 1991). See also Jonathan Crystal, 
What Do Producers Want? On the Origins of Societal Policy Preferences, European Journal o f  
International Relations, Vol.9, No.3 (2003)
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[T]he typical organization for collective action within a society will, at least if it represents only a 
narrow segment of the society, have little or no incentive to make any significant sacrifices in the 
interest of the society; it can best serve its members’ interests by striving to seize a larger share of 
society’s production for them... The organizations for collective action within societies that we are 
considering [for example, labour unions], are therefore overwhelmingly oriented to struggles over 
the distribution of income and wealth rather than the production of additional output -  they are 
“distributional coalitions.”
In addition, time-inconsistency between economic adjustment and its consequences 
creates political conflicts. The so-called J-curve theory explains the problem. In the short term, 
economic reform is likely to cause transitional costs such as high unemployment, price 
inflation and the decline of output growth before the promised benefits of economic reform 
start to materialise. This is why “Good economics does often turn out to be good politics, 
but only eventually. Policies that work do become popular, but the time lag can be long 
enough for the relationship not to be exploitable by would-be reformers.”
These problems become serious when losers of reform are politically powerful groups (i.e., 
urban industrialists and organised labour) while gainers (i.e., agricultural workers and small 
industrialists) are disenfranchised and powerless. In such situation, economic adjustment 
could be constrained by political and social oppositions at least in the short-term. Thus the 
success of economic reform depends, in large part, on how domestic social groups’ resistance 
is managed.
When it comes to the Asian crisis, most literature highlighting the role of big business and 
organised labour are based on interest-oriented approaches. In both countries, vested interests
Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline o f Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social 
Rigidities (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), p.44.
^  Joel S. Heilman, Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions, 
World Politics, Vol.20, No.2 (January 1998)
Dani Rodrik, Understanding Economic Policy Reform, Journal o f Economic Literature, Vol.XXXIV, 
No.l (March 1996), p.lO.
For example, see Hector E. Schamis, Distributional Coalitions and the Politics of Economic Reform 
in Latin America, World Politics, Vol.51, No.2 (January 1999) See also Dani Rodrik, Trade and 
Industrial Policy Reform, in Jere Behrman and T.N. Srinivasan (eds.). Handbook o f Development 
Economics, Vol.III (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1995)
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played a role in economic adjustment. Initially, big business in Korea and Malaysia sought to 
delay or sidestep corporate governance reform. And trade unions in Korea fiercely resisted the 
legalisation of redundancy. Despite the opposition, both big business and organised labour 
reluctantly accepted the Washington consensus during the crisis. For example, big business 
tried to upgrade corporate governance and trade unions approved massive redundancy. 
Interest-oriented approaches do not provide a reasonable answer to the question of why they 
embraced neoliberalism that neither represents nor serves their interests.
The other type of interest-oriented approaches put stress on the role of external pressure 
from the international financial institutions, trans-national corporations and major industrial 
countries (especially the US). Its intellectual origin can be traced back to Marxist dependency 
theories that prevailed in the 1970s in the developing world. Nowadays, however, there is a 
wide ideological variation from neoclassical economists (Joseph Stiglitz) to developmental 
state theorists (Robert Wade). The common theme of the explanations is that trans-national 
capitalists forced the crisis-affected countries to follow the Washington consensus through the 
international financial institutions (IFIs) to secure their interests in the crisis-affected countries.
The IFIs have various channels to constrain economic policy in developing countries.
First, international organisations such as the IMF, the World Bank and the World Trade 
Organisation have enormous impacts on financial and trade policy. Second, internationally- 
operated banks and credit rating agencies informally affect financial policy by their impact on
For a review of crony capitalism, see Linda Y.C. Lim and Aaron Stem, State Power and Private 
Profit: The Political Economy of Corruption in Southeast Asia, Asian Pacific Economic Literature,
Vol. 16, No.2 (2002) In the case of Korea and Malaysia, see Stephan Haggard, Wonhyuk Lim, Euysung 
Kim (eds.). Economic Crisis and Corporate Restructuring in Korea: Reforming the Chaebol 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Kwame Sundaram Jomo (ed.), Malaysian Eclipse: 
Economic Crisis and Recovery (London: Zed Books, 2001)
Robert Wade, Wheels Within Wheels: Rethinking the Asian Crisis and the Asian Model, Annual 
Review o f Political Science, Vol.3 (2000)
Barbara Stallings, International Influence on Economic Policy: Debt, Stabilization, and Structural 
Reform; Miles Kahler, External Influence, Conditionality, and tiie Politics of Adjustment, in Stephan 
Haggard and Robert R. Kaufinan (eds.). The Politics o f Economic Adjustment: International 
Constraints, Distributive Conflicts, and the State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992)
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capital flows and credit ratings on sovereign bonds. Their policy preferences reflect the 
political and economic interests of creditor countries as well as the IFIs.
In this regard, the ‘Wall Street-US Treasury-IMF complex’ is a key determinant in 
explaining patterns of economic recovery across the crisis-affected countries. According to 
this view, the main objective of IMF-supported programmes was given to protect the interests 
of the IFIs and creditor countries rather than to assist the crisis-affected countries.
This structural explanation exaggerates the overriding role of the IMF in macroeconomic 
policy choice. Thus it does not explain why Malaysia introduced many IMF policy 
recommendations. The government did not have any obligation because it was not under the 
IMF-supported programmes. Despite this, Anwar implemented an IMF-style polices. Even 
after his downfall, little change had been made in the frameworks of stmctural reform. Like 
the other three countries, Malaysia consolidated the banking sector and upgraded its corporate 
governance system. It is equally important to note that there is considerable divergence across 
the three IMF-rescued countries even though the IMF imposed a similar set of policy 
measures. In terms of financial and corporate reform, for example, Korea’s interventionist 
approach was contrasted with Thailand’s market-oriented approach. Structural reform in 
Malaysia was initiated by the government. In this respect, Korea’s structural reform was more 
similar to Malaysia’s than Thailand’s.
Richard Cantor and Frank Packer, Determinants and Impact of Sovereign Credit Ratings, Economic 
Policy Review, Vol.2, No.2 (1996); Robert Brooks, Robert W. Faff, David Millier and Joseph Millier, 
The National Market Impact of Sovereign Rating Changes, Journal o f Banking and Finance, Vol.28, 
No.l (January 2004)
Strom Cronan Thacker, The Migh Politics of IMF Lending, World Politics, Vol.52, No.l (October 
1999); Erica R. Gould, Money Talks: Supplementary Financiers and International Monetary Fund 
Conditionality, International Organization, Vol.57, No.3 (Summer 2003)
Robert Wade and Frank Veneroso, The Asian Crisis: The Migh Debt Model VS. the Wall Street- 
Treasury-IMF Complex, New Left Review, No.228 (March-April, 1998); Jagdish Bhagwati, The Capital 
Myth: The Difference between Trade in Widgets and Dollars, Foreign Affairs, Vol.77, No.3 (May/June 
1998)
Masahiro Kawai, Ira Lieberman and William P. Mako, Financial Stabilization and Initial 
Restructuring of East Asian Corporations: Approaches, Results, and Lessons, in Charles Adams, Robert 
E. Litan, and Michael Pomerleano (eds.). Managing Financial and Corporate Distress: Lessons from 
Asia (Washington D C.: Brookings Institution, 2000); Stijn Claessens, Daniela Klingebiel and Luc 
Laeven, Financial Restructuring in Banking and Corporate Sector Crises: What Policies to Pursue?, in 
Michael Dooley and Jeffrey Frankel (eds.). Managing Currency Crises in Emerging Markets (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2003)
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2) Institution-oriented Approaches
The lingering influence of developmental state theory draws attention to the role of 
political institutions -  particularly regime type and state capacity. First, there was a debate 
on how regime type -  democratic or authoritarian -  affected economic reform. In the 1980s, 
the successful economic adjustment in the East Asian newly-industrialised countries seemed 
to support the hypothesis that authoritarian regimes have an advantage in resolving collective 
action problems; in other words, authoritarian regimes are likely to implement politically 
unpopular polices more easily than democratic ones because their weak legislatures make 
interest groups less influential in shaping economic policy. However, there is no conclusive 
evidence to support it.
Second, proponents of developmental state theories argued that strong states could reduce 
distributional conflict by harmonising the interests of individual capitalists and the objectives 
of national economic development. The minimum requirements of developmental state are the 
relative autonomy of bureaucracy from special interest groups and high level of state capacity, 
which is defined as “a combination of internal coherence and external connectedness that can 
be called embedded autonomy.”
Finally, transactions costs analyses underline the institutional environments of economic 
reform. Their basic assumption is that well-functioning institutions such as property rights and 
the rules of law reduce transactional costs that tend to increase during economic crisis. “[I]f
For an overview of institutional approach in general, see John L. Campbell and Ove Kaj Pedersen 
(eds.), The Rise o f Neoliberalism and Institutional Analysis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2001). See also Peter A. Hall and Rosemary Taylor, Political Science and the Three New 
Institutionalisms, Political Studies, Vol. 44, No.5 (December 1996); Lisa Martin and Beth Simmons, 
Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions, International Organization, Vol.54, No.4 
(Autumn 1998)
Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufinan (eds.). The Politics o f Economic Adjustment: International 
Constraints, Distributive Conflicts, and the State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Stephan 
Haggard, Jean-Dominique Lafay and Christian Morrisson, Political Feasibility o f Adjustment (OECD, 
1995); Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufinan, The Political Economy o f Democratic Transitions 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995)
Peter B. Evans, The State as Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy, and Structural 
Change, in Haggard and Kaufinan (1992), p.l78. See also Stephan Haggard and Chung-In Moon, 
Institutions and Economic Policy: Theory and a Korean Case Study, World Politics, Vol.42, No.2 
(January 1990); Richard F. Doner, Limits of State Strength: Toward an Institutionalist View of 
Economic Development, World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 3. (April 1992)
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market reforms are carried out within a polity where accountability institutions are weak (or 
even deliberately emasculated to accelerate policy implementation), corruption, collusion, and 
patronage will ensue and promote disastrous economic crises in the medium term.”
However, the effects of corruption are ambivalent. As David Kang shows, transaction costs 
can be reduced even country with weak institutions, “if there is a balance of power among a 
small and stable set of government and business elites.” ®^
With respect to the Asian crisis, there are three kinds of institutional explanations. First, 
Haggard put forward an institutional explanation on the politics of economic reform. In his 
account, political uncertainties were a key concept to explain the variations of economic 
reform in the crisis-affected countries. The sources of the uncertainties include electoral cycles, 
opposition parties, decision-making process and govemment-business relations.
Among them, the most important factor is the decision making process. His argument is 
that democracies -  Korea and Thailand -  were relatively successful in implementing 
economic reform without undermining political stability, while pseudo-democracies (or soft 
authoritarian regimes) -  Malaysia and Indonesia -  experienced political turmoil in carrying 
out economic adjustments policies. The reason is that “democracy benefits from popular 
support, which itself stabilizes expectations, provides the basis for monitoring government and 
private-sector malfeasance, even if imperfectly, and has a crucial self-corrective mechanism, 
in the form elections, through which failing governments can be changed. In Malaysia and 
Indonesia, autocratic leaders did not surrender cronyism and nepotism, which resulted in 
further deterioration. By contrast, Korea and Thailand elected new leaders who committed 
themselves to economic reform.
Luigi Manzetti, Political Manipulations and Market Reforms Failures, World Politics, Vol. 55, No.3 
(April 2003)
^  David C. Kang, Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p.3.
Gordon Paul Means, Soft Authoritarianism in Malaysia ad Singapore, Journal o f Democracy, Vol.7, 
No.4 (1996); William Case, Malaysia's Resilient Pseudodemocracy, Journal o f Democracy, Vol. 12, 
No.l (2001)
“  Stephan Haggard, The Political Economy o f the Asian Financial Crisis (Washington DC.: Institute 
for International Economics, 2000), p.222.
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This explanation accounts well for the relations between regime change and economic 
reform. However, it has difficulties in explaining the variations across cases. There is little 
evidence that authoritarian regimes managed the crisis better than democratic ones, and vice 
versa. In Korea, démocratisation helped the Kim Dae Jung government to overcome 
resistance from big businesses and labour unions. Meanwhile, Mahathir’s authoritarianism 
made it easy for the government to introduce unorthodox policies without significant political 
side effects.
Second, MacIntyre suggests another formal institutional approach. His argument is that 
national political architecture -  shaped by the interaction of the complex of the rules that make 
up the constitutional structure and party system -  was a key determinant in explaining the 
differences in crisis management across the four Southeast Asian countries: Thailand, 
Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines.
His approach begins with veto player analysis. A veto player is defined as an individual or 
collective actor that has the institutionalised power to defeat a proposed law by withholding 
formal approval. “Veto players are specified in a country by the constitution (the president, 
the House, and the Senate in the United States) or by the political system (the different parties 
that are members of a government coalition in Western Europe).” ^  The analysis assumes that 
the more veto players in a decision-making process, the more decision-making authority is 
dispersed. Based on the assumption, he proposes a power concentration paradox: “A national 
political architecture that either severely centralises or severely fragments decision making is 
likely to produce seriously problematic patterns of governance.”
Following the concept, he classifies the crisis-affected countries into three groups. Seen in 
Figure 2-1, Indonesia and Malaysia had one veto player while Thailand and the Philippines
For a comprehensive discussion, see Valerie Bunce, Democratization and Economic Reform, Annual 
Review o f Political Science, Vol.4 (2001). Except the case of post-socialist economic reform, the 
relationship is statistically insignificant in East Asia and Latin America.
^  George Tsebelis, Veto Players (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), p.2.
Andrew MacIntyre, The Power o f Institutions: Political Architecture and Governance (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2003), p.l 1
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had multiple veto players. Although he does not deal with the Korean case, the country was 
not either of the two extremes. ^
This explanation is successful in explaining why Indonesia and Malaysia’s policy 
responses were more politically volatile than the others’. However, its explanatory power is 
confined to the extent of political risks at national level because it does not look at how policy 
preference was formed in each policy areas. In other words, it cannot explain why a specific 
policy was introduced and how it was implemented. As MacIntyre admits, “institutions, by 
themselves, do not cause these policy outcomes...It is the interests and the ideas that lie 
behind them that animate politics.”
[Figure 2-1] Veto Player and Policy Risk 68
Policy risk for investors
Indonesia Thailand
M alaysia
Philippines
(Korea)
Num ber o f  veto players
^  Ibid, p .m .
Andrew Ma 
rganization, 
original diagram does not include Korea.
cIntyre, The Politics of the Economic Crisis in Southeast Asia, International 
O Vol.55, No.l (Winter 2001), p.94. Because he does not look at the Korean case, the
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Finally, for proponents of developmental state theory, the transformative capacity of the 
state is a key variable in explain policy choice and outcomes. For this reason, many 
developmental state theorists attribute the financial crisis to the weakening of state power after 
financial liberalisation. It was financial liberalisation that substantially reduced the ability to 
“adapt to external shocks and pressures by generating ever-new means of governing the 
process of industrial change.”
Natasha Hamilton-Hart extends this concept to crisis management. According to her, 
governing capacity is defined as the government’s ability to implement its declared policy in a 
constant and rule-abiding way. In the financial sector, for example, governing capacity can be 
measured by how much governments “control and influence financial resources through an 
active financial policy, state-owned bank, compulsory saving schemes, or compulsory 
purchases of public debts.”
Based on the definition, Hamilton-Hart divide East Asian countries into two groups.
[T]he national strategies of the high- or moderately high-capacity states of Taiwan, Singapore, 
Hong Kong, Malaysia and Korea show the variety of policy responses that were viable in the post­
crisis environment. They were compelled to react the crisis, but the way each did so reflected 
primarily national priorities. In contrast, the lower-capacity states of Thailand, Indonesia, and 
Philippines were more constrained in their policy choices.
This classification is useful in explaining why Indonesia failed to introduce capital control 
policy while Malaysia successfully implemented. According to her, the Malaysian
Chalmers Johnson, M/77 and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth o f Industrial Policy, 1925-1975 
(Stanford; Stanford University Press, 1982); Alice H, Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and 
Late Industrialization (Oxford University ftess, 1989); Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic 
Theory and Role o f Government in East Asian Industrialization (Princeton University Press, 1990); 
Meredith Woo-Cummings (ed.). The Developmental State (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999) 
Linda Weiss, State Power and the Asian Crisis, New Political Economy, Vol.4, No.3 (1999), p.4. See 
also Linda Weiss, The Myth o f the Powerless State: Governing the Economy in a Global Era 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998)
Natasha Hamilton-Hart, Asian States, Asian Bankers: Central Banking in Southeast Asia (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2002), p.8.
^^/W , pp. 155-56.
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government had intensive capital-account monitoring regimes in place well before the crisis.
In contrast, the Indonesian government had few systems to oversee financial liberalisation. 
Further, Indonesia’s insufficient administrative power explains, to some extent, why Indonesia 
lagged behind Malaysia in terms of financial / corporate reform.
However, Hamilton-Hart’s explanation does not fit into the Korean case. The government 
had power enough to enforce the top five chaebols to accept its business swap plan (the so- 
called Big Deal) even though its state capacity was substantially constrained by the IMF. 
Furthermore, her explanation has difficulties in understanding why Malaysia implemented 
structural reform. According to her assessment, the Malaysia government should reject 
neoliberal reform policies. With the exception of capital controls, however, the government 
followed most elements of IMF-supported programmes. In these respects, the state capacity 
thesis is not successful in explaining the policy convergence and divergence across the 
countries.
3) Ideas-oriented Approaches
Interest-oriented and institution-oriented approaches do not provide a convincing 
explanation of the ‘policy’ convergence between Korea and Malaysia. For this reason, I turn 
to ideas-oriented approaches. Until recently, ideational factors have not been seriously 
considered in the field of mainstream IPE scholars who based their methodologies on 
rationalist institutionalism. Although rational choice theories and institutional approaches 
do not completely ignore the role and influence of ideas, ideas are treated, at best, as a 
mediating or intervening variable. As a result, “an interest in ideas never vanished, but was
It can be said that, compared with Taiwan, Korea’s governing capacity shrunk rapidly after the 
dissolution of the Economic Planning Board in 1994, See Linda Weiss, Developmental States in 
Transition: Adapting, Dismantling, Innovating, not ‘Normalizing’, Pacific Review, Vol. 13, No. 1 
(2000); Elizabeth Thurbon, Two Paths to Financial Liberalization: South Korea and Taiwan, Pacific 
Review, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2001); Hisahiro Kondoh, Policy Networks in South Korea and Taiwan during 
the Democratic Era, Pacific Review, Vol. 15, No.2 (2002); Xiaoke Zhang, Domestic Institutions, 
Liberalization Patterns, and Uneven Crises in Korea and Taiwan, Pacific Review, Vol. 15, No.3 (2002) 
For the theory, see Robert O. Keohane and Helen V. Milner (eds.). Internationalization and Domestic 
Politics (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1996)
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simply sidelined into the bailiwicks o f ‘reflectivists’, neo-Marxists, and other marginal figures 
in the discipline.”
The re-emergence of interest in ideas coincided with a systemic change in the 1990s.
Many scholars raised questions over the explanatory power o f rationalist approaches in 
analysing the end of the Cold War. In addition, some IPE scholars raised questions over 
rationalist and institutionalist approaches because some issues -  such as US strategic trade 
policy -  were not explained by rationalist institutionalism.
The literature can be divided into three approaches: institutionalist, neo-Gramscian and 
constructivist. This classification is distinguished by their methodological foundations and the 
importance each attaches to ideas relative to interests and institutions. On the one hand, 
institutionalists -  rational and historical -  take ideas into consideration to analyse anomalies 
that are not explained by interest-based or institution-based theories. For institutionalists, ideas 
are considered, at best, as a mediating or intervening variable that can complement their 
explanatory power. On the other hand, constructivists regard ideas as an independent variable. 
Ideas are an endogenous factor that is embedded in languages or discourses. They try to 
transcend the positivist or empiricist concept of material- ideational divide to emphasise the 
role of ideational factors. Between them, neo-Gramscians exist. While rejecting the traditional 
Marxist notion of.base-superstructure, they do not exclude the importance of non-ideological 
elements in Marxist class analysis.
John Kurt Jacobsen, Much Ado about Ideas: The Cognitive Factor in Economic Policy, World 
Politics, Vol. 47, No. 2. (January 1995), p.284 
For example, see Jeff Checkel, Ideas, Institutions, and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution, 
World Politics, Vol.45, No.2 (January 1993); Thomas Risse-Kappen, Ideas do not Float Freely: 
Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War, International 
Organization, Vol.48, No.2 (Spring 1994); Mark Kramer, Ideology and the Cold War, Review of 
International Studies, Vol.25, No.4 (October 1999); Margarita H. Petrova, The End of the Cold War: A 
Battle or Bridging Ground Between Rationalist and Ideational Approaches in International Relations?, 
European Journal o f International Relations, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2003)
For example, see Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Institutions, and American Trade Policy, International 
Organization, Vol.42, No.l (Winter 1988); Judith Goldstein, The Impact of Ideas on Trade Policy: The 
Origins of U.S. Agricultural and Manufacturing Policies, International Organization, Vol.43, No.l 
(Winter 1989)
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(1) Institutionalist Approaches
Institutionalist approaches take into consideration the role and influence of ideas only 
when some phenomena are not satisfactorily explained by interest- and institution-based 
models. There are two kinds of institutionalist approaches: rational and historical. Although 
their methodological foundations are different, both treat ideas as an exogenous factor.
Rational institutionalist approach has an assumption that social phenomenon are explained 
by individual actor’s interests. Because actors’ preferences and causal belief are given and 
logically prior to any belief, the role of ideas is limited. It is thus no surprise that many 
rationalists regard ideas as hooks: that is, ideas are merely a tool to legitimise the interests of 
certain group.
Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane relax some of the rationalist premise to incorporate 
the role of ideas into their analytical framework. However, their recognition of ideas does not 
mean that ideas play a central role, because their underlying motivation is to defend the 
rationalist perspective from reflectivist or constructivist attack on their theoretical foundations. 
Their strategy is to employ null hypotheses to reveal the reflectivist’s inability to provide 
empirical evidence.
Ideas are considered only when interest-based explanations encounter empirical anomalies. 
In other words, “from a game-theoretical perspective, ideas may be important precisely 
because unique predictions cannot be generated solely through an examination of interests and 
strategic interactions (utility functions and payoff matrices). Because almost all games with 
repeated play have multiple equilibria, the ideas held by players are often the key to a game’s 
outcome.” Accordingly their focus is on the effects of particular belief shared by large 
number of people on human action, not on the sources of the belief. In the perspective, ideas 
are regarded at best as intervening or meditating variables.
Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds.), Ideas and Foreign Policy: Belief, Institutions and 
Political Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 17.
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Goldstein and Keohane divide ideas into three categories. First, worldviews are an idea 
that defines the universe of possibilities for action. Embedded in the symbolism of a culture, 
worldviews deeply affect modes of thought and discourse. Second, principled beliefs are 
normative ideas that specify criteria for distinguishing right from vyrong and just from unjust. 
Finally, causal beliefs are beliefs about cause-effect relationships that derive authority from 
the shared consensus of recognized elites. These beliefs provide guides for individuals on how 
to achieve their objectives.
Then they provide a causal explanation of how and under what condition ideas function in 
policy-making. “[IJdeas influence policy when the principled or causal beliefs they embody 
provide road maps that increase actors’ clarity about goals or ends-means relationships, when 
they affect outcomes of strategic situations in which there is no unique equilibrium, and when 
they become embedded in political institutions.”
The contribution of rational institutionalism to ideational research programmes is very 
limited, although Goldstein and Keohane’s works played a crucial role in reviving the interest 
in ideas and thus provide a useful reference for debates. Its limitation lies in the fact that 
rational institutionalism is not a theory of ideas but a theory of interests and institutions. As 
Peter Hall points out, their approaches “privilege interests and incorporate ideas into their 
analyses only in relatively restricted roles, allows for a clear causal analysis but tends to miss 
many of the respects in which ideas many influence economic behavior.”
Unlike rational institutionalism, historical institutionalism starts from the assumption that 
the perceived interests of political groups are neither fixed nor given by a set of socio­
economic conditions because they are influenced, to some degree, by how they interpret their 
interests in a historical setting. In this regard, “politics is not only a contest for power. It is 
also a struggle for the interpretation of interests.” Furthermore, Hall acknowledges both 
normative and positive power of ideas. “Ideas are central to politics in two ways. From the 
competing moral visions put forward by contenders for political power, a sense of collective
80 Hall (1997), p. 185.
"V W ,p.l97.
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purpose is forged; and out of the policy proposals generated by intellectuals and officials alike, 
solutions to common problems are devised.”*^
His analyses on the spread of Keynesianism across industrial nations illustrates that ideas 
could be an independent variable when they provide a policy paradigm to politicians. The 
most important factor is not the logic of the paradigm but their function as a catalyst to resolve 
institutional stalemates. According to him, the power of ideas as policy paradigm depends on 
economic viability, political viability and administrative viability. In a similar vein, James 
Walsh argues that ideas are most likely to be implemented if they do not attract high levels of 
opposition from society and if institutional arrangements concentrate authority within the state. 
For example, Thatcher’s monetary policy was successful because there was low societal 
opposition and high concentration of authority.
Kathryn Sikkink applies that approach to the debates on developmental policy in Latin 
American countries. She distinguishes the role of ideas in the process of adoption, 
implementation and consolidation. “The adoption of new models is the result of the ideas of 
top policy makers, who respond to what they perceive as the constraints and opportunities in 
the international and domestic economic situation. Ideas held by powerful individuals are the 
key to understanding the adoption of polices... At the level of the implementation and 
consolidation of developmentalist policies, state institutions and the manner in which ideas are 
embodied in state institutions are more central to the explanation.”
Like rational institutionalism, historical institutionalism introduces ideas to explain 
empirical anomalies. The focus of historical institutionalism is not ideas per se but the 
conditions that turn a particular idea to a policy. In this respect, the main difference between 
them lies in their ontology rather than epistemology. Whereas rationalists look at individual 
actor’s interests, the focus of the institutionalist perspective is on institutional configurations.
Peter A. Hall, Conclusion, in Peter A. Hall, Introduction, in Peter A. Hall (ed.). The Political Power 
ofEconomicIdeas: Keynesianism across Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 389.
James I. Walsh, When do Ideas Matter?: Explaining the Successes and Failures of Thatcherite Ideas, 
Comparative Political Studies, Vol.33, No.4 (May 2000)
^  Kathryn Sikkink, Ideas and institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1991), p.26-27.
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In this regard, it is hard to conclude that historical institutionalism provides a systemic 
analysis of ideas.
In sum, the main criticism of the institutionalist approaches is that it limits the role and 
influence of ideas on the both epistemological and ontological basis. First, their main 
interest is not ideas but interests and institutions. “What matters is not the idea’s intrinsic force 
in a given context but whether the idea reconciles the interests of elites within the institutional 
processes of a state so that a coalition emerges to enact the resulting agenda. The more 
powerful the sponsors, the more powerfiil the ideas. Goldstein went a step further in arguing 
that the ‘power of the idea itself explains its acceptance’, but her trade policy study 
consistently retreated into a political sponsorship argument.”
Second, this ontological basis gives rise to an epistemological problem. The role o f ideas 
is important only if there exist “empirical anomalies that can be resolved only when ideas are 
taken into account.” As a result, it makes it logically impossible for institutional approaches 
to realise the power of ideas a priori. It only concedes the power ex post. At the same time, 
their emphasis on outcomes prohibits institutional approaches from investigating the sources 
of interests. This problem is critical if ideas can have an impact on the formation of actors’ 
preferences and causal belief.
Third, economic ideas are tested at the cognitive and normative levels at the same time.
As Table 2-1 shows that normative implications are as politically significant as cognitive 
implications in legitimising economic ideas and gaining public support.
Jacobsen (1995); Ngaire Woods, Economic Ideas and International Relations: Beyond Rational 
Neglect, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 2 (January 1995); Mark M. Blyth, Any More 
Bright Ideas?: The Ideational Turn of Comparative Political Economy, Comparative Politics, Vol. 29, 
No. 2 (January 1997)
John Kurt Jacobsen, Duelling Constructivisms: A Post-mortem on the Ideas Debate in Mainstream 
ER/IPE, Review o f International Studies, Vol. 29, No. 1 (January 2003), p.48.
Ibid, p.6.
Martha Fiimemore and Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 
International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998)
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[Table 2-1] Types of Ideas and Their Effects on Policy-making 89
Concepts and theories in the foreground of 
the policy debate
Underlying assumptions in the background 
of the policy debate
Cognitive
level
Programs
Ideas as elite policy prescriptions that help 
policy makers to chart a clear and specific 
course of policy action
Paradigms
Ideas as elite assumptions that constrain the 
cognitive range of useful solutions 
available to policy makers
Normative
level
Frames
Ideas as symbols and concepts that help 
policy makers to legitimize policy 
solutions to the public
Public sentiments
Ideas as public assumptions that constrain 
the normative range of legitimate solutions 
available to policy makers
Finally, from a perspective of sociology of knowledge, institutionalist approaches -  
implicitly or explicitly -  prohibit the development of alternative ideational approaches by 
treating ideas as auxiliary hypotheses to solve prior theoretical problems in their own research 
programs, although it contributed to reigniting the interest in ideas. The dominance of 
rationalist institutionalism was not seriously challenged until constructivists produced 
empirical work that provided evidence for their theory. At the same time, neo-Gramscian 
approaches developed by the British and Canadian scholars were largely overlooked in the 
US, with the exception of Robert Cox’s achievements. In any cases, rationalists consider these 
alternatives as “sometimes useful as a supplement” to their own theories.
(2) Neo-Gramscian Approaches
Neo-Gramscian approach put special emphasis on the role of ideas or ideology. Unlike 
traditional Marxists, it tries to transcend a dichotomy of base-superstructure -  i.e., ideas and 
materials -  by introducing the concepts of hegemony and discourse. In doing so, ideas become 
an endogenous -  rather than exogenous -  factor in the approach.
89 John L. Campbell, Institutional Analysis and the Role of Ideas in Political Economy, in Campbell and 
Pedersen (2001), p. 166.
^  Michael C. Desch, Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies, 
International Security, Vol.23, No.l (Summer 1998), p. 142.
Stephen Gill (eds.), Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993); Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton, A Critical Theory Route
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For Gramscians, the power of ideas or ideologies begins with the concept o f hegemony, 
which is defined as the persistence of specific social and economic structures that 
systematically advantage certain groups. Hegemony is maintained and reproduced by 
persuasive power (consent) rather than coercive power (force). In civil society, ideologies 
provide legitimacy through the assertion of moral and intellectual leadership and the 
projection of a particular set of interests as the general interest. The role of ideologies is 
important because the relative autonomy of civil society from economic structures and state 
apparatus open the ideological realm that becomes a key site of political struggles. It is the 
role of ‘organic intellectuals’ to produce ideas and to propagate them. Because civil society 
composed of several social groups, there are two types of intellectuals: one is intellectuals 
serving dominant social forces; another is intellectuals supporting social changes.
Robert Cox develops a neo-Gramscian approach by applying these concepts to IPE. 
According to him, together with material capabilities and institutions, ideas are one of the 
components of a historical bloc. He divides ideas into two categories. One is “intersubjective 
meanings, or those shared notions of the nature of social relations which tend to perpetuate 
habits and expectations of behavior.” The other is “collective images of social order held by 
different groups of people.” The difference between them is that inter-subjective meanings 
are common throughout a historical bloc and cut across social divisions, whereas collective 
images are multiple and represent particular social forces. Thus inter-subjective meanings 
constitute the common ground for social discourses. In contrast, competing collective images 
are a tool of class conflict.
to Hegemony, World Order and Historical Change: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives in International 
Relations, Capital & Class, No.82 (2004) For a general overview of Marxist traditions, see Andrew 
Gamble, Marxism after Communism: Beyond Realism and Historicism, Review o f International Studies, 
Vol.25, No.5 (December 1999)
Peter Ghosh, Gramscian Hegemony: An Absolutely Historicist Approach, History o f European Ideas, 
Vol.27, No.l (2001)
Andreas Bieler, Questioning Cognitivism and Constructivism in IR Theory: Reflections on the 
Material Structure of Ideas, Politics, Vol. 21, No.2 (2001), p.73.
Robert W, Cox, Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory, 
reprinted in Robert W. Cox with Timothy J. Sinclair, Approaches to World Order (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp.98-99.
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Base on this framework, neo-Gramscians analyse how neoliberalism legitimise economic 
globalisation. According to Stephen Gill, neoliberal globalisation and its ideology “serve to 
reify a global economic system by large institutional investors and transnational firms which 
control the bulk of the world’s productive assets and are the principal influences in world 
trade and financial markets.” The network of transnational elites includes the IMF, the US 
Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board, Wall Street, Ivy League universities, think tanks, 
transnational corporations, and the governments of North Atlantic countries.
The discursive formation of neoliberalism proceeds in two ways. First, it asserts that there 
is no alternative to the Washington consensus or neoliberal globalisation. This is employed to 
“justify weaker or lax enforcement of labor laws and regulations on environmental protection 
as well as the elimination of restrictions on trade and capital movements. “ Second, “the 
equation of free competition and free exchange (global capital mobility) with economic 
efficiency, welfare, and democracy, and a myth of virtually unlimited social progress, as 
represented in television advertising and other media, and in World Bank and IMF reports.”
By constructing these discourses, “Disciplinary neoliberalism is institutionalised at the macro­
level of power in the quasi-legal restructuring of state and international political forms...This 
discourse of global economic governance is reflected in the conditionality policies of the 
Bretton Woods organisations, quasi-constitutional regional arrangements such as NAFTA or 
Maastricht, and the multilateral regulatory framework of the new World Trade Organisation. It 
is reflected in the global trend towards independent central banks, with macroeconomic policy 
prioritising the ‘fight against inflation’.”
From this perspective, IMF-supported programmes in the crisis-affected countries involve 
the imposition of Anglo-American model of capitalism on East Asian economies. “Central to
Stephen Gill, Globalisation, Market Civilisation, and Disciplinary Neoliberalism, Millennium, Vol. 
23, No. 3 (1994), p.405.
^  For a sociological analysis on the network, see Leslie Sklair, Social Movements for Global 
Capitalism; The Transnational Capitalist Class in Action, Review o f International Political Economy, 
Vol.4, No.3 (Autumn 1997)
Daniel Egan, The Limits of Internationalization: A Neo-Gramscian Analysis of The Multilateral
Agreement On Investment, Critical Sociology, Vol.27, No.3 (2001), p.79. 
“ Gill (1994), p.406.98
^ /W ,p .412 .
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U.S. strategy is the imposition of a specific neoliberal model of restructuring. In the context of 
recent crises, state-directed and controlled forms of political economy have been, and are 
being, pressured to liberalize.”
Although there are still controversies over the achievements of the so-called ‘Italian 
School’ (including Robert Cox and Stephen Gill), it is hard to deny that the school have 
developed theories of the power of ideas that has been largely ignored by mainstream IPE 
scholars. In their approaches, ideas are “recognised as realities in their own right and thus an 
object of knowledge.” Equally important is that its transnational historical materialism 
contributes to analysing the role of ideas at the international level.
Despite these achievements, neo-Gramscian approaches have some problems. First, the 
neo-Gramscian definition of ideology does not fit easily into the analysis o f global political 
economy. “The flow and power of ideas, Gramsci should have taught us, is nowhere clear and 
unambiguous; and outside of where these ideas are firmly grounded within national social 
formations, their global power must be seen as contingent, open to contestation, and 
malleable.” Second, the link of neoliberalism to transnational networks can be regarded as 
a return to traditional Marxist dichotomy of base-superstructure. In Gill’s definition of 
disciplinary neoliberalism, there is little room for relative autonomy of ideology -  or 
independent influence of ideas.
Stephen Gill, The Geopolitics of the Asian Crisis, Monthly Review, VoL50, No. 10 (1999)
Stephen Gill, Epistemology, Ontology and the ‘Italian School’, in Gill (1993), p.26,
Randall D. Germain and Michael Kenny, Engaging Gramsci: International Relations Theory and the 
New Gramscians, Review o f International Studies, Vol.24, No.l (January 1998), p.l9. See also Craig N. 
Murphy, Understanding IR: Understanding Gramsci, Review o f International Studies, Vol.24, No.3 
(July 1998); Mark Rupert, Re-engaging Gramsci: A Response to Germain and Kenny, Review o f 
International Studies, Vol.24, No.3 (July 1998)
Marieke De Goede, Beyond Economism in International Political Economy, Review o f International 
Studies, Vol.29, No.l (2003), pp.89-90.
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(3) Constructivist Approaches
Although there are variants of constructivist approaches in IR, most constructivists are 
based on post-structuralist or post-modern methodology. First, constructivists are opposed 
to epistemological positivism that fails to take account of the role of discourses or languages. 
“What counts as a socially meaningful object or event is always the result of an interpretive 
construction of the world out there... Our interpretations are based on a shared system of 
codes and symbols, o f languages, life-worlds, social practices. The knowledge of reality is 
socially constructed.” Second, most constructivists criticise ontological individualism in 
that the evolution and transformation of discourses or languages are inter-subjective. “They 
exist in the shared meanings of their users and are reproduced through their practices. These 
practices, in turn, are patterned by the rules embodied in the language. In order to avoid 
individualist reductionism, structural change cannot be conceived as being the simple 
aggregation of individual action, but must be conceived as the open reproduction of 
intersubjective practices following rules on their own.”
With respect to the role of ideas in policy-making, there are two kinds of constructivist 
approaches: epistemic communities and discursive analysis. In the first place, the epistemic 
communities approach stresses the role of special or technical knowledge. According to Peter 
Hass, “An epistemic community is a network of professionals with recognized expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge
For a comprehensive overview, see John G. Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo­
utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge, International Organization, Vol.52, No.4 (1998); 
Emanuel Adler, Constructivism and International Relations, in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and 
Beth A. Simmons (eds.). Handbook o f International Relations (London: Sage, 2002). Although 
Alexander Wendt is one of the pioneers of constructivism, I do not include Wendt’s works -  especially 
Social Theory o f International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) -  because his 
methodology is half-constructivist. As his critics point out, he bases his theory on positivist 
epistemology and post-positivist ontology. This criticism arises from the fact that his intention is to 
bridge between rationalists and reflectivists. For the debate, see Steve Smith, Wendt’s World; Robert 
Keohane, Ideas Part-Way Down; and Alexander Wendt, On the Via Media: A Response to the Critics, 
Review o f International Studies, Vol.26, No.l (January 2000) Cf. Ted Hopf, The Promise of 
Constructivism in International Relations Theory, International Security, Vol. 23, No.l (Summer 1998) 
Stefano Guzzini, A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations, European Journal 
o f International Relations, Vol. 6, No.2 (2000), pp. 159-160.
'°^/W,p.l64.
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within that domain or issue-area.” The influence of epistemic communities on policy­
making is made by communicative actions. “Epistemic communities can help define the self- 
interest of a state or factions within it. The process of elucidating the cause-and effect 
relationships of problems can in fact lead to the redefinition of preconceived interests or to the 
identification of new interests.”
This approach is epistemologically constructivist in that it accepts the concept of inter­
subjectivity. Reality is socially constructed; ideas inform policies; actors’ understanding of the 
world and the formulation of alternative actions are shaped by belief systems, operational 
codes, and cognitive maps. In terms of ontology, however, it is not free from positivist or 
empiricist legacies. The reservation over inter-subjectivity prevents them from recognising the 
power of languages or words. In this respect, Peter Hass and Emanuel Alder argue, “learning 
may occur through reflection on empirical events rather than through their representation.” 
One good example is Richard Cockett’s analysis of the role of monetarists in the 
formation of Thatcherism. The analysis shows that several economists under the 
intellectual leadership of Friedrich von Hayek developed and propagated neoliberal economic 
ideas. In the UK, the Institute for Economic Affairs (lEA) was at the heart of their intellectual 
networks. The lEA was also closely linked to American and European economists via Mont 
Pelerin Society, whose member included Milton Friedman and George Stigler.
In a similar vein, compliance theories also assume that economic ideas are diffused or 
transferred by social learning: “a process whereby agent interests and identities are shaped 
through and during interaction”.^ ^^  In the process, argumentative persuasion can change policy 
preference through debate in the absence of coercion. The existence of epistemic communities 
is also important because “Learning can take the form of simple copying of ideas or solutions.
Peter M. Hass, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, 
International Organization, Vol.46, No.l (Winter 1992), p.4.
'°*/Z)/J,p.l4.
'°^/W,p.371.
Richard Cockett, Thinking the Unthinkable: Think-Tanks and the Economic Counter-Revolution, 
1931-1983 (London: HarperCollins, 1993)
Jeffrey T. Checkel, wiiy Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change, International 
Organization, Vol.55, No.3 (Summer 2001), p.516.
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or more sophisticated adaptation of ideas to the particular problem in focus.” Among 
others, international organisations, international negotiations and international conference are 
major arena for social learning.
The epistemic communities approach has many limitations. Its empiricist tendency 
regards technical or instrumental knowledge as given, making it impossible for them to raise a 
question of how the knowledge is constructed. In addition, the impact of ideas is confined to 
self-contained groups of specialists, experts or top policy makers. There are not many issue 
areas on which allow technical advices to exert crucial influence. This is why the existing 
literature is confined, largely, to environmental, research and development (R & D) and 
nuclear policies. Finally, the approach is not clear about whether ideas per se or experts 
affect policies. In this regard, it can be criticised that “the causal effects of ideas on policies 
are displaced onto the political effects of experts.”
Unlike the epistemic communities approach, which looks at the power of technical or 
special knowledge, the discursive analysis puts emphasis on the linguistic construction of 
subjects. “Discourse is a system of meaning that orders the production of conceptions and 
interpretations of the social world in a particular context. In this view, ideas are always 
embedded in discourses and become meaningful only by being interpreted as part of a 
particular discursive system of meaning.”
Discursive practices generate narrative structures that constitute the social meaning of 
politics and economics. The socially-constructed meanings have an impact on decision­
making.
"^Arild Underdal, Explaining Compliance and Defection: Three Models, European Journal o f 
International Relations, Vol.4, No.l (1998), p.21.
De Goede (2003), pp.86-87.
Albert S. Yee, The Causal Effects of Ideas on Policies, International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 1. 
(Winter 1996), p.86.
Peter Kjaer and Ove K. Pedersen, Translating Liberalisation: Neoliberalism in the Danish Negotiated 
Economy, in Campbell and Pedersen (2001), p.220.
Jennifer Milliken, The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and
Methods, European Journal o f International Relations, Vol. 5, No.2 (1999)
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As a set of ideas, discourse offers both cognitive arguments about the logic and necessity of a 
particular policy programme and normative arguments about its appropriateness. As an interactive 
process, discourse involves both a coordinative discourse among key policy actors focused on 
constructing a policy programme and a communicative discourse between political actors and the 
public focused on informing and deliberating about such a programme.
In this process, ideational power converts into material power. As a result, “struggles about 
meaning are struggles about power.”
The primary contribution of constructivism lies in its role in flourishing ideational 
research programmes in the field of international relations and international political economy. 
“Whereas realism and liberalism tend to focus on material factors such as power or trade, 
constructivist approaches emphasize the impact of ideas... They pay close attention to the 
prevailing discourse(s) in society because discourse reflects and shapes beliefs and interests, 
and establishes accepted norm of behaviour.” It regards ideas as an independent variable by 
emphasising the role of epistemic communities and discourses.
The main criticism of constructivists is the underdevelopment of empirical studies to test 
their theories. This criticism can be applied to extreme versions of constructivism 
supposing that causality is hardly a testable concept. “Postmodern analyses usually regard a 
causal focus as misdirected because in a world of ambiguity, indeterminacy, and multiplicity, 
causal connections are unstable, impermanent, and obscure.” However, conventional 
constructivists do not agree to the proposition. In this sense, the criticism is due, in part, to the 
misunderstanding of constructivist methodology. “Some ideational factors simply do not
Vivien A. Schmidt, How, Where and When does Discourse Matter in Small States’ Welfare State 
Adjustment?, New Political Economy, Vol. 8, No. 1 (2003), p. 134.
John Kurt Jacobsen, Duelling Constructivisms: A Post-mortem on the Ideas Debate in Mainstream 
IR/IPE, Review o f International Studies, Vol. 29, No.l (January 2003), p.48. Cf. Jutta Weldes, 
Constructing National Interests: The United States and The Cuban Missile Crisis (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1999)
Stephen M. Walt, International Relations: One World, Many Theories, Foreign Policy, No.l 10 
(Spring 1998), pp.40-41.
Ronen Palan, A World of Their Making: An Evaluation of the Constructivist Critique in 
International Relations, Review o f International Studies, Vol. 26, No.4 (October 2000)
Yee (1996), p. 102.
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function causally in the same way as brute facts or the agentive role that neo-utilitarianism 
attributes to interests. As a result, the efficacy of such ideational factors is easily 
underestimated.” In other words, it would be illogical to assess constructivist analyses only 
in the prism of positivism or empiricism.
Another problem is that discursive analysis has a danger of over-emphasising the 
importance of political rhetoric and underestimating the role of interests and institutions. For 
example, Vivien Schmidt defines the vehicles of discourses as politicians’ speeches, party 
platforms, government pronouncements, opposition positions, public debates, and media 
commentary. In many cases, it is very difficult to draw on meaningful implications from 
politicians’ addresses and official documents because they tend to reiterate moral causes of 
their actions without revealing their interests or motivations.
For example, Linda Lim argues that “Asian economic success is the product simply of the 
application of orthodox Western text book economic principles -  external ‘openness’ to trade 
and foreign investment on the one hand, and domestic ‘good government’ with small, 
balanced, or surplus government budgets and conservative monetary policy leading to low 
inflation and high saving rates, on the other.” Discursive analyses of official addresses and 
documents might provide some evidence in support of her argument, because few policy 
makers and politicians do not endorse protectionism and state intervention at least in public. 
However, institutional- and interest- oriented approaches can successfully reject the claim by 
showing that their economic system was not an application of Western orthodoxy in many 
aspects: for example, extensive state intervention in the financial and corporate sectors. For 
this reason, discursive analysis can be meaningful only after examining whether their rhetoric 
is consistent with their real behaviour. In this respect, ideational approaches should be 
accompanied by interest- and institution- oriented analyses.
Ruggie (1998), p.869.
Vivien A. Schmidt, Does Discourse Matter in the Politics of Welfare State Adjustment?, 
Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 35, No. 2 (2002), p. 169.
Linda Y.C. Lim, Whose Model Failed? Implication of the Asian Economic Crisis, Washington
Quarterly, Vol,20, No.3 (Summer 1998), p.25.
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3. An Ideational Explanation of Policy Change
Each of these explanations provides some insights. Institutional approaches show that 
economic ideas can be a causal factor in building, consolidating and maintaining institutions. 
Neo-Gramscian approaches demonstrate that the formulation of class interests at both national 
and international level is constrained by economic ideas. And constructivist approaches 
develop key concepts -  discursive practices, social learning and epistemic communities -  that 
are useful in comprehending how economic ideas affect interests and institutions. But none of 
them alone can answer the research question of this thesis because they do not specify under 
what condition and how much economic ideas affect policy change. For this reason, I 
synthesise the three approaches to draw an explanatory framework.
The starting point is to define under what condition economic ideas matters. All the three 
approaches agree that economic crises increase the significance of economic ideas. However, 
not all crises generate an ideational shift. In other words, economic crisis is a necessary 
condition for economic reform. For this reason, Wesley Widmaier makes a distinction 
between material and ideational crisis. What is important is not whether an economic crisis 
takes place but the crisis ignites theoretical and policy debates over economic models (or 
systems).
[CJrises are defined as events that agents interpret as undermining not material relations, but rather 
some set of shared understandings... As a form of practice, the social construction of crises 
specifically involves efforts to fix or to define events as the temporal beginnings of some ‘crises’ at 
certain initial points in ways that run counter to some set of views. The successful reframing of a 
policy problem can then legitimate new intersubjective frameworks and the provision of 
governance for revised purposes in the reversal of the pre-crisis state. Over time, the successive
Javier Corrales, Do Economic Crises Contribute to Economic Reform? Argentina and Venezuela 
in the 1990s, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 112, No. 4. (Winter 1997-1998); Allan Drazen and 
William Easterly, Do Crises Induce Reform?: Simple Empirical Tests of Conventional Wisdom, 
Economics and Politics, Vol.13, No.2 (July 2001)
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construction of particular types of crises can gradually transform state and societal interests, 
engendering the institutionalisation of new self-fulfilling prophecies regarding behaviour.
In a similar vein, Mark Blyth introduces a concept of ‘Knightian uncertainty’, where 
contemporary agents know neither what their interests actually are nor how to realise them. 
Under the uncertainty, economic ideas can become an endogenous factor. First, economic 
ideas reduce uncertainty by helping policy makers to interpret the causes and consequences of 
economic crises or policy failures. Second, economic ideas enable political parties to co­
operate by redefining the perception of existing political costs and benefits regarding 
alternative course of action. Third, economic ideas may be effective in transforming existing 
institutions by de-legitimising the existing political and economic institutions in the struggle 
over existing institutions. Fourth, following the de-legitimation of existing institutions, new 
economic ideas help to construct the form and content of the institutions that should be 
designed to resolve a given economic msis. Finally, such economic ideas are institutionalised 
over time by generating conventions that result in institutional coordination of agents’ 
expectations.
The political power of economic ideas is wielded through two mechanisms. First, 
discursive practices generate narrative structures that construct the social meaning of 
economic policies. The socially-constructed meanings affect decision-making through 
theoretical and policy debates. Second, social learning is an important process that causes 
policy preferences. For example, compliance with international standards or “best practice” 
helps politicians and policy makers to legitimise the economic ideas. This point is very
Wesley W. Widmaier, Constructing Monetary Crises: New Keynesian Understandings and Monetary 
Cooperation in the 1990s, Review o f International Studies, Vol.29, No.l (January 2003), p.65. See also 
Collin Hay, The “Crisis” of Keynesianism and the Rise of Neoliberalism in Britain: An Ideational 
Approach, in Campbell and Pedersen (2001)
Mark Blyth, Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth 
Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 10.
'^^/W,pp.37-41.
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instructive in analysing the role of economic ideas in developing countries that have been 
often importers- rather than exporters -  of economic ideas.
Figure 2-2 summarises the conditions, mechanisms and functions of economic ideas in 
policy change.
[Figure 2-2] An Ideational Model of Policy Change
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This model provides the theoretical basis for an ideational explanation of policy 
convergence, because policy convergence is a particular kind of policy change that increases 
similarity or uniformity. According to Collin Bennett, ‘policy’ convergence takes place 
through four processes: emulation, elite networking and policy communities, harmonisation 
through international regimes, and penetration by external actors and interests.
There are few case studies on developing countries. Some exceptions are Kathryn Sikkink, Ideas and 
institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); Anil 
Hira, Ideas and Economic Policy in Latin America: Regional, National and Organizational Case 
Studies (Westport: Praeger, 1998); Hilary Appel, The Ideological Determinants of Liberal Economic 
Reform: The Case of Privatization, World Politics, Vol.52, No.4 (July 2000)
Colin J. Bennett, What Is Policy Convergence and What Causes It?, British Journal o f Political 
Science, Vol. 21, No. 2. (April 1991)
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Ideas play a crucial role in the processes except penetration. First, policy ideas inspire 
policy emulation (or transfer) by providing benchmarks. To solve a problem, a government 
can copy a policy that is successful in managing the same problem in other countries. Second, 
networking in epistemic communities is a channel of policy transfer. Policy makers can 
import new policy ideas that are learned from international conferences and seminars. For 
policy makers in developing and transition economies, international gatherings provide a good 
opportunity to exchange their experiences and to get advice from world-class experts. Finally, 
international regimes play a crucial role in policy convergence by leading countries to comply 
with international agreements, conventions and accords. This policy harmonisation is 
legitimised in the name of global standards or best practices. Even though some of clauses in 
international agreements are not in their interests, governments do not reject (or at least 
pretend to follow) them. The reason is that “government face reputational consequences that 
cast doubt on their approach to the economy and potentially the legitimacy of their 
governance.”’^ '
The concept of confidence game clearly explains how these ideational factors affect 
economic policy.
Market confidence is then an intersubjective construction that has a tenuous relationship to market 
fundamentals but does not have any precise, calculus metric... Market behaviour therefore rests on 
the coordination of agent’s expectations through the maintenance of conventions. So long as such 
intersubjectively held conventions regarding the economy are adhered to, then the economy will 
perform within the parameters of the expected “conventional judgement”.
Figure 2-3 summarises an ideational explanation of how different policies converge to a 
policy. It should be noted that policy convergence does not always mean that policy B (or A)
Beth A. Simmons and Zachary Elkins, The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the 
International Political Economy, American Political Science Review, Vol. 98, No.l (February 2004), 
p.173.
Mark Blyth, The Political Power of Financial Ideas: Transparency, Risk and Distribution in Global 
Finance, in Jonathan Kirshner (ed.). Monetary Orders: Ambiguous Economics, Ubiquitous Politics 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), p.257.
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is replaced with policy A’ (or B’); and it is difficult to distinguish the three processes in real 
policy-making because they are intertwined.
[Figure 2-3] An Ideational Model of Policy Convergence
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4. Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the existing literature on the politics of the East Asian financial 
crisis. Because interest-oriented and institution-oriented approaches do not provide a 
convincing explanation of the policy convergence between Korea and Malaysia, I have turned 
to ideas-oriented approaches: institutional, neo-Gramscian and constructivist.
The common assumptions of ideational approaches are: (1) economic ideas can be a 
causal factor when a new problem or policy failures that are not clearly understood take place; 
(2) discursive practices and social learning play a crucial role in the diffusion of economic 
ideas; and (3) economic ideas can re-define interests and change institutional settings.
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It should be noted that discursive practices and social learning are an inter-subjective 
process. In other words, ideas are not merely diffused but translated. As Blyth points out, 
“Translation is a process whereby concepts and conceptions from different social contexts 
come into contact with each other and trigger a shift in the existing order of interpretation and 
action in a particular world.” In a similar vein, Sikkink argues that “The same ideas do not 
take on the same meanings in all settings. Meanings emerge through a process of 
interpretation, in which certain actors play a more privileged role as interpreters”. To 
understand the settings, it is necessary to note that “the meaning and acceptance of new ideas 
derive not only from the content but also from; (1) powerful symbolic issues; (2) the nature of 
the political and ideological context into which ideas they are introduced; (3) the nature of 
who interprets or carries the ideas.”’^ ^
To assess the political power of economic ideas in different socio-political environments, I 
deduct four operational hypotheses from the existing ideational approaches.
1) The political power o f economic ideas is likely to increase i f  external agencies support 
the ideas.
This hypothesis is designed to test to what extent the IFIs affected the political power of 
the Washington consensus. The international financial institutions import their policy 
preferences in two ways: by attaching policy conditionality to their financial assistance and by 
dispersing them by discourse practices. International organisations including the IMF and 
World Bank have its own research departments that Robert Wade calls the ‘controllers of 
ideas’. Think thanks such as Institute for International Economics (HE), Brookings 
Institution, American Enterprise Institute (AEI) in US and Institute o f Economic Affairs (lEA)
Kjaer and Pedersen (2001), p.219.
Kathryn Sikkink, Ideas and institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1991), p.254.
Ibid, p.252.
Robert H. Wade, US Hegemony and the World Bank: The Fight over People and Ideas, Review o f 
International Political Economy, Vol.9, No.2 (Summer 2002), p.220.
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in UK also affect policy-making. Their modus operandi includes publishing reports and 
journals, hosting conferences and seminars and using the media (i.e., contributing articles and 
giving interviews). These discourse practices have a constraining impact on economic policy­
making through various mechanisms. Their analyses affect major powers’ foreign economic 
policy, investment banks’ portfolio and credit rating agencies’ assessments. In developing 
countries, policy makers and economists learn economic ideas when training at academic 
institutions, working at international organisations and participating in bi- or multi-lateral 
negotiations.
2) The political power o f economic ideas is likely to increase i f  big business supports the 
ideas.
This hypothesis is designed to evaluate the impact of big business on the political power 
of the Washington consensus. Big business has financial and organisational resources to 
promote its policy preferences through various political activities: for example, raising 
political funds, providing information and building constituency. Big business does not 
only buy policy by contributing political donations but also provide information to 
policymakers to project its policy preferences to policy-making process. An Information 
strategy includes reporting research and survey results, commissioning research projects, 
testifying as expert witnesses and in hearings, and supplying decision makers with position 
papers or technical reports. To this end, business associations and conglomerates own or fund 
think tanks and media that promote pro-business policy agendas. For example, umbrella 
organisation -  the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI) -  has the Korea Economic Research
For the US case, see Andrew Rich and R. Kent Weaver, Think Tanks in the U.S. Media, 
Vress/Politics, Vol.5, No.4 (2000)
Wendy L. Hansen and Neil J. Mitchell, Disaggregating and Explaining Corporate Political Activity: 
Domestic and Foreign Corporations in National Politics, American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, 
No. 4. (December 2000)
John M. De Figueiredo, Lobbying and Information in Politics, Business and Politics, Vol. 4, No. 2 
(2002) See also Susan K. Sell and Aseem Prakash, Using Ideas Strategically: The Contest Between 
Business and NGO Networks in Intellectual Property Rights, International Studies Quarterly, Vol.48, 
No.l (2004)
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Institute and top four Korean chaebols -  Samsung, Hyundai, Daewoo and LG -  have its own
economic research centres.
3) The political power o f economic ideas is likely to be greater i f  top policy makers -  
particularly finance minister and central banker -  support the ideas.
This hypothesis is to assess the role of policy makers in introducing and implementing the 
Washington consensus. Ideological orientations of technocrats are an important factor in 
policy-making. This is more important in the East Asian NICs where policy makers have 
embedded autonomy. Highly selective meritocratic procedure and recruitment and long-term 
career compensations enable policy makers to deliver collective goods without becoming 
captive to vested interests. Policy makers use government-affiliated institutions to promote 
the economic ideas that they support. In Korea, for example, the Korea Development Institute 
(KDI) has played a key role in economic policy-making since the early 1970s. In Malaysia, 
although not controlled by the government, the Institute of Strategic and International Studies 
(ISIS) and the Malaysian Institute of Economic Research (MIER) are well connected to key 
policy makers in finance ministry and the central bank.
4) The political power o f economic ideas is likely to be greater in democratic regimes than 
authoritarian regimes.
The role of business associations in the developing world, see Mick Moore and Ladi Hamalai, 
Economic Liberalisation, Political Pluralism and Business Associations in Developing Countries, World 
Development, Vol.21, No.l2 (December 1993); John Lucas, The Politics of Business Associations in 
the Developing World, Journal o f Developing Areas, Vol.32, No.l (1997); Richard E, Doner and Ben 
R. Schneider, Business Associations and Economic Development: Why Some Associations Contribute 
More than Others, Business and Politics, Vol.2, No.3 (December 2000); Paola Perez-Aleman, A 
Learning-centered View of Business Associations: Building Business—Government Relations for 
Development, Business and Politics, Vol.5, No.2 (August 2003)
Stephan Haggard, The Politics of Adjustment: Lessons from the IMF's Extended Fund Facility, 
International Organization, Vol. 39, No. 3 (Summer 1985), p.531-32.
Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995)
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This hypothesis is intended to examine how much regime types affect the political power 
of the Washington consensus. The impact of regime types on policy debates draws much 
attention as many developing and transition economies shifted from authoritarian regimes to 
democratic ones. Although there is no conclusive evidence, an emerging consensus is that 
democracy encourages policy debates more than authoritarianism. The logic is as follows. 
In democratic regimes, policy debates tend to give rise to a political controversy because 
elections intensify the polarisation of economic ideas among political parties or vested interest 
groups. High possibility of regime change increases the political significance of economic 
ideas. In authoritarian regimes, policy debates are confined to elite factions because opposition 
to the incumbents’ policies face significant sanctions. In addition, elections under 
authoritarian rulers are less relevant for policy-making because there is very little possibility 
of regime change.
In the next part, I test these hypotheses against the cases of Korea and Malaysia, which 
examines the role and influence of economic ideas in the process of crisis management. In 
doing so, I show how economic ideas bring about policy convergence between the two 
countries in four policy areas: macroeconomic adjustment, financial reform, corporate reform, 
and social and labour policy.
Karen L. Remmer, Democracy and Economic Crisis: The Latin American Experience, World 
Politics, Vol. 42, No.3 (April 1990); Peter A. Gourevitch, Democracy and Economic Policy: Elective 
Affinities and Circumstantial Conjunctures, World Development, Vol.21, No.8 (August 1993); John 
Williamson, Democracy and the “Washington Consensus”, World Development, Vol.21, No.8 (August
1993); Hilton L. Root, What Democracy can do for East Asia, Journal o f Democracy, Vol. 13, No.l 
(January 2002)
Geoffrey Garrett and Peter Lange, Internationalization, Institutions and Political Change, 
International Organization, Vol.49, No.4 (Fall 1995), pp.641-43; Stephan Haggard, Inflation and 
Stabilization, in Gerald M. Meier (ed.). Politics and Policy Making in Developing Countries: 
Perspectives on the New Political Economy (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1991), pp.238-39.
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Chapter III
The Political Power of the Washington Consensus:
A Historical Bacl^round
1. Introduction
This chapter aims to explain the political power of the Washington consensus in a 
historical perspective. In the 1990s, the influence of the consensus steadily increased in the 
developing world. After a series of debt crises, the consensus was introduced in many Latin 
American countries by international financial institutions’ policy conditionality. In East Asia, 
policy makers cautiously embraced neoliberal policies including financial liberalisation.
The East Asian financial crisis opened a window of opportunity for the Washington 
consensus. By attributing the primary cause of the crisis to domestic weaknesses in the 
financial and corporate sectors, the consensus effectively de-legitimised the East Asian 
development model. In such circumstances, liberal policy makers and economists were given 
more scope to push ahead with neoliberal economic policies. In the latter stage of the crisis, 
however, the political power of the consensus decreased as the negative effects of the 
consensus on growth and equality gave rise to political and social instabilities.
This chapter begins with an explanation of the rise of the Washington consensus from an 
ideational perspective that highlights the mechanism of discursive practices and social 
learning. Then it discusses how the consensus prevailed in the theoretical and policy debates 
on the causes and consequences of the financial crisis. I then analyse how the negative side 
effects of the consensus contributed to decreasing its political power and the emergence of the 
post-Washington consensus. Finally, the two ideas are compared in the context of the post­
crisis economic adjustment.
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2. Ideological Shift from Keynesianism to Neoliberalism in Industrial Countries
The emergence of neoliberalism in industrial countries had an enormous impact on the 
development of the Washington consensus. Neoliberalism provided theoretical foundations 
for the consensus that were effective in criticising the Keynesian consensus -  inward-looking 
development and active state intervention. More importantly, the revival of the US and 
British economies under Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher and the collapse of 
communism helped the international financial institutions including the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund to convince developing and transition countries to accept the 
consensus.
The core principles o f neoliberalism are: (1) securing macroeconomic stability by low 
inflation and small fiscal deficits; (2) opening their economy to international competition by 
trade and capital account liberalisation; and (3) liberalising their markets through deregulation 
and privatisation.
In terms of macroeconomic policy, neoliberalism bases itself on monetarism.*^’ Until the 
late 1960s, the predominant macroeconomic policy framework in most industrial countries was 
Keynesianism. In the framework, top priority is given to full employment on the ground that it 
brings both economic growth and socio-political stability. To reduce unemployment, 
Keynesians support active policy instruments including fiscal deficits and redistributive taxes. 
The success of Keynesianism underpinned the post-World War ‘embedded hberalism’. 
Monetarists led by Milton Friedman challenged the Keynesian orthodoxy by criticising that 
fiscal stimulus policies made economic equilibrium unstable and caused chronic inflation. For 
this reason, they put special emphasis on price stability rather than full employment. In the
H. W. Singer, Editorial: The Golden Age of the Keynesian Consensus -  The Pendulum Swing Back, 
World Development, Vol.25, No.3 (March 1997)
Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, The Commanding Heights: the Battle between Government and 
the Marketplace that is Remaking the Modern World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998)
Gérard Duménil and Dominique Lévy, Costs and Benefits of Neoliberalism: A Class Analysis, 
Review o f International Political Economy, Vol. 8, No.4 (Winter 2001)
For the concept, see John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: 
Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2 
(Spring 1982)
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1970s, monetarism became popular among policy makers as well as academic economists 
who sought for solutions to solve stagflation. Although the theory was refuted in academic 
debates, some of its policy ideas such as control of monetary aggregates and independence of 
central bank were widely accepted in many industrial countries.
With regard to foreign economic policy, monetarists do not agree with Keynesians either. 
Basically, Keynesians are sceptical over the efficiency of financial markets -  both domestic 
and international -  because they think that financial transactions are affected by psychological 
factors -  such herding behaviour -  as well as economic calculation. For this reason, Keynes -  
as one of the founding fathers of the Bretton Woods system -  supported national 
governments’ right to impose restrictions on capital flows. In contrast, neoliberal 
economists argue against capital controls on the basis that market mechanisms allocate 
financial resources effectively. Milton Friedman also made a case for free floating regime, 
believing that the Bretton Wood system -  a dollar-pegged regime -  distorted free capital 
transactions.
When it comes to structural reform, “Monetarists generally favor free market pohcies.” 
The core of their policy ideas is to reduce the role of government in the economy through 
liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation. These policy ideas were popularised by Friedrich
Friedman’s policy ideas is summarised in Milton Friedman, The Role of Monetary Policy, American 
Economic Review, Vol.58, No.l (March 1968). For their impact on policy-making over the past decades, 
see Andrew F. Brimmer, The Political Economy of Money: Evolution and Impact of Monetarism in the 
Federal Reserve System, American Economic Review, Vol. 62, No. 1/2. (1972); David Laidler, 
Monetarism: An Interpretation and an Assessment, Economic Journal, Vol.91, No.361 (March 1981); J. 
Bradford De Long, The Triumph of Monetarism?, Journal o f Economic Perspectives, Vol. 14, No.l 
(Winter 2000)
Eric Helleiner, States and the Re-emergence o f Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994); Jonathan Kirshner, Keynes, Capital Mobility and the Crisis of 
Embedded Liberalism, Review o f International Political Economy, Vol.6, No.3 (Autumn 1999); André 
Cartapanis and Michel Herland, The Reconstruction of the International Financial Architecture:
Keynes’ Revenge?, Review o f International Political Economy, Vol. 9, No.2 (Summer 2002)
Milton Friedman, The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates, in Milton Friedman, Essays in Positive 
Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953). However, not all monetarists support free 
floating regimes.
Thomas Mayer and Patrick Minford, Monetarism: A Retrospective, World Economics, Vol. 5, No.2 
(April-June 2004), p. 171.
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von Hayek and Milton Friedman that attacked the costs of state intervention in socialist 
economies.
Anne Krueger elaborated on the theoretical grounds for neoliberal reform. According to 
her, government is defined as a multitude of actors, who are concerned with their self-interests 
as well as public ones. This pluralist definition of government implies that decision-makers do 
not always behave as a benevolent social guardian. “Even when it appears that government 
action would actually be effective, there is something of a presumption in favour of policies 
and programmes requiring a minimum of administrative and bureaucratic input.” Put 
simply, the less the state intervenes, the better markets work.
Based on the definition, Krueger criticises three fallacies of the Keynesian concept of 
govemment.*^^ First, the problem of imperfect information is not confined to market actors. 
Like individual firms, government cannot free itself from the information asymmetry since it 
is impossible to forecast the future performance of all economic actors. Thus state intervention 
is not costless. Second, the capture theory by George Stigler shows that public regulators tend 
to serve the interests of the regulated to secure their own self-interests such as promotion and 
rewards. In particular, this kind of capture, like an iron triangle, lasts as long as bureaucrats 
benefit from regulation. Thirdly, Mancur Olson’s collective action dilemma occurs when 
small but powerful interest groups lobby to influence decision-making process without 
considering public interests.
From the late 1980s, the influence of neoliberalism spread from the policy-making circles 
in industrial countries to their counterparts in developing and transition economies. The IMF 
and World Bank played a key role in die policy diffusion. The Bretton Woods institutions 
demand member states to follow their policy guidelines in order to avail itself of financial
Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944); Milton and 
Rose Friedman, Free to Choose: A Personal Statement (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1980)
Anne O. Krueger, Government Failures in Development, Journal o f Economic Perspective, Vol.4, 
No.3 (Summer 1990), p.20.
Anne O. Krueger, Economists’ Changing Perceptions of Government, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 
Vol. 126 (1990)
Thomas J. Biersteker, Reducing the Role of the State in the Economy: A Conceptual Exploration of 
IMF and World Bank Prescriptions, International Studies Quarterly, Vol.34, No.4 (December 1990)
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assistance from them. Initially, policy conditionality was concerned with macroeconomic 
policy because most balance-of-payments crises were caused by large fiscal deficits.
However, macroeconomic stabilisation programmes were not successful so that the IFIs 
turned their attention to structural weaknesses in the developing world.
Ideational factors contributed to the spread of the Washington consensus. First, there
were epistemic communities that helped the transfer of the new economic ideas at an 
international level. One of the best examples is the “Chicago Boys” in Chile. As one of the 
US aid programmes, American economists selected by the economics department of Chicago 
University were dispatched to train Chilean students. Initially the Chicago faculty contacted 
National University of Chile (NUC), but the programme was awarded to Catholic University 
in 1953. The reason is that the NUC faculty were dominated by structuralists -  or followers of 
Raul Prebisch -  of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean did not 
want to follow Chicago-style curriculum. As a result, the Chilean protégés of Chicago 
economists led by Friedrich von Hayek, George Stigler, Milton Friedman and Arnold 
Harberger imported their mentors’ doctrines; market-oriented development, monetarism and 
rationality in economic policy. Until Augusto Pinochet’s military coup in 1973, however, the 
Chicago Boys did not have a significant influence in economic policy-making, even though 
they were linked to the business community. In the 1970s when monetarists succeeded in 
challenging Keynesianism in the US academic world, Pinochet gave the Chicago Boys a good 
opportunity to convert their ideas into economic policies. With the exception o f foreign 
exchange rate policy, they implemented key neoliberal policies: austere macroeconomic 
stance, trade liberalisation and privatisation.
Jacques J. Polak, The Changing Nature of IMF Conditionality, Essays in International Finance,
No. 184 (International Financial Section, Department of Economics, Princeton University, 1991) 
Stephan Haggard and Steven B, Webb (eds.). Voting for Reform: Democracy, Political 
Liberalization, and Economic Adjustment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp.27-29.
Kathryn Sikkink, Development Ideas in Latin America: Paradigm Shift and the Economic 
Commission for Latin America, in Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard (eds.). International 
Development and the Social Sciences: Essays in the History and Politics o f Knowledge (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1997)
Juan Gabriel Valdes, Pinochet’s Economists: The Chicago School in Chile (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995); Patricio Silva, Technocrats and Politics in Chile: From the Chicago Boys to the
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The Chilean state was able to carry out its program, not because it was more repressive, 
personalistic, or patrimonial than other states, but because it had a coherent political economic 
project and a talented, ideologically motivated bureaucracy capable (despite some costly policy 
errors) of designing new legal and economic institutions.
Second, social learning is important in the ideological shift. Some developing countries 
undertook neoliberal reform as a pre-emptive measure not to be marginalised from the world 
economy. International conferences and negotiations hosted by the IFIs including the OECD 
and the GATT (later the WTO) played a part in persuading them to accept the Washington 
consensus. Research departments in the IFIs have been led by chief economists, most of 
whom are sympathetic to neoliberalism. This is why the US influence on the recruitment of 
key positions in the departments has intensified the tendency.
Ever since the US began, in the early 1980s, to assert its neoliberal foreign economic policy 
unilaterally in multilateral organizations, and since the Bank at the same time became involved not 
just in projects but in structural adjustment of whole economies, the US Treasury has been keenly 
interested in the appointment of the chief economist. It has exercised a de facto veto.
CIEPLAN Monks, Journal o f Latin American Studies, Vol.23, No. 2 (May 1991); William J. Barber, 
Chile Con Chicago: A Review Essay, of Economic Literature, Vol.33, No.3 (December 1995)
The political power of neoliberalism was strong in other Latin American countries. See Catherine M. 
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Neoliberalism in the Central Andes, Latin American Research Review, Vol. 25, No. 2. (1990); David E. 
Hojman, The Political Economy of Recent Conversions to Market Economics in Latin America, 
Journal o f Latin American Studies, Vol.26, No. 1 (Febmary 1994); William R. Nylen, Selling Neo­
liberalism: Brazil’s Instituto Liberal, Journal o f Latin American Studies, Vol.25, No.2 (May 1993)
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Chile (1973-90), World Affairs, Vol. 156, No.l (Summer 1993), p.lO.
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Finally, IFIs’ discursive practices contributed to championing the Washington consensus 
in the developing world. The IFIs publish numerous theoretical papers, journal reports and 
policy reviews to sell their policy recommendations. Although there is no obligation, many 
developing countries follow (or pretend to listen to) IFIs’ recommendations not because their 
recommendations are always good advice but because they set the boundaries o f conventions 
o f economic policy. I f  one country does not follow the conventions, it would be criticised by 
the IFIs. In the current international financial system, IFIs’ criticism has a negative impact on 
credit ratings o f sovereign debts and thus the allocation o f international portfolio because their 
criticism is a signal that foreign investors should leave the country. In other words, the IFIs 
can punish a country when it does not meet their expectations.
Against this background, Paul Krugman argues that the emerging market phenomenon 
was as much ideational as materialist.
[B]y 1993 or so “emerging market funds” were being advertised on television and the pages of 
popular magazines. At the same time that this self-reinforcing process was under way in the 
financial markets, a different kind of self-reinforcing process, sociological rather than economic, 
was taking place in the world of affairs -  the endless rounds of meetings, speeches, and exchanges 
of communiqués that occupy much of the time of economic opinion leaders. Such interlocking 
social groupings tend at any given time to converge on a conventional wisdom, about economics 
among many other things. People believe certain stories because everyone important tells them, 
and people tell those stories because everyone important believes them. Indeed, when a 
conventional wisdom is at its fullest strength, one's agreement with that conventional wisdom 
becomes almost a litmus test of one's suitability to be taken seriously,
Ilene Grabel, The Political Economy of ‘Policy Credibility’: The New-Classical Macroeconomics 
and the Remaking of Emerging Economies, Cambridge Journal o f Economics, Vol.24, No.l (January 
2000); Juan Martinez and Javier Santiso, Financial Markets and Politics: The Confidence Game in 
Latin American Emerging Economies, International Political Science Review, Vol.24, No.3 (2003) 
Paul Krugman, Dutch Tulips and Emerging Markets, Foreign Affairs, Vol.74, No.4 (July /August 
1995), p.36
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In the early 1990s, many East Asian developing countries embraced some policy 
recommendations of the Washington consensus. In the region, more attention was paid to 
financial and trade liberalisation because their macroeconomic management was relatively 
prudent, compared with Latin American countries. In the name of financial globalisation, 
many restrictions on capital account transaction were lifted to attract foreign investment and to 
enhance the efficiency of domestic financial markets. For example, Korea implemented -  
though incompletely and gradually -  liberalisation policies to become a member of the OECD 
in 1996. Malaysia also established an offshore tax heaven for foreign financial institutions in 
Labuan in 1990, which was intended to be a regional financial centre such as Hong Kong and 
Singapore.
3. The East Asian Financial Crisis and the Triumph of the Washington Consensus
As Richard Higgott argues, “The Asian Crisis is a contest of ideology between Asian and 
Anglo-American ways of organising capitalist production.” The triumph of the 
Washington consensus was not only achieved by IMF’s financial resources but also by its 
ideological warfare against the East Asian developmental model. The predominance of 
neoliberalism in the theoretical and policy debate over the causes of the crisis enhanced the 
legitimacy of the Anglo-American economic model on which IMF-supported programmes is 
based.
Financial globalisation can be defined as “the broad integration of national markets associated with 
both innovation and deregulation in the postwar era and is manifested by increasing movements of 
capital across national fi'ontiers.” Benjamin J. Cohen, Phoenix Risen: The Resurrection of Global 
Finance, World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 2 (January 1996), p.269.
Stephan Haggard and Sylvia Maxfield, The Political Economy of Financial Internationalization and 
the Developing World, International Organization, Vol. 50, No.l (Winter 1996); Michael Loriaux, 
Meredith Woo-Cumings, Kent E. Kalder, Sylvia Maxfield and Sofia Perez (eds.). Capital Ungoverned: 
Liberalizing Finance in Interventionist States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997); Arvid 
Lukauskas and Susan Minushkin, Explaining Styles of Financial Market Opening in Chile, Mexico, 
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To understand the debates in a broader context, it is necessary to examine theories of 
currency / financial crisis. There are three models in neoclassical economics. The first- 
generation model highlights fiscal indiscipline. Under fixed exchange regimes, loose fiscal 
policy is likely to create a balance-of-payments crisis by putting downward pressure on the 
currency in the long run. In the second-generation model, self-fulfilling speculative attack is 
the main trigger of currency crisis. Irrational behaviour such as herding, contagion or adverse 
selection can bring even an economy with sound macroeconomic fundamentals to currency 
crisis. Finally, the third-generation model emphasises the role of moral hazard, which makes 
the financial and corporate sectors vulnerable to external shocks.
There is little doubt that the first-generation model does not fit into East Asia. As the 
IMF says, “The Asian crisis differed from previous financial crises in which the IMF’s 
assistance has been needed... Conventional fiscal imbalances were relatively small; and only 
in Thailand were significant real exchange rate misalignments evident” Thus economists 
turned to the second and third generation models. In the debate, supporters of the Washington 
consensus -  including the US government and the IMF -  emphasised domestic weaknesses in 
the financial and corporate sectors, whereas its critics highlighted speculative attacks and 
herding behaviours. This theoretical difference had a far-reaching political implication. In the 
second- generation model, the crisis-affected countries were victims of the flawed 
international financial system. In contrast, the countries themselves were to blame for the 
crisis in the third-generation model. Against this background, the underlying motivation of
For an overview of financial crises in historical perspective, see Charles P. Kindleberger, Manias, 
Panics and Crashes: A History o f Financial Crises, fourth edition (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 
2000); Bany Eichengreen, Financial Crises and What to Do About Them (Oxford: Oxford University 
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IMF’s support for the third-generation model was a strategy to de-legitimise the East Asian 
model, thereby making it easy for the Fund to impose its own programmes on the region.
To this end, neoliberal economists attacked World Bank’s The East Asian Miracle that 
made the case for industrial policy and strategic trade policy. This was of political and 
theoretical significance because the report was published under the sponsorship of the 
Japanese government that wanted to legitimise and promote its economic model.
Their strategy to blame systemic problems with the East Asian development model for the 
financial crisis was two-fold: positive and normative. First, neoliberal economists attempted to 
show that the development model was neither productive nor efficient. This argument was 
suggested by Paul Krugman’s The Myth of Asia’s Miracle. Theoretically, Krugman’s 
analogy between the East Asian miracle and Stalin’s industrialisation in the Soviet Union was 
based on the theoiy of total factor productivity (TFP) that is defined as the ratio between real 
product and real factor inputs. The theory is used to measure the contribution of technological 
change in economic growth. Some empirical studies found out that economic growth in East 
Asia was driven by more capital and labour than technology. The underlying implication of 
the finding was that the East Asian model was neither efficient nor sustainable in the long run. 
In other words. East Asian NICs’ economic growth was not a miracle and their development 
model was not superior to Western model. For this reason, some Western commentators
World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993). Some economists and journalists also praised the economic model, urging the 
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suggested that the crisis-affected countries would ultimately adopt Anglo-American style 
capitalism by surrendering Japanese-style capitalism.
Second, neoliberal economists developed a theory of crony capitalism to criticise the 
model from a normative po-spective. The concept was originally invented to describe 
Ferdinand Marcos’s behaviour that gave oligopoly rights to group of businessmen and various 
political supporters to maintain his power in the Philippines. Sang Jin Wei generalises the 
concept in a broader perspective. “Crony capitalism refers to an economic environment in 
which relatives and friends of government officials are placed in positions of power and 
government decisions on allocation of resources and judicial judgement on commercial disputes 
are distorted to favour these fiiends and relatives.”
The core of the theory is that the primary cause of the crisis is moral hazard problem 
inherent in the East Asian development model. The moral hazard thesis had three points. 
First, industrial policy was accused of breeding cronyism in the corporate sector. Before the 
crisis, close-govemment relationship was an advantage that allowed the crisis-affected 
countries to achieve rapid industrialisation. Second, deposit insurance was criticised for 
generating moral hazard in the financial sector. Excessive risky lending of financial 
institutions arose from their expectation that their liabilities were under government guarantee.
For critics of Japanese (or East Asian) model, see Ron Bevacqua, Whither the Japanese Model? The 
Asian Economic Crisis and the Continuation of Cold War Politics in the Pacific Rim, Review o f 
International Political Economy, Vol.5, No.3 (Autumn 1998); Ronald Dore, Asian Crisis and the Future 
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Shang-Jin Wei, Domestic Crony Capitalism and International Fickle Capital: Is There a 
Connection?, International Finance, Vol.4, No.l (Spring 2001), p.21.
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Finally, political corruption delayed the development of good governance system. The 
counties lacked sufficient regulatory agencies that could prevent moral hazard problem.
The crony capitalism thesis was very effective because it de-privileged the model from a 
normative perspective.
[T]he successful discursive attacks on Asian model practices coupled with the severe economic 
effects of the crisis generated a normative environment for policy formation that severely 
constrained resistance to the radical restructuring of the institutional and legal framework of the 
Korean economy than would otherwise have been expected. Defense of these practices became 
untenable when these practices had been successfully discursively reconstructed as corruption, 
while a move to market-based outcomes and decision-making had been successfully discursively 
reconstructed as ethical and authoritative. The major mechanism by which ideas are transmitted 
into the policy arena is through discourse, or arguments. In this context, discourse is high 
politics.**^
The crony capitalism thesis paved the way for the IMF to intervene in governance issues 
as well as monetary and financial policies. Structural reform became one of the key pillars of 
IMF-supported programmes in East Asia on the ground that the roots of crony capitalism 
could not be solved without transforming the economic system as a whole. IMF’s emphasis on 
structural reform were criticised in two ways. First, many of them -  especially labour market 
reform, privatisation and trade liberalisation -  have nothing to do with the financial crisis.
For criticisms of the thesis, see Chalmers Johnson, Economic Crisis in East Asia: The Clash of 
Capitalisms, Cambridge Journal o f Economics, Vol.22, No.6 (November 1998); Ha-Joon Chang, The 
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although they are helpful to lay the foundation for long-term economic growth. Second, 
there were suspicions that these measures were inserted to serve the national interests of 
IMF’s major shareholders. For example, import diversification was a priority of the Japanese 
government, while the liberalisation of financial service reflected the US demand. 
Nevertheless, the thesis enabled the IMF to disguise the hidden agenda of structural reform 
successfully.
Furthermore, the crony capitalism thesis protected the IMF and major creditor countries 
from the accusation that they should bear responsibility for their mistakes: for example, its 
failure to deliver early warnings and neghgence in reforming the international financial 
architecture.
Laying the blame on homegrown causes protects the current international financial regime behind 
an ideational shield. Ironically, it even legitimizes arrangements for international financial players 
that are similar to the crisis-affected countries’ arrangements that those same international players 
identify as the main cause of the crisis and in need of reform: if no blame rests with international 
financial players or the international financial system, but does rest with irresponsible governments 
in the crisis-affected countries (who did not insist on full “transparency” in company accounts, for 
example), then the international private financiers are entitled to be protected fi"om private losses 
just as they are entitled to keep the private profits. And the homegrown causes explanation also 
legitimizes the use of the IMF to subject the governments, banks, and firms of developing countries 
to the kind of discipline demanded by private international capitalists (who saw themselves shut out 
by “cronyism”), but not to subject those capitalists to the kind of discipline that might operate to 
the advantage of developing countries.
For a defence of the IMF policy, see Nancy Brune, Geoffrey Garrett and Bruce Kogut, The 
International Monetary Fund and the Global Spread of Privatization, IMF Staff Papers^ Vol.51, No.2 
(2004)
At that time, the IMF was criticised for its bailout policy. For example, see George P. Shultz, 
William E. Simon and Walter B. Wriston, Who Needs the IMF?, Wall Street Journal (3 February 
1998); Timothy Lane and Steven Phillips, Does IMF Financing Result in Moral Hazard?, Working 
Paper No. 00/168 (IMF, 2000)
Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and Role o f Government in East Asian 
Industrialization, second edition (Princeton University Press, 2003), p.xxiii.
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4. The Emergence o f the Post-Washington Consensus after the Financial Crisis
Although the Washington consensus effectively attacked the East Asian development 
model in both positive and normative ways, its policy recommendations were far from perfect. 
As heated debates on policy responses to the crisis shows, IMF-supported programme were 
criticised in many ways. As a result, the IMF conceded that some of their policy 
recommendations proved to be ineffective.
First, fiscal contraction contributed to deepening of a recession rather than a restoration of 
investors’ confidence. At the time of the crisis, as most crisis-hit countries maintained a sound 
fiscal stance during the 1990s, there was room for expansionary budgets.
Fiscal targeting in IMF-supported programs...are typically projections based on current policies 
and assumptions together with measures adopted under the programs: in the Asian crisis countries, 
these assumptions were proved drastically wrong... [Pjrogram revisions accommodated a 
substantial part of the expansionary effect of changing economic conditions on the fiscal positions 
from the start of 1998.
Second, the successful revival of the Malaysian economy disproved the IMF’s scepticism. 
Irrespective of whether capital controls contributed to economic recovery, the policy was not 
as dangerous as the Fund had envisaged.
[ Pjreliminary evidence suggests that the controls have been effective in realizing their intended 
objective of reducing the ringgit’s internationalisation and helping to contain capital outflows by 
eliminating the offshore ringgit market and by restricting the outflows of capital by residents and
**^ A self-critical assessment is undertaken by the Independent Evaluation Office at the IMF. See IMF, 
IMF and Recent Capital Account Crises: Indonesia, Korea, Brazil (IMF, 2003)
Lane et al. (1999), p.62.
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non residents. The wide-ranging nature, and strict enforcement, of the controls prior to the partial 
relaxation of the control regime in early 1999 certainly play a role.
Third, it is a moot point whether structural reform contributed to economic recovery.
IMF supporters argue that structural reform played a significant role in the restoration of 
investors’ confidence. However, critics points out,
Most of the serious structural problems that were identified as the main causes of the crisis in 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand could not have been resolved over a span of two years... 
Since the crisis countries are not even half-way there in restructuring their financial institutions and 
corporations, it would be presumptuous to argue that the reform efforts have established a 
foundation for sustainable growth in East Asia.
These mistakes that the IMF conceded provided a rare window of opportunity to rethink 
the advantages and disadvantages of the Washington consensus in a broader perspective. 
Before the East Asian crisis, empirical studies on Africa and Latin America cast doubt on the 
legitimacy of the Washington consensus, pointing out the poor results from IMF and World 
Bank conditionality.^’  ^However, this scepticism was not seriously regarded among policy 
makers and mainstream (or neoclassical) economists. It is the East Asian crisis that provoked 
profound debates on IMF-supported programmes. From the early stage of the crisis, some
Akira Ariyoshi, Karl Habermeier, Bernard Laurens, Inci Otker-Robe, Jorge Ivan Canales-Kriljenko, 
and Andrei Kirilenko, Capital Controls: Country Experiences with Their Use and Liberalization, 
Occasional Paper No. 190 (IMF, 2000), pp. 104-05.
Wall Street Journal, Korean Comes Back, Suggesting Reform Isn’t the Only Answer (17 May 1999)
Yung Chul Park and Jong-Wha Lee, Recovery and Sustainability in East Asia, Working Paper 
No.8373 (NBER, 2001), p.31. See also Jong-Wha Lee and Changyong Rhee, Macroeconomic Impacts 
of the Korean Financial Crisis: Comparison with the Cross-country Patterns, World Economy, Vol. 25, 
No. 4 (April 2002)
Barry Eichengreen, Toward a New International Financial Architecture: A Practical Post-Asia 
Agenda (Washington D C.: Institute for International Economics, 1999); Kenneth Rogoff, International 
Institutions for Reducing Global Financial Instability, Journal o f Economic Perspectives, Vol. 13, No.4 
(Fall 1999)
Barry Gills and George Philip, Editorial: Towards Convergence in Development Policy?: 
Challenging the ‘Washington Consensus’ and Restoring the Historicity of Divergent Development 
Trajectories, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 4 (1996); Lance Taylor (eds.). After Neoliberalism: 
What Next for Latin America? (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999)
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prominent economists -  who once held high-profile positions in the international financial 
institutions or US government -  criticised the IMF. Their point was that IMF’s austere 
macroeconomic policy would worsen economic recession; and capital account liberalisation 
would make the crisis-affected countries more vulnerable to external shocks. Although these 
criticisms were echoed by some policy makers in the crisis-affected countries, they could not 
be immediately implemented because the Washington consensus overwhelmingly prevailed at 
that time.
These critical assessments resulted in the post-Washington consensus. When it comes to 
macroeconomic stabilisation, the consensus prefers Keynesian stimulus policies to 
monetarist’s anti-inflation policies. Its advocates argue that fiscal deficits should be allowed to 
cope with economic recession because they are an effective measure to spur output and to 
reduce social costs of unemployment. In terms of structural reform, the consensus supposes 
that government intervention makes markets function better. In this regard, it suggests 
gradualist approaches to liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation.^^^
Among others, the post-Washington consensus warns the danger of ill-sequenced financial 
liberalisation. It has three rationales. First, financial liberalisation is likely to make domestic 
financial markets vulnerable to volatile capital flows at least in the short term. Second,
Among others, Martin Feldstein was Chairman of Council of Economic Advisers in the Reagan 
administration. Joseph Stiglitz was Chairman of the Council in the Clinton administration and Vice 
President and Chief Economist of the World Bank at that time of the crisis. Jeffrey Sachs has 
participated in various IMF and World Bank missions in developing and transition economies since the 
1980s.
For example, many Japanese economists had a dissent view, which is different from that of the IMF 
and the US. A major difference lies in the prescriptions to the crisis. The Japanese government seems to 
hold the view that there are few reasons to reform the whole financial system since the crisis stemmed 
from a liquidity problem. This difference was reflected in the New Miyazawa Initiative that did not 
attach any IMF-style conditionality to financial assistance. See Yoshitomi Masaru, The Asian Crisis 
and the IMF’s Medicine, Japan Echo (April 1998)
Joseph E. Stiglitz, More Instruments and Broader Goals: Moving toward the Post-Washington 
Consensus, WIDER Annual Lecture (Helsinki: 7 January 1998)
Carlos Diaz-Alejandro, Good-Bye Financial Repression, Hello Financial Crash, Journal o f  
Development Economics, Vol. 19, No. 1/2 (1985); John Williamson and Molly Mahar, A Survey of 
Financial Liberalisation, Essays in International Finance, No.211 (International Financial Section, 
Department of Economics, Princeton University, 1998), p.53. See also Asli Demirguc-Kunt and Enrica 
Detragiache, Financial Liberalization and Financial Fragility, Working Paper No. 98/83 (IMF, 1998); 
Paul Wachtel, Growth and Finance: What Do We Know and How Do We Know It?, International 
Finance, Vol.4, No.3 (2001); Lance Taylor, The Consequences of Capital Liberalization, Challenge, 
vol.43, No.6 (November / December 2000) This criticism is confirmed by IMF economists. See Eswar
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there is no conclusive evidence to prove positive correlation between financial liberalisation 
and economic performance. Third, the correlation between liberalisation and growth is 
fragile and tenuous at least in the short term.
As a matter of fact, the East Asian financial crisis and its spread to emerging economies in 
Eastern Europe and Latin America undermined one of the key doctrines that the IMF has 
pursued: capital account liberalisation. As Joseph Stiglitz points out, “[W]hen there is a single 
accident on a highway, one suspects that the driver’s attention may have lapsed. But when 
there are dozens of accidents at the same bend in the same highway, one needs to re-examine 
the design of the road.” Even neoliberal newspapers as well as mainstream economists 
seriously consider that the affected countries have good reason to limit capital outflows in 
order to prevent further depreciation of their currencies.
Table 3-1 shows that the crisis-hit five Asian economies (Indonesia, Korea, Thailand, 
Malaysia and Philippines) received a net private capital inflow of 65.8 billion dollars in 1996. 
However, the next year witnessed a net outflow of 20.4 billion dollars. Compared with FDI 
and portfolio investment, bank loans were very volatile. There are a couple of reasons why 
foreign capital flowed to the region at that time. First, low interest rates in industrial countries 
led institutional investors to divert their portfolio to emerging markets. From 1990 to 1996,
S. Prasad, Kenneth Rogoff, Shang-Jin Wei, and M. Ayhan Kose, Effects o f Financial Globalization on 
Developing Countries: Some Empirical Evidence, Occasional Paper No.220 (IMF, 2003)
Dennis Quinn, The Correlates of Change in International Financial Regulation, American Political 
Science Review, Vol.91, No.3 (September 1997);
Dani Rodrik, Who Needs Capital-Account Convertibility?, Essays in International Finance, No.207 
(International Financial Section, Department of Economics, Princeton University, 1998); Barry 
Eichengreen, Capital Account Liberalization: What do the Cross-Country Studies Tell Us?, World Bank 
Economic Review, Vol. 15, No.3 (2001); Hali Edison, Michael Klein, Luca A. Ricci, and Torsten M. 
Slok, Capital Account Liberalization and Economic Performance: Survey and Synthesis, Working 
Paper No, 02/120 (IMF, 2002); Eichengreen, Barry and David Leblang, Capital Account Liberalization 
and Growth: Was Mr. Mahathir Right?, International Journal o f Finance and Economics, Vol.8, No.3 
(July 2003)
Joseph E, Stiglitz, Capital Market, Liberalization, Economic Growth, and Instability, World 
Development, Vol.26, No.6 (June 2000), p. 1075. See also Maurice Obstfeld, The Global Capital 
Market: Benefactor or Menace?, Journal o f Economic Perspective, Vol. 12 (Fall 1998); Frederic S. 
Mishkin, Global Financial Instability: Framework, Events, Issues, Journal o f Economic Perspective, 
Vol,13, No.4 (Fall 1999); Pierre-Richard Agénor, Benefits and Costs of International Financial 
Integration: Theory and Facts, World Economy, Vol. 26, No.8 (August 2003)
For example, see Martin Wolf, Asia: Ins and Outs of Capital Flows, Financial Times (16 June 1998); 
David Wessel and Bob Davis, Currency Control are Getting a Hearing Amid Asian Crisis, Wall Street 
Journal (4 September 1998)
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net capital flows to emerging economies surged seven-fold. Second, there was a wave of 
flnancial liberalisation in developing countries. Many East Asian countries removed 
restrictions on capital accounts that provided many channels for flow foreign capital.
[Table 3-1] Net Private Capital Flows to Emerging Maikets
92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99
Emerging markets 
Total net private capital infiows 
Net FDI
Net portfolio investment 
Bank loans and other
112.6
35.4
56.1
21.0
172.1
59.4
84.4 
28.3
136.3
84.0
109.6
-57.3
226.9
92.6
36.9
97.4
215.9
113.2
77.8
24.9
147.6
138.6 
52.9 
-44.0
75.1
143.3
8.5
-76.7
80.5
149.8
23.3
-92.5
Asia
Total net private capital inflows 
Net FDI
Net portfolio investment 
Bank loans and other
20.8
15.7
9.0
-3.9
57.4
33.9
21.8
1.7
63.6
47.1
11.8
4.7
104.9
46.6
14.2
44.1
104.1
53.1 
12.9
38.1
-1.4
55.5
3.5
-60.4
-42.6
58.3
-17.9
-82.9
-27.0
49.9
-5.6
-71.3
Five crisis-affected Asian countries* 
Total net private capital infiows 
Net FDI
Net portfolio investment 
Bank loans and other
29.0
7.3
6.4 
15.3
31.8
7.6
17.2
7.0
36.1
8.8
9.9
17.4
74.2 
7.5
17.4
49.2
65.8
8.4
20.3
37.1
-20.4
10.3
12.9
-43.6
-25.6
8.6
-6.0
-28.2
-24.6
10.2
6.3
-41.1
* Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand 
** Unit: Billions of US dollar
This massive reversal o f capital flows, including the flight of domestic capital, pressured 
them to depreciate their currencies to nearly 40 percent below pre-crisis values In short, 
“countries with a large number of controls on capital inflows tend to be less prone to a
Takatoshi Ito, Capital Flows in Asia, Working Paper No. 7134 (NBER, 1999); Dani Rodrik and 
Andres Velasco, Short-Term Capital Flows, Working Paper No. 7364 (NBER, 1999)
IMF, International Capital Markets: Developments, Prospects, and Key Policy Issues (IMF, 2000), 
p.46,
Tony Makin, The Great East Asian Capital Flow Reversal: Reasons, Responses and Ramifications, 
World Economy, Vol. 22, No. 3 (May 1999); Andrew Elek and Dominic Wilson, The East Asian Crisis 
and Intemational Capital Markets, Vol. 13, No, 1 (May 1999);
Stephen Grenfell, Capital Flows and Crises, Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, Vol. 13, No. 2 
(November 1999) It is still debatable which actors - hedge fimds or international banks -  initiated the 
reversal. For the debate, see Thomas D. Willett, Aida Budiman, Arthur Denzau, Gab-Je Jo,Cesar 
Ramos and John Thomas, The Falsification of Four Popular Hypotheses About the Asian Crisis, World 
Economy, Vol.27, No.l (2004)
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currency crash, perhaps, by limiting the amount of funds that could leave a particular country 
should foreign investors’ sentiments change.”
According to Paul Krugman, financial liberalisation policy is attributable to IFIs’ 
obsession with market confidence. Their emphasis on market sentiment reflects the interest 
of portfolio investors rather than that of crisis-affected countries. Indeed, a substantial amount 
of IMF’s loans were used to advance creditor interests rather than to regaining economic 
growth. “The Fund-led bailouts impose few net costs on the industrialized countries, since the 
Fund has always been repaid.” For this reason, the Fund has been accused of “creditor 
community’s enforcer” or “chief debt collector for international banks.” In other words, the 
Fund is more concerned about the policy objectives of its chief shareholders -  i.e., the 
industrial countries -  than about rescuing currency crisis-affected countries.
The case of Korea illustrates how Western banks imposed severe conditions and burdens 
on crisis-hit countries.
There is little question that the rollover was critical to Korea’s relatively rapid turnaround. 
Creditors, for their part, came out better after the rollover than before: there was no writedown, the 
new loans carried higher interest rates than the original loans, plus they carried a Korean 
government guarantee. Korea had certain advantages that may not be present for other 
reschedulings: its political importance brought strong pressure from the Unites States to get a deal 
done, the Korean government negotiated on behalf of the banks, and there were a relatively small 
number of creditors (mainly U.S. banks).
With respect to corporate reform, supporters of the post-Washington consensus have some 
reservations over IFIs’ encouragement of governance reform. First, they are opposed to a mere 
imposition of an Anglo-American model in the disguise of global standards or “best practice”.
Marco Rossi, Financial Fragility and Economic Performance in Developing Economies: Do Capital 
Controls, Prudential Regulation and Supervision Matter?, Working Paper No.99/66 (IMF, 1999), p. 16. 
Paul Krugman, The Confidence Game, New Republic (5 October 1998)
Devesh Kapur, The IMF: A Cure or a Curse?, Foreign Policy, No.l 11 (Summer 1998), p.l25. 
Steven Radelet, Orderly Workout of Cross Border Private Debts, Working Paper (Harvard Institute 
for International Development, 1999), p. 10.
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A series of corporate scandals in the US -  including Enron, Tyco and World Com -  show that 
the Anglo-American system is far from perfect.
The term crony capitalism, as loosely applied today by Western technocrats, editors and sundry 
commentators, denotes corruption or favoritism...Explanations centered on a crony capitalism 
variant as the cause of the Asian crisis tend to induce moral satisfaction. They help confirm mostly 
hidden prejudice among Europeans and Americans about non-Westem governments not being able 
to govern well. They also encourage the state of deep denial in which the technocracies of 
international organizations and Western governments find themselves today.
Second, they suspect that IFIs’ ultimate objective does not lie in the development of 
corporate governance itself but in the protection of foreign investors.
[Djespite the claim that good corporate governance embodies ‘universal principles’, the definition 
advanced by the IFIs intentionally draws on the Anglo-American variant. This imposed 
standardisation of corporate governance serves two overlapping goals. First, it attempts to stabilise 
the international financial system by ensuring that emerging markets adapt to the exigencies of the 
neoliberal open market economy. Second, by placing greater emphasis on ‘shareholder value’ 
rather than on other variants of corporate governance, the interests of foreign capitals are 
protected.^^^
These criticisms of the Washington consensus gave rise to a critical review of democratic 
accountability in the IFIs. In principle, the executive board of the IMF should represent the
Franklin R. Edwards, Hedge Funds and the Collapse of Long-Term Capital Management, Journal o f 
Economic Perspective, Vol. 13, No.2 (Spring 1999); Paul M. Healy and Krishna G. Palepu, The Fall of 
Enron, Journal o f Economic Perspective, Vol. 17, No.2 (Spring 2003)
Karel Van Wolferen, The Global Conceptual Crisis, New Perspectives Quarterly, Vol. 16, No.l 
(Winter 1999)
Susanne Soederberg, The Promotion o f ‘Anglo-American’ Corporate Governance in the South: Who 
Benefits fi'om the New International Standard?, Third World Quarterly, Vol.24, No.l (2003), pp.8-9. 
See also Ewald Engelen, Corporate Governance, Property and Democracy: A Conceptual Critique of 
Shareholder Ideology, Economy and Society, Vol.31, No.3 (August 2002)
Ngaire Woods, Making the IMF and the World Bank More Accountable, International Affairs, Vol. 
77, No. 1 (January 2001); Leo Van Houtven, Governance of the International Monetary Fund: Decision
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finance ministers of all of the member countries. The reality, however, is the predominance of 
the major industrial countries since the voting weight of the US, Europe and Japan is 
sufficient to pass any decision. In particular, the US Treasury has wielded significant power 
over the Fund with sufficient votes to veto. In this regard, the Fund has been accused of being 
a rubber stamp of the Treasury whose constituency is -  in Dam’s words -  Wall Street.
[T]the Fund too often pursues policies that serve the interests of Wall Street and the US Treasury 
Department rather than the world as a whole,.. [T]he IMF is too responsive to the agendas of 
national governments (the governments of its principal shareholders in particular).,. The US 
government’s prominence in international financial markets and large voting share in the Board 
enable it to exercise a disproportionate influence over decision-making in the Fund,
One way to solve the dominance of the major countries is to update the distribution of 
voting rights, which has not reflected the growing significance of emerging economies.
Based on an analysis of each country’s wealth and economic performance, the IMF sets the 
amount o f the quota the member will contribute. Quotas are reviewed every five years and can 
be raised or lowered. However, the Quota Formula Review Group commissioned by the IMF 
shows that the existing quota formula failed to reflect the rapidly-changing world economy. 
There is no doubt that East Asia is under-represented in the Fund by many standards as Table
3-2 demonstrates.
Making, Institutional Oversight, Transparency and Accountability, Pamphlet No. 53 (IMF, 2002); 
Rethinking IMF Governance, Finance and Development (September 2004); Vijay Kelkar, Vikash 
Yadavl and Praveen Chaudhry, Reforming the Governance of the International Monetary Fund, World 
Economy, Vol,27, No.5 (2004)
Kenneth W, Dam, The Rules o f the Global Game: A New Look at US International Economic 
Policymaking (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2001), p,198,
Jose De Gregorio, Barry Eichengreen, Takatoshi Ito and Charles Wyplosz, An Independent and 
Accountable IMF: Geneva Reports on the World Economy 1 (London: Centre for Economic Policy 
Research, 1999), pp. 1-4,
Even at current exchange rates, China and Brazil have already surpassed Canada in terms of GDP. 
And Korea, Russia, India, Argentina and Mexico are bigger than small G-10 countries including 
Switzerland, Belgium and Sweden, See Jeffrey Frankel and Nouriel Roubini, The Role of Industrial 
Country Policies in Emerging Market Crises, in Feldstein (2003)
Raghbendra Jha and Mridul K, Saggar, Towards a More Rational IMF Quota Structure: Suggestions 
for the Creation of a New International Financial Architecture, Development and Change, Vol. 31, No, 
3 (June 2000); David P, Rapkin and Jonathan R, Strand, Is East Asia Under-represented in the
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[Table 3-2] IMF Quotas and the Shares of the World Economy
Country Quota
(’99)
GDP
(’94)
PPP-based GDP 
(’94)
Trade 
(Average o f ’90-’94)
Reserves
(’94)
US 17.5 27.0 21.2 15.2 7.0
Germany 6.1 7.9 4.8 10.6 7.8
France 5.0 5.1 3.6 6.7 2.6
UK 5.0 3.9 3.4 6.1 3.6
Netherlands 2.4 1.3 0.9 3.5 3.2
Belgium 2.1 0.8 0.6 2.8 1.3
Switzerland 1.6 1.0 0.5 1.9 3.2
Japan 6.2 18.3 8.2 8.2 10.4
China 2.2 2.1 9.8 1.6 3.4
Korea 0.7 1.4 1.5 1.8 2.0
Indonesia 0.9 0.6 2.2 0.7 1.0
Malaysia 0.7 0.2 0.5 0.9 2.8
Thailand 0.5 0.5 1.3 0.9 2.4
Source: IMF, Report to the IMF Executive Board of the Quota Formula Review Group (2000)
Another way is to change IFIs’ modus operand!. An over-emphasis on confidentiality 
hinders transparency and accountability in the decision-making process. Indeed, the secrecy of 
the IMF makes it difficult to evaluate the appropriateness of its operations. In addition, the 
Fund tends to be intolerant of its critics. It is widely believed that the Fund persuaded the US 
Treasury to expel Joseph Stiglitz from the Bank before his term of office had finished.
In a broader perspective, it was the anxiety about neoliberalism that posed a serious 
challenge for the Washington consensus.
International Monetary Fund?, International Relations o f the Asia-Pacific, Vol.3, No.l (February 2003) 
This view is shared by European policy makers. See Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, A Single EU Seat in the 
IMF?, Journal o f Common Market Studies, Vol. 42, No, 2 (2004)
Washington Post, Outspoken Economist to Leave World Bank (25 November 1999); New York 
Times, World Bank Economist Felt He Had to Silence His Criticism or Quit (2 December 1999)
For criticisms of the consensus, see Robin Broad and John Cavanagh, The Death of the Washington 
Consensus?, World Policy Journal (Fall 1999); Charles Gore, The Rise and Fall of the Washington 
Consensus as a Paradigm for Developing Countries, World Development, Vol.28, No.5 (May 2000); 
Moises Naim, Fads and Fashion in Economic Reforms: Washington Consensus or Washington 
Confusion?, Third World Quarterly, Vol.21, No.3 (2000); Eduardo Lora and Ugo Panizza, The Future 
of Structural Reform, Journal o f Democracy, Vol. 14, No.2 (April 2003) For a defence, see T. N. 
Srinivasan, The Washington Consensus a Decade Later: Ideology and the Art and Science of Policy 
Advice, World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 15, No.2 (August 2000); Richard Higgott, Contested 
Globalization: The Changing Context and Normative Challenges, Review o f International Studies, Vol. 
26, No.5 (December 2000)
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The window of opportunity had closed and the first real backlash against ‘globalization’ was fully 
in train. At the very least, US and IMF dreams of even more open capital markets had to be put on 
the back burner, replaced by fears that the anti-globalization sentiments, strong in many emerging 
markets and growing in the USA, could spread to other liberalized OECD countries... the recent 
financial crises, and responses to them in Asia and Latin America, represent less the final 
ideological triumph of liberalism in a post-Cold War era than a further spur to rethinking 
significant aspects of the neoliberal project.
The distributional impacts of economic globalisation have serious political implications 
because the benefits and costs of economic globalisation are not even across countries and 
across classes within countries. Internationally, the gap between developed countries and less- 
developed ones is not narrowed. Domestically, globalisation reduces the capacity of 
government to redistribute wealth by forcing them to adopt more business-friendly economic 
policy at the expense of social welfare.
Public discontents with neoliberal globalisation prevailed in advanced world as well as 
developing world. At the WTO conference in Seattle in 1999, even well paid workers in 
advanced countries aggressively expressed their concerns about a ‘race to the bottom’ -  losing 
their jobs against low-paid workers in developing countries. A widespread perception is that 
globalisation reduced the relative wage of unskilled workers in industrial countries, thus 
leading to uneven income distributions. In Davos in January 2000, where the World Economic 
Forum takes place annually, anti-globalisation activists protested that globalisation would 
increase inequality between nations. In Washington D.C. in April 2002, many non­
governmental organisations (NGOs) called for the reform of the Bretton Woods institutions 
that were under criticism for the lack of transparency and democratic accountability. The
Richard Higgott, Economics, Politics and (International) Political Economy: The Need for a 
Balanced Diet in an Era of Globalisation, New Political Economy, Vol.4, No.l (1999), p.360.
This argument is subject to much controversy. For a general overview, see Jeffrey G. Williamson, 
Winners and Losers over Two Centuries of Globalization, WIDER Annual Lecture (Copenhagen: 5 
September 2002); Geoffrey Garrett, The Distributive Consequences of Globalization (2001), available 
at http://www.intemational.ucla.edu/cms/files/conseall.pdf
For example, see Business Week, Backlash: Behind die Anxiety Over Globalization (24 April 2000) 
Cf. Gary Burtless, Robert Z. Lawrence, Robert E. Litan, and Robert J. Shapiro, Globalphobia: 
Confronting Fears about Open Trade (Washington, D C.: Brookings, 1998)
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resistance to globalisation, which have developed over the past decade, are not confined only 
to economic issues, but also political, social and environmental ones.
Against this backdrop, the post-Washington consensus moves beyond the technocratic 
recommendations of the Washington consensus, highlighting the socio-political dimensions of 
globalisation. The Washington consensus is not enthusiastic about increasing social 
spending because of negative effects on social expenditures on economic growth. First, social 
welfare system tends to reduce national savings that provide capital to industries. Second, 
social expenditures are one of the sources of inflation, which sometime lead to a large 
devaluation of the currency. Finally, social policy can weaken the incentive to seek 
employment. For these reasons, neoliberalism suggests a business-friendly social policy: 
cutbacks in welfare benefits due to fiscal constraint, a reduction in the share of the employer’s 
contributions in the social security revenues, increase of human capital investment and labour 
market flexibility.
Supporters of the post-Washington consensus argue that globalisation increases the 
importance of social insurance and the role of government in providing cover against external 
risk. The reason is that the neoliberal policy can provoke a backlash against economic 
globalisation itself because international economic integration can cause domestic social 
disintegration. Unless the adverse effects of globalisation on those who do not benefits from
Duncan Green and Matthew Griffith, Globalization and its Discontents, International Affairs, Vol.78, 
No.l (January 2002); Nick Crossley, Global Anti-corporate Struggle: A Preliminary Analysis, British 
Journal o f Sociology Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2002); Alan V. Deardorff What Might Globalisation's 
Critics Believe?, World Economy, Vol. 26, No. 5 (May 2003); Eric Helleiner, Economic Liberalism and 
Its Critics: The Past as Prologue?, Review o f International Political Economy, Vol. 10, No.4 (November 
2003)
This concern is recently acknowledged by the proponents of the Washington consensus. See John 
Williamson, What Should the World Bank Think about the Washington Consensus?, World Bank 
Research Observer, Vol. 15, No.2 (August 2000); Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski and John Williamson (eds.). 
After the Washington Consensus (Washington D C.: Institute for International Economics, 2003)
Dong-Myeon Shin, Economic Policy and Social Policy: Policy-Linkages in an Era of Globalisation, 
International Journal o f Social Welfare, Vol.9, No.l (2001) For the impacts of globalisation on welfare 
policy in the developing world, see Layna Mosley, Room to Move: International Financial Markets and 
National Welfare States, International Organization, Vol. 54, No.4 (Autumn 2000); Robert Kaufinan 
and Alex Segura-Ubiergo, Globalization, Domestic Politics, and Social Spending in Latin America, A 
Time-Series Cross-Section Analysis, 1973-97, World Politics, Vol.53, No.4 (July 2001); Brian 
Burgoon, Globalization and Welfare Compensation: Disentangling the Ties that Bind, International 
Organization, Vol. 55, No.3 (Summer 2001); Nita Rudra, Globalization and the Decline of the Welfare 
State in Less-Developed Countries, International Organization, Vol. 56, No. 2 (Spring 2002)
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globalisation are well managed, it is very difficult to gain political support for financial and 
trade liberalization, which is a serious threat for open economic system. Thus “the need for 
social insurance does not decline but rather increases as global integration increases.”
In industrial economies, organised labour resists liberalisation and privatisation because 
the policy is likely to result in a reduction of social welfare. In East Asia, decades-long 
economic growth was not accompanied by the growth of social welfare system. As Table 3-3 
shows, their social welfare was not better placed to cope with economic hardship than Central 
European countries that are in the similar stage of economic development.
[Table 3-3] Welfare State around 2000 226
Former communist countries Western OECD 
countries
East Asian 
countries
Developing
countriesCentral
Europe Others
Universal or near 
universal provision 
of pensions
Yes Very low
replacement
rates
Yes; high
replacement
rates
For civil 
servants 
only
For civil 
servants only
Universal or near 
universal provision 
of family benefits
Yes Limited Yes, except in 
the United 
States
No No
Unemployment
insurance
Yes No Yes Limited No
Socialized health Yes No Yes, except in 
the United 
States
Limited No (in 
practice)
Socialized
education
Yes Limited Yes Yes Yes
(Limited)
Score 5 2 5 2.5 1.5
Dani Rodrik, Has Globalization Gone Too Far? (Washington D C.: Institute for International 
Economics, 1997), p.79.
225 For example, see Elmar Rieger and Stephan Leibfried, Welfare State Limits to Globalization, 
Politics & Society, Vol.26, No.3 (September 1998)
Ethan B. Kapstein and Branko Milanovich (eds.). When Markets Fail: Social Policy and Economic 
Reform (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002), p. 19.
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5. Conclusion
This chapter has traced the development of the Washington consensus in the context of 
the theoretical and policy debates on the East Asian financial crisis. By analysing the spread 
of neoliberalism from industrial countries to developing and transition countries, it has shown 
how ideational factors -  epistemic communities, social learning and discursive practices -  
affected the spread of the Washington consensus.
From a perspective of neoliberalism, the financial crisis was a good opportunity to 
vindicate the Washington consensus. To this end, neoliberal economists de-legitimised the 
East Asian development model with the TFP theory and crony capitalism thesis. The 
ideological triumph of the consensus helped the IMF to push ahead with neoliberal economic 
policies in the crisis-affected countries.
As the negative side effects of IMF-supported programmes -  such as prolonged economic 
recession, massive unemployment and the rise of income inequality - ,  the influence of the 
Washington consensus decreased. For these reasons, the post-Washington consensus 
emphasised pro-cyclical macroeconomic policy, institutional frameworks for pmdent 
regulation / supervision, and social safety nets.
It should be noted that the emergence of the post-Washington consensus does not 
necessarily mean the decline of the Washington consensus. As Table 3-4 demonstrates, the 
PWC is no absolute denial of the WC. In other words, the PWC is neither anti-global not anti­
liberal. The PWC supports trade liberalisation by supporting the WTO disciplines and prudent 
macroeconomic management by establishing independent central banks. Furthermore, the 
PWC endorses a transparent corporate governance system and labour market reform. In this 
sense, Dani Rodrik calls the PWC an “augmented Washington consensus”.
John Williamson, Costs and Benefits of Financial Globalisation: Concepts, Evidence and 
Implications, in Geoffrey R. D. Underhill and Xiaoke Zhang (eds.). International Financial 
Governance under Stress: Global Structures versus National Imperatives (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002)
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[Table 3-4] A Comparison o f the Washington Consensus and the Post-Washington Consensus
228
Original Washington Consensus Augmented Washington consensus
Fiscal discipline
Reorientation of public expenditure 
Tax reform
Interest rate liberalization
Unified and competitive exchange rate
Trade liberalization
Openness to DPI
Privatization
Deregulation
Secure property rights
Corporate governance 
Anti-corruption 
Flexible labor markets 
Adherence to WTO disciplines 
Adherence to international financial 
codes and standards 
“Prudent” capital-account opening 
Non-intermediate exchange rate regimes 
Independent central banks / inflation 
targeting 
Social safety nets 
Targeted poverty reduction
In the next part, I analyse how the political power o f the Washington consensus affected 
the post-crisis economic adjustment in Korea and Malaysia. To this end, I examine four policy 
areas respectively: macroeconomic stabilisation, financial restructuring, corporate reform and 
labour market reform. Although the policies were intertwined, I explore them separately for 
analytical reasons.
228 Dani Rodrik, Growth Strategies, Working Paper No. 10050 (NBER, 2003), p.44.
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Part II 
Case Studies
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Chapter IV 
Macroeconomic Stabilisation
1. Introduction
This chapter examines how much the political power of the Washington consensus 
affected macroeconomic adjustment in Korea and Malaysia. When it comes to 
macroeconomic policy, the consensus preaches the importance of Gscd discij)%e;^a 
competitive exchange rate and market-determined interest rates, which became the key 
features of IMF-supported programmes. The IMF gave top priority to exchange rate 
stabilisation -  consisting of high interest rates and fiscal tightening -  on the basis that price 
stability is the foundation for sound macroeconomic policy. At the same time, the IMF 
emphasised the need for radical restructuring of the financial and corporate sectors. The 
rationale is that the macroeconomic imbalances could not be fixed without structural reform 
because the financial crisis arose from microeconomic weaknesses as well as macroeconomic 
mismanagement.
On the other hand, critics of the Washington consensus -  for example, Joseph Stiglitz and 
Jeffrey Sachs -  put stress on economic growth rather than price stability. For this reason, they 
recommended a counter-cyclical policy: i.e., low interest rates and fiscal expansion. With 
respect to structural reform, they claimed that financial and corporate restructuring should be 
implemented after economic recovery on the ground that structural reforms would be likely to 
defer economic growth at least in the short-term. For example, high interest rate policy
Morris Goldstein, The Asian Financial Crisis: Causes, Cures, and Systemic Implications 
(Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1998); Giancarlo Corsetti, Paolo Pesenti and 
Nouriel Roubini, Paper Tigers? A Model of the Asian Crisis, European Economic Review, Vol.43, No.7 
(June 1999)
The IMF privileged the fundamentalist view. See Stanley Fischer, In Defense of the IMF:
Specialized Toils for a Specialized Task, Foreign Affairs, Vol.77, No.4 (July-August 1998); Jack 
Boorman, Timothy Lane, Marianne Schulze-Ghattas, Ales Bulir, Atish R Ghosh, Javier Hamann, 
Alexandros Mourmouros, and Steven Phillips, Managing Financial Crises: The Experience in East Asia, 
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Vol.53 (2000)
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worsened non-performing loans (NPLs) by increasing the financial burden of highly-indebted 
companies?^^
Table 4-1 presents the two competing views on the causes of the crisis and policy 
remedies to it.
[Table 4-1] Competing Views on the Financial Crisis 232
Fundamentalist Non-fundamentalist
Analysis
Definition Financial (or illiquid) Crisis Currency (or liquid) Crisis
Causes
Moral Hazards in Financial Sector Volatility of Financial Markets
Vulnerable Financial Structure 
Inflexible Exchange Rate
Un-hedged Liberalisation 
Large Short-term Borrowing
Policy
Responses
Capital Account Liberalisation Control
Exchange Rates Free Floating Fixed / Managed Floating
Monetary Policy Tightening Easing
Fiscal Policy Austerity Expansion
Whether the IMF intervened or not, Korea and Malaysia adopted a pro-cyclical policy at 
least from October 1997 to the first half of 1998. Both governments raised interest rates and 
reduced fiscal spending to slow capital outflows and to prevent rapid depreciation of the 
currency.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Each section of Korea and Malaysia begins 
with an overview of the debate on the causes of the financial crisis. In the sections, attention is 
paid to how the IMF, policy makers and big business interpreted the crisis. Then I analyses 
how their interpretations affected the making and implementation of policy prescriptions. The 
final section draws a conclusion from the case studies.
Martin Feldstein, Refocusing the IMF, Foreign Affairs, Vol.77, No.2 (March-April 1998); Jeffrey D. 
Sachs and Steven Radelet, The East Asian Financial Crisis: Diagnosis, Remedies, Prospects, Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity, No.l (1998); Jason Furman and Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economic Crises: 
Evidence and Insights from East Asia, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, No.2 (1998); Roberto 
Chang and Andres Velasco, A Model of Financial Crises in Emerging Markets, Quarterly Journal o f 
Economics, Vol.CXVI, No.2 (May 2001)
The distinction is drawn from Giancarlo Corsetti, Paolo Pasenti, and Nouriel Roubini, What Caused 
the Asian Currency and Financial Crisis?, Japan and World Economy, Vol. 11, No.3 (1999)
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2. Korea
1) The Causes and Consequences o f the Financial Crisis
In the mid-1990s, the Korean economy had few symptoms of financial crisis. Except 
looming current account deficits, most macroeconomic indicators appeared sound, compared 
with other developing countries. This assessment proved to be wrong when the Thai crisis 
spread to the Northeast Asian region. A series of bankruptcy of chaebols including Hanbo 
Steel and Kia Motor in the first half of 1997 reminded both foreign investors and policy 
makers that the underlying weaknesses at the micro level were disguised by apparently sound 
‘macro’ economic indices.
The health of the economy got worse in the second half of 1997. The corporate failures 
spilled over the banking sector by generating an unprecedented level of NPLs. In response to 
the growing concern over the fragility of domestic financial institutions, the government 
issued a public statement that it would guarantee the payment of foreign debt liabilities by 
Korean financial institutions on 29 August 1997. This measure failed to stabilise financial 
markets because market participants suspected that the government did not have sufficient 
foreign exchange reserves to support the institutions. As a matter of fact, the government did 
not have correct information about the total obligation of overseas borrowing by Korean 
institutions because it relied on IMF’s residence-based debt data that did not include offshore 
borrowing by overseas branches of domestic banks.
For a historical background, see Donald Kirk, Korean Crisis: Unraveling o f the Miracle in the IMF 
Era (New York: St. Matin’s Press, 2000); Tat Van Kong, The Politics o f Economic Reform in South 
Korea: A Fragile Miracle (London: Routledge, 2000); Heather Smith (ed ). Looking Forward: Korea 
after the Economic Crisis (Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 2000); Marcus Noland, Avoiding the 
Apocalypse: The Future o f the Two Koreas (Washington DC.: Institute for International Economics, 
2000); Robert F, Emery, Korean Economic Reform: Before and Since the 1997 Crisis (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2001); Brian Bridges, Korea after the Crash: The Politics o f Economic Recovery (London: 
Routledge, 2001)
IMF, IMF and Recent Capital Account Crises: Indonesia, Korea, Brazil (IMF, 2003), pp. 188-89.
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Politically-motivated exchange rate policy worsened the situation. In the second half of 
1997, a widespread consensus among economists was that the won should be depreciated to 
reduce trade deficits. However, the Bank of Korea (BOK) actively intervened in currency 
markets to defend the currency. Behind the intervention lay political considerations. It is 
believed that President Kim Young Sam ordered his cabinet to maintain a strong won policy 
to accomplish GDP per capita 10,000 dollars by the end of his tenure. As a result of the 
policy, foreign exchange reserves were quickly depleted. Between June and November 1997, 
foreign exchange reserves fell by nearly 10 billion dollars. Despite this intervention, the 
currency was devalued below the psychological barrier W 1,000: $ 1 on 17 November 1997 
(the 1996 averaged rate is W 802: $ 1). According to Stanley Fischer, “Negotiations began in 
Seoul on 26 November, and concluded on December 3, by which date Korea was virtually out 
of reserves.”
To prevent a balance-of-payments crisis. Finance Minister Kang Kyung Shik sent his 
deputy to Tokyo on 11 November 1997. However, the Japanese government refused to 
provide any financial assistance on a bilateral basis. To make matters worse, the 
government not take any action to stop Japanese banks from withdrawing 7 billion dollars 
loans from Korean banks. This lukewarm attitude was due to US Treasury’s diplomatic 
pressure on its Japanese counterpart not to bypass the IMF. Korea’s negative reaction to the
The mistakes made by policy makers were clearly stated by the Board of Audit and Inspection. See 
Board of Audit and Inspection, Gamsa Yeongam 1998 [BAI Annual Report 1998\ (Seoul: Board of 
Audit and Inspection, 1998), pp. 110-119.
Sang-Woo Nam and Se-Jong Kim, Evaluation of Korea’s Exchange Rate Policy, in Ito Takatoshi 
and Anne O, Krueger (eds.). Changes in Exchange Rates in Rapidly Developing Countries: Theory, 
Practice, and Policy Issues (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999) See also Dong-A Ilbo, 
Ilgeobeorin Sibnyeon Kalguksueseo IMFkkajvYS Munmin Jeongbu 1800U Bihwa [Lost Five Years from 
Noodle to the IMF: The Secret behind the Kim Young Sam Government} (Seoul: Dong-A Ilbosa, 1999), 
pp.215-237.
Woo Sik Moon and Yeong Seop Rhee, Foreign Exchange Market Liberalization Policies in South 
Korea: Past Assessment and Future Options, in Kyung Tae Lee (ed.). Globalization and the Asia 
Pacific Economy (London: Routledge, 2002), p.l21.
Stanley Fischer, The International Financial System: Crises and Reform, The Lionel Robbins 
Lecture (London School of Economics, 29-31 October 2001), pp. 14-15.
Paul Blustein, The Chastening: Inside the Crisis that Rocked the Global Financial System and 
Humbled the IMF (New York: PublicAffairs, 2001), p. 128.
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Asian Monetary Fund (AMP) proposal in September 1997 also made Japanese officials 
unenthusiastic about financial aid to Korea.
In addition to the policy mistakes, social and political instability contributed to aggravate 
the crisis. To enhance flexibility in the labour markets, the government proposed new labour 
bills in December 1996. However, the bills backfired because the New Korea Party (NKP: the 
ruling party) tried to pass them secretly in the National Assembly without giving opposition 
parties and trade unions any notice. After a general strike organised by the Korean 
Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) and the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU), 
the government made substantial concessions to them. Furthermore, die implementation of 
many laws was deferred in two years.
Second, high-profile corruption scandals weakened President Kim Young Sam’s political 
leadership. In particular, the collapse of Hanbo Steel in early 1997 had an enormous impact on 
domestic politics. The company provided bribes to key politicians and policy makers who 
exerted influence on banks to extend credit to the company. Among them, Kim Ifyun Choi, a 
son of the President, was the most notorious case. His arrest severely damaged the moral and 
political authority of President Kim. The decline of his political power was accelerated by the 
presidential election due in December 1997.
Finally, the presidential election aggravated both political and economic uncertainty. 
Under authoritarian regimes, it had not been hard to predict who would be the next president 
because the ruling party supported by the military and the chaebol won presidential elections 
with a comfortable margin. Démocratisation changed the rules of the game, making the 
election an unpredictable competition.
^  Jung Hun Lee and Chung in Moon, Responding to Japan’s Asia Policy: The Korean Calculus, in 
Takashi Inoguchi (edj, Japan’s Asia Policy: Revival and Response (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan,
2002), pp. 154-58. See also Do Hyung Kim, East Asia’s Economic Crisis and Korea-Japan Cooperation, 
Korea Focus (November / December 1998)
Park, Se-il, Managing Labor Reform Lessons from the Korean Experience, 1996-97 (KDI, 2000) 
Sung Deuk Hahm and Kwang Woong Kim, Institutional Reforms and Democratization in Korea: 
The Case of the Kim Young Sam Administration, 1993-1998, Governance, Vol. 12, No,4 (October 
1999)
For the role of democracy in the crisis, see Jongryn Mo and Chung-in Moon, Epilogue: Democracy 
and the Origins of the 1997 Korean Economic Crisis, in Jongryn Mo and Chung-in Moon (eds.).
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In the presidential race, the prospects for Lee Hoi Chang, the candidate of the Grand 
National Party (GNP: the ruling party) were not promising. One reason is that he was 
caught out by a scandal that his two sons had intentionally evaded mandatory military service. 
The revelation was a severe setback to him because the former Justice of the Supreme Court 
had earned a reputation as an anti-corruption campaigner. The decline of Lee Hoi Chang’s 
popularity did not automatically increase that of his main rival. Although Kim Dae Jung -  the 
candidate of the National Congress for New Politics (NCNP) -  was respected for his life-long 
struggle for democracy and human rights, his radical platform was an obstacle to broadening 
his political base. It was the power struggle in the ruling party that helped Kim Dae Jung to 
become a fiont-runner in the race. Lee Hoi Chang’s popularity fell substantially after 
expelling President Kim Young Sam from the party. This prompted Rhee In Je, former 
Governor of Kyonggi province to leave the party and established himself as a serious 
contender. Consequently Kim Dae Jung won the election on 19 December 1997.
The end of the presidential election did not alleviate political uncertainty at all. As Table
4-2 shows, Kim Dae Jung won the election with a very narrow margin. In additicxi, the ruling 
coalition (NCNP-ULD) was in a minority in the National Assembly. Thus his political power 
was much more limited than his predecessors. Moreover, there was a concern about his 
economic policy among market participants because he was not regarded as a pro-market 
politician.
Democracy and the Korean Economy (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1999); Sunhyuk Kim, The Political 
Origins of South Korea’s Economic Crisis: Is Democratization to Blame?, Democratization, Vol.7, 
No.4 (Winter 2000)
^  The GNP succeeded the NKP after Lee expelled President Kim Young Sam in November 1997.
Won-Taek Kang and Hoon Jaung, The 1997 Presidential Election in South Korea, Electoral Studies, 
Vol. 18, No.4 (December 1999); Byung-Kook Kim, Electoral Politics and Economic Crisis, 1997-1998, 
in Larry Diamond and Byungkook Kim (eds.), Consolidating Democracy in South Korea (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner, 2000)
^  Washington Post, Opposition Leader Wins S. Korean Vote (19 December 1997)
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[Table 4-2] Presidential Election Results (December 1997)
Candidate Political party Share of the vote (%)
Kim Dae Jung NCNP- ULD 40.3
Lee Hoi Chang GNP 38.7
Rhee In Je NPP 19.0
Others 2.0
Source: National Election Commission
2) The Collapse of Developmentalism and the Triumph of Neoliberalism
It is well-known that Park Chung Hee’s developmental strategy was heavily influenced by 
Japan’s industrialisation strategy. According to Bai Gao, Japanese economic ideas consist of 
three general principles: viewing the economy strategically; restraining excessive competition; 
and rejecting the profit motive in management. These policy ideas were imported by the 
Park regime. Park Chung Hee was a graduate of the Japanese Military Academy and his key 
policy makers such as Tae Wan Son and Chang Ki Yong worked at Japanese banks during the 
colonial period (1910 -  1945). In addition, few economists had economic ideas about 
economic development and industrialisation in less-developed economies at that time. 
Although American-trained economists such as Nam Duck Woo fi'equently advised President 
Park, their influence was very limited until the late 1970. In this regard, Robert Wade points 
out that those neoclassical economists did not play a crucial role in the government.
The activities of such an agency are likely to be uncongenial to economists trained to believe that 
targeting by officials will generally fail. That is one good reason for curbing number and influence 
of economists in the industrial policy-making process, as was done in Japan, Korea and Taiwan. 
The other reason is that neoclassical economics has little to say about the issues raised by the
Bai Gao, Economic Ideology and Japanese Industrial Policy: Developmentalism from 1931 to 1965 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997)
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present shift of technoeconomic paradigm, of how to exploit the opportunities opened by the new 
information technologies.
Since the 1980s, the number of economists educated in American rapidly grew in the 
government and academic institutions. During the 1980s, almost six hundred Koreans 
received PhD from US academic institutions. The number is nearly three times more than that 
of Japan. Many American-trained economists joined government-affiliated institutions 
including the Korean Development Institute (KDI) and chaebol’s research centres which 
influenced policy-making through various channels.
The inflow of the American-trained economists generated a profound intellectual shift. 
Because most economics departments in American universities taught neoclassical economic 
theories that were drawn from the experience of American capitalism, their policy preferences 
were market-oriented rather than state-led development. More importantly, some economists 
witnessed the monetarist revolution led by Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman in the 
1970s. The intellectual shift in the US had an enormous impact on Korean economists.
The Korean Development Institute (KDI) was at the heart of the intellectual shift. The 
KID was established as a think tank in March 1971 under the Second Five-Year Development 
Plan. Its influence rapidly increased among policy makers as its economists were recruited by 
President Park particularly after Nam Duck Woo was appointed as the Minister of Economic 
Planning Board (EPB) in the mid-1970s.
The theoretical foundation for the KDI was neoclassical economics that was predominant 
in American universities at that time. Some neoliberal American economists including Anne 
Krueger collaborated with KDI economists. Their collaborations were concerned about
Wade (1991), p.372.
Alice H. Amsden, The Specter of Anglo-Saxonization is Haunting South Korea, in Lee-Jay Cho and 
Yoon Hyung Kim (eds.), Korea’s Political Economy: An Institutional Perspective (Boulder: Westview, 
1994), pp. 91-96.
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financial and trade liberalisation. Although some works admitted the advantages of 
interventionist policies, most KDI publications promoted market-oriented reform.
This tendency was intensified by its recruitment policy. From the begging, the institution 
employed Korean economists graduated from top American academic institutions. For 
example, ten out Of eleven presidents of the KDI were American-trained economists: UC 
Berkeley (2), Minnesota (2), University of Pennsylvania, Missouri, Pittsburgh, Vanderbilt, 
Wisconsin- Madison and Syracuse. One exception was Kang Bong Kyun who had a typical 
bureaucrat career in the EPB but did master degree at Williams College. It should be noted 
that major Chaebol’s research centres also started to recruit American-trained economists at 
that time.
The political power of KDI economists was not fully realised until the early 1980s. One 
reason is that Park Chung Hee wanted to continue his ambitious industrial policy, although he 
recognised many negative consequences of the policy.
Although Korea’s economic policy has been broadly outward oriented, the thinking of its top 
economic policymakers has departed in a number of ways from economic orthodoxy. During the 
1970s, two contending policy lines coexisted. A number of officials in the economic bureaucracy 
argued for a more market-oriented style of economic management. The top political leadership and 
advocates of an activist industrial pohcy supported a more dirigist approach, emphasizing exports 
but also industrial planning and the use of a variety of controls and direct interventions in order to 
deepen the industrial sector in heavy and chemical industries.
Some exceptions were Leroy P. Jones and Sakong II, Government, Business, and Entrepreneurship 
in Economic Development: The Korean Case (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980); David C. 
Cole and Yung Chul Park, Financial Development in Korea, 1945-1978 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1983)
Like US universities, the KDI has recruited research fellows through job fairs at annual conference 
of the American Economic Association. Confidential interview with KDI economists (Seoul, July 2002) 
Stephan Haggard, Richard N. Cooper, and Susan Collins, Understanding Korea’s Macroeconomic 
Policy, in Stephan Haggard, Richard N. Cooper, Sung-Tae Ro, and Susan Collins (eds.). 
Macroeconomic Policy and Adjustment in Korea, 1970-1990 (Cambridge: Harvard Institute for 
International Development, 1994), p. 5.
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After the assassination of President Park Chung Hee in October 1979, the Chun Doo 
Hwan regime recruited young economists to replace old bureaucrats who were accused of 
corruptions. As a result, several KDI economists -  Kim Jae Ik, Kim Ki Hwan, Sakong II and 
Kim Mahn Je -  and their supporters such as Kang Kyung Shik in the bureaucracy held the key 
posts in the Presidential Office and the EPB in the early 1980s. The core of their ideas was 
stabilisation by liberalisation (especially, interest rates and trade) and the restructuring of 
heavy and chemical industries. Although the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry opposed their policy initiatives, the KDI economists pushed ahead 
with the policies.
The ascent of Kim Jae Ik was the best example to show how liberal economists dominated 
economic policy-making. He started his career as an economist at the Bank of Korea. After 
doing Ph.D. at Stanford University, he was hired by Nam Duck Woo -  Minster of Economic 
Planning Board (EPB) in 1974 and worked at the Presidential Office until the death of 
President Park. However, his policy ideas were not fully implemented until he became a 
senior economic adviser to President Chun Doo Hwan in 1980. His policy preferences were to 
achieve price stability, to liberalise trade regimes and to refrain growth in wages and tax rates. 
At the same time, he pushed ahead with radical structural adjustments. He was the key 
architect o f the Investment Reorganisation of the Heavy and Chemical Industries in August 
1980.
Against this background, financial liberalisation in the early 1990s was motivated by 
neoliberal ideas.
The quest for liberalize Korean finance was carried out by transnational elites now ensconced as
economic technocrats... all experts on finance, all with American Ph.D.s, and all professing
For the debate on stabilisation package, see Heunggi Kim (ed.), Yeongyokui Hanguk Gyeongje: Bisa 
Gyeongjegihoegwon 33 Nyeon \Up and Down in the Korean Economy: The Secret behind the Economic 
Planning Board 33 Years^ (Seoul: Maekyung, 1999), pp.275-314.
Kihwan Kim, Kim Jae-Dc: His Life and Contributions, in Lawrence B. Krause and Kim Kihwan 
(eds.). Liberalization in the Process o f Economic Development (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1991); Yun Tae Kim, Neoliberalism and the Decline of the Developmental State, Journal o f 
Contemporary Asia, Vol.29, No.4 (1999), pp.444-46.
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allegiance to the goal of liberalization, as well as the entire panoply of thirty five men at the Korean 
Development Institute, every last one of them a Ph.D. from American universities. Ideological 
osmosis could not have more complete.
Despite the increasing influence of liberal economists, many of their policy initiatives 
were not popular among policy makers and some of his initiatives -  for example, real name 
deposit system and stronger anti-monopoly laws -  were not implemented. One of the reason is 
that there were little consensus over the liberal policy ideas. The political power of Kim Jae-Ik 
was based on his close relationship with President Chun Doo Hwan. Although there were 
several supporters in the EPB, very few senior bureaucrats in the Ministiy of Finance were 
sympathetic towards liberalisation. In fact, state intervention was pervasive in some policy 
areas including exchange rate management and financial market policy until the late 1980s.
To overcome the opposition, Kim Jae-Ik persuaded President Chun to appoint his 
lieutenant Kang Kyung Shik as the Minster of Finance. More importantly, politicians 
supported Kim Jae-Ik’s structural reform not because they believed in liberal economic 
thoughts but because they regarded it as a useful tool to control the chaebols. In other words, 
“the new military dictatorship adopted a policy o f ‘liberalization’, one intent of which was to 
mitigate monopolistic abuses by strengthening freer markets as a particular form of discipline 
over big business.”
American-trained economists contributed to supporting economic liberalism in the private 
sector. In the 1990s, top five chaebols -  Samsung, Hyundai, Daewoo, LG and SK-expanded 
research centres to encourage their policy preferences: liberalisation and deregulation policy. 
However, they rarely expressed their dissatisfactions with government policies because
Jung-en Woo, Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1991), pp.190-191.
Janggyu Lee, Gyeongjeneun Dangsini Daetongryeoniya: Chun Doo Hwan Sidaeui Gyongje Bisa 
[You are the President in charge o f Economic Affairs: The Secret behind the Chun Doo Hwan Era] 
(Seoul: Joongang Ilbosa, 1991); Stephan Haggard and Susan Collins, The Political Economy of 
Adjustment in the 1980s, in Stephan Haggard, Richard N. Cooper, Sung-Tae Ro, and Susan Collins 
(eds.), Macroeconomic Policy and Adjustment in Korea, 1970-1990 (Cambridge: Harvard Institute for 
International Development, 1994)
Amsden (1989), p.l20.
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officials frequently complained them about negative assessments on government policies.
To avoid this kind of intervention, the Korean Economic Research Institute (KERI) funded by 
the Korean Federation of Industries (KFI) -  chaebol’s umbrella organisation -  established the 
Center for Free Enterprise (CFE) in 1997. The main aim of the centre is to promote liberal 
economic ideas: minimal state intervention and free market principles. To this end, the CFE 
has published the works of neoliberal economists including Friedrich von Hayek and Milton 
Friedman.
Against this background. President Kim pursued the entry of the Organisation of 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), “ which in turn became the symbol of 
Kim’s new liberal vision for Korea and his intention to push ahead with liberalisation as the 
government’s main policy priority.” In the name of the Segyehwa policy, further 
liberalisation of the economy was undertaken. Its ultimate objective was to enhance national 
competitiveness by overhauling the old politico-economic system. To this end, the 
Presidential Commission of Segyehwa Promotion, set up on 21 January 1995, proposed a 
broad agenda of six major reforms: education, law and economy, politics and mass media, 
national and local administration, environment, and culture.
The ambitious projects were hardly implemented because many of them were a political 
marketing tool rather than a serious policy initiative. Nevertheless, the policy had a 
significant impact on the ideological shift toward neoliberalism by emphasising the need for 
liberalisation.
Liberal economists in govemment-affilated institutions moved to chaebol’s think tanks, but vice 
versa is very rare. Personal interview with Yoon Jong Wang (Seoul, 19 August 2002); Confidential 
interview with SERI economist (Seoul, December 2004)
Elizabeth Thurbon, Ideational Inconsistency and Institutional Incapacity: Why Financial 
Liberalisation in South Korea Went Horribly Wrong, New Political Economy, Vol.8, No.3 (November
2003), p.352.
^  The term Segyehwa means internationalisation or globalisation in Korean. See Samuel S. Kim, 
Korea and Globalization (Segyehwa): A  Framework for Analysis, in Samuel S. Kim (ed.), Korea’s 
Globalization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) For socio-cultural aspects of the policy, 
see Kong (2000), Ch.5; James Lewis and Amadu Sesay (eds.), Korea and Globalization (London: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2001)
Barry K. Gills, Economic Liberalisation and Reform in South Korea in the 1990s: A ‘Coming of 
Age’ or a Case of ‘Graduation Blues’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 17, No.4 (1996); Barry K. Gills and 
Dong-Sook S. Gills, South Korea and Globalization: The Rise to Globahsm?, in Samuel S. Kim (ed.). 
East Asian and Globalization (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000)
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The chaebol supported the Segyehwa policy. However, its priority was a bit different from 
the government’s policy objectives. The chaebol focused on financial liberalisation and labour 
market flexibility, ^fi^ , the government maintained strict regulation on chaebol’s ownership 
of commercial banks because commercial banks could become piggy banks for the chaebol.
For this reason, the chaebol wanted to reduce government intervention in the financial markets^ 
SÉ^oî^ the chaebol d e m ^ ^ d  the government to increase labour market flexibility to reduce 
labouLÇQSts, Many chaebol companies except Samsung experienced violent labour disputes 
from the late 1980s.
The financial crisis accelerated the ideological shift. Massive criticisms of crony 
capitalism led policy makers and economists to convince that close govemment-business 
relationship was a major source of political corruption; the relationship should be changed to 
end a vicious circle of cronyism between political elites and business leaders. This is why the 
vast majority of Korean economists agreed to IMF’s interpretations that the crisis was caused 
by domestic weaknesses in the financial and corporate sectors.^ *^ ^
Some economists challenged the dominant interpretation, arguing that external factors 
such as speculative attacks were more important than internal ones in explaining the cause of 
the crisis.^^^ Furthermore, Chung Un Chan, one of the most influential economists, criticised 
IMF’s stabilisation policy from a perspective of Keynesianism. However, this view was not 
shared by mainstream economists.
For example, See Deakeun Park and Changyong Rhee, Currency Crisis in Korea: How was it 
Aggravated?, Asian Development Review, Vol. 16, No.l (1998); Sung Hee Jwa and Huh Chan Guk, 
Korea’s 1997 Currency Crisis: Causes and Implications, Korea Journal (Summer 1998); Hak K. Pyo, 
The Financial Crisis in South Korea: Anatomy and Policy Imperatives, in Karl D. Jackson, The Asian 
Contagion: The Causes and Consequences o f a Financial Crisis (Boulder: Westview Press ,1998); 
Joon-ho Hahm and Frederic S. Mishkin, The Korean Financial Crisis: An Asymmetric Information 
Perspective, Emerging Markets Review, Vol.l, No.l (May 2000); Dongchul Cho and Kiseok Hong, 
Currency Crisis of Korea: Internal Weakness or External Interdependence, in Takatoshi Ito and Anne O. 
Krueger (eds.). Regional and Global Capital Flows: Macroeconomic Causes and Consequences 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001)
Ha-Joon Chang, Korea: The Misunderstood Crisis, World Development, Vol.26, No.8 (August 1998) 
Un-Chan Chung, Hanguk Gyeongje Ajikdo Meoreotda [There is still a long way to go to reform the 
Korean Economy] (Seoul: Namu wa Sup, 1999) See also Un-Chan Chung, The Korean Economy before 
and after the Crisis, in Duck-Koo Chung and Barry Eichengreen (eds.). The Korean Economy beyond 
the Crisis (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2004).
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The triumph of the crony capitalism thesis is reflected in the Korea Development Institute 
(KDI)’s assessment.
[T]he Korean economic crisis arose from international creditors’ loss of confidence in the Korean 
economy’s insolvent corporate and financial sectors, negligent financial supervision and an 
inherently unstable international money market. However, it should be kept in mind that these 
fundamental causes are rooted in die accumulation of structural economic weaknesses. Over the 
past thirty years of accelerated economic growth, former governments were deficient in developing 
the rules and principles of a market economy, failing to implement structural reform policies 
consistent with changes in the international environment.
The political power of the Washington consensus was enhanced by IMF’s intervention.
On 11 December, Kim Dae Jung hinted that some clauses of the IMF-supported programmes 
could be revised if he were elected. His intention was not to reject the agreement but to 
renegotiate some clauses in the conditionality. Nevertheless, his remark disturbed financial 
and currency markets because foreign observers understood that he would not implement the 
economic reform that the Fund demanded. To restore market confidence, the IMF warned the 
three presidential candidates that it would cancel its financial assistance unless all of them 
commit themselves to the programmes. Although this was a clear violation of national 
sovereignty, they could not help accepting IMF’s demand because of the crisis.
This incident restrained, to some extent, economists as well as bureaucrats from 
discussing -  let alone criticising -  the appropriateness of the programme in public. Even 
after the election, Kim Dae Jung as President-elect invited high-profile foreign investors 
including George Soros to assure his commitment to economic reform. At the same time, he 
included liberal economists and policy makers -  among others. You Jong Keun and Lee Hun
KDI, Djnomics: A New Foundation for the Korean Economy (Seoul: KDI, 1999), p. 10. 
Asiaweek, Biting the IMF Bullet - Seoul was Close to a ‘Financial Catastrophe’ (12 December 
1997); Economist, Panic in South Korea (13 December 1997)
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (London: Allen Lane, 2002), pp.42-43.
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Jai -  in the Committee for Emergency Economic Countermeasures that functioned as a 
cabinet before his inauguration.
The success of the crony capitalism thesis in the theoretical battles shaped Kim Dae 
Jung’s economic policy. The persuasive influence of the Washington consensus was so 
enormous that all the opposition parties committed themselves to economic reform, 
irrespective of their ideological orientations. It is equally important that Kim Dae Jung’s 
economic philosophy had an important impact on the rise of the Washington consensus. He 
was one of the most ardent critics of the chaebol system. According to him, the crisis was 
caused by the collusion between the government and business. For this reason, Kim argued that 
economic reform could not be accomplished without political démocratisation.
As seen in Figure 4-1, the primary objective of economic reform in the Kim Dae Jung 
administration was to transform the state-led economic system into a market-friendly 
economic system. To this end, the administration embraced key principles of the Washington 
consensus: financial liberalisation, corporate restructuring, labour market flexibility and 
privatisation.
There was a concern that veteran policy makers such as Kim Yong Hwan in the committee might not 
give up government control over the financial sector. See Business Week, The Battle for Kim's 
Economic Soul (26 January 1998)
In terms of policy priority, there was a significant difference between the NCNP and the GNP. The 
ruling party gave top priority to corporate reform to overhaul the old economic system. In contrast, the 
opposition party put more emphasis on deregulation and privatisation than corporate reform because of 
their closeness to the chaebol.
Dae Jung Kim, Mass-Participatory Economy: Korea’s Road to World Economic Power, revised and 
updated Edition (Lanham: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University and University Press of 
America, 1996)
Sunhyuk Kim, The Politics of Reform in South Korea: The First Year of the Kim Dae Jung 
Government, 1998-1999, Asian Perspective, Vol. 24, No. 1 (2000)
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[Figure 4-1] Blueprint for Economic Restructuring 272
Establishing 
market discipline
Market
opening
and
FDI
Corporate sector 
Restructuring
Financial sector 
Restructuring
Public
sector
restructuring
and
fiscal
support
Labor market 
Restructuring
Expanding 
Social safety nets
3) Macroeconomic Adjustment
Despite the widespread consensus over the need for fundamental transformation of the 
economic system, there was a significant disagreement over the speed and sequence of 
economic reform. On the one hand, many policy makers and economists in government- 
affiliated research institutes preferred a radical approach. Their priority was given to structural 
reform rather than macroeconomic stabilisation. They supported a pro-cyclical policy on the 
ground that a counter-cyclical policy might provide some breathing space to unhealthy 
companies, thereby making structural reform incomplete.
272 KDI (1999), p.46.
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This was a significant shift in policy preferences. Because nearly double-digit growth rate 
over the past decades made even five percent growth look a recession, policy makers were 
very negative on pro-cyclical macroeconomic policy. Since the 1960s, pro-stability policy 
seldom prevailed over pro-growth policy. One exception was the 1979-80 recession when 
Kim Jae Ik -  Chief Economic Advisor to President Chun Doo Hwan -  presided over 
economic policy-making. Against this background, it was no surprise that some policy 
makers were hesitant to accept IMF’s stabilisation package. This negative attitude was not 
changed until Michel Camdessus intervened in the negotiation process.
On the other hand, most economists in chaebol’s research institutes favoured a gradual 
approach. Their argument was that structural reform should be implemented only after 
economic recovery become solid. In the short term, structural reform tends to aggravate 
economic recession. Thus, they demanded a Keynesian policy to boost economic growth. At 
the same time, they warned that government involvement in structural reform would violate 
the ultimate objectives of economic reform: a transformation of the state-led system to a 
market-oriented one.
As a matter of fact, highly-leveraged chaebol companies suffered from high interest rates 
policy due to companies suffered from rising burdens of interest payments. In the first quarter 
of 1998, the bankruptcy rate was nearly triple its level a year earlier. For this reason, the 
chaebol called for the IMF to decrease interest rates. For example, Kim Woo Choong -  then 
chairman of Daewoo and President of the FKI -  sent an open letter to the IMF managing 
director on 9 February 1998.
For his policy, see Lawrence B. Krause and Kim Kihwan (eds.), Liberalization in the Process o f 
Economic Development (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991)
IMF (2003), p. 170.
KERI, Choegeun Gyeongje Hyeonangwa Daechaek [Current Economic Problems and its Remedies] 
(KERI, 1998). Top four chaebol’s research centres -  Samsung, Hyundai, LG and Daewoo -  participated 
in the making of this policy paper.
Sung Hee Jwa, A New Paradigm for Korea’s Economic Development: From Government Control to 
Market Economy (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp.214-19.
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In the debate, the pro-cyclical policy prevailed over the counter-cyclical policy. This made 
it easy for the IMF to implement its stabilisation package effectively. Table 4-3 is a summary 
of IMF’s policy recommendation.
[Table 4-3] Changes in the IMF’s Macroeconomic Projections 277
Monetary policy Fiscal policy 
(%)
Growth 
rate (%)
Inflation
(%)
Current account *
97.12. 3 Raise call rates from 
12.5 % to 21 %
A minimum 
balance and 
preferably small 
surplus
-3 5
97.12.24 Raise call rates, 
reaching about 30 %
98. 2. 7
Cautiously allowed to 
ease in line with 
continued exchange 
rate stabilization
-0.8 -1 Slightly
below
double
digits
2
98. 5.2 Call rates continued 
to be lowered
-1.75 -1 One digit 7
98. 7.24 Further gradual 
reduction in interest 
rates
-4 -4 9 11
98.11.13 Easy monetary stance -5 5 7
99. 3.10 Flexible monetary 
policy
-5 2 3 Narrow
significantly but 
remain substantial
99.11.24 Low interest rate 
policy
-4 8-9 3 Narrow but 
remain in surplus
00. 7.12 Adjusted to address 
possible inflationary 
pressures
-1 .5 -2 8 -8 .5 Below 2.5 Narrow but 
remain in surplus
* Percent of GDP
The most urgent task was the stabilisation o f the currency rate. On the brink of default, the 
government borrowed 21 billion, 10 billion and 4 billion dollars from the IMF, the World 
Bank and ADB, respectively. As a second line of defence, 13 countries made a commitment to 
lend 23.3 billion dollars, if necessary. The total amount of the package was 58.35 billion 
dollars. Following the Manila Framework in November 1997, the country was offered 13.5
Based on Letters of Intent. Available at httD://www.imf.org/extemal/countrv/KOR/index.htm
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billion dollars of Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF) in addition to the 7.5 billion dollars in 
stand-by loans.
The rescue package failed to improve foreign exchange liquidity quickly. One of the 
reasons is that the debts o f Korean banks were not rolled over due to its negative economic 
outlook. To resolve the problem, the IMF and the US Treasury and the Federal Reserve 
System organised special meeting in New York in January 1998. As a result, 13 
representatives of the foreign commercial banks agreed to extend the maturity dates of 23 
billion dollars short-term credits to Korean banks on 28 January 1998. Following the 
agreement, 96.5 percent of Korean commercial banks’ short-term debt -  21.8 billion dollars -  
was converted to longer-term loans with a maturity o f one to three years. The success of 
rescheduling offered a breathing space for the wrecked economy to launch wide-ranging 
reforms.
In April 1998, the government succeeded in issuing 4 billion dollars worth of Foreign 
Exchange Equalisation Bonds with the help of the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission.^’  ^The global bond issuance allowed Korean financial institutions and 
corporations in the private sector to regain access to international capital markets. However, 
this did not imply the return of foreign investor confidence. At that time, the country’s 
creditworthiness remained below investment grade.
To stabilise the currency markets, short-term interest rates -  which fluctuated around 12 
percent prior to the crisis -  rose to over 30 percent by 24 December 1997. Nonetheless, the 
won fell to its lowest point of won 1,965 per dollar -  more than 50 percent below its pre-crisis 
level. For this reason, some policy makers and the chaebol asserted that the policy worsened 
credit crunch in the financial sector. The IMF defended its policy on the basis that there was 
no realistic alterative to it although the duration of the policy might be too long. In May
Woochan Kim and Yangho Byeon, Restructuring Korean Banks' Short-Term Debts, in David T. Coe 
and Se-Jik Kim (eds.), Korean Crisis and Recovery (IMF & KIEP, 2002)
279 Euromoney, Koreans Dig in their Heels (June 1998)
For the debate, see Dongchul Cho and Kenneth D. West, The Effect of Monetary Policy in Exchange 
Rate Stabilization in Post-Crisis Korea, in Inseok Shin (ed.), The Korean Crisis: Before and After 
(Seoul: KDI, 2000)
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1998, interest rates were lowered to levels well below those prior to the crisis. The three- 
month interest rate fell to its pre-crisis level of around 11 percent by August, and further to 6 
percent in March 1999.
Ironically, the high interest rate policy resulted in consolidating the dominance of the five 
largest chaebols in the financial markets. The top five chaebols borrowed money at a 
cheaper rate by getting their successful subsidiaries to guarantee the debts of others. In 
contrast, even small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with high creditworthiness had to 
pay extra costs in raising funds. As a result, only the corporate bonds issued by the top five 
were traded in bond markets. As shown in Table 4-4, the predominance of the top four 
chaebols was enhanced after the collapse of Daewoo.
[Table 4-4] Concentration of Top Four Chaebols: Hyundai, Samsung, LG & SK
96 97 98 99
Top Thirty Chaebol (a) 348.3 435.3 472.7 422.7
Assets Top Four Chaebol (b) 166.5 220.0 232.7 243.7
Ratio (b/a) 47.8% 50.5% 49.2% 57.6%
Top Thirty Chaebol (a) 385.2 441.4 479.3 445.4
Sales Top Four Chaebol (b) 220.8 257.8 295.2 303.9
Ratio (b/a) 57.3% 58.4% 61.5% 68.2%
♦ Unit: Tri] lion Won
Source: Fair Trade Commission
When it comes to fiscal policy, the IMF’s prescription was a budget balance or small 
surplus in 1998. With the benefit of hindsight, there is little question that the policy was 
flawed. First, it did not consider Korea’s conservative stance in the pre-crisis years. In fact, the 
budget surplus consolidated during 1993-97 was about 0,3 percent of GDP. As a result, the 
national debt was just only 8.8 percent and 11.1 percent of GDP in 1996 and 1997. This figure 
is much lower than the average of the OECD countries of 70 percent. Thus, there was room 
for fiscal deficits. Second, the 1998 recession was far more severe than the IMF projected. The
See IMF (2003), p. 177.
Economist, The Chaebol that Ate Korea (14 November 1998)
Dong Won Kim, Young Soo Lee, and Kyung Suh Park, Credit Crunch and Shocks To Firms: Korean 
Experience under the Asian Financial Crisis, Emerging Markets Review, Vol.3, No.2 (June 2002); IMF, 
Korea: Selected Issues, Country Report No.01/101 (2001), Ch.IV.
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Fund initially estimated -  1 percent of economic growth, but the real GDP contracted by 6 
percent in 1998. According to the IMF, the optimistic projection was due to the Korean 
government’s opposition to a growth projection lower than 2.5 percent in 1998.
To counter the recession, the IMF allowed the government to widen the deficit target to 1 
percent of GDP in May 1998, and to 4 percent in July 1998. A rationale for accommodative 
fiscal policy was that because public debt was only 6 percent of GDP, the government could 
have drawn on its spare borrowing capacity to offer its obligations in exchange for those of 
the countries’ troubled financial sector.
This expansionary policy also had a political motivation. The local election in 1998 was 
regarded as a vote of confidence for Kim Dae Jung’s economic policy. In addition, outcomes 
of the elections had a far-reaching implication for next general election due by April 2000. If 
the ruling party failed to win the election, the GNP would have pursued a pro-chaebol policy 
agenda in the National Assembly. In this respect, the NCNP pushed the government to expand 
fiscal spending.
Following the introduction of a supplementary budget in July and September 1998, the 
deficit objective was raised to 5 percent of GDP. Public expenditure was used 1) to assist 
small and medium-sized enterprises, which were most affected by a lack of credit; 2) to 
finance financial intermediaries ridden with a huge amount of NPLs; and 3) to finance the 
unemployment problem. In the last quarter, however, the decline in interest rates, lay-offs and 
a pay cut in the public sector reduced government spending. Consequently, the government 
deficit shifted from a small surplus in 1997 to a deficit of 3.2 percent of GDP in 1998. As 
Table 4-5 shows, the shift to counter-cyclical policy contributed to impressive economic 
recovery in 1999 and 2000.
IMF (2003), p.178.
Ibid, p .m .
OECD, Economic Surveys: Korea (1999), pp.9-10.
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[Table 4-5] Changes in the Major Economic Index (year-end basis) 287
1997 1998 1999 2000
Economic Growth Rate^^ 5.0 -6.7 10.9 8.8
Unemployment Rate (%) 2.6 6.8 6.3 4.1
Interest Rate (%) 
Overnight Call Rate 31.32 6.48 4.74 6.01
Corporate Bond 28.98 8.00 9.95 8.13
Stock Price Index (p) 376.31 562.46 1,028.07 504.62
Total External Liabilities^ 159.2 148.7 137.1 136.3
Ratio of Short-term Debt (%) 39.9 20.6 28.6 32.4
Foreign Investment^ 7.0 8.9 15.5 15.7
Foreign Exchange (won/dollar) 1,695 1,204 1,138 1,264.5
Foreign Exchange
8.9 48.5 74.0 96.2
Reserves Available^
Unit: $ billion ♦♦Percentage change year-on-year
In the meanwhile, the impact of political institutions was ambivalent On the one hand, the 
1997 presidential election contributed to strengthening the political power of the Washington 
consensus by drawing public attention to economic policy debates. On the other hand, a series 
of elections had a constraining effect on the pro-cyclical policy by exposing policy makers to 
political pressures.
Drawn from MOFB, IMF Wigiihu 4 Nyeonei Seonggwawa Gwaje [Achievements and Tasks after the 
IMF Crisis] (3 December 2001), p.l5.
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3. Malaysia
1) The Causes and Consequences o f the Financial Crisis
Following the collapse of the Thai baht in July 1997, Malaysia underwent one of the worst 
financial crises in recent history. Its currency, the ringgit, depreciated by 44 percent and the 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) Composite Index lost nearly 50 percent between mid- 
1997 and January 1998. As NPLs rose to 8.7 percent by February 1998, some domestic 
financial institutions became virtually insolvent.
Despite the economic hardship, the Malaysian government did not call for any financial 
assistance from the IMF. Its low exposure to foreign currency loans and sound 
macroeconomic fundamentals helped the government to manage the crisis in its own way. 
Above all, its macroeconomic fundamentals were sound in relative terms. In the first half of 
1997, real GDP grew at 8 percent. Fiscal policy was prudent, registering a surplus for the 
previous four years. Further, inflation remained at its lowest level. Although the current 
account deficit -  which was 9.0 and 5.5 percent of GDP in 1995 and 96 respectively -  was a 
cause for concern, it continued to decline in the first half of 1997. Moreover, the financial 
sector was relatively well-regulated. As of the end o f June 1997, the average risk weighted 
capital ratio (RWCR) of the banking system was 12 percent, well above the internationally- 
recommended minimum level of 8 percent. And net NPLs were 2.2 percent of total loans.
However, there were some serious imbalances in the economy. First, rapid credit 
expansion led to deterioration in the asset quality of financial institutions. A large portion of 
foreign capital flowed in the early 1990s was disbursed to non-productive sectors (i.e., 
property and stock). While its robust macroeconomic indices helped to disguise the underlying 
imbalances, it was estimated that the currency was overvalued by approximately 25 percent
This figure was based on the pre-crisis classifications of NPLs. The classifications were revisited 
twice. In January 1998, Anwar shortened the six-month standard to a three-month one. After his 
downfall, the old standard was restored due, in part, to pressures from the business community. See 
Mohamed Ariff and Syarisa Yanti Abubakar, The Malaysian Financial Crisis: Economic Impact and 
Recovery Prospects, Developing Economies, Vol. XXXVII, No.4 (December 1999), p.428.
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and stocks were overpriced by roughly 30 percent. Second, heavy dependence on electronic 
products left the exporting sector prone to economic downturns of its major trading partners. 
Further, the devaluation of the Chinese currency and the depreciation of the Japanese yen 
against the US dollar eroded Malaysia’s competitiveness particularly in the US market.
Policy mistakes aggravated these vulnerabilities. First, the initial attempt to defend the 
ringgit in July 1997 failed to stop the depreciation of the currency. The loss of 1.5 billon 
dollars forced Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) to float the currency. Despite this, the authorities 
denied the possibility of a full-scale financial crisis, thus missing the opportunity to take pre­
emptive actions. It was not until the collapse of the currency and stock market that 
macroeconomic adjustments and structural reforms were seriously considered. Second, some 
temporary measures in the stock market did more harm than good. In December 1997 when 
the KLSE index plunged to its lowest level, trading restrictions were imposed on five of the 60 
brokerage companies without any concrete reason. This unexpected suspension clearly 
shook investors’ confidence. The injection of public funds was not successful in boosting the 
stock market index either. The reason is that many investors exploited the intervention as a 
last chance to sell out their stocks at a reasonable rate.
The economic turmoil gave rise to political instability. In the wake of the crisis, the 
Malaysian leadership carefully observed Indonesia’s crisis because of the geographical 
proximity, close politico-economical relations and ethnic/ religious similarities. ‘Reformasi’ -  
the catchphrase of Indonesian activists -  started to be circulated among anti-Mahathir groups, 
who hoped to emulate the Indonesian movement. In particular, the resignation of Suharto sent 
an alarming warning to Mahathir.
Mohamed Ariff, Fixing Malaysia’s Fixed Exchange Rate Regime: Some Options, Kajian Malaysia, 
Vol.XVII, No.2 (Disember 1999), p.2.
Anita Doraisami, Trade Causes of the Asian Crisis: The Malaysian Experience, World Economy, 
Vol.27, No.5 (2004). See also Enzo Grilli, The Asian Crisis: Trade Causes and Consequences, World 
Economy, Vol. 25, No. 2 (February 2002); Rupa Duttagupta and Antonio Spilimbergo, What Happened 
to Asian Exports During Àe Crisis?, IMF Staff Papers, Vol.51, No.l (2004)
Wall Street Journal, Malaysian Exchange Restricts Five Firms (1 December 1997)
Wall Street Journal, Malaysia Pledges Funds to Assist banks: Plan Unnerves Stock Market, and 
Ringgit (6 March 1998)
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2) Legacies of the New Economic Policy
The financial crisis led policy makers to rethink Mahathir’s economic policy framework 
seriously. At the heart of the framework lies the New Economic Policy (NEP) that was 
launched in the early 1970s. The key principle of the NEP was the harmony between 
economic growth and ethnic equality.
• Eradicating poverty by raising income levels and increasing employment opportunities for all 
Malaysians, irrespective of race
• Accelerating the process of restructuring Malaysian society to correct imbalances, to reduce 
and eventually eliminate the identification of race with economic fimction.
To reduce the gap among the three main ethnic groups (Malays, Chinese and Indian), 
many preferential treatments were given to the bumiputera. Due to the socio-political 
implications, the legitimacy of the policy was rarely challenged even when some NEP 
measures had negative impacts on economic growth.
Against this background, the Look East policy was launched to emulate the East Asian 
countries (particularly Japan and Korea) rather than Western European countries. To achieve 
the nationalist industrialisation programme, the government established the Heavy Industries 
Corporation of Malaysia (HICOM) which subsidised large industrial projects: for example, 
Kedah Cement and Perak Hanjoong, Perwaja Steel and Proton.
The policy was tested by the 1985 economic crisis that was aggravated by the declining of 
major exporting goods (especially petroleum, tin, rubber and palm oil). Facing one of the 
worst recession, there was little room for fiscal expansion because the government over- 
invested heavy indusfrialisation projects. Therefore, Mahathir and Daim turned their attention
Samuel Bassey Okposin, Abdul Halim Abdul Hamid and Ong Hway Boon, The Changing Phases o f 
Malaysian Economy (London: ASEAN Academic Press, 1999), p.44.
R. S. Milne, The Politics of Malaysia's New Economic Policy, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 49, No. 2 
(Summer 1976); Malaysia-Beyond the New Economic Policy, Asian Survey, Vol. 26, No. 12.
(December 1986) For the pre-NEP era, Kwame Sundaram Jomo, A Question o f Class: Capital, the State, 
and Uneven Development (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1988)
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to foreign and non-bumiputera investors. On the one hand, the Investments Promotion Act 
was introduced to encourage foreign investment in 1986. On the other hand, the Industrial 
Coordination Act was revised to support non-bumiputera investment. These liberal policies 
relaxed regulations on ownership and employment -  especially in manufacturing industries -  
that were intended to promote the share of the bumiputera in the economy.
It is hard to conclude that these liberal policies were inspired by the Washington 
consensus. The reason is that the government did not surrender the NEP. Mahathir used the 
policies not to transform the policy framework but to cope with the downturn in business 
cycle. In this regard, it is fair to say that his policy shift was motivated by neoliberalism (or 
the Washington consensus) but by pragmatism.
The legacy of the NEP was clearly imbedded privatisation. The original objective of the 
policy was to downsize inefficient public companies. However, this objective was not 
completely accomplished. The main reason is that “Most of the deregulation and market- 
oriented reforms have avoided directly encroaching on bumiputera ethnic interests in the 
economy. On the contrary, an important condition for privatization efforts is that they should 
conform to NEP objectives, meaning that bumiputera interests should be enhanced in the 
process. ” As a matter of fact, bumiputera were awarded eight projects during the 1986- 
1989 when 14 public enterprises were privatised. In the process, key bumiputera politicians -  
namely, Mahathir, Daim and even Anwar -  took advantage of the policy by awarding 
government contracts their protégés. Ironically, the policy provided the economic and 
financial basis for cronyism.
In the early 1990s, several liberal policies were gradually undertaken by liberal policy 
makers. Although there was no defining moment of policy shift, the ‘National Development
For the causes and consequences of the crisis, see K.S. Jomo, Ling How Kong and Ku Ahmad 
Shamsulbahriah (eds.), Crisis and Response in the Malaysian Economy (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysia 
Economic Association, 1987)
Rajah Rasiah and Ishak Shari, Market, Government and Malaysia’s New Economic Policy, 
Cambridge Journal o f Economics, Vol.25, No. 1 (January 2001), p.65.
Kwame Sundaram Jomo, Whither Malaysia's New Economic Policy?, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 63, No. 4 
(Winter 1990-1991), p.478.
Edmund Terence Gomez and Kwame Sundaram Jomo, Malaysia’s Political Economy: Politics, 
Patronage and Profits, second edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), Chapter 4.
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Policy (NDP: 1991-2000) and ‘Wawasan 2000 (Vision 2020)’, explicitly or implicitly, 
embraced some features of neoliberalism.
The policies defined nine challenges that the government should tackle to become an 
advanced economy by 2020. Among them, three challenges were very close to neoliberal 
economic ideas.
• An entrepreneurial economy that is self-reliant, outward-looking and enterprising
• An economy characterised by low inflation and a low cost of living
• An economy that is subjected to the full discipline and rigour of market forces.
Both political considerations and economic rationales lay behind the shift towards 
neoliberal economic ideas. Although bumiputera businessmen were protected and 
subsidised by the NEP, they complained that government protections and subsidies were not 
sufficient to accomplish the original target (i.e., 30 percent share of the economy). However, 
this complaint was not accepted by the government. As a matter of fact, Mahathir thought that 
bumiputera businessmen demanded more and more government interventions rather than 
making efforts to develop technology and improve productivity.
We should not dismiss the infant industry argument, but we should not bow to illegitimate 
pressure... productive liberalisation ensures that our private sector will be less reliant on artificial 
profits and on protection, which benefits some producers at the expense of consumers and other 
producers. Infants must grow up. They must grow up to be sturdy and strong. And this cannot be 
done if they are over-protected.^®^
Abdul Hamid Ahmad Saiji (ed.), Malaysia’s Vision 2020: Understanding the Concept, Implications 
and Challenges (Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 1993); Mei Ling Sieh Lee, Taking on the World: 
Globalization Strategies in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: McGraw-Hill, 2000)
Okposin et al, (1999), p.46.
For political purpose, Mahathir sometimes chose non-liberal policies such as capital controls despite 
severe opposition from liberal policy makers at the Treasury and the central bank. Personal interview 
with Tan Siok Choo (Kuala Lumpur, 14 March 2002)
Mohamad Mahathir, Malaysia: The Way Forward, Presented at the Inaugural Meeting of the 
Malaysian Business Council (Kuala Lumpur, 28 February 1991)
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Malaysia’s way to liberalisation was different from its neighbours because o f its special 
emphasis on the social objectives of economic development. An underlying consensus among 
political leaders was that the political / social objective of economic development should not 
be surrendered. The consensus had far-reaching implications for the Mahathir regime that 
based its raison d'être on class harmony. If he failed to manage it, he could not justify his 
authoritarian or pseudo-democratic regime. In this regard, the reform plans did not embrace all 
aspects of the Washington consensus that paid very little attention to social policy.
The financial crisis raised a significant question over the consensus by increasing the 
tension between economic efficiency and social objective. On the one hand, Mahathir 
attributed the crisis to external factors. Indeed it was the Thai crisis that put the ringgit into 
a downward spiral. In anticipation of a large devaluation, currency traders undertook a series 
of speculative attacks on the currency in the offshore ringgit market. Consequently, offshore 
ringgit interest rates rose well above domestic rates. This created a vicious cycle o f massive 
capital outflows and financial / corporate distress.
From Mahathir’s point of view, IMF-supported programmes were unacceptable.
Many expected us to go to the IMF for loans to tide over our crisis. But we did not do that. Calling \  
in the IMF would have been a disaster for the Malaysian ummah, as the NEP policies are not in I
keeping with the IMF’s idea of free unfettered competition in which the strongest would take all. /
Equity is not of concern to the IMF. Efficiency, maximising profit for the already rich is.
Bridget Welsh, Malaysia and Globalization; Contradictory Currents, Asian Perspective, Vol. 23, No. 
4 (1999); Mark Beeson, Mahathir and tiie Markets: Globalization and the Pursuit of Economic 
Autonomy in Malaysia, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 3 (Fall 2000); Bruno Trezzini, Embedded State 
Autonomy and Legitimacy: Piecing Together the Malaysian Development Puzzle, Economy and 
Society, Vol. 30, No.3 (August 2001)
For a conspiracy theory, see Kok Wing Lim, Hidden Agenda (Petaling Jaya: Limkokwing Integrated, 
1998) Cf. Linda Y, C. Lim, Crisis and Conspiracy, Far Eastern Economic Review (19 March 1998) 
Kwame Sundaram Jomo (ed.), Malaysian Eclipse: Economic Crisis and Recovery (London: Zed 
Books, 2001)
Mohamad Mahathir, Malaysia’s Experience: Lessons for the Ummah, in Hashim Makaruddm (ed.), 
Islam and the Muslim Ummah: Selected Speeches o f Dr Mahathir Mohamad (Selangor Darul Ehsan: 
Pelanduk Publications, 2000), p.55.
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This interpretation had political origins. Among others, rising ethnic tension was one of 
the key factors than policy makers and politicians had to take into consideration. In Malaysia, 
the economic inequality between the Malays and Chinese was the major source of political 
problems. Until the early 1970s, bumiputera (the literal meaning is sons of the soil) accounted 
for approximately 60 percent of the total population, but the economy was under the control of 
the Chinese. The ethnic rioting on 13 May 1969 alarmed politicians into concluding that 
the economic inequity was a destabilising factor. To prevent ethnic conflicts, multi-ethnic 
political coalitions -  the Alliance (1954-74) and Barisan Nasional (1974- present) -  reached 
an agreement that non-Malay ethnics should tolerate pro-Malay policies. They regarded it 
as a sort of insurance securing them a safer business environment. To achieve equitable 
development among the diverse ethnic groups, the New Economic Policy (NEP) gave 
preferential treatment to the Malays in order. As a result, the stake of the Malays in the 
economy over the decades increased faster than that of the Chinese and Indian.
In terms of foreign economic policy, Mahathir was more pro-Japan than any other East 
Asian leader. A ‘Look East’ policy and ‘East Asian Economic Caucus’ proposals reflect his 
preference. The Look East policy was designed to emulate Japan’s industrialisation rather than 
that o f Western countries. And the East Asian Economic Group (later renamed the East Asian 
Economic Caucus) aimed at building a Japan-led regional framework to cope with economic 
blocs such as the European Union (EU) and the North American Free-Trade Agreement
For example, see Mohamad Mahathir and Shintaro Ishihara, translated by Frank Baldwin, The Voice 
o f Asia: Two Leaders Discuss the Coming Century (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1995) See also Boo 
Teik Khoo, Paradoxes o f Mahathirism: An Intellectual Biography o f Mahathir Mohamad (Kuala 
Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1995)
The majority of the population is Malay (54 percent). Minorities consist of Chinese (35 percent) 
Indian (10 percent) and otiiers (1 percent). Politics have reflected this ethnic division. Political parties 
have organised along ethnic lines and thus their objectives are to promote a particular ethnic group. See 
Harold A. Crouch, Government and Society in Malaysia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996)
John Funston, Malaysia, in John Funston (eds.). Government and Politics in Southeast Asia 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001)
For the historical background of the policy, see Mohamad Mahathir, The Malay Dilemma 
(Singapore: Federal Publication, 1970)
Kit G. Machado, Malaysian Cultural Relations with Japan and South Korea in the 1980s: Looking 
East, Asian Survey, Vol. 27, No. 6 (January 1987); Ho Khai Leong, Malaysia’s Conceptions of 
Security: Self-Resilience, Sovereignty and Regional Dynamics, Asian Perspective, Vol. 22, No. 3 
(1998)
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(NAFTA). In this regard, it is not surprising that Mahathir was one of the most outspoken 
supporters of the Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) proposal.
On the other hand, Anwar sympathised with the IMF, implying that it was not fair to 
ascribe the causes of the crisis solely to external determinants since Malaysia had weaknesses 
in the financial and corporate sectors. Following this logic, he introduced IMF policy 
recommendations in December 1997. His case for the policy was economic efficiency. This 
means that the principle of the NEP -  a harmony between development and equality -  could 
be reserved to regain foreign investor confidence in the short run and to prepare institutional 
frameworks for further economic growth in the long run. As a result, “Anwar’s choice 
projected him as pro-IMF and pro-West, especially in the light of the parameters of public 
discourse that had already been established.”
It is not easy to explain why Anwar took the pro-IMF stance because his political 
supporters in poor agricultural areas suffered most from the IMF-style policy. Before the 
crisis, he earned nation-wide reputation as a defender of Islamic Malays. Moreover, as a 
devoted Muslim, he criticised Western culture in defence of Asian and Islamic culture. For 
these reasons, his conversion to pro-Western values cannot be explained without considering 
his political ambitions. Since the 1995 general election, younger members of UMNO 
anticipated that Anwar would succeed to Mahathir, hoping that leadership change would 
provide them with greater opportunities for promotion.
Despite this, it appeared that the relationship between Mahathir and Anwar was benign. 
Whenever asked about disagreement between them, both leaders dismissed it as an unfounded 
rumour. On departing for a two-month leave of absence abroad in 1997, for example,
Mahathir had appointed Anwar both Acting Prime Minister and Acting President of the j
/
UMNO. In this respect, Anwar’s succession to Mahathir seemed to be a matter of time. /
I
Christine B, N. Chin, The State of the ‘State’ in Globalization: Social Order and Economic 
Restructuring in Malaysia, Third World Quarterly, Vol.21, No.6 (2000), p. 1050.
Ibrahim Anwar, The Asian Renaissance (Singapore: Times Books International, 1996)
Hari Singh, Tradition, UMNO and Political Succession in Malaysia, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 19, 
No 2 (1998)
Sunday Times, Anwar Denies Contradicting Mahathir’s Financial Statements (5 October 1997)
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The financial crisis offered Anwar a window of opportunity to challenge Mahathir’s 
leadership. The Prime Minister was attacked by the failure of his policy responses to the crisis. 
In addition, external environment were not favourable for him. Implicitly or explicitly, the 
disgraceful downfall of Suharto negatively affected his authority because there were many
similarities between the two leaders; for example, intolerance of dissent and pervasive /
/
cronyism.
This uneasy relationship came to the surface when Anwar announced a new policy 
package on 5 December 1997. The package was a political challenge to Mahathir in two 
ways. First, it was initiated by the Treasury and the central bank, not the Prime Minister.
Some measures introduced by the Prime Minister -  including interventions in the stock 
markets and the bailout of Renong -  worsened the crisis. Thus Anwar had a chance to project 
his view into economic policy. His priority was given to restore foreign investor confidence 
and IMF-style macroeconomic policy was adopted. Second, some of Mahathir’s pet projects 
were deferred as a result of budget tightening: for example, the Bakun hydroelectric dam, the 
Kuala Lumpur Linear City project, the Northern Region International Airport, the mountain 
resort highway, and Phase 2 of the new administrative centre in Putrajaya.
The package was welcomed by the international financial community. For example, \  
Michel Camdessus praised Anwar’s policy package. Implicitly or explicitly, this 
endorsement encouraged Anwar to distance himself slightly from Mahathir’s policies. When 
visiting Canada, he said that the pursuit of economic growth without democracy might
R. S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Malaysian Politics under Mahathir (London: Routledge, 1999), 
pp. 156-57. See also Peter Searle, Coping with Corruption and Cronyism, in Gerald Segal and David S. 
G. Goodman, Towards Recovery in Pacific Asia (London: Routledge, 2000)
Wall Street Journal, Intimate Enemies: How Malaysia’s Rulers Devoured Each Other and Much 
They Built (30 October 1998)
Helen E. S. Nesadurai, In Defence of National Economic Autonomy? Malaysia's Response to the 
Financial Crisis, Pacific Review, Vol. 13, No.l (2000)
IMF, Camdessus, Welcomes Malaysia’s New Package of Economic Measures, New Brief No.98/9 
(25 March 1998) Since late 1997 when Anwar introduced IMF-style policy, foreign investors and 
commentators regarded him as a sincere reformer. For example. Wall Street Journal, Malaysia's 
Finance Chief Gains in Stature (22 September 1997)
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encourage cronyism and corruption. It was an implicit challenge to Mahathir who preached 
that economic development should be achieved even at the expense of civil rights.
Despite the international recognition of his policy, only Ahmad Don -  the Governor of the 
central bank -  was on Anwar’s side among senior policy-makers. There are two reasons 
why the IMF’s endorsement did not contribute to strengthening the political power of the 
Washington consensus in the government. First, the bumiputera business community 
supported Mahathir’s interpretation of the crisis. “This not only drew attention away from 
past business mistakes that these companies may have made that contributed to their 
problems, it also meant that state assistance may be forthcoming. Alternative views and 
interpretations were therefore generally downplayed or ignored.”
Second, relatively small short-term foreign borrowings helped Malaysia to survive the 
financial crisis without the IMF’s financial assistance. Nevertheless, the surge of capital 
flights, trade deficits and fiscal deficits required the government to seek extra funding 
resources. Table 4-6 summarises a plan for refinancing.
[Table 4-6] Refinancing Plan 323
Funding requirements Possible sources of funds
Asset management company RM 25 b World Bank US $ 300m disturbed 
US $ 700m to be disturbed 
before year end
Special purpose vehicle RM 16b
Social development RM 7b AMC bond US $ 2 b (maximum)
Infrastructure development RM 5b Japan US $ 300 m (seeking 1-2 b)
Credit facilities for exporters RM 4b Taiwan EXIM Bank US 1 b (under consideration)
Low-cost housing RM 2b Asian Development 
Bank / International 
Islamic Bank
No figure disclosed
One option was the issuing of sovereign bonds in international financial markets. This 
option was postponed since the downgrade of its sovereign credit rating substantially
John Hilley, Malaysia: Mahathirism, Hegemony and the New Opposition (London: Zed Books, 
2001), pp. 65-77 & 106-111.
321 Straits Times, Malaysia’s Interest Rates Take Centre Stage (1 June 1998)
Nesadurai (2000), p.87.
Business Times, Topping More Loans from the World Bank for 1999 (24 July 1998)
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increased the cost of foreign borrowing. An international road show scheduled in July 1998 
was cancelled. Moreover, the introduction of capital controls isolated Malaysia from the 
international financial community. The delay o f the World Bank’s loan was a serious 
setback.^^^ Despite this, Malaysia did not accept the offer o f a 4 million dollars loan from 
Singapore due, in large part, to the uneasy relationship between the two countries.
It was Japan that rescued the country from the danger of a balance-of-payments crisis. 
Since 1994, Malaysia had never asked Japan for loans because the appreciation of the yen 
substantially increased its debt burden. However, the rapid depletion of its foreign currency 
reserves led the country to be a recipient of the New Miyazawa Plan. On 11 December 1998, 
Malaysia issued five-year government bonds (74 billion yen), 90 percent of which was 
guaranteed by Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). Besides, Japan’s 
Export-Import Bank provided the Malaysian government with a 500 million dollars loan.
Against this background, Malaysia strongly supported Japan-centred regional co­
operation. This pro-Japanese stance has a historical origin. A ‘Look East policy’ and ‘Buy 
British Last’ campaign was aimed at emulating Eastern (Japanese) capitalism rather than 
Western capitalism. And Japan’s ODA and EDI were the main sources of its industrialisation 
projects.
Japanese investment has helped raise our level of prosperity and standard of living. Such genuine 
support stands in stark contrast to the dubious ‘investment’ more recently undertaken by currency 
and stock-market speculators, coming to Malaysia after the country had ‘taken off, not to assist in 
the building of a nation, but merely to reap instant profits.
Wall Street Journal, Malaysia Shelves Bond Offering After Moody’s Downgrades Debt (27 July 
1998)
Straits Times, Controls Disrupt World Bank’s Plans for $ 3b Loan (24 September 1998)
EIU, Country Report: Malaysia (1st quarter 1999), p.26.
Asiamoney, The Real Message in Miyazawa’s Plan (February 1999)
Mohamad Mahathir, A New Deal for Asia (Selangor Darul Ehsan: Pelanduk Publications, 1999), 
p.90. For a critical review of the policy, see Kwame Sundaram Jomo (ed.), Japan and Malaysian 
Development: In the Shadow o f the Rising Sun (London: Routledge, 1994)
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Despite Japan’s assistance, the funding problem was not completely resolved until the 
issue of a 1 billion dollars global bond in May 1999. To fill the gap, the government organised 
political campaigns to mobilise domestic savings. At the same time, the government 
requested twelve foreign banks operating in the countiy to lend 1.3 billion dollars at a very 
cheap rate in December 1998.
The general framework of crisis management was presented by the National Economic 
Action Council (NEAC), which was established as a consultative organisation to the cabinet 
on 7 Januaiy 1998. The primary task of the NEAC was to provide a comprehensive 
framework for crisis management and to coordinate ministries at the stage of implementation. 
Its 26 members included the Prime Minister, Finance Minister, Governor of the central bank, 
and representatives from industry, banking and finance, trade unions and consumer 
associations. In character, it functioned as an emergency cabinet. The NEAC announced 
the National Economic Action Plan on 23 July 1998.
As Table 4-7 shows, the plan was a compromise between the Washington consensus and 
the NEP principles.
[Table 4-7] National Economic Action Plan 332
Objectives Measures
Stabilising the 
ringgit
• Appropriate Choice of Exchange Rate Regime
• Reduce Over-Dependence on the US Dollar
• Increase External Reserves
• Adopt a Balanced Interest Rate Policy
Restoring market 
confidence
• Improve Transparency and Regulatory Environment
• Establish Rules for Assisting Industries and Companies in Trouble
• Increase Consistency of Policies
• Adopt Liberal and Market-Based Policies
• Improve Public Relations
• Improve the Dissemination of Economic Information
Straits Times, KL Halts US $ 2b Bond Plan (28 July 1998); KL to raise RM 60b Locally (7 October 
1998)
Business Times, 12 Foreign Banks to Lend US $ 1.35 b at Below Market Rate (30 December 1998) 
For a comprehensive overview of the NEAC, see Zainal-Abidin Mahani, Rewriting the Rules: The 
Malaysia Crisis Management Model (Petaling Jaya: Prentice Hall, 2002)
NEAC, National Economic Recovery Plan: Agenda for Action (NEAC, 1998), p.45.
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Maintaining 
financial market 
stability
• Preserve die Integrity of the Banking System
• Establish Agencies Along the Lines of FDIC/RTC
• Recapitalise the Banking Sector
• Monitor Closely Overall Credit Expansion
• Improve the Capital Market
• Develop the PDS Market
Strengthening
economic
fundamentals
• Increase the Quality of Investments
• Improve the Balance of Payments
• Maintain a Balanced Public Sector Financial Position
• Maintain an Appropriate Monetary Policy
• Maintain Price Stability
• Increase Labour Competitiveness
Continuing the 
equity and socio­
economic agenda
• Ameliorate the Hardship from Poverty
• Address the issues on Bumiputera Equity Ownership
• Expand Employment Opportunities
• Meet the Challenge of Expanding Tertiary Education
• Address the Problem of Graduate Unemployment
• Control the influx of Foreign Workers
• Gear up State Corporations to Face the Crisis
• Revamp Cooperatives and Cooperative Banks
• Protect the Environment for Sustainable Development
Restoring 
adversely affected 
sectors
- Primary Commodities and Resource-Based Industries
- Manufacturing
- Information Technology and the Multimedia Super Corridor
- Motor Industry - Construction
- Property - Infrastructure
- Transportation - Freight Forwarding
- Tourism - Insurance and Reinsurance
- Industrial Development Finance Institutions
From a political perspective, the creation of the NEAC reflected a growing cleavage 
between Mahathir and Anwar. Indeed there was a cause for concern that the rivalry between 
the Finance Ministry and the NEAC might complicate a coherent and transparent policy­
making process. Furthermore, the appointment of Daim Zainuddin as the executive director 
had political implications. The former Finance Minster had been a close ally of Mahathir in 
the cabinet (Finance Minister) and party (UMNO Treasurer) from the early 1980s. Thus 
Daim’s comeback meant that the Prime Minister did not trust his deputy as before.
More importantly, Daim’s political background was the bumiputera business community. 
He was one of the most outspoken politicians who supported the NEP principles: i.e..
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affirmative actions should be maintained until bumiputera to achieve the 30 percent share of 
the economy. In this regard, he was critical of Anwar’s policy that allowed non-bumiputera 
investors to increase their share. Further, he argued that this policy would undermine the 
political dominance of Malays in the end.
3) Macroeconomic Adjustment
Under Anwar’s leadership, Malaysia’s responses were not different from those of the 
countries under the IMF-supported programmes. Anwar’s policy package was veiy similar 
to IMF-supported programmes: reductions in government spending by postponing large-scale 
infrastructure projects, curbing capital outflows by raising interest rates, and reforming the 
financial sector by upgrading the regulatory framework.
With respect to fiscal policy, Malaysia maintained a prudent stance. For five years in a 
row (1992-97), the economy registered a sizeable amount of surplus. A fiscal surplus of 2.7 
percent was envisaged in the 1998 budget plan announced in October 1997. In the middle of 
the regional crisis, the need for reducing current account deficits led the government to revise 
the original plan. To show its commitment to sound macroeconomic management, Anwar 
aimounced a new budget plan in December 1997. Its highlight was an 18 percent reduction in 
the 1998 budget allocations. To repress domestic demand, major infrastructure projects and 
privatisation programmes were deferred or cancelled. In addition, operational costs in the 
public sector were slashed as a result of downsizing government agencies. For example, 
cabinet ministers / their deputies and senior civil servants took a voluntary 10 and 3 percent 
pay cut respectively, while the others’ salaries were frozen.
New Straits Times, Daim Tells Why Malays Still Need Privileges (19 December 2000)
Mohd. Yaacob Abdul Aziz, Towards a Sustainable Financial System: The Malaysia Situation, in 
Ramesh Adhikari and Ulrich Hiemenz (eds.). Achieving Financial Stability in Asia (OECD, 2000) 
BNM, Annual Report 1997 (1998), pp.82-84.
Wall Street Journal, Malaysia Unveils More of Austerity Plan as Stock Surge 11 % in Reaction to 
Idea (9 December 1997)
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Hindsight reveals that this austere stance was inappropriate. At that time, an active fiscal 
policy was needed to cope with an impending recession. Malaysia’s strong fiscal position 
could have provided considerable scope for counter-cyclical measures. Nevertheless, Anwar 
did not surrender the conservative stance until crisis-hit countries including Thailand and 
Korea increased fiscal deficits to fund social safety nets and financial restructuring.
To mitigate the negative impact of economic recession, some measures were taken to 
support job mobility programmes. In August 1998, the Employment Act of 1955 was 
amended to bring more flexibility to labour markets. The financial crisis increased the 
unemployment rate from 2.6 percent in 1997 to 3.9 percent in 1998. Compared with the other 
crisis-affected countries, its social impact was modest. First, most companies reduced foreign 
workers rather than Malaysian ones. Second, pay cuts were preferred to lay-offs because the 
economic recession was expected to disappear. As a result, labour unrest was not of major 
political concern.
When it comes to monetary and exchange rate policy, massive capital inflows in the early 
1990s created symptoms of asset and equity bubbles in the economy. Thus, BNM attempted to 
reduce the inflationary pressure. To this end, ceilings on lending to the property sector and for 
the purchase of shares were introduced as pre-emptive measures.
In the wake of the crisis, BNM adopted a low interest rate policy to protect highly- 
indebted companies from insolvency. However, this policy was not sustainable due to the 
depreciation of the ringgit and trade deficits. In particular, the depreciation of the currency 
made it more difficult for the central bank to pursue a coherent monetary policy. Before the 
crisis, the ringgit was floating in a narrow band of between RM 2.36 and RM 2.51 to the US 
dollar. This parity became unstable in March 1997, and depreciated to an average of 2.57 in 
July. The central bank attempted to maintain the value of the currency by intervening in 
foreign exchange markets on 8 July 1997. However, after wasting an estimated 1.5 billion 
dollars, the central bank gave up the policy, allowing the currency to devalue. On 7 January 
1998, the currency plunged to its lowest level -  RM 4.88 -  but recovered to an average of 3.73
IMF, Malaysia; Recent Economic Developments, Staff Countiy Report No. 99/85 (IMF, 1999), p.6.
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in April 1998. This disappointing result left the monetary authorities with no choice but to 
raise interest rates.
The market-based solution brought serious side effects to the economy. Many highly- 
leveraged companies faced financial difficulties because they could not serve surging interest 
on their debts, let alone the principal. In October 1997, for example, Renong -  one of the 
largest and best-connected companies -  was forced to restructure its debts. Corporate distress 
gave rise to the surge of non-performing loans (NPL), which adversely affected the 
commercial banks. In addition, new regulations that were intended to strengthen the financial 
system aggravated corporate distress. For example, die shortening of the NPL classification 
period from six months to three months made financial institutions more cautious about new 
lending. This vicious circle eventually endangered the integrity of the domestic financial 
markets.
In this situation, Mahathir called for a reduction of interest rates. However, Anwar did not 
respond to the Prime Minister’s plea. Instead, the Finance Minister maintained a high interest 
rates policy on the basis that the reversal of the policy would delay structural reform by giving 
unprofitable companies easy access to bank loans. The debate was not easily resolved because 
the confrontation between the Prime Minister and the Vice Prime Minister was not only 
confined to economic policy.
To overcome the isolation, Anwar launched a political campaign against nepotism and 
corruption in early May 1998. The campaign was assisted by young UMNO members. Despite 
warnings from senior UMNO members, Anwar’s supporters openly demanded that the 
government curb cronyism. The campaign reached its highest point at the UMNO’s annual
Business Times, Malaysia Forced to Keep Interest Rates High (6 May 1998)
Wee Beng Gan, Lee Ying Soon and Chee Chee Soh, The Ringgit and the Malaysian Financial Crisis: 
An Interpretation, Malaysian Journal o f Economic Studies, Vol.XXXVI, No.l (June 1999); Wee Beng 
Gan and Lee Ying Soon, Credit Crunch during a Currency Crisis: The Malaysian Experience, ASEAN 
Economic Bulletin, Vol. 18, No.2 (August 2001)
K.S. Jomo argued that the confrontation between them was exaggerated by Western media at that 
time. According to him, there was little disagreement between them at least macroeconomic policy until 
mid-May. It was Western newspapers that led Mahathir to suspect his deputy seriously. K. S. Jomo, 
Personal interview (Kuala Lumpur, 14 March 2002)
Straits Times, Subversives Using Cronyism Charge (16 June 1998)
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general assembly where UMNO Youth Chief, Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, criticised government 
assistance to state-owned Petroliam Nasional that had rescued the companies of Mahathir’s 
eldest son.
Although the cause of the campaign was correct, the timing was very tricky. At that time, 
Indonesia’s President Suharto was forced to resign amid nationwide demonstrations. After the 
resignation of the region’s longest-serving elected leader, Mahathir was believed to fear that 
the political instability in this neighbouring country would be contagious to his countiy.
To gain support from the business community, Mahathir disclosed the names of 
companies and their principal shareholders that received beneficial contracts in the 
privatisation of state-run companies. Among the list of nearly 300 companies were Anwar’s 
supporters as well as Mahathir’s cronies. Furthermore, Mahathir emphasised that the 
affirmative action was designed to promote bumiputera business.
Anwar’s attempt to attack Mahathir was not successful because his economic policy failed 
to stop economic recession. The economy contracted by - 7.4 percent in terms of real GDP. 
Senior UMNO leaders did not support his painful strategy, worrying about the next election 
which was held due by April 2000. Thus his challenge to the Mahathir leadership intensified 
his isolation in the party.
The winner of the power struggle was Mahathir. This does not mean that all his policies 
proved to be correct; on the contrary, most of them still remain the subject of much debate. In 
this respect, Anwar’s defeat was more political rather than theoretical. Although Anwar’s 
macroeconomic policy was praised by the international financial community, he failed to gain 
enough support to push ahead with it. His allies were gradually isolated in the cabinet, the 
central bank and the ruling party [UMNO].
With hindsight, the policy rift between Mahathir and Anwar became politically serious 
when the National Economic Action Council (NEAC) was created in January 1998. In fact, 
NEAC had no raison d’être because its functions were, to a considerable extent, overlapped by
For the assembly, see Malaysian Business, Show Stoppers (16 July 1998) 
Wall Street Journal, Malaysia Hit by Problems in Indonesia (27 March 1998)
344 EIU, Country Report: Malaysia (3rd quarter 1998), p. 14.
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those of the Ministry of Finance and the central bank. The appointment of Daim as its 
executive director signalled the decline of Anwar’s authority in the policy-making circle. 
Second, Daim’s return to the cabinet as special functions minister “entrusted with the tasks 
relating to economic development” in June 1998 confirmed the speculation that Anwar had 
been excluded from Mahathir’s iimer circle. Third, the elimination of Anwar’s supporters 
accelerated after young UMNO leaders accused Mahathir of cronyism. An Anti-Anwar 
pamphlet -  Fifty Reasons Why Anwar Shouldn ’t Be Prime Minister -  was widely circulated 
within the UMNO. In late August, Ahmad Don and his deputy Fong Weng Phak had to resign 
because both supported Anwar’s policies. It is also widely believed that Mahathir pressured 
two influential newspaper editors {Utusan Malaysia and Berita Marian) and a director of TV3 
-  all of whom were regarded as Anwar’s supporters -  to resign. The final step was the 
dismissal of Anwar as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance on 2 September 1998.
The removal of political opponents paved the way for Keynesian policy. Although the 
policy shift was swift and decisive, the timing was too late to re-ignite economic growth. And 
the introduction of capital controls had an ambivalent impact on economic recoveiy. On the 
one hand, capital controls allowed the authority to regain monetary autonomy by insulating 
the economy from external pressures. On the other hand, capital controls left the economy 
isolated from international financial markets, thereby making it difficult to attract foreign 
capital that is required to finance fiscal deficits and structural reform.
When it comes to fiscal policy, the main obstacle to expansionary budget was Anwar’s 
resistance. As the economy contracted by 4.8 percent in the first half of 1998, he rethought his 
policy. On 24-25 March 1998, the budget plan was revised to allow a fiscal deficit of 2.6 
percent of GDP. Additional expenditures were allocated on social spending. Because 
external conditions became favourable, the policy reversal continued in the second half of 
1998. The current account was in surplus in the second quarter of the year. This meant that
Wall Street Journal, Malaysian Central Bank Officials Quit (31 August 1998)345
346
Business Times, KL Ready to Run Budget Deficit to Keep up Social Spending: Anwar (12 May
Sunday Times, KL ‘Won’t’ Restrict Flow of Capital’ (30 August 1998) 
 
1998)
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one of the obstacles to using fiscal stimulus disappeared. In addition, there was need for an 
extra budget for banking sector restructuring. To this end, a supplementary budget amounting 
to RM 7 billion was announced in July 1998. In addition, an Infrastructure Development Fund 
was launched to boost economic activity. Consequently, the 1998 budget resulted in a deficit 
of 3.7 percent of GDP.
The impact of fiscal expansion on economic growth was not as strong as expected because 
the original budget was so tightened and the policy shift took place well after economic 
activity slowed. This recognition led the government to expand its fiscal deficit to 6.1 of 
GDP in 1999. Economic recovery in the first half of 1999 increased government revenues and 
there was more room for expenditure on financial restructuring and social spending. As a 
result, real expenditure was raised by RM 9.5 billion while the original deficit rate (6.0 
percent o f GDP) was not violated. To finance the deficit, government bonds were issued. Not 
to place extra burdens on financial institutions, the bonds were sold to the Employees 
Provident Fund (EPF) and insurance companies. Table 4-8 summarises the projection and 
result of fiscal operations.
[Table 4-8] Fiscal Operations (Percentage of GDP)
Year Original plan Result
1997 1.6 2.5
1998 2.7 -3.7
1999 -6.0 -6.1
2000 -5.0 -4.1
Source: Ministry of Finance, Annual Report (various issues)
There was political controversy over who initiated the policy shift. According to Mahathir, 
Anwar stuck to the economic orthodoxy supported by the IMF and thus refused to relax this
Ministry of Finance, Economic Report 1998/99 (1999), p.47.
Kanitta Meesook, II Houng Lee, Clin Liu, Yougesh Khatri, Natalia Tamirisa, Michael Moore, and 
Mark H. Krysf Malaysia: From Crisis to Recovery, Occasional Paper No. 207 (IMF, 2001), p.40. 
BNM, Annual Report 1999 (2000), pp.87-89.
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fiscal stance despite the impending economic recession, On the other hand, K. S. Jomo 
argues that Anwar had already planned to change the macroeconomic policy framework in 
May 1998. Nonetheless, there is no convincing evidence that Anwar acted on his own 
initiative. At that time, the IMF already allowed its loan recipients to increase their budget 
deficits.
With respect to monetary policy, Mahathir ordered the NEAC to consider a low interest 
rate policy on 21 April 1998. His point was that high interest rates increased debt-serving 
burden of highly-leveraged firms. When interest rates rose to an average of 11 percent in June 
1998, financial and corporate distress was at its peak. And he urged the government to rescue 
some strategic firms for the sake of economic recovery and the national interest. However, 
Anwar refused to change the policy, arguing that low interest rates would encourage capital 
flight, thereby putting more downward pressure on the currency.
[Table 4-9] Changes to BNM Intervention Rate and Statutory Reserve Requirement (SRR) 352
Period Liquidity Date Intervention Rate SRR
Jan-Feb Tightening End-97 8.70 13.5
9 Jan 9.00
20 Jan 10.00
6 Feb 11.00
Mid Fed-July Stable 16 Feb 10
1 July 8
1998 Aug-Dee Easing 3 Aug 10.5010 Aug 10.00
27 Aug 9.50
1 Sep 6
3 Sep 8.00
16 Sep 4
5 Oct 7.50
9 Nov 7.00
Jan-Aug Continued Easing 5 Apr 6.50
1999 3 May 6.00
9 Aug 5.50
The confrontation turned bitter when Singaporean banks started to sell highly lucrative 
ringgit deposits (up to 40 percent returns). As Table 4-9 shows, the statutory reserve
Mohamed Mahathir, The Malaysian Currency Crisis: How and Why It Happened (Selangor Darul 
Ehsan: Pelanduk Publications, 2000)
BNM, The Central Bank and the Financial System in Malaysia (BNM, 1999), p.595.
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requirement (SRR) was lowered from 10 percent to 8 percent from 1 July 1998. The shift 
to a fixed exchange regime made it easy for the authorities to relax monetary policy because 
they would no longer have to consider the potential exchange rate consequences.
Despite consecutive interest rate reductions, money circulation did not grow. Many banks 
were still very passive in lending due to tight regulations on NPLs and to economic 
uncertainty. To encourage bank lending, some regulations were relaxed on 23 September 
1998 that was effective from January 1999. First, the default period for classifying a loan 
as non-performing by banking institutions would be increased from three to six months. 
Second, banking institutions would no longer be automatically required to provide a 20 % 
specific provision on sub-standard loans. Finally, for non-performing loans that were 
restructured or rescheduled, such loans could be reclassified as performing loans when the 
repayments under the rescheduled terms were complied with for a continuous period of six 
months, instead of the current practice that required 12 months of continuous payment.
Table 4-10 demonstrates that the problem was resolved in 1999 and the economy was 
successful in regaining economic growth in 1999 and 2000.
[Table 4-10] Changes in the Major Economic Index
1997 1998 1999 2000
Gross official reserves (US $ billion) 21.7 26.2 30.9 29.9
Exchange rate (ringgit/dollar) 2.8 3.9 3.8 3.8
Three montii inter-bank rate (%) 8.6 6.5 3.2 3.3
Federal budget balance (% of GDP) 2.5 -1.5 -4.1 -4.2
Stock Price Index (end of period) 594 586 812 680
Real GDP Growth 7.3 -7.4 6.1 8.3
Source: IMF
EIU, Country Report: Malaysia (3rd quarter 1998), p.20.
IMF, Malaysia: Recent Economic Developments, Staff Country Report No. 99/85 (IMF, 1999), p. 16. 
Straits Times, Mahathir Calls for Easier Bank Borrowing (9 November 1998); Business Times, 
Ultra-Conservative Bankers Seen Hurting Malaysia Recovery (24 April 2000)
Straits Times, KL to Ease Classification o f ‘Bad Loans’ (2 September 1998)
Ministry of Finance, Economic Report 1998/99 (1999), p.42.
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4. Conclusion
This chapter have analysed the political impact of the Washington consensus on economic 
policy. The cases of Korea and Malaysia have shown that the consensus played a crucial role 
in leading the two countries to adopt a similar set of economic policy. This is why both 
introduced IMF-style economic adjustment policies, whether the IMF involved or not.
The Korean case shows that the Washington consensus played a crucial role in 
interpreting the causes of the crisis and designing policy prescriptions. It is hard to deny that 
IMF’s policy conditionality lay behind the supremacy of the consensus. However, it would be 
a big mistake to overlook the transformation of ideological terrain. As President Kim Yong 
Sam’s Segyehwa policy shows, a growing number of policy makers and economists were 
supportive of market-oriented reform from the early 1990s. The chaebol were also enthusiastic 
about the ideas of liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation because they wanted to reduce 
government intervention. In this regard, the financial crisis was a catalyst for accelerating the 
speed of structural reform.
The Washington consensus also had a significant effect on Malaysia’s economic 
adjustment particularly under Anwar. From October 1997 to June 1998, Anwar introduced 
IMF-style policy packages, even though the government did not have any legal obligation to 
do so. Despite the opposition from the bumiputera business community, pro-cyclical policy 
was implemented at the early stage of economic adjustment. Although the policy was reversed 
by Mahathir in September 1998, it should be noted that the other three crisis-affected 
countries also shifted to counter-cyclical policy at that time. Even after the dismissal of Anwar, 
the Basel core principles of bank supervision and the OECD principles of corporate 
governance were applied to the financial and corporate sector, albeit sometimes superficially.
Some unorthodox policies employed by Mahathir show that the political power of the 
Washington consensus was not strong enough to reject the legacies of the NEP. The main \ 
reason is that there was an ideational division among policy makers and big business. On the 
one hand, Anwar’s supporters in the Treasury and BNM followed IMF policy
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recommendations. On the other hand, Mahathir, Daim and senior bumiputera business leaders 
were strongly opposed to Anwar’s policy in the name of the NEP principles. This 
disagreement led Mahathir to establish the NEAC to decrease the power of Anwar’s 
supporters in the Treasury and the central bank. More importantly, it should be noted that not 
all pro-Anwar policy makers believed in neoliberalism. Some of them supported Anwar for 
political reasons. In other words, their commitment to IMF-style stabilisation policies was not 
strong enough to reject the legacies of the NEP.
Despite the presence of domestic political constraints, the government has liberalized some aspects 
of the ethnic-based distributive policy in a move to accommodate global market forces and restore 
growth. Nevertheless, these limited liberalizing tendencies do not signal any ideological or policy 
shift towards full acceptance of neoliberal norms and practices. This was demonstrated by the 
clearly illiberal move in September 1998 to impose capital controls and insulate the domestic 
economy from a harsh external environment in order to regain some monetary independence. It 
suggests that the commitment to free markets in Malaysia is instrumental or tactical rather than 
ideological.
The differences between Korea and Malaysia can be explained by socio-political factors 
that affected the political power of the Washington Consensus. In Korea, IMF’s conditionality 
was a key factor that made the consensus predominant. Equally important, policy makers 
agreed to IMF’s policy recommendations, realising that the existing economic model was no 
longer appropriate for the economy. Although big business was unenthusiastic about some 
IMF policies -  especially high interest rate policy - ,  their opposition was of less political 
importance because the chaebol’s legitimacy was seriously damaged by the crony capitalism 
thesis. The presidential election in December 1997 contributed to reminding voters of the 
importance of economic reform and thus to increasing the political influence of the consensus.
Nesaradui (1999), p. 106.
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In Malaysia, the political power of the Washington consensus was not robust. There was a 
clear tension between the NEP principles -  a harmony between racial equity and economic 
development -  and neoliberalism that champions economic efficiency. This tension divided 
policy makers into two groups. While Anwar’s supporters the Treasury and BNM preferred 
orthodox policy measures, Mahathir’s followers in the NEAC adhered to the NEP principles. 
As the National Economic Recovery Plan demonstrates, its economic adjustment programme 
was a political compromise between the two economic ideas.
It was the bumiputera business community that gradually shifted the swing of the 
pendulum toward the NEP principles. The community was very critical of it because high 
interest rates and the cancellation of big infrastructure projects had negative impacts on their 
business. Mahathir exploited this discontent to protect his political authority and to rescue his 
cronies from bankruptcy.
It should be noted that Mahathir’s policy shift in September 1998 was an anti-IMF policy. 
In mid-1998, the IMF allowed the crisis-affected countries under the IMF programmes to use 
Keynesian stimulus measures. As a matter of fact, the Korean government lowered interest 
rates aggressively from April 1998 and introduced supplementary budgets in July and 
September in the year. In this regard, it is hardly surprising that there was not much difference 
between the two countries in terms of the pattern of economic recovery. ^
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Chapter V 
Financial Reform
1. Introduction
This chapter explores to what extent the political power of the Washington consensus 
affected financial reform in Korea and Malaysia. Financial liberalisation is one of the most 
important doctrines of the consensus. Many of the consensus’s policy agendas are, directly 
and indirectly, related to the policy doctrine: i.e., interest rate liberalization, liberalization of 
inflows of foreign direct investment, a competitive interest rate and deregulation (to abolish 
barriers to entry and exit) and privatisation.
Prior to the crisis, the East Asian financial system was widely believed to be a bank-based 
system. To finance rapid industrialisation, the state frequently and extensively intervened 
in the financial markets with various policy tools: for example, interest ceilings, credit 
rationing and debt guarantees. Strong government intervention was effective in mobilising 
scarce capitals to invest large projects such as economic infrastructure.
As Figure 5-1 indicates, this system is close to a Japanese system rather than an Anglo- 
American one. In the US and the UK, stock and bond markets are crucial for the allocation of 
financial resources. In the financial market-based system, hostile takeovers are allowed and 
market competitions are fierce. In France and Germany, banks play a bigger role in financial 
markets. In the bank-based system, the relations among them are generally stable because
For cross-national comparisons of the system across the region, see Robert Wade, East Asian 
Financial Systems as a Challenge to Economics: Lessons from Taiwan, California Management 
Review, Vol.27, No.4 (Summer 1985); Stephan Haggard, Chung Lee, and Sylvia Maxfield (eds.), The 
Politics o f Finance in Developing Countries (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); Stephan Haggard 
and Chung H. Lee (eds.). Financial Systems and Economic Policy in Developing Countries (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1995)
Joseph E. Stiglitz and Marilou Uy, Financial Markets, Public Policy, and the East Asian Miracle, 
World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 11, No.2 (August 1996); Dimitri Vittas and Yoon Je Cho, Credit 
Policies: Lessons from Japan and Korea, World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 11, No.2 (August 1996)
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there is little chance of hostile M & As, The Japan system is located between them, but it is 
more close to the bank-based system rather than the financial-based system.
[Figure 5-1] Comparing Financial Systems of Major Countries 361
United States United Kingdom Japan France Germany
Financial Markets Central Central Developed
Fairly
unimportant
Unimportant
External corporate 
governance
Hostile
takeovers
Hostile takeovers
Main bank 
system
Hausbank
system
According to John Zysman, the divergence between market-based system and bank (or 
credit)-based system arises from different industrialisation strategies. “A capital market-based 
financial system [i.e., the US and the UK] would be linked to company-led growth, a credit- 
based system with administrated price [i.e., France and Japan] would be linked to state-led 
growth, and a credit-based system with bank domination [i.e., Germany] would be linked to 
negotiated change.”
The financial crisis led East Asian policy makers to rethink the bank-based financial 
system in a fundamental way. Supporters of the Washington consensus argued that 
interventionist policy tools were the source of moral hazard problem that caused unsustainable 
levels of non-performing loans (NPLs). For this reason, they recommended deregulation 
and liberalisation of financial markets. This policy was supported by some empirical studies
Based on Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale, Comparing Financial Systems (Cambridge; MIT Press, 
2000), p.4.
John Zysman, Governments, Markets, and Growth: Financial Systems and the Politics o f Industrial 
Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), p.286.
Carl-Johan Lindgren, Tomâs J.T. Baliflo, Charles Enoch, Anne-Marie Guide, Marc Quintyn, and 
Leslie Teo, Financial Sector Crisis and Restructuring: Lessons from Asia, Occasional Paper No. 188 
(IMF, 1999)
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showing that there is a positive correlation between financial liberalisation and economic 
growth.
Critics of the IMF pointed out that ill-sequenced liberalisation were the main cause of the 
crisis, suggesting more cautious approach to liberalisation. Before liberalisation, appropriate 
institutional frameworks for prudent regulation / supervision should be in place. Further, some 
economists argued that capital controls could be useful in stabilising currency and financial 
market.
In the post-crisis era, Korea and Malaysia used a similar set of measures. To address 
financial distress, both governments established asset management companies (AMCs) that 
purchased NPLS and consolidated the financial sector by encouraging M & As. At the same 
time, they re-organised their supervisory agencies and revised regulations to prevent moral 
hazard problem. In the meanwhile, there was a stark contrast in terms of capital account 
liberalisation. Malaysia used capital controls whereas Korea liberalised capital account. 
However, the capital control policy was quickly removed after solid economic recovery.
The remainder of this chapter is divided into three sections. In the next two section 
sections, I trace the development of the financial system in Korea and Malaysia respectively. 
The focus of the chapters is on how the Washington consensus had an influence on policy 
choice and implementation. The final section compares the two cases to evaluate the impact of 
the IFI, policy makers, big business and political institutions on the political power of the 
consensus.
World Bank, Finance for Growth: Policy Choices in a Volatile World (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001) See also Ross Levine, Financial Development and Economic Growth, Views and Agenda, 
Journal o f Economic Literature, Vol. 35, No.2 (June 1997); Mohsin S. Khan and Abdelhak S. Senhadji, 
Financial Development and Economic Growth: An Overview, Working Paper No.00/209 (IMF, 2000) 
Robert Wade, The Coming Fight Over Capital Flows, Foreign Policy, No.l 13 (Winter 1998-9); 
Richard N. Cooper, Should Capital Controls Be Banished?, Brookings Papers on Economic Activities, 
No.l (1999); Benjamin J. Cohen, Capital Controls: The Neglected Option, in Geoffrey R. D. Underhill 
and Xiaoke Zhang (eds ), International Financial Governance under Stress: Global Structures versus 
National Imperatives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002)
Malaysia’s capital control policy could be explained in the previous chapter because its main 
objective was macroeconomic stabilisation rather than microeconomic reform. Nonetheless, I include 
Malaysia’s capital control policy in order to compare it with Korea’s capital account liberalisation 
policy.
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2. Korea
1) Financial Liberalisation in the Early 1990s
Prior to the financial crisis, the Korean financial system was bank-dominated rather than 
market-oriented. Major commercial banks were under state control, whether nationalised or 
not. For example, the government used to handpick executives of the commercial banks and 
set credit quotas. Since the early 1970s when the government promoted some strategic 
industries such as heavy and chemical industry, state intervention was pervasive in the 
financial sector. Interest rate controls and quantitative credit targets were used to finance the 
favoured industries. In this regard, financial policy was considered as a means of industrial 
policy.
The bank-based financial system was relatively successful in overcoming two weaknesses 
of the economy: insufficient domestic savings and lack of foreign investment. At the early 
stage of industrialisation, domestic capital markets were not developed enough to finance 
large industrial projects. Moreover, it was difficult to attract foreign investment since 
international organisations as well as foreign investors were sceptical over the prospects of the 
economy. Under such circumstances, the government mobilised financial resources to fund 
the projects. Except for two economic recessions following the oil crises in the 1970s, the 
system was relatively successful.
There were negative aspects of the bank-based system. Pervasive state involvement 
hindered domestic financial institutions from developing efficient and competitive financial 
markets. As a result, the financial sector was one of the most underdeveloped parts of the 
economy. At the same time, strong government interventions generated moral hazard problem 
in the financial sector.
For an overview of the financial system, see David Cole and Yung Chul Park, Financial 
Development in Korea, 1945-78 (Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University Press, 
1983); Jung-en Woo, Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1991); Chongwoo Choe and Imad A. Moosa, Financial System and 
Economic Growth: The Korean Experience, World Development, Vol. 27, No. 6 (June 1999)
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In the early 1980s, many policy-makers and economists recognised that strong state 
intervention in the financial sector did more harm than good. Liberalisation of the financial 
sector was undertaken in the mid-1980s. Key changes included the privatisation of the 
commercial banks, the reduction in the dispersion of regulated interest rates, and the 
relaxation of entry barriers to non-bank financial markets.
The first wave of liberalisation remained slow and limited. The reason is that was part 
of macroeconomic stabilisation to cope with the recessions that followed the second oil crisis 
and the assassination of President Park Jung Hee in 1979. Thus, the opening of capital 
accounts was postponed on the basis that financial institutions lacked both sufficient resources 
and techniques to compete with foreign counterparts. For this reason, many restrictions on 
capital account transactions remained untouched until the late 1980s when the economy 
recorded current account surpluses.
The second wave of liberalisation was launched in the early 1990s. As Table 5-1 shows, a 
five-year plan. Blueprint for Financial Liberalisation and Market Openings was introduced in 
July 1993. Its objective was to give greater autonomy to domestic financial intermediaries to 
determine their interest rates on loans and deposits. Major changes included a gradual 
liberalisation of long and short-term international capital flows and the deregulation of interest 
rates on lending and deposits.
These measures were not enough to meet the OECD entry requirements. In 1992, for 
example, restrictions on the items in the OECD code for capital account liberalisation were 89 
percent, while the average for all OECD countries was 17 percent. To accelerate the speed
Sang-Woo Nam and Chung H. Lee, Korea, in Haggard and Lee (1995)
For details, see Appendix 5-1.
Alice H. Amsden and Yoon-Dae Euh, South Korea’s 1980s Financial Reform: Good-bye Financial 
Repression (Maybe), Hello New Institutional Restraints, World Development, Vol.21, No.3 (March 
1993) Nonetheless, Korea maintained a cautious approach compared with other developing countries.
Sangwoo Nam, Korea's Financial Reform since the Early 1980s, in Gerard Caprio Jr., (ed.). 
Financial Reform: Theory and Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994)
Sung Hee Jwa, Capital Mobility in Korea Since the Early 1980s: Comparison with Japan and 
Taiwan, in Ito and Knieger (1994)
OECD, Economic Surveys: Korea (1994), p.l 18.
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of liberalisation, the Presidential Commission for Financial Reform was established in 1995.
374
[Table 5-1] Third-Stage Blueprint for the Liberalisation & Opening o f the Financial Sector 375
Schedule Items
Phase 1 
(1993)
Liberalise all bank and non-bank lending rates (except for policy loans) and long­
term deposits over tow-year maturity
Issue Monetary Stabilisation Bonds and government bonds of close to market 
interest rates
Operate M2 targets flexibly 
Liberalise call markets
Widen the daily won-dollar trading margin from 0.8 to 1.0 percent 
Switch to the notification system for foreign direct investment into Korea
Phase II 
(1994-5) Liberalise all lending rates and rate for short-term marketable instruments
Establish indirect monetary controls
Deregulate loans to large conglomerates
Develop short-term financial markets
Further widen the daily won-dollar trading margin
Further ease requirements for underlying documentation prior to foreign
exchange transactions
Expand limits on foreign investment in the stock market
Allow foreign participation in primary markets for some bonds
Ease requirements for opening branches of foreign securities companies
Phase III 
(1996-7) Liberalise all deposit rates except for demand deposits (allow money market 
certificates and money market funds)
Utilise open market operations as main monetary policy tool 
Operate the Loans Management System as a prudential regulation 
Introduce free-floating exchange rate system
Eliminate requirements for underlying documentation for the usual foreign 
exchange transactions
Allow foreign borrowing through commercial loans
Allow foreign financial institutions to hold stock of domestic banks
Moon-Soo Kang, Financial Deregulation and Competition in Korea, in Takatoshi Ito and Anne O. 
Krueger (eds.). Deregulation and Interdependence in the Asia-Pacific Region (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2000)
Won-Am Park, Financial Liberalisation: The Korea Experience, in Takatoshi Ito and Anne O. 
Krueger (eds.), Financial Deregulation and Integration in East Asia (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1996), p.252.
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In December 1995, the Foreign Exchange System Reform Plan was proposed. In the plan, 
most significant is the elimination of restrictions on foreign investment. The government 
expanded the scope for short-term foreign currency borrowing, while restrictions on long-term 
overseas borrowing were maintained. As a result, the approval of the Ministry of Finance 
and Economy (MOPE) was no longer required to borrow short-term loans. Meanwhile, 
liberalisation of outward flows was faster than that of inward flows to prevent rapid 
appreciation of the Korean won, which would be likely to increase inflationary pressure and to 
lower export competitiveness.
With hindsight, the plan proved to be a critical mistake. First, the sequence of 
liberalisation was poorly designed. The liberalisation of short-term interest rate before long­
term interest rates resulted in a rapid expansion of short-term debts in financial institutions 
and the corporate sector. Second, there were loopholes in the regulatory ffamewoik. Banks 
remained under tight regulation, while restrictions on non-banking financial institutions 
(NBFIs) were relaxed or lifted. The regulatory asymmetry allowed the NBFIs to deal in much 
riskier foreign exchange transactions. Third, liberalisation was not accompanied by 
appropriate supervisory frameworks. One of the reasons is that a long-standing confrontation 
between the MOF and the BOK hindered the establishment of an independent supervisory 
institution.
These problems played a role in the build-up of short-term debt denominated in the US 
dollar. Between 1994 and 1996, the authorities granted 24 finance companies a merchant bank 
licence. The newly-licensed merchant banks took advantage of financial liberalisation with 
very profitable ‘carry trades’: that is, borrowing foreign currencies fi^ om Japan or the US at a 
low interest rate, converting them to the US dollar, and using it to invest in the Southeast
OECD, Economic Surveys: Korea (1996), Ch. II.
OECD, Economic Surveys: Korea 0999), p.30.
Moon and Rhea (2002), p. 125.
Yoon Je Cho, The Role of Poorly Phased Liberalization in Korea’s Financial Crisis, in Gerald 
Caprio, Jr., Patrick Honohan and Joseph E. Stiglitz (eds.). Financial Liberalization: How Far, How 
Fast? (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Financial Repression, Liberalization, Crisis and 
Restructuring: Lessons o f Korea’s Financial Sector Policies, Research Paper No.47 (Asian 
Development Bank Institute, 2002)
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Asian region. However, a massive reversal of capital flows in the mid-1990s left them with a 
huge amount of loss. In addition, commercial banks were allowed to open new foreign 
branches. Their performance was very poor and a large amount of the official foreign currency 
reserves was used to finance the repayment of the short-term debts of the offshore branches.
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These problems with rapid liberalisation were not totally unforeseen. Some economists 
had urged the government to delay entry into the OECD, fearing that financial liberalisation 
would result in a disaster without appropriate institutional frameworks. Nevertheless, the 
pace and scope of liberalisation was not decelerated. Why did the government push so 
vigorously for financial liberalisation in the early 1990s? The answer to the question is not 
simple, since external and internal factors are intertwined.
The third wave of financial liberalisation reflected an ideological shift on a global scale. 
Since the early 1980s, neoliberal policies were introduced by neoclassical economists 
educated in US and UK academic institutions. Because Reaganomics and Thatcherism 
flourished in the countries, most of them were familiar with -  though not necessarily 
supportive of -  neoliberalism. In particular, research institutes of the chaebol such as the 
Korea Economic Research Institute (KERI) were increasingly filled with those who were 
sympathetic to the idea. This phenomenon also affected bureaucrats, many of whom had 
studied in the institutions or worked for international financial institutions. Consequently, the 
influence of Keynesianism gradually faded among policy-makers as well as academics.
David Gillen, Yoolim Lee and Bill Austin, J.P. Morgan’s Korean Debacle, Bloomberg (March 
1999), pp.24-30.
Wonsik Sul, On the Performance of the Foreign Subsidiaries of Korean Banks: Are Securities 
investments Really Profitable?, Journal o f Asian Economics, Vol.l 1, No.2 (Summer 2000)
Stephen L. Harris, South Korea and the Asian Crisis: The Impact of the Democratic Deficit and 
OECD Accession, in Underhill and Zhang (2003) See also Euromoney, Korea: Living in the Sham of a 
Free Market (September 1996)
For die political economy of financial liberalisation in the 1990s, see Panicos O. Demetriades and 
Bassam A. Fattouh, The South Korean Financial Crisis: Competing Explanations and Policy Lessons 
for Financial Liberalization, International Affairs, Vol.75, No.4 (1999); Henry Laurence, Financial 
System Reform and the Currency Crisis in East Asia, Asian Survey, Vol.39, No.2 (March / April 1999) 
Yeon-ho Lee, The Failure of the Weak State in Economic Liberalization: Liberalization, 
Democratization and the Financial Crisis in Korea, Pacific Review, Vol. 13, No.l (2000), pp. 125-129
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Pressure from the US government also played a crucial role in opening up the financial 
markets. Since the US is its key trading partner as well as military ally, the Korean 
government could not sidestep the bilateral pressure. One problem with the pressure was 
that the US government demanded some polides that would bring negative side effects to the 
Korean economy.
[N]owhere in the memo’s three pages is there a hint that South Korea should improve its bank 
regulation or legal institutions, or take similar stems. Rather, the goal is clearly to use the [pending 
Korean application to join the OECD] as a way of prying open Korean markets -  in part to win 
business for American banks and brokerages. “These are all of interest to the US financial services 
community,” the memo reads,
The external pressure coincided with the chaebol’s interests. The chaebol complained 
that a substantial gap between domestic and foreign interest rates reduced their profitability. In 
fact, internationally-recognised chaebols such as Samsung, Hyundai and Daewoo with good 
credit ratings were keen to attract foreign capital by issuing corporate bills and convertible 
bonds in international financial markets. In addition, removal of outward capital flows would 
enable them to expand their overseas investment. From the early 1990s, many chaebols 
considered moving product lines to Southeast Asian countries to reduce labour costs.
However, financial liberalisation was not always good for the chaebols because the opening of 
domestic capital markets would deprive them of their privileged position.
For the role of the US government, see Meredith Woo-Cumings, Slouching Toward the Market: The 
Politics of Financial Liberalization in South Korea, in Loriaux, Woo-Cumings, Kalder, Maxfield and 
Perez (1997)
New York Times, How U.S. Wooed Asia To Let Cash Flow In (16 February 1999)
Byung-Sun Choi, Financial Policy and Big Business in Korea: The Perils of Financial Regulations, 
in Stephan Haggard, Chung Lee, and Sylvia Maxfield (eds.). The Politics o f Finance in Developing 
Countries (Ithaca: Cornell University l4ess, 1993); Chung H. Lee, Keun Lee and Kangkoo Lee, 
Chaebol, Financial Liberalization, and Economic Crisis: Transformation of (^asi-Interaal Organization 
in Korea, Working Paper No.31 (Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University, 2000)
Duk Choong Kim and Dong Suk Suh, Financial Liberalization and Korean Corporations’ Financing 
Policy for Globalization, Journal o f Asian Economics, Vol.9, No.l (1998)
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2) Financial Restructuring after the Financial Crisis
Korea’s approach to financial liberalisation was gradualist rather than big bang. This 
gradualist approach provoked a debate over financial reform. On the one hand, proponents of 
the Washington consensus argued that radical liberalisation could have prevented moral 
hazard problem arising from heavy state intervention. Their solution to the problem was 
further deregulation and liberalisation of financial markets. On the other hand, critics of the
consensus asserted that the countries failed to protect themselves from volatile capital flows 
because neoliberal liberalisation policy did not take into consideration relevant safeguards 
against negative aspects of liberalisation. Thus they suggested that liberalisation should be 
delayed until well-functioning regulatory frameworks are in place. The debate had no real 
impact on policy-making because the IMF imposed a comprehensive liberalisation plan on the 
government.
Financial reform proceeded in two stages. The first stage was aimed at easing the capital 
crunch in the financial and corporate sectors and restoring a sophisticated regulatory system: 
re-capitalisation of weak financial intermediaries, the establishment of prudential supervisory 
frameworks, and further liberalisation and opening up of the financial markets. In the second 
stage, market-based restructuring was increased to reduce the role of government. At the same 
time, most restrictions on capital account transactions were lifted.
One of the most urgent tasks was to resolve financial distress. The rapid increase in NPLs 
threatened the integrity of the sector. As Table 5-2 demonstrates, NPLs surged sharply 
particularly in non-banking financial institutions.
This view was shared by the Presidential Committee on Financial Reform that suggested a bold 
reform plan before the crisis. For details, Buhmsoo Choi, Financial Reform in Korea, in Lee-Jay Cho, 
Yoon Hyung Kim and Chung H. Lee (des.). Restructuring the National Economy (KDI, 2001)
In this context, some economists argue that the crisis is the result of under - not over- regulation. See 
Ha-Joon Chang, Hong-Jae Park and Chul Gyue Yoo, Interpreting the Korean Crisis: Financial 
Liberalisation, Industrial Policy and Corporate Government, Cambridge Journal o f Economics, Vol.22, 
Vol.6 (November 1998); Jin-Wook Choi, Regulatory Forbearance and Financial crisis in South Korea, 
Asian Survey, Vol.42, No.2 (March-April 2002)
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[Table 5-2] NPL Breakdown by Financial Sector (Ratio o f NPLs /  Total loans) 391
Dec 1997 Dec 1998 Dec 1999 Dec 2000
Bank 6.1 7.6 8.4 8.0
Commercial 6.0 7.4 8.3 8.9
Special & development 6.2 8.1 8.4 6.1
Non-Banking financial institutions 9.3 19.9 23.2 23.6
Merchant banks 4.1 20.0 15.4 37.1
Insurance companies 9.3 8.8 13.9 8.5
Mutual savings & loans 11.7 24.1 32.6 36.9
Credit unions 10.2 22.3 21.6 12.6
Leasing companies NA 30.2 36.3 43.1
Securities companies 13.2 26.0 34.0 52.6
Total 6.7 10.4 11.3 10.4
Two approaches were employed to address the problem. On the one hand, a purchase and 
acquisition (P & A) approach was applied to healthier institutions. The authorities encouraged 
strong banks to merge with weaker ones by providing public funds to dispose of bad debts. In 
exchange for public funds, acquired banks reduced the number of staff and closed branches. 
On the other hand, a much harsher approach was employed with unhealthy institutions. Most 
of them were closed down or suspended. As a result, 11 commercial banks, 26 merchant 
banks, 9 leasing companies, 7 securities houses, 13 insurance companies and 10 investment 
trusts disappeared from January 1998 to March 2001. Table 5-3 is a sununary of the result.
[Table 5-3] Financial Institutions (as of March 2001) 392
Dec 97 Mar 01
Jan 1998-M ar 2001
Newly 
Created Co.Mergers
Relocation 
of Licence/ 
Liquidations
Total
Banks 33 22 6 5 11 -
Merchant Banks 30 5 3 23 26 1
Leasing Co. 25 19 1 8 9 3
Securities Co. 36 43 1 6 7 14
Insurance Co. 50 40 6 7 13 3
Investment Trust Co. 31 29 1 9 10 8
Mutual Savings & Finance Co. 231 146 25 72 97 12
Credit Unions 1666 1311 101 258 359 4
Total 2102 1615 144 388 532 45
Based on OECD, Economic Survey: Korea (2001), p.l55. It should be noted that there were changes 
in the classification of NPLs during the crisis. At the end of March 1998, the classification was 
shortened from loan in arrears of 6 months or more to loans in arrears of 3 months or more. In 
December 1999, financial institutions introduced forward-looking criteria to make a more realistic 
assessment of loan risks. See Chan-Hyun Sohn, Korea’s Corporate Restructuring since the Financial 
Crisis, Policy Analyses No.02-04 (Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, 2002), p.26.
FSC, Financial Reform and Supervision in Korea (FSC, 2001), p.9.
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The government injected public funds to re-capitalise weak financial institutions. By the 
end of 1999, public funds were allocated to purchase NPLs worth 20.5 trillion won (17.1 
billion dollars) from banks and secondary financial institutions, and to provide 43.5 trillion 
won (36.2 billion dollars) in re-capitalisation and deposit repayment support. Despite this, the 
soundness of the financial institutions did not improve quickly. Thus the government injected 
additional funds in 2001.
As Table 5-4 shows, the total amount of funds that used to rescue the financial institutions 
was a 134.7 trillion won (26 percent o f GDP). As a result of the rescue package and economic 
recovery, nearly all major banks officially met or exceeded the 10% BIS capital adequacy 
ratio as of 30 June 1999, with some as high as 13%.
[Table 5-4] Expenditures on Financial Sector Restructuring 393
First programme 
(through Aug 2000)
Second programme 
(As of Mar 2001)
Total
Expenditure by type of institution
Banking sector 70.3 10.4 80.7
Investment trusts 12.2 3.7 15.9
Merchant banks 11.9 4.6 16.5
Insurance companies 10.5 2.0 12.5
Mutual savings & loans/ credit cooperatives 4.7 4.4 9.1
Total 109.6 25.1 134.7
Sources of financing
Government-guaranteed borrowing 4.0 19.8 83.8
Recycled funds 18.6 8.6 27.2
Other public funds 20.7 -3.3 23.7
Total 109.6 25.1 134.7
Percent of GDP (2000) 21.2 4.8 26.0
Net outlays
Total minus recycled funds 91.0 16.5 107.5
Percent of GDP (2000) 17.6 3.2 20.8
* Unit: 1 trillion won
393 OECD, Economic Surveys: Korea (2001), p. 152.
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In the process of financial restructuring, some financial institutions resorted to politics. 
Local banks that failed to meet the BIS minimum capital adequacy ratios tried desperately to 
organise political campaigns for survival. On the one hand, directors of the banks attempted to 
persuade policy-makers on the basis that the closure of local banks might destroy the local 
economy. On the other hand, local businesses lobbied politicians whose constituencies might 
be adversely affected. For example, directors of Kyungki Bank offered bribes of more than 
80,000 dollars to Lim Chang-yuel, the then Governor of Kyungki Province and a former 
Finance Minister. This attempt failed to save the bank, which was merged into KorAm Bank 
in June 1998. The Governor and his wife were prosecuted for taking bribes from the bank in
1999. 395
The closure and M &A of financial institutions resulted in massive unemployment and 
wage cuts. As Table 5-5 illustrates, no less than 20 percent of bank branches were closed and 
one third of staff in the banking sector was made redundant to decrease operational costs. The 
FKTU and the KCTU collaborated to minimise the number of redundancies. However, their 
protests did not succeed in reducing the scale of restructuring since the government linked its 
assistance to their self-rescue plans.
[Table 5-5] Numbers of Branches and Staff, and Operational Expenses 396
Domestic commercial banks Nation wide Regional Top 3
1997
No. of Branches 6,177 4,872 1,305 1,010
No. of Staff 113,994 94,065 19,929 25,710
Operational expenses 6.1 - - -
June
2001
No. of Branches 4,784 4,039 745 1,828
No. of Staff 73,401 64,759 8,642 31,019
Operational expenses 0.3 25 22 11
Change
(%)
No, of Branches -22.6 -17.1 -42.9 81.8
No. of Staff -35.6 -31.2 -56.6 20.6
Operational expenses -95.3 - - -
For relations between politicians and banks, see James C. Schopf, An Explanation for the End of 
Political Bank Robbery in the Republic of Korea: The T + T Model, Asian Survey, Vol.41, No.5 
(September - October 2001)
Korea Herald, Prosecutors Seek Arrest Warrant for Gov, Lim in Bribery Case (17 July 1999) 
IMF, Korea: Selected Issues, Country Report No.Ol/lOl (2001), p.98.
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In the meanwhile, the government revised institutional frameworks for regulation and 
supervision. To this end, 15 major pieces of financial reform legislation -  including the 
General Banking Law and the Financial Industry Restructuring Act -  were enacted on 29 
December 1997. Two pieces of legislation were revised to enhance procedures for 
restructuring financial institutions in September 1998.
The objective of the institutional change was to upgrade its regulatory and supervisory 
frameworks to comply with international standards. Table 5-6 summarises key features of the 
reform.
[Table 5-6] Standards in Prudential Regulations and Supervision 398
Objectives Measures Schedule
Mark-to Market for 
security
• Introduction of mark-to-market for securities
• Change in securities’ classifications from 
categorisation by currency (domestic / foreign) to 
maturity (investment / marketable securities)
June 1998 
- completed
Banking sector 
disclosure
• More information to be disclosed to meet the 
international accounting standards
December 1998 
- completed
Loan classification 
& provisions
• Revision of lain classification procedures to fully 
reflect capacity to repay and not simply past 
performance
June 1999 
Effective from 
December 1999
Improvement in 
BIS capital ratio 
calculation
• Deduction form tier 2 capital of all provisions except 
those with respect to assets classified as normal and 
precautionary
January 1999 
- completed
Prudential rules for 
foreign exchange 
liquidity and 
exposure
• Risk management for short-term foreign currency risk 
(short-term assets of less than 3-month maturity of at 
least 60 percent of short-term liabilities)
• Report maturity mismatched for sight to 7 days; 7 
days to 1 month, 1 to 3 months, 3 to 6 months; 6 
months to 1 year; and over 1 year
• Management of country exposures (set exposure 
limits for each country based on international credit 
ratings)
July 1998 
- completed
Trust accounts
• Introduction of rules providing full disclosure to trust 
beneficiaries and precluding any possibility of 
payment by managing banks to make good or 
guarantee any loss
• Introduction of restrictive rules to be applied to all 
trust accounts ensuring segregation for management 
as well as accounting purposes
January 1999 
- completed
January 2000
397
398
FSC, Financial Reform and Supervision in Korea (FSC, 2000), pp.39-41. 
OECD, Economic Surveys: Korea (1999), p. 85.
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To strengthen the capacity of prudent supervision and regulation, government agencies 
were reshuffled. One of the most remarkable changes was the downsizing of the Ministry
of Finance and Economy (MOFE), created from the merger of the Economic Planning Board 
and the Ministry of Finance in December 1994. Despite its comprehensive policy instruments 
and organisations, the MOFE was blamed for failures to predict and prevent the crisis. 
Following the recommendation of the Presidential Committee on Financial Reform, the 
Ministry transferred its authority to supervise and regulate to new independent agencies. In 
addition, the creation of the Budget and Planning Commission deprived the MOFE of one of 
its most powerful resources in maintaining its supremacy among ministries.
Before the crisis, the BOK was caricatured as a branch o f the MOFE because the ministry 
had more power to control monetary policy than the central bank. However, the crisis shifted 
the balance of power between the two institutions. An amendment to the Bank of Korea Act in 
April 1998 enhanced the independence of the BOK. For example, the governor of the BOK 
replaced the Minister of the MOFE as the Chair of the Monetary Board consisting o f seven 
members. In accordance with this organisational change, the management system of the BOK 
moved from direct control, exercised by fixing ceilings on bank loans, to indirect intervention, 
exerted by changes in reserve requirements, open market operations and rediscount policy.
In addition to the organisational change, there was a significant shift in its modus operandi. 
Inflation targeting was introduced to define its primary objective clearly and thus to make
Kwang-woong Kim, A Critical Reflection on the Reform of the Kim Dae-jung Government, Korea 
Journal, Vol.39, No.2 (Summer 1999)
From January to February 1999, the Special Investigation Commission on the Causes of the 
Economic and Currency Crisis organized in the National Assembly conducted in-depth inspections of 
related institutions. As a result, Kang Kyung Shik, the then Minister of Finance and Economy, and Kim 
In Ho, Chief Presidential Secretary for Economic Affairs, were charged with negligence of duty and 
abuse of power. See National Asseinbly, Gukhoebo [National Assembly Review] (February 1999), 
pp.34-39.
Wall Street Journal, Power Fades Korea’s Financial Ministry (28 June 1999), p. 14. However, in 
order to coordinate conflicting interests among ministries, the Minister of the MOFE was promoted to 
Deputy Prime Minister on 29 January 2001.
Independent monetary institution is a key feature of neoliberalism. See Ilene Grabel, Ideology,
Power and the Rise of Independent Monetary Institutions in Emerging Economies, in Jonathan Kirshner 
(ed.). Monetary Orders: Ambiguous Economics, Ubiquitous Politics (Ithaca; Cornell University Press, 
2002)
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itself freer from external pressures. And its target changed from M2 to M3, a measure of 
total liquidity including the liability of non-bank financial institutions. This shift was nothing 
more than an acceptance of the criticism that the narrow definition did not properly capture 
monetary expansion in the process of financial restructuring.
Meanwhile, the BOK lost some of its functions. The Financial Supervisory 
Commission (FSC) took the place of the central bank as the principal supervisor of banks. 
Although being placed under the Office of the Prime Minister, the FSC was supposed to be an 
independent watchdog, free from direct government control. Its mandate includes: the 
resolution of issues relating to financial supervision, the instruction of supervisory authorities, 
and the implementation of restructuring plans. In addition, the Commission has the authority 
to issue and revoke licences to financial institutions.
In January 1999, its executive body (the Financial Supervisory Service: FSS) was 
launched as a single regulator unifying four existing supervisory agencies: the Banking 
Supervisory Authority (BSA), the Security Supervisory Board (SSB), the Insurance 
Supervisory Board (ISB) and the Non-bank Supervisory Authority (NSA). The FSS is 
responsible for the inspection and examination of all financial institutions. In addition, it acts 
as an arbitrator in resolving disputes between financial institutions and their customers. This 
integrated supervisory approach allows the FSC to monitor various types of financial 
institution.
The FSC oversaw corporate and financial governance reform as the regulator of the 
country’s banks. It took charge of various tasks: organising with banks a list of companies to 
be liquidated, closing financial institutions, drafting plans to restructure corporations and 
negotiating the sale of two nationalised banks to foreign investors. In particular, the FSC 
played a crucial role in corporate reform. At its peak, the Chairman of the Commission, Lee
Alexander W. Hoffinaister, Inflation Targeting in Korea: An Empirical Exploration, IMF Staff 
Papers, Vol.48, No.2 (2001) Monetarism that was the theoretical basis for the policy has been dominant 
since the late 1980s in the central bank. Confidential interview with BOK official (London, September 
2002 & Seoul, November 2004)
BOK’s trade union initially opposed the creation of the FSC because they were concerned that the 
new regulatory body would be under the control of the MOFE.
FSC, Financial Supervisory System in Korea (FSC, 2001)
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Hun Jai, was ranked as the second most-powerful economic policy-maker after the President 
Kim Dae Jung.
As a result, a new division of labour emerged among government agencies. The MOFE, 
which had control of the specialised banks and non-bank financial institutions, lost almost all 
its authority on supervision. The Ministry managed to retain the right to draft legislation 
related to financial supervision and to coordinate financial sector policy. In the meanwhile, the 
BOK transferred its responsibility for bank supervision to the FSC, while retaining a few of its 
previous supervision functions such as checking prudential requirements for banks. However, 
its functions are limited. At best, the central bank as a lender of last resort for banks has the 
power to inspect banks to which it extends liquidity support. And the Monetary Board of the 
BOK can call for a reconsideration of any FSC decision that may include measures directly 
related to monetary policy.
The reorganisation of the economic ministries had political implications. The disgrace of 
the pilot agencies did not mean the end of state intervention. Instead, the FSC replaced the 
MOFE as a policy co-ordinator. Hence the emergence of the FSC can be seen as an important 
change in state intervention: from industrial to financial policy.
As Figure 5-2 demonstrates, two state-own institutions played a crucial role in the 
restructuring of the financial sector. The Korea Depository Insurance Corporation (KDIC) is a 
special juridical entity with no capital established in June1996. In cases where liquidation in 
the insurance sector is needed, or where the FSC and the MOFE conclude that re­
capitalisation using public funds of any such company is die appropriate action, the KDIC 
provides the funds and oversees the enforcement of the terms and conditions. Its main 
governing body is the Policy Committee which comprises the President of the KDIC, the Vice 
Minister of Finance and Economy, the Deputy Governor of the BOK, the Vice Chairman of
Before the crisis, he was regarded as an interventionist because he started his career in the Ministry 
of Finance. In fact, his approach to corporate restructuring (especially, the so-called Big Deal) was not 
market-oriented. Confidential interview with MOFE officials (Seoul, August 2002)
Ha-Joon Chang and Chul Gyue Yoo, The Triumph of the Rentiers?, Challenge, Vol.43, No.l 
(January / February 2000)
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the FSC and the heads of the associations representing banks, insurance companies and other 
financial institutions.
[Figure 5-2] Re-organisation of Regulatory Framework 408
Government
KAMCO KDIC
FSCBOK
(independent)
MOFE
The Korea Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO) is equivalent to the Resolution 
Trust Corp (RTC) in the US. Its original mandate was the management and disposal of non­
performing assets (NPAs) in the financial sector and state-owned properties. In November 
1997, the KAMCO was formally re-established to enhance and expand its role: management 
and operation of the Non-performing Loans Management Fund; acquisition and resolution of 
NPAs from financial institutions; implementation of work-out programmes for acquired 
distressed companies; and the management of state-owned properties and the resolution of tax
409arrears.
The chaebol was not satisfied with the ways of financial restructuring. First, 
implementation of the BIS capital adequacy ratio was too strict to increase sufficient liquidity.
Based on Charles Enoch, Gilhan Garcia and V. Sundararajan, Recapitalizing Banks with Public 
Funds, IMF Staff Papers, Vol.48, No.l (December 2001), p.l06.
Dong He, The Role of KAMCO in Resolving Nonperforming Loans in tiie Republic of Korea, 
Working Paper No.04/172 (IMF, 2004)
KERI, Choiguen Choigeun Kyeongje Hyeonankwa Daechaek [Current Economic Problems and its 
Remedies] (KERI, 1998), pp.79-110.
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The government ordered public-funds-injected banks not to expand lending until they met the 
ratio. As a result, even top five chaebols had difficulties in borrowing money from their main 
banks. This situation did not quickly improve even after economic recovery.
Second, the chaebol were worried that the de facto nationalisation of some commercial 
banks might lead to enhance state intervention in financial markets. Public fund injections into 
the financial sector resulted in a substantial increase of government ownership. Before the 
crisis, the equity shares of the government in commercial banks were no more than 18 percent 
of total banking sector capital. As of mid-2000, they accounted for 56 percent. As of the 
end of 2000, the government held a 49 percent interest in Korea First, 80.1 percent in Cho 
Hung, 74.7 percent in Han vit, 100 percent in Seoul and 35.9 percent in Korea Exchange. And 
many ex-MOFE and ex-BOK officials on the boards of directors of financial institutions were 
generally supportive of government policy.
Finally, the chaebol complained that the government discriminated against national 
capitalists in favour of foreign ones. Since the chaebol were prohibited fi’om holding a 
controlling stake (4 or 8 percent) in any commercial bank, the chaebol could not increase their 
influence on the banking sector. To overcome this problem, Kim Woo Choong -  chairman of 
the FKI and Daewoo -  proposed that a chaebol consortium (Hyundai, Samsung, Daewoo and 
LG) sponsored by the FKI could bid for one or more banks or create a mega-bank with foreign 
partners. The government dismissed it as wishful thinking on the basis that the chaebol might 
use it as their ‘piggy bank’.
3) Capital Account Liberalisation
As Table 5-7 demonstrates, capital count liberalisation proceeded in two stages. The first 
stage (implemented by 1 April 1999) was designed to liberalise foreign exchange transactions 
by corporations and financial institutions related to their external activities. To maintain a
411
412
IMF, Korea: Selected Issues, Country Report No.Ol/lOI (2001), p.88.
Donald Kirk, Korean Crisis: Unraveling o f the Miracle in the IMF Era (New York: St. Matin’s
Press, 2000), p. 134.
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level of prudence, an ex post facto reporting was required. In April 1999, the new Foreign 
Exchange Transaction Act replaced the positive list system with a negative list, which permits 
all capital account transactions except those expressly forbidden by law and presidential 
decree. At the second stage (implemented by the end o f2000), the focus shifted to the 
liberalisation of capital account transactions by individuals.
[Table 5-7] Two Stage of Foreign Exchange Liberalisation 413
Objectives Features
First
phase
(April
1999)
Upgrade the foreign 
exchange system to 
international standards 
Facilitate the flow of 
foreign capital 
Further promote overseas 
business activities of the 
private sector in the current 
open market environment
Converting regulations on capital account 
transactions into a negative system 
Revising regulation on foreign exchange 
institutions
Establishing Safeguard measures
Second
phase
(January
2001)
Liberalize foreign 
exchange and capital 
account transactions for 
individuals
Streamlined remaining 
restrictions on corporations 
and financial institutions 
regarding their foreign 
exchange transactions
Alleviating obligatory repatriation of overseas 
claims
Eliminating ceiling on overseas payments and 
monetary possessions when leaving the 
country for residents
Easing the regulation on purchase and sale of 
foreign exchange
Relaxing the limitation on deposits and trusts 
Greater allowance for overseas borrowing and 
Korean won lending
Further liberalization of securities investment 
Allowing acquisition of overseas real estates 
Expanding foreign exchange businesses 
Expanding methods of corporate settlement
Capital account liberalisation helped the economy to attract record levels of foreign 
investment. According to Jin Nyum, Finance Minster, the economy received at least 50 billion 
dollars of FDI from 1998 to 2001. This was quite exceptional, considering that the total
413 MOFE, Je 2 Dangye Oehwan Jayuhwa Sebuchujin Bangan [The Second Stage of Foreign Exchange 
Liberalization] (15 December 2000)
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amount of inward FDI was only 24 billion dollars from the beginning of industrialisation to
1997, 414
Some safeguards were put in place to protect domestic financial markets from extremely 
unfavourable market conditions. For example, restrictions on trading the won on overseas 
markets by non-residents were not lifted because the authorities wanted to keep its influence 
on the currency’s movement.
At the same time, the government improved its institutional frameworks for crisis 
prevention. Central to these measures were various limits on short-term capital flows by 
unsound financial institutions. As Table 5-8 shows, the nature of the measures is pre-emptive 
actions rather than direct controls because the authorities want to enhance market mechanisms 
by avoiding interventionist policies.
[Table 5-8] Measures to Prevent a Foreign Exchange Crisis 415
Area Measures
Establishment of a 
monitoring system
• Creation of a computer system to monitor speculative transactions in the 
foreign exchange, stock, bond and fiiture markets
• Establishment of an "International Financial Centre” to provide an early 
warning system against a foreign currency crisis
Precautionary
measures
• Restrictions on short-term overseas borrowing by financially unsound 
companies
• Restrictions on foreigners’ borrowing of more than W 100 million at a 
maturity of less than one year
• Requirement that securities with less than one-year maturity issued 
domestically by foreigners be approved by MOFE
Emergency
measures
• Partial or complete freeze on foreign exchange transactions
• Concentration of foreign currency in the central bank
• Capital transaction authorisation system
• A variable deposit requirement on capital inflows
Further opening of the financial markets allowed foreign investors to purchase some 
troubled banks. Nevertheless, few banks drew attention from them. Huge amounts of NPLs 
were a major obstacle to attracting foreign investment. Thus, the government injected public
Financial Times, Seoul Warns Tension May Scare Investors (7 February 2002) 
OECD, Economic Surveys: Korea (1999), p.63.
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funds into two of the weakest banks: Seoul Bank and Korea First Bank. In 1999, Hong Kong 
Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) had an interest in Seoul Bank. However, differences 
over takeover conditions were so big that the deal was not finalised. In April 2000, the 
government commissioned Deutsche Bank to draw up a rationalization programme for the 
bank after the sale of the bank to foreign investors was not realised.
The failure of the Seoul Bank sale prompted foreign observers to question the 
government’s commitment to financial liberalisation. Thus, the government hurried the sale 
of its 51 percent stake in Korea First Bank for 500 billion won (442 million dollars) to 
Newbridge Capital, an American investment fund in December 1999. This sale was criticised 
for fire sale because the deal was very favourable to the buyer.
Besides, Commerzbank of Germany purchased 29.8 % of Korean Exchange Bank for 267 
million dollars. And Goldman Sachs invested 500 million dollars in Kookin Bank, which 
consisted of shares (300 million dollars) and convertible bonds (200 million dollars). ING 
Group also acquired 10 percent of Housing and Commercial Bank. As a consequence, total 
foreign ownership reached approximately 30 percent of total banking sector assets as of the 
end of 1999.
To sum up, the Korean experience illustrate that financial reform was clearly influenced 
by the Washington consensus. Prior to the crisis, most policy makers and economists in the 
chaebol’s research institutes recognised the need for liberalisation and deregulation. This 
ideological shift toward market-friendly policy coincided with external pressures from the IFTs 
and the US government. It is also important that big business was supportive of liberalisation 
and deregulation. In this regard, Kim Woo Choong’s resort to nationalist rhetoric was not a 
challenge to the principle of financial reform but a political tactic to gain special treatments 
from the government to save his companies.
Lonestar (a US fund) and Hana Bank bid for the bank, and Hana Bank was allowed to merge it in 
September 2002, See Chungwon Kang, From the Front Lines at Seoul Bank: Restructuring and 
Reprivatization, Working Paper No.03/^35 (IMF, 2003)
IMF, Korea: Selected Issues, Country Report No.01/101 (2001), p.90. For more details, see 
Appendix 5-2.
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Political considerations did not play a role in financial reform, even though the 
government injected a huge amount of public fund. One reason is that, as a result of 
liberalisation and deregulation, its influence on the financial sector was not as strong as 
before. It is thus hardly surprising that there were much fewer corruption scandals in the 
process of financial sector restructuring.
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3. Malaysia
1) Financial Liberalisation in the 1990s
Before the New Economic Policy (NEP), most financial institutions were owned and run 
by foreign and Chinese capitalists. In order to increase the role of Malay capitalists, various 
affirmative actions were used to set up banks and to encourage commercial banks to lend 
more to bumiputera entrepreneurs. As a result, the size and number of Malay financial 
institutions gradually increased during the 1970s.
In the meanwhile, there were strict regulations on foreign banks. Since 1983, new foreign 
banks had not been allowed to open new branches. And the ‘60/40 borrowing guideline’ -  
requiring foreign firms to raise not less than 60 percent of their finance with local banks -  
remained intact. And foreign equity investment in financial institutions was limited to 30 
percent. As a result, the share of total bank deposits held by foreign banks decreased from 
more than 70 percent in the early 1980s to approximately 30 percent in the mid-1990s.
The recession in the mid-1980s offered an opportunity to re-consider the pro-Malay 
strategy because the policy generated moral hazard problem in the banking sector. A 
notable example is Bank Bumiputra (Malaysia). Because the bank was set up to provide credit 
to the Malay business community, it was regarded as a piggy bank by many Malay politicians 
who patronised bumiputera companies. As a result, political considerations played a more 
significant role in making loans than cost-benefit analysis. When the 1985-86 economic 
recessions aggravated NPLs, the bank was rescued twice in 1985 and 1989 on the basis that
Peter Searle, The Riddle o f Malaysian Capitalism: Rent-seekers or Real Capitalists? (St Leonards: 
Allen & Unwin, 1999), pp. 73-75,
Prema-chandra Athukorala, Crisis and Recovery in Malcysia (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2001), 
p.52.
Adek Hussein Awang, Financial System, in Kwame Sundaram Jomo (ed.), Malaysia’s Economy in 
the Nineties (Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 1994)
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the collapse of the country’s second-largest bank might undermine the integrity of the 
financial markets.
This experience led the authorities to deregulate the financial sector to expose Malay 
banks to market disciplines, thereby enhancing their competitiveness. For example, controls 
on the base lending rate (BLR) were removed in 1991 to advance competition among 
commercial banks. At the same time, the regulatory and supervisory frameworks were 
tightened. For instance, a two-tier system was introduced in 1994, extending to finance 
companies and merchant banks in 1996. The objective of the system was to offer incentives to 
well-managed banking institutions. Despite these efforts, old habits of political favouritism 
continued. Thus, a potential danger of moral hazard emerged when the economic situation 
deteriorated.
The early 1990s witnessed more radical liberalisation o f frnancial markets. From January 
1990, Malaysian firms no longer registered on the Stock Exchange of Singapore (SES). To 
deal with this change, the Securities Commission (SC) was set up to take over stock market 
regulation and supervision from the Capital Investment Committee under Bank Negara 
Malaysia. The institution provided the foundation for a more flexible operational framework. 
The ceiling of foreign shareholding of local brokerage companies was extended from 30 
percent to 49 percent.
To promote Kuala Lumpur as a regional financial centre, an international offshore 
financial centre was opened in the Federal Territory of Labuan in October 1990. The main 
objective of the Labuan centre was to attract foreign investors who wanted to set up their 
office outside Europe and the Caribbean. To this end, offshore banks were permitted to
Alasdair Bowie, The Dynamics of Business-Govemment Relations in Industrialising Malaysia, in 
Andrew MacIntyre (ed.). Business and Government in Industrialising Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1994), p,183; Edmund Terence Gomez and Kwame Sundaram Jomo, Malaysia’s Political 
Economy: Politics, Patronage and Profits, second edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), pp.60-66.
The system turned out to be ineffective in encouraging “best practice” and was abolished in April 
1999, See IMF, Malaysia: Selected Issues, Staff Country Report No.99/86 (1999), p.70.
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operate under a more liberal and relaxed regime regulated by the Labuan Offshore Financial 
Service Authority since February 1996.
The independence from the regulatory institution brought about negative side effects. 
Many domestic financial companies used the offshore centre as a loophole to avoid 
regulations. For example, 868 million dollars loans to Renong and its business partner Hottick 
Investments (Hong Kong) by Malaysian banks remained uimoticed for a long time. The main 
reason was that the centre was outside the purview of the central bank.
As Table 5-9 illustrates, Malaysia’s approach to financial liberalisation was generally 
gradual and cautious. This approach enabled Malaysia not to be exposed to large short-term 
currency borrowings compared with other crisis-affected countries. Malaysia’s outstanding 
debt at the end of 1997 was equivalent to 160 percent of GDP, but most of them were 
denominated in ringgit, not foreign currency.
Three factors contributed to reducing short-term capital flows. First, prudential regulations 
by BNM discouraged Malaysian companies from borrowing foreign currency loans. In the 
mid-1990s, rapid loan growth and its exposure to securities and property generated bubbles. 
BNM managed to tackle the problem by taking pre-emptive measures: improving credit 
allocation and strengthening prudential regulation. Stricter controls were imposed on loans to 
property and share financing. And the minimum capital requirement for Tier-1 banking 
institutions was increased.
Labuan Offshore Financial Service Authority, Labuan Offshore Financial centre, in Low Chee 
Keong (ed,). Financial Markets in Malaysia (Singapore: Butterworths, 2000)
Far Eastern Economic Review, Clouded Version (2 April 1998)
Zainal Aznam Yusof, Awang Adek Hussin, Ismail Alowi, Lim Chee Sing, and Sukhdave Singh, 
Financial Reform in Malaysia, in Gerard Caprio Jr., (ed.). Financial Reform: Theory and Experience 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Anwar Nasution, ‘Big Bang’ versus ‘Go Slow’: 
Indonesia and Malaysia, in J. M. Fanelli and R. Medhora (eds.). Financial Reform in Developing 
Countries (New York: St. Martin's, 1998)
BNM (1999), pp.188-191.
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[Table 5-9] Financial Liberalisation and Deregulation 427
Items Year
Financial
Deregulation
• Removing regulation on interest rate of fixed deposits placed with 
commercial banks for maturities four years
• Lifting administrative control on all deposit rates of finance 
companies and fixed deposit rates (exceeding one year maturity) of 
commercial banks
• Freeing interest rates for deposits of 12 months and less and prime 
lending rates of commercial banks
• Introducing new interest rate system to boost competition
• Enacting the Future Industry Act to facilitate financial iimovations
1971
1973
1978
1990
1992
Institutional 
& Regulatory 
Reform
• The Banking Act -  setting the legal and financial requirements for 
compliance by banking institutions
• New provision of the Central Bank of Malaysia Ordinance of 1958 to 
resolve NPLs
• The Bank and Financial Institution Act (BAFIA) -  increasing 
minimum amount for capital funds (foreign banks should meet higher 
minimum capital adequacy ratio than domestic ones
• Establishment of the Securities Commission as a single regulatory 
agency
1973
1986
1989
1992
Foreign 
Exchange & 
Capital 
Account 
Liberalisation
• Transition to an IMF article VIII country
• Replacing the pound sterling with the US dollar in defining the 
exchange rate parity of the ringgit
• Establishing the Labuan Offshore Financial Service Authority 
(LOFSA)
• Expanding access to ringgit business
1968
1973
1996
1997
Second, the authorities preferred FDI rather than portfolio investment. The first is less 
volatile than the latter. At its peak in 1992-93, FDI accounted for 8.7 percent of GDP. In 
the first half of the 1990s, nearly 70 percent of foreign capital flows were related to FDI.
Finally, capital controls were used to tame the volatility of capital flows. In 1988/89 and 
1992, the authorities introduced restrictions on swap transactions to discourage non-trade 
related currency trade. In the early 1990s when massive capital inflows resulted in inflationary
Drawn from UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Financial Sector 
Reform, Liberalisation and Management for Growth and Stability in the Asia and the Pacific Region: 
Issues and Experiences (UN, 1998)
Prema-chandra Athukorala and Jayant Menon, Foreign Investment and Industrialization in Malaysia: 
Export, Employment and Spillovers, /If Economic Journal, Vol. 10, No. 11 (1996) See also Graham 
Bird and Ramkishen S. Rajan, Does FDI Guarantee the Stability of International Capital Flows? 
Evidence from Malaysia, Development Policy Review, Vol. 20, No, 2 (June 2002)
Prema-chandra Athukorala, Capital Account Regimes, Crisis, and Adjustment in Malaysia, Asian 
Development Review, Vol. 18, No.l (2000), p.20.
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pressure, the authorities tried to sterilise short-term capitals using monetary tools. However, 
this measure was not effective and temporary capital controls on portfolio investment were 
introduced. In 1995 when its objectives were achieved, they were quickly removed.
2) Financial Restructuring after the Financial Crisis
As Table 5-10 shows, the authorities took pre-emptive measures to safeguard the financial 
sector from the contagious effect of the Thai crisis. From January 1998, financial 
institutions were required to submit more detailed financial statements and loan classification 
and provision were tightened. To discourage short-term borrowings, any new capital injection 
by shareholders of banking institutions had to be funded through non-debt sources or very 
long-term debt instruments. To contain the possibility of connected lending, the central bank 
prohibited banks from lending to their shareholders. Furthermore, CEOs and directors of 
banking institutions were subject to biennial performance reviews. Finally, financial 
restrictions were tightened on the provision of bridging finance for the development of 
residential properties, shop houses valued in excess of RM 250.000 per unit and commercial 
properties.
Despite these measures, many financial companies suffering from the downturn in real 
estate and equity markets were still in danger of default. In January 1998, BNM announced a 
plan to consolidate finance companies: (1) merger of small companies with the six identified 
anchor finance companies; (2) absorption by parent commercial banks; and (3) strategic 
alliance. To smooth the process, six major companies (four Tier-1 and two large-sized finance 
companies) were given anchor status and were recommended to find merger partners by the 
end of March 1998. Before the crisis, there were 39 finance companies, but the top three
For details, see Appendix 5-3.
For the supervisory system prior to the crisis, see Lin See Yan, The Institutional Perspective of 
Financial Market Reform: The Malaysian Experience, in Shakil Faruqi (ed.). Financial Sector Reforms 
in Asian and Latin American Countries: Lessons o f Comparative Experience (World Bank, 1993)
Low Chee Keong, Strengthening the Banking Sector, in Keong(2000)
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companies (MBf, Mayban Finance, and Arab-Malaysian) had over 60 percent o f the market 
share.
[Table 5-10] Preventive Measures undertaken in 1997-98 434
Measures
Supervision
The level of transparency in the annual financial statements of banking 
institutions
All banking institutions would be subjected to a more intensive and rigorous 
supervision, including stress testing their positions each month 
Banking institutions is required to report and publish key indicators of 
financial soundness every financial quarter not later than six weeks after the 
closure of the financial quarter
Loan classification and provisioning standards is streamlined to be 
consistent with international best practices
Risk
management
The default period for classifying a loan as non-performing by banking 
institutions is reduced from six months to three months 
Banking institutions is required to maintain general provisions for bad and 
doubtful debts of at least 1.5 % of total loans net of specific provision and 
interest-in-suspension
Banking institutions are required to comply with the consolidated minimum 
risk-weighted capital ratio (RWCR) of 8 % on a quarterly basis 
To expand the current capital adequacy framework to incorporate market 
risks
The minimum capital funds for finance companies is raised from RM 5 
million to RM 300 million by end-June 1999 and RM 600 million by the end 
of year 2000
The limits of single customer exposure were reduced from 30 % to 25 
percent of total capital funds
Initially, the plan received a negative response from the financial markets. In particular, 
the choice of United Merchant Finance (UMF) as an anchor company provoked suspicions 
because it was not a non-tier 1 company. At that time, it was widely believed that this decision 
had been taken to help its parent company. United Merchant group, which had political
Malaysian Business, Marriages of Convenience (16 January 1998)
Drawn from Ministry of Finance, Economic Report 1998/99 (1999), pp.39-40. It should be noted 
that some measures ware reversed to boost monetary expansion in September 1998. For more details, 
see Soo-Nam Oh, Towards a Sustainable Banking Sector-Malaysia, in ADB, Rising to the Challenge in 
Asia: A Study o f Financial Markets, Vol. 8 Malaysia (ADB, 1999)
The IMF did not support the merger plan. See Far Eastern Economic Review, Taking its Medicine (2 
April 1998)
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connections with Daim and Anwar. In addition, minority shareholders opposed the merger 
plans, claiming that the price paid for them did not reflect the market value. To meet the 
deadline, the government had to exert pressure on them. After all, 15 small and medium-sized 
firms were merged with 6 anchor firms, and 14 firms were absorbed by their parent banks.
The systemic nature of the banking crisis highlighted the need for more radical 
approaches. To this end, the authorities prepared a more comprehaisive financial sector 
restructuring plan. Figure 5-3 presents the whole structure of the plan. It did not only include 
short-term measures to resolve all NPL problems in the banking sector but also long-term 
tasks to enhance the financial system by institutional reform.
[Figure 5-3] Objectives of the Banking Sector Restructuring Plan 439
Short term Long term
Halt the vicious cycle 
Stimulate economic recovery
i
Encouraging banks to lend
i
Manage
NPLs
Capital Funding
Danaharta
CDRC
Rehabilitation
Unit
Danamodal Special Unit
Create resilient banking system to 
withstand future shocks 
Developing efficient & competitive 
banking sector to support economic 
growth & contribute as sector of 
growth
Provide foundation to broaden & 
deepen financial markets & 
strengthen financial infrastructure to 
meet future challenges
i
Financial companies merger 
programme
BNM to initiate mergers and use 
Danamodal to facilitate consolidation 
of the banking sector and to 
rationalise and revamp management 
where necessary 
Asset-backed securitisation 
Plan to chart the direction of the 
banking sector__________________
436
437
438
439
Malaysian Business, A Merger Wager (April 16 1998)
Straits Times, KL Merger Plan Hurts Finance Stocks (6 January 1998)
Business Times, All 39 M’sian Finance Firms Say Yes to Consolidation (1 April 1998) 
BNM, Annual Report 1998 (1999), p. 145.
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To this end, the authorities established special agencies to address the problem under the 
Treasury and the central bank. Figure 5-4 illustrates demonstrates the relationship between 
government agencies.
[Figure 5-4] Re-organisation of Regulatory Framework 440
Special
Administrator
CDRC
Danamodal
Treasury
Restructuring 
Steering Committee
Special
Administrator
BNM Danaharta
In the first place, Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad (hereafter Danaharta) was 
established on 20 June 1998. Danaharta aimed to purchase NPLs below their book value (in 
other words, at fair market value) from financial institutions, which were given government- 
guaranteed bonds in exchange for the purchase of their NPLs. The removal of NPLs was very 
important because financial institutions were reluctant to resume their lending activities. The 
initial share capital of Danaharta was RM 10 billion and it increased its paid-up capital to RM 
250 billion in January 1999. The government had full ownership of the institution, but the 
board of directors included former senior government officials as well as representatives from 
the private sector. In addition, Danaharta could appoint a special administrator without having
to go to court. 441
Based on Enoch, Garcia and Sundararajan (2001), p. 106.
Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad, Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad, in Keong (2000)
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Danamodal Nasional Berhad (hereafter Danamodal), founded on 10 August 1998, also 
contributed to restructuring the financial / corporate sector. Its main objective was to re­
capitalise debt-ridden banks. The asset management company did not only lend loans to weak 
banks, but also played a part in mergers and acquisitions (M & As) for the banks. By assessing 
their prospects, Danamodal provided funds to viable banks and monitored their operation to 
prevent a moral hazard problem. Its seed capital for Danamodal -  RM 3 billion -  was raised 
by the central bank. The funds for recapitalisation were financed by common shares, 
irredeemable Non-Cumulative Convertible Preference Shares (INCPS) and subordinated 
loans. These instruments were designed to minimise the use of public funds and to base its 
modus operandi on market principles.
The bank recapitalisation agency had acquired RM 37.5 billion (in terms of book value), 
which represent 44 percent of the NPLs in the sector. As a result, the net NPL ratio of the 
sector reduced to 6.3 percent based on the 6- month classification from its peak of 9 percent in 
November 1998. To finance the operation, the agency issued bonds amounting to RM 11.1 
billon. The performance of Danaharta is summarised in Table 5-11.
[Table 5-11] Performance of Danaharta (As of the end of 2000) 443
Loan outstanding* Expected recovery * Expected recovery rate
Performing loans 2.57 2.57 100
Plain loan restructuring 7.06 6.54 93
Settlement 6.34 4.86 77
Scheme of arrangement 6.08 5.07 83
Special administrators 2.50 1.54 62
-  scheme approved 7.63 2.12 28
Foreclosure 2.02 1.10 55
Legal action 1.63 - -
Total 35.83 23.80 66
Unit: RM billion
Danamodal is under greater influence of the central bank than Danaharta. 
BNM, Annual Report 2000 (2001), p.l33.
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Despite Danaharta and Danamodal’s efforts, NPLs rose rapidly because the austere 
macroeconomic policy deepened the economic recession. In 1998, two large banks -  Bank 
Bumiputera Malaysia and Sime Bank -  registered huge losses. The injection of RM 1.1 billion 
to Bank Bumiputera was not enough to stop a bank run, and the authorities took over 65 
percent of its NPLs. In June and September 1999, Bank Bumiputera Malaysia and Sime Bank 
were taken over by Bank of Commerce (M) and RHB Bank respectively.
The sale of Sime Bank to RHB Bank was under attack because the RHB Bank was 
controlled by Rashid Hussain who had been a close friend to Mahathir and Daim. Among the 
major shareholders of RHB Bank was Malaysian Resources Corporate Berhad controlled by 
Anwar’s cronies and the UMNO co-operative. ^
To avoid any likelihood of systemic failure, BNM took over control over the operation of 
four banking institutions in 1999: Kewangan Bersatu, MBf Finance, Sabah Finance and Sime 
Merchant Bankers. The central bank intervened in merging two o f the weakest banks with 
stronger ones. As a result, Kewangan Bersatu and Sabah Finance were consolidated with 
Mayban Finance and Multi-Purpose Bank respectively in September 1999. Meanwhile, Sime 
Merchant Bankers was subjected to an open tender exercise. And RM 2 billion was injected 
into MBf Finance through Danamodal.
Furthermore, BNM initiated a radical plan on 29 July 1999. The central bank selected six 
banking groups from aU 58 domestic financial institutions: Malaysian Banking Group, Multi- 
Purpose Banking Group, Bumiputera Commerce Group, Public Bank Group, Perwira Affln 
Bank Group and Southern Bank Group. The requirement for anchor bank was minimum 
shareholders’ funds of RM 2 billion and an asset base of at least RM 25 billion.
This plan drew criticism of its criteria of anchor banks. It was suspected that Daim tried 
to save under-performing banks under the control of his cronies. For example, RHB Bank and
^  Malaysian Business, Facing the Music (16 January 1999)
BNM, Annual Report 1999 (2000), p. 130.
^  BNM, Annual Report 2000 (2001), p. 123.
Malaysian Business, Merger by Decree (16 October 1999) Daim’s intervention in the financial 
sector had a long history. Anwar was no exception because he also used to exert his influence on the 
banking sector by proxy. For details, see Hamilton-Hart (2002), Ch.5.
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Hong Leong Bank controlled by associates of Anwar were excluded, while Perwira Afïïn 
Bank and Multi-Purpose Bank run by cronies of Daim were included.
The central bank maintained that the selection of anchor banks was based on an economic 
rationale, not political considerations. However, there is little doubt that Bumiputera 
Commerce Bank, Multi-Purpose Bank and Perwira Affin Bank had poor performance records. 
As Table 5-12 shows, only two banks -Southern Bank and Public Bank -  were allowed to 
survive among non-state or non-UMNO-associated banks.
[Table 5-12] Malaysia’s Commercial Banks by Asset Size (1997) 450
Bank
Rank in 
Malaysia
Rank in 
Asia
Founders’ 
Ethnic origin
Major shareholder
Malaysian Banking 1 59 Chinese Government
Bank Bumiputra Malaysia 2 109 Malay Government
RHB Bank 3 127 Malay Rashid Hussain
Public Bank 4 141 Chinese Teh Hong Piow
Sime Bank 5 224 Malay Sime Darby
Bank of Commerce (M) 6 237 Chinese Renong
Hong Leong Bank 7 252 Chinese Quek Leng Chan
Perwira Affin Bank 8 271 Malay/Pakistan Affin Holdings
After the announcement of the plan, some banks attempted to mobilise their political 
networks to save their businesses. In particular, the Chinese community expressed strong 
opposition to the plan because many Chinese employees in the banking sector were made 
redundant in favour of their Malay counterparts. In August 1999, 11 ethnic Chinese groups 
demanded more equal treatment in an open letter. On 3 October 1999, the plan was abandoned 
by Prime Minister Mahathir, fearing that the opposition could lead to political moves against
Business Times, Bank Negara Gives Nod for 10 Anchor Banks (15 February 2000)
Asiamoney, The Humbling of Daim Zainuddin (November 1999)
Drawn from Malaysian Business, Wiiming the Race (16 November 1997) and the homepages of 
each bank.
Malaysian Business, Mixed Response (1 April 1999)
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him. Eventually anchor bank status was given to four other banks: RHB Capital, Arab- 
Malaysian Merchant Bank, Hong Leong Bank and EON Bank.
In addition, Daim’s intervention provoked political controversies. For example. Daim 
played a key role in permitting the International bank of Malaysia which was previously 
controlled by himself to acquire the merchant-banking arms of Bank Bumiputera Malaysia at 
a very low price. He also blocked the Hong Leong Bank’s bid for Bank Simpanan Nasional 
Merchant Bankers to favour Perwira Affin Bank. These interventions were opposed by Ali 
Abul Hassan Sulaiman, then governor of BNM. After his retirement in April 2000, he sent a 
confidential letter to Mahathir that described Daim’s extensive involvement. The letter
gave rise to the decline of Daim’s power by convincing the Prime Minister to suspect that 
Daim was violating the original principle of economic reform to support his political funding 
machine. Eventually Mahathir used the same tactic to remove Daim as he had to eliminate 
Anwar. Nor Mohamed Yakop, the architect of the capital controls policy, replaced Daim as 
his special adviser.
A revised plan of banking sector consolidation was announced on 14 February 2000.
The objective was to establish large financial holding companies to compete with foreign 
banks. Various incentives were granted, including exemption from stamp duty and real 
property gain tax and recognition of the losses of the acquired institutions for tax purposes. To 
accelerate the process, the government made these incentives available by 30 August 2000.
Nevertheless, only six of the ten anchor banks met the deadline. In particular, Utama Bank 
resisted any merger plan, arguing that Sabah and Sarawak -  the states on the western part of 
the Island of Borneo -  needed a bank to support the local economy. Its resistance led to the
Far Eastern Economic Review, Merger delayed (4 November 1999); Malaysian Business, Merger 
Challengers (16 February 2000)
According to an opposition leader, Daim’s cronies were very concerned about Anwar’s succession to 
Mahathir because Anwar’s followers would take over their vested interests. See Syed Husin Ali, The 
Changing Faces of Politics and Repression in Malaysia, Inter-Asian Cultural Studies, Vol.2, No.l 
(2001)
Far Eastern Economic Review, Behind Daim’s Fall (27 June 2002)
Business Times, Dr M Picks New Adviser on Financial Issues (11 May 2000); Will Daim Stay on as 
Finance Minister? (12 May 2000)
Malaysian Business, The Main Players (16 February 2000) See also Meesook (2002), p.79.
Straits Times, KL Bank Mergers to Get Tax Breaks (1 August 2000)
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deadline being extended twice. Finally, behind-the-scenes match-making by the Prime 
Minister led the bank to agree to merger terms with RHB Bank in February 2002. The 
outcome of the restructuring is summarised in Table 5-13.
[Table 5-13] Result of Bank Restructuring
Number 97 98 99 00 01
Commercial Banks 36 36 33 31 25
Finance companies 39 33 23 19 12
Merchant banks 12 12 12 12 10
Islamic banks NA NA 2 2 2
Total 87 81 70 64 49
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia, Annual Report (various issues)
In 2001, BNM proposed a far-reaching plan to overhaul the banking sector. The main
objective was the dispersion of the ownership structure to prevent controlling shareholders 
from abusing their power. To this end, the central bank announced that Section 46 of the 
Banking and Financial Institutions Act 1989 (Bafia) would be strictly enforced. Section 46 
defines the ceiling of shareholdings in banking institutions: not more than 10 percent for any 
one individual and 20 percent for any one corporation. This regulation is in favour of 
institutional investors rather than individual ones.
The success of banking sector consolidation convinced the authorities to push ahead with 
the integration of other sectors. In 2000, the Securities Commission urged 66 stock-broking 
firms to form about 15 universal brokers, whose requirements were minimum paid-up capital 
of 250 million ringgit and at least three merger partners. Because only three firms met the 
condition at that time, the deadline was extended beyond the end of 2000. In addition. Bank 
Negara Malaysia put forward a plan to restructure the insurance industry. To do so, the 
minimum paid-up capital requirement o f issuers was increased twofold in November 2000. 
The target was to reduce the number of firms to around 40 by 2003 (down from 67 at the end
EIU, Country Finance: Malaysia (March 2002), p.l 1.
For details, see Appendix 5-4.
For the impact of the plan on the banking sector, see Malaysian Business, Bankers Going Bonker (1 
April 2001), pp. 24-33.
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of 2000). From 2001, Dananharta did not acquire NPL form the financial sector and it was 
scheduled to close its operation in 2005. As of the end of 2002, the average recovery rate 
achieved was 57 percent.
3) Capital Controls
Until the late 1960s, Malaysia had a currency board system under which the Malaysian 
dollar was fixed to the British pound sterling. In 1967, the system was replaced with a more 
flexible regime and the new Malaysian currency, the ringgit, was issued. In June 1972, the US 
dollar replaced the pound sterling as the intervention currency. Just after the Bretton Woods 
system collapsed in 1973, the ringgit was allowed to float. From October 1978 onwards, the 
ringgit was de facto pegged to a trade-weighted basket of currencies. With the exception of the 
1986 depreciation, the managed floating system successfully stabilised the exchange rate.
Cross-border transactions in ringgit remained liberal from the time of independence. 
Malaysia was the fourth East Asian country that accepted the obligation of Article VIII in 
1968 after Hong Kong, Japan and Singapore. In 1973, many regulations on foreign exchange 
transactions were lifted. Few restrictions on portfolio inflows by non-residents resulted in the 
development of an active offshore ringgit market in Singapore.
Compared with its neighbouring countries, Malaysia maintained a liberal regime of 
foreign exchange transactions. Restrictions on non-resident holdings were, however, briefly 
used in the early 1990s when massive capital inflows brought inflationary pressures to the 
economy. The financial crisis led the government to rethink its liberal attitude toward
EIU (2002), pp.16-18.
BNM, Annual Report 2002 (2003), p. 116.
IMF, Malaysia: Recent Economic Developments, Staff Country Report No. 99/85 (IMF, 1999), p.84. 
^  Prema-chandra Athukorala and Jayant Menon, Outward Orientation and Economic Development in 
Malaysia, World Economy, Vol. 22, No. 8 (November 1999); Jayant Menon, How Open is Malaysia?
An Analysis of Trade, Capital and Labour Flows, World Economy, Vol. 23, No. 2 (February 2000); S.K. 
Goh, M. H. Alias, and N. Olekalns, New Evidence on Financial Opeimess in Malaysia, Journal o f 
Asian Economics, Vol. 14, No.2 (April 2003)
Latifah Merican Cheong, Capital Flows and Capital Controls: The Malaysian Experience, in Kyung 
Tae Lee (ed.). Globalization and the Asia Pacific Economy (London: Routledge, 2002)
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capital account liberalisation. Mahathir’s condemnation of hedge funds in September 1997 
signalled a policy change. However, his attack backfired and the depletion of the country’s 
foreign exchange reserves was accelerated. Worse, economic recession drove foreign 
investors out of the economy.
Against this background, capital controls were widely tipped as a policy option from April 
1998. The architect of the policy was Nor Mohamed Yakcop -  a special adviser to the 
Prime Minister and member of the NEAC -  who masterminded the design and 
implementation of the policy. His policy preference was close to Mahathir rather than
Anwar. Basically, he was sceptical of financial liberalisation on the ground that neoliberalism 
is more beneficial to developed countries than developing ones.
In today's unipolar world, the so-called neo-liberal order is the dominant one, with its agenda of a 
trading and capital flows architecture that favors large trans-national corporations (TNCs) and 
capital providers from the developed countries. We see current WTO initiatives including TRIPs 
(Trade-Related Intellectual Property) and TRIMs (Trade Related Investment Management) 
provisions and the current international financial institutions, such as the IMF, very much favoring 
developed countries' TNCs, creditors and investors,
Not all policy makers supported capital controls. At that time, the governor and deputy 
governor of the central bank -  both of whom were regarded as Anwar’s allies -  opposed the 
policy, fearing that the policy would isolate Malaysia from the international financial 
community. Their opposition was very critical because the central bank should take 
responsibility for the implementation of capital controls. This is why it took several months to 
carry out the policy.
^  Zainal-Abidin Mahani, Implications of the Malaysian Experience on Future International Financial 
Arrangements, ASEAN Economic Bulletin, Vol. 17, No.2 (August 2000)
Thanks to his strong commitment to Mahathir’s policy, he was promoted to Deputy Finance Mister 
later. Personal interview with K.S. Jomo (Kuala Lumpur, 14 March 2002)
Nor Mohamed Yakcop, The Remaking of Malaysia Inc., New Strait Times (22 February 2002) 
Straits Times, Mahathir: Central Bank Opposed Controls (2 September 1998)
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The final decision was made on 6 August 1998 and announced on 2 September 1998. The 
policy shift consisted of three measures.
• Freezing the external ringgit accounts of non-residents in Malaysia, which aimed at 
eliminating the offshore ringgit market in Singapore and stopping currency traders from 
accessing to ringgit funds
• Introducing a ‘twelve-month rule’ that prohibits the repatriation of portfolio capital inflows
• Fixing the exchange rate at RM 3.8 to the US dollar.
It should be noted that Malaysia’s capital controls policy was a temporary measure with a 
very limited time span. As Table 5-14 distinguishes, the main target of the policy was short­
term capital flows. Thus, there was no restriction on long-term capital flows and current 
account transactions. In addition, the policy was designed to discourage outflows rather than 
inflows.
[Table 5-14] Selective Capital and Foreign Exchange Controls 471
Transaction subject to control Transaction not subject to control
Ringgit-denominated transactions with non­
residents
Current account transactions 
• trade transactions denominated in foreign 
currency
Outflow of short-term capital
• One-year withholding period until 30 
August 1998
• A three-tier tax ( 10%, 20%, 30%) on profit 
remittance between September 1998 and 
February 1999
Repatriation of profits, interests, dividends, 
capital gains and rental income from FDI and 
similar forms of ringgit assets owned by non­
residents
Import and export of ringgit (carriage on person)
Export of foreign currency by citizens (carriage 
on person)
General payments by residents including those for 
education abroad
Outflow of Malaysian investment abroad FDI inflows and outflows
For more details, see Appendix 5-5,
Prema-chandra Athukorala, Crisis and Recovery in Malaysia (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2001),
p.77.
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The switch from the managed float to a pegged system was also exceptional. While other 
crisis-affected countries gave up their de facto pegged regimes following the IMF’s 
recommendation, Malaysia alone pegged its currency to the US dollar. Three questions were 
raised with regard to the exchange regime change. First was the appropriateness of fixed 
regimes in East Asia. Traditionally East Asian countries preferred managed floating regimes, 
which gave them some room for devaluation to increase exports. The adoption of a fixed 
exchange regime made it difficult to manipulate exchange rates. Second, the exchange rate 
mattered. Unless the rate was uncompetitive, it could not be sustained because large trade 
deficits put downward pressure on the currency. The average rate for the previous two months 
was RM 4.18, while the pre-crisis rate was RM2.4. Third, it was also important to choose 
which foreign currency the ringgit should be pegged to. In most cases, currencies of major 
trading partners are selected as anchor currencies. Well before the switch, rumours were 
circulating that the Japanese yen was being seriously considered as the anchor. However, the 
choice turned out to be the single currency peg to the US dollar. This decision is 
understandable because more than three quarters of Malaysia’s trade was settled in the US 
dollar.
The initial reaction to Malaysia’s capital controls was very unfavourable. At that time, 
very few economists and policy-makers dared to support the policy. The international 
financial community regarded it as unorthodox “not because it was unheard of or unthinkable 
before, but because it ran counter to the IMF prescriptions adopted by other crisis-hit 
countries.” Only exception was Paul Krugman who recommended the policy as a 
temporary measure.
It is not clear that this measure meant either appreciation or depreciation. Before the crisis, the 
currency had been traded at around 2.5 RM per $ 1. According to Kaplan and Rodrik, it was the 
approximately 10 percent appreciation relative to the level at which the ringgit had been trading 
immediately before the controls. However, Dwight Perkins and Wing Thye Woo point out that the rate 
left it undervalued against the other major currencies in tiie region. Considering the rise of its trade 
surplus afterwards, it is de facto devaluation.
BNM, Annual Report 1999 (2000), pp. 107-11.
^^^Ariff(1999), p.2.
Paul Krugman, Saving Asia: It's Time to Get Radical, Fortune (7 September 1998)
181
Foreign investors withdrew their funds from the country, even though the repatriation of 
principal and profits from direct investments was unaffected by the policy. Subsequent 
outflows pushed the stock market to fall by 13.3 percent to its lowest level in 1998. At the 
same time, major investment banks removed Malaysia from their investment indices, which 
were used as investment benchmarks for fund mangers. On 4 September 1998, for instance, 
Morgan Stanley Capital International announced that Malaysia was excluded from the MSCI 
Developed Market series, effective as of the close of 30 September 1998. Furthermore, all 
international rating agencies including Moody’s, Thompson Bank Watch and Fitch IBCA, 
downgraded Malaysia’s credit and sovereign risk ratings. As a result, Malaysia’s risk 
premium rose substantially even above those of Korea and Thailand. On 23 September 
1998, the World Bank postponed its aid plan (300 million dollars) which was designed to 
improve social safety nets, suggesting that the Bank needed some time to analyse the impact 
of the capital controls on the plan.
The backlash made it virtually impossible for Malaysia to borrow funds from the 
international financial markets. However, the government managed not to go to the IMF 
because some East Asian countries gave financial assistance to the economy. In July 1998, 
Taiwan pledged soft loans of 1 billon dollars. In October, Japan’s New Miyazawa Initiative 
relieved the shortage of foreign investment.
In the meanwhile, domestic responses were not negative. The unexpected policy shift 
generated confusion in the financial markets. And there was concern about black markets and 
bureau de change fraud. Nevertheless, the business sector -  including the Federation of 
Malaysian Manufacturers (FMM) -  welcomed the new policy. First, the pegging to the US
Akira Ariyoshi, Karl Habermeier, Bernard Laurens, Inci Otker-Robe, Jorge Ivan Canales-Kriljenko, 
and Andrei lürilenko, Capital Controls: Country Experiences with Their Use and Liberalization, 
Occasional Paper No. 190 (IMF, 2000), p.100-102.
EIU, Country Report: Malaysia (4tii quarter 1998), pp.20-21.
Straits Times, Black Market in Currency Begins (10 September 1998); 20 Money Changers under 
Probe (13 November 1998)
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dollar released them from the burdens and costs of hedging. Second, its undervalued rate 
helped them to improve their competitiveness significantly.
Just after the policy was implemented, the KLSE index started to rebound. However, it is 
hard to say whether capital controls and the pegged exchange regime lifted the index. It was 
state-controlled institutional funds that purchased stocks. However, non-resident investors, 
intentionally or unintentionally, contributed to the recovery because restrictions on capital 
outflows required them to re-invest their funds in the economy.
There is little doubt that the main objective of the policy was achieved. '*** First, the 
restrictions on the internationalisation of the ringgit blocked offshore ringgit trading, thus 
containing the outflows of the currency. For a month, RM 11 billion of an estimated 20 billion 
ringgit in offshore holdings was returned to Malaysia from Singapore, where the ringgit was 
traded in foreign exchange markets. Second, there were no more speculative attacks on the 
currency, even after the relaxation of fiscal and monetary policy. Finally, the turnaround of the 
economy gave a breathing space to press ahead with structural reform.
According to the IMF, the success of the policy can be ascribed to many factors.
(1) The wide-ranging nature of the controls that has covered essentially all the potential loopholes 
in the system; (2) strict implementation and enforcement of the measures by Bank Negara Malaysia 
and a disciplined banking system, which strictly interpreted the measures and has not sought out 
potential loopholes; and (3) Bank Negara Malaysia’s efforts to disseminate information on the 
nature of the exchange control rules to promote greater transparency and under-standing of the 
measures.
Solid economic recovery enabled the government to relax the restriction on capital 
outflows in February 1999. As Table 5-15 shows, outright prohibition on the repatriation of
Malaysian Business, Positive Effects (16 September 1998)
IMF, Malaysia: Selected Issues, Staff Country Report No.99/86 (1999), p.9.
David Cook and Michael B. Devereux, Capital Controls in Malaysia: Effectiveness and Side Effects, 
Asian Economic Papers, Vol. 1, No. 1 (January 2002)
Straits Times, RM 11b Moved Back into Malaysia (18 September 1998)
Ariyoshi et al. (2000), p. 105.
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portfolio investment for a 12-month holding period was replaced with a market-based measure 
of a system of exit levies.
[Table 5-15] Malaysia’s Exit Tax on Foreign Capital (15 February 1999)
Funds brought in before 15 February 1999
Principal withdrawn Tax (percent)
Within 7 months 30
Within 7 to 9 months 20
Within 9 to 12 months 10
After 12 months 0
Profits withdrawn
During 12 montii holding period 0
After 12 month holding period 10
Funds brought in on or after 15 February 1999
Principal No Tax
Profits
Withdrawn within 12 months 30
After 12 months 10
Source: Asian Wall Street Journal (5-6 February 1999)
Despite the high levy, some fund managers cleared up their holdings on the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange (KLSE). Thus stock prices fell sharply after the introduction of the new 
system. Nevertheless, this change was regarded as a positive signal. The IMF board of 
directors said, “the regime of capital controls -  which was intended by the authorities to be 
temporary -  had produced more positive results than many observers had initially expected.” 
Investment banks embraced Malaysia in their investment indices and upgraded Malaysia’s 
credit ratings. Subsequently in May 2001, the 10 percent exit levy on repatriated profits from 
portfolio investment of less than a year was abolished and the restrictions on the purchase of 
property by foreigners were eased. Since then there is no restrictions on all foreign investment 
in Malaysia, including the equity market.
Although the capital control policy achieved its own objective, it is still controversial how 
much the pohcy contributed to economic recovery. Supporters hold the view that the pressures
Available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/sec/pn/1999/pn9988.htm 
For details, see Appendix 5-6.
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on the ringgit in offshore markets could not have been halted without the policy. Moreover, 
capital controls provided some breathing space to take reform measures without putting 
downward pressure on the currency. On the other hand, critics claim that the effects of 
capital controls should not be exaggerated. At that time, there were few incentives for capital 
outflows because substantial capitals had already left the country and the ringgit was 
subsequently depreciated. The unexpected controls might have -  even though 
unintentionally -  punished “the investors who had also shown greater commitment to 
Malaysia.” '***
Considering that capital controls were a supplementary part o f the Keynesian stimulus 
policy package, it is difficult to identify the effects of the policy. And the scope of the 
capital controls was selective, not comprehensive. Its main target was to the offshore ringgit 
market in Singapore. “The exchange controls introduced by the government on 2 September 
1998 do not affect the operation of long-term investors in the manufacturing and related 
service sectors... The measures, which are applicable mainly to short-term portfolio 
investments, are aimed at containing speculation on the ringgit and minimising the impact of 
short-term capital inflows on the domestic economy. In addition, the policy did not last
Hali J. Edison and Carmen M. Reinhart, Capital Controls during Financial Crises: The Case of 
Malaysia and Thailand, International Financial Discussion Paper (Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, 2000); Dwight Perkins and Wing Thye Woo, Malaysia: Adjusting to Deep Integration 
with the World Economy, in Wing Thye Woo, Jeffrey D. Sachs, and Klaus Schwab (eds.). The Asian 
Financial Crisis: Lessons for a Resilient Asia (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000); Ethan Kaplan and Dani 
Rodrik, Did the Malaysian Capital Controls Work?, Working Paper No. 8142 (NBER, 2001); Rawi 
Abdelal and Laura Alfaro, Capital and Control, Lessons from Malaysia, Challenge, Vol. 46, No. 4 
(July/August 2003); Gan Wee Beng and Soon Lee Ying, Current Account Reversal during a Currency 
Crisis: The Malaysian Experience, ASEAN Economic Bulletin, Vol.20, No.2 (August 2003); Anita 
Doraisami, From Crisis to Recovery: The Motivations for and Effects of Malaysian Capital Controls, y  y  
Journal o f International Development, Vol. 16, No.2 (March 2004)
Ron Hood, Malaysian Capital Controls, Working Paper No.2536 (World Bank, 2001); Rudiger 
Dombusch, Malaysia’s Crisis: What was Different?, in Sebastian Edwards and Jeffrey Frankel,
Preventing Currency Crises in Emerging Markets (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002);
Robert Dunn, Jr., The Misguided Attractions of Foreign Exchange Controls, Challenge, Vol. 45, No.5, 
(September / October 2002); Masahiro Kawai and Shinji Takagi, Rethinking Capital Controls: The 
Malaysian Experience, Discussion Paper No.03A-05 (Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance,
2003); Natalia T. Tamirisa, Do Macroeconomic Effects of Capital Controls Vary by Their Type?
Evidence from Malaysia, Working Paper 04/3 (IMF, 2004)
'*** Kwame Sundaram Jomo, Capital Controls: The Experience of Malaysia, World Economics, Vol.3,
No.l (January-March 2002), p. 131.
For details of the package, see IMF, Malaysia: Recent Economic Developments, Staff Country 
Report No. 99/85 (IMF, 1999)
EIU, Country Finance: Malaysia (March 2000), p.22.
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more than six months. The restriction on a one-year holding period for repatriation of portfolio 
capital inflows was replaced in February 1999 with a system of graduated exit levies, and 
further relaxed in September 1999.
The capital control policy had political implications because of its distributional effects. 
Simon Johnson and Todd Mitton argue that it resulted -  intentionally or unintentionally -  in 
protecting Maharthir’s clients from economic difficulties. According to their analysis, 
politically-connected firms, suffering from an estimated 60 billion dollars loss in market value 
from July 1997 to August 1998, gained an estimated 5 billion dollars in market value during 
September 1998. However, the evidence is far from perfect. Above all, the classification of 
Mahathir’s cronies is flawed. Due to their decades-long alliance, the political patronage 
structures of Mahathir, Anwar and Daim were overlapped. In addition, there is no evidence 
that Anwar was opposed to the policy.
[Figure 5-5] Different Effects of Capital Controls on the Manufacturing Sector 493
High exports, low imports
Rubber products 
Palm oil processing 
Wood products 
Petroleum products
High exports, medium-high imports
Electronics 
Electrical products 
Textiles and clothing 
Chemical products
Low exports, low imports Low exports, high imports
Transport equipment
As Figure 5-5 demonstrates, the distributional impact of the policy was uneven across 
industries. Resource-based industries benefited from the policy because of improved terms of 
trade. And electronics, apparel and chemical industries also enhanced their competitiveness to 
a considerable extent. In contrast, the surge in prices of imports was disadvantageous to the
Simon Johnson and Todd Mitton, Cronyism and Capital Controls: Evidence from Malaysia, Journal 
o f Financial Economics, Vol.67, No.2 (February 2003)
Their classification of ownership is based on Gomez and Jomo (1999). However, Jomo admitted that 
some parts of the data were outdated and incorrect. Personal interview with K. S. Jomo (Kuala Lumpur, 
14 March 2002)
BNM, Annual Report 1999 (2000), p. 109.
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transport equipment industry. The distributional effects on Mahathir’s cronies were not 
uniformly favourable.
There is a controversy over whether capital controls can be regarded as a political tactic to 
remove Anwar from the cabinet because of a coincidence between the downfall of Anwar and 
the capital control policy. Moreover, the resignation of Ahmad Don and Ton Weng Phak -  
Anwar’s key allies -  before the implementation of the policy implied that Anwar was in 
opposition to the policy. There were rumours that the capital control policy was announced 
hours before the dismissal of Anwar to prevent speculation on the currency because he was 
regarded as a pro-market politician among foreign investors.
According to Mahathir, however, only Fon Weng Phak strongly argued against the 
p o l i c y T h i s  is confirmed by Jomo’s explanation.
This earlier imposition of controls—while Anwar Ibrahim was already Finance Minister (from 
1991) and soon after Ahmad Don became central bank governor—suggests that the two were not as 
opposed to such measures as they have been made out to be after Ahmad Don’s (forced) 
resignation in August 1998 and Anwar Ibrahim’s sacking on 2 September 1998.
Anwar’s popularity did not enhance his political power because Mahathir deliberately 
hinted that Anwar was not loyal to his nation. The suspicion escalated after the arrest of 
Anwar. The US government urged Mahathir to release him. When visiting Kuala Lumpur to 
attend the annual summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum on 16 
November 1998, Vice President A1 Gore expressed his support for Anwar in front of 
Mahathir. This comment provoked a very fierce reaction from Malaysia’s political and 
business elites since they regarded it as arrogant. Even several foreign delegates criticised the 
Vice President, suggesting that his comment might be regarded as inappropriate
Sunday Times, KL ‘won’t Restrict Flow of Capital’ (30 August 1998); Business Times, Anwar 
Brands Forex Controls as Jingoistic Outburst (8 September 1998)
Mohamad Mahathir, Controls Have Proven Successful in Bringing About Quick Recovery, New 
Straits Times (4 August 1999)
Jomo (2002), p. 129.
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interference/^^ Mahathir gained momentum, portraying Anwar as a puppet of foreign powers. 
On December 9, the Dewan Negara, the upper house of parliament, approved a call for the 
resignation of Michel Camdessus. In such circumstances, it is not surprising that there were 
rumours that the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had sponsored Anwar’s supporters 
when A1 Gore condemned the government for repressing democracy.
After being dismissed as Deputy Prime Minister, Finance Minister and Vice President of 
the UMNO, the police charged Anwar with allegations of sexual misconduct and corruption 
(section 377 of the Criminal Act). On 20 September 1998, he was under house arrest under the 
Internal Security Act, which permits detention without trial. On that day, thousands of his 
supporters marched to the national mosque and then to Merdeka (Freedom) Square in central 
Kuala Lumpur. The protest was so big that riot police used tear gas and water cannon to break 
up the demonstrations. Large-scale protests against the arrest of Anwar continued across the 
country until the end of the year.
The controversial trial was a catalyst for the consolidation of anti-Mahathir groups. On 27 
September 1998, 18 parties and organisations formed GAGASAN [Coalition for People’s 
Democracy]. And Islamic NGO groups led by PAS also made a political alliance called 
GERAK [Movement for People’s Justice Council]. These opposition coalitions were merged 
into ADIL [the Movement for Social Justice] led by Anwar’s wife Wan Azizah Ismail. In 
April 1999, ADIL developed into a multi-ethnic political party, KeADILan [National Justice 
Party].'''
During the trial, Anwar claimed that the charges of obstruction of justice and sodomy 
were fabricated by lieutenants of Mahathir to remove him from the government, and that the 
policemen who interrogated him beat him several times in order to force him to admit to the 
charges. His defence was not successful, although he managed to refute the charges of sodomy.
Wqll Street Journal^ Gore’s Support of Malaysian Protester’s Disturbs Reformers Who Fear 
Backlash (18 November 1998) Even after the completion of his trial, seven US congressmen filed a 
resolution to give Anwar a new trial on 27 October 2000. See New Straits Times, American Lawmakers 
File Anwar Resolution (2 November 2000)
EIU, Country Report: Malaysia (1st quarter 1999), p,20.
Jason P. Abbott, Bittersweet Victory: The 1999 Malaysian General Election and the Anwar Ibrahim 
Affair, Round Table, Vol. 354, No. 1 (April 2000)
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In April 1999, he was sentenced to six years in jail for abuse of power. Nine years for sodomy 
charges were eventually added in August 2000.
Afterwards, his supporters were expelled from key positions in the government and the 
ruling party. In a cabinet reshuffle in January 1999, Mahathir appointed outgoing Foreign 
Minister Abdullah Badawi as Deputy Prime Minister. This appointment eliminated the 
political uncertainty over the succession to Mahathir. Furthermore, the result of the general 
election in November 1999 confirmed that Mahathir’s leadership was strong enough to 
overcome the challenge of Anwar and his supporters.
This harsh and controversial case drew world-wide criticisms. Even ASEAN leaders as 
well as Western governments expressed deep concern. For example, Indonesian President B. J. 
Habibie, a long-time friend of Anwar, cancelled a state visit to Malaysia in October 1998. And 
Philippine President Joseph Estrada considered boycotting the Asian Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) forum hosted by Malaysia in November 1998.
However, it is very tricky to evaluate the case of Anwar Ibrahim. There is little doubt that 
his campaign against corruption, cronyism and nepotism was correct in principle. And 
Mahathir’s treatment of him at his trial was a disgrace. However, it is hard to deny that his 
political struggle was motivated by his ambition to succeed to Mahathir. Furthermore, he was 
not perfectly free from cronyism because he also patronised many Malay and Chinese 
businessmen during his tenure as Finance Minister. As Hari Singh pointed out, his reformasi 
movement includes this contradiction.
To summarise, Malaysia’s general framework of financial sector restructuring was similar 
to Korea’s: establishment of AMCs, purchase of NPLs, and the consolidation of the banking 
sector by M & As. At the same time, there was a re-organisation of supervisory / regulatory 
institutions. Despite this, Malaysia’s financial reform was believed as very unorthodox mainly
Patricia Martinez, Malaysia in 2000, Asian Survey^ Vol.41, No.l (January - February 2001). The 
sodomy charge was overturned by the high court on 2 September 2004 but his appeal to the corruption 
charge was rejected. See International Herald Tribune’, Anwar is Released by Court in Malaysia (8 
September 2004); Malaysia Court Refuses to Hear Anwar Appeal (16 September 2004)
Wall Street Journal, Fired Malaysian Official is Transferred from Solidarity (October 15 1998) 
Hari Singh, Democratization or Oligarchic Restructuring? The Politics of Reform in Malaysia, 
Government and Opposition, Vol.35, No.4 (Autumn 2000)
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because of capital controls policy. Although it was a temporary measure that lasted for just 
two years, the policy was regarded as a revolt against the IMF. This is not because the policy 
was revolutionary but because the other crisis-affected countries followed the quite opposite 
policy: i.e., capital account liberalisation. Moreover, Mahathir’s fierce criticism of Western 
hedge funds made Malaysia’s policy look more conventimal.
The legacy of cronyism in the process of banking sector consolidation reinforced the 
impression. Some financers -  both bumiputera and Chinese -  lobbied their political sponsors 
-  especially Mahathir and Daim -  to save their banks. These attempts -  successful or not -  
weakened the political power of the Washington consensus.
4. Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the political influence of the Washington consensus on 
financial reform. The experiences of Korea and Malaysia have demonstrated that the 
consensus had a substantial impact. However, its impact varied across policies. In terms of 
financial sector restructuring, both countries used a similar policy framework: i.e., market- 
friendly London approach. With respect to capital account liberalisation, there was a 
fundamental difference between them.
In Korea, the political power of the Washington consensus was visible since the early 
1990s. Financial liberalisation was undertaken by liberal policy makers. Their logic was that 
financial globalisation made it hard for the government to maintain the state-controlled 
system. In addition, external pressures from the US and the IFIs (particularly the OECD) were 
crucial for financial opening. Big business also supported the policy for two reasons. First, 
chaebol’s dependence on policy loans decrease as it could borrow funds at a discounted rate. 
Second, its business expansion to foreign countries led the chaebol to lobby policy makers to 
relax regulations on foreign exchange transactions. However, financial reform was not in 
favour of the chaebol because the IMF and the authorities tightened regulations on chaebol- 
owned financial institutions to prevent them to become chaebol’s piggy banks.
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In Malaysia, the political power of the Washington consensus was weak due to the 
legacies of the NEP principles. Although the IFIs and some liberal policy makers in the 
Treasury and BNM supported Anwar’s reform plan, their political power did not 
overwhelmed Mahathir’s. This led to two unorthodox policies. First, the bumiputera business 
community exerted political influence on banking sector restructuring. As a result, the process 
of the restructuring was distorted by vested interests of bumiputera businessmen and their 
political sponsors. Second, foreign economic policy such as capital controls was also 
unconventional. It should be noted, however, that the policy was designed to slow capital 
outflows, not to reverse the whole process of financial liberalisation. In fact, there was no 
control on FDI and the restrictions on outward capital flows were lifted after economic 
recovery. In this regard, the impact of the policy should not be exaggerated.
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[Appendix 5-1] Korea: Financial Liberalisation and Deregulation during the 1980s 503
Items Year
• Introduction of corporate paper 1981
• Privatisation of nationwide commercial banks 1981-3
• Abolition of beneficial interest rates on policy loans 1982
• Alleviation of government intervention un the internal operation of 1984
banks 1984
• Introduction of negotiable CDs 1984
• Introduction of a band for bank loan rates 1984
• Indirect opening of the stock market through the Korean Fund 1987
• Introduction of cash management accounts by short-term finance 1987
Financial
companies 1988
Liberalisation
• Introduction of bond management funds by securities companies
• Relaxation of entry barriers to financial industry, including banks. 1988
life insurance, lease, and investment trust 1988
• Opening of the life insurance industry to foreign firms 1991
• Announcement of phased deposit and loan rate deregulation 1991
• Opening of the life securities industry to foreign firms
• Announcement of a four-step interest rate liberalisation plan
1991
• Conversion of short-term finance companies to securities companies 
or banks
• Opening of purchase of individual equity stocks on the Korean
• Stock Exchange to foreign investors
1992
• Switch to a basket-peg exchange rate system from a dollar-peg 1980
• Foreign exchange forward transaction implemented 1981
• Interest rate swap allowed 1984
Foreign • Switch to a negative system in foreign direct investment policies 1984
Exchange & • Insurance of convertible bonds (CBs), warrant bonds (WBs), and 1985
Capital depositoiy receipts (DRs)
Account • Financial future allowed 1987
Liberalisation • Transition to an IMF article VIII country 1988
• Foreign exchange call market established 1989
• Switch to the Market Average Exchange Rate System 1990
• Switch to a negative system in foreign exchange management 1992
503 Park (1996), p.250.
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[Appendix 5-2] Korea: Equity Participation in Domestic Banks by Foreigners 504
Bank
1997 2000
Weight of 
foreign 
shareholders
Major shareholders
Weight of 
foreign 
shareholders
Major shareholders
Korean Housing & 
Commercial
41.2 Government (22.4%) 65.4 Bank of New York 
(US, 13.1%)
ING Group (Europe, 
10%)
Kookmin 37.0 Government (15.2%) 
Bank of New York 
(8.4%)
58.2 Goldman Sachs (US, 
11.1%)
Korea First 0.1 Korea Life Insurance 
(4.9%)
Over 51.0 New Bridge Capital 
(US, 51%)
Regent Securities 4.6 Daeyu Group (31.8%) 51.4 RPGL (Malaysia, 
37.8%)
KGI Securities 0.0 Chohung Bank (59.7%) Over 51.0 KGI Group (Taiwan, 
51%)
Good Morning 
Securities
9.4 Ssangyong Group 
(27.4%)
52.1 H&Q AP (US, 20.6%) 
Lombard APIC (US, 
13.8%)
GIC (Singapore, 9.19%)
Seoul Securities 0.6 Daelim Group (36.2%) 51.8 Quantum Emerging 
(US, 30.9%)
Meritz Securities 0.2 Hanjin Group (43.6%) 25.3 Prudential (US, 25.3%)
Mirae Asset 
Securities
0.0 Mirae Asset Venture 
Capital (16.8%)
Over 11.35 CDIB (Taiwan, 11.35%)
Ileun Securities 0.0 Korea First Bank 
(49.0%)
36.7 SWKOL (Malaysia, 
29.2%)
Regent Securities 
(Subsidiary of RPGL, 
19.6%)
Kyeong-won Kim (ed.), Three Years after the IMF Bailout: A Review o f the Korean Economy’s 
Transformation since 1998 (Seoul: Samsung Economic Research Institute, 2001), pp.39-40.
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[Appendix 5-3] Malaysia: Merger Programme for Domestic Banking Institutions 505
Original Anchor Banking Group M erged with Resultant Entity After M erger
Affm  Bank Berhad Group 
Perwira Affin Bank Berhad 
Asia Commercial Finance Berhad 
Perwira Affin Merchant Bank Berhad
BSN Commercial Bank (M) Berhad
BSN Finance Berhad
BSN M erchant Bankers Berhad
Affin Bank Berhad 
Affin ACF Finance Berhad 
Affin Merchant Bank Berhad
Alliance B an k  B erhad  G roup
Multi-Purpose Bank Berhad International Bank M alaysia Berhad 
Sabah Bank Berhad 
Sabah Finance Berhad 
Bolton Finance Berhad 
Amanah M erchant Bank Berhad 
Bumiputra Merchant Bankers 
Berhad
Alliance Bank Berhad 
Alliance Finance Berhad 
Alliance Merchant Bank Berhad
A rab-M alaysian  B an k  B erhad  G roup
Arab-M alaysian Bank Berhad 
Arab-Malaysian Finance Berhad 
Arab-M alaysian Merchant Bank Berhad
M B f Finance Berhad
Arab-M alaysian Bank Berhad 
Arab-Malaysian Finance Berhad 
Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank 
Berhad
B u m ip u tra  C om m erce B an k  B erhad  
G ro u p
Bumiputra Commerce Bank Berhad 
Bumiputra Commerce Finance Bediad 
Commerce International Merchant Bankers 
Berhad
Bumiputra Commerce Bank 
Berhad
Bumiputra Commerce Finance 
Berhad
Commerce International Merchant 
Bankers Berhad
EO N  B ank  B erhad  G ro u p
EON Bank Berhad 
EON Finance Berhad
Oriental Bank Berhad 
City Finance Berhad 
Perkasa Finance Berhad 
Malaysian International Merchant 
Bankers Berhad
EON Bank Berhad 
EON Finance Berhad 
M alaysian International M erchant 
Bankers Berhad
H ong Leong B ank  B erh ad  G roup
Hong Leong Bank Berhad 
Hong Leong Finance Berhad
Wah Tat Bank Berhad 
Credit Corporation (Malaysia) 
Berhad
Hong Leong Bank Berhad 
Hong Leong Finance Berhad
M alayan  B anking B erh ad  G roup
M alayan Banking Berhad 
M ayban Finance Berhad 
Aseambankers Malaysia Berhad
T he Pacific B ank  B erhad
PhileoAllied Bank (M) Berhad 
Sime Finance Berhad 
Kewangan Bersatu Berhad2
M alayan Banking Berhad 
M ayban Finance Berhad 
Aseambankers Malaysia Berhad
Public B ank  B erh ad  G ro u p
Public Bank Berhad 
Public Finance Berhad
Hock Hua Bank Berhad 
Advance Finance Berhad 
Sime M erchant Bankers Berhad
Public Bank Berhad
Public Finance Berhad
Public M erchant Bankers Berhad
RH B B an k  B erhad  G ro u p
RHB Bank Berhad
RHB Sakura M erchant Bankers Berhad
Delta Finance Berhad 
Interfinance Berhad 
Bank Utama *
RHB Bank Berhad 
RHB Delta Finance Berhad 
RHB Sakura M erchant Bankers 
Berhad
S outhern  B an k  B erhad  G ro u p
Southern Bank Berhad Ban Hin Lee Bank Berhad 
United M erchant Finance Berhad 
Perdana Finance Berhad 
Cempaka Finance Berhad 
Perdana Merchant Bankers Berhad
Southern Bank Berhad 
Southern Finance Berhad 
Southern Investment Bank Berhad
* T he m erger w as com pleted at the end o f  2002.
505 BNM, Annual Report 2001 (2002), p.l 11.
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[Appendix 5-4] Malaysia: Change in Capital Account Regulations in 1994-97 506
Date Type of transaction Measure
1/17/94 Bank transactions A ceiling was placed on the net external liability position of domestic 
banks (excluding trade-related and direct investment inflows). 
(Removed on January 20, 1995)
1/24/94 Portfolio
investment
Residents were prohibited to sell the following Malaysian securities to 
non residents: banker’s acceptances; negotiable instruments of 
deposit; Bank Negara bills; treasury bills, government securities 
(including Islamic securities) with a remaining maturity of up to one 
year, and Cagamas bonds and notes (whether or not sold or trade on a 
discount basis) with a remaining maturity of up to one year.
(Removed on August 12, 1994)
2/7/94 Portfolio
investment
Residents were prohibited to sell to non residents all forms of private 
debt securities (including commercial papers, but excluding securities 
convertible into ordinary shares) with a remaining maturity of one 
year or less.
The restriction on the sale of Malaysian securities to non residents was 
extended to both the initial issue of the relevant security and the 
subsequent secondaiy market trade.
2/23/94 Banking system 
transactions
Prohibition of forward transactions (on bid side) and non trade-related 
swaps by commercial banks with foreign customers to curtail the 
speculative activities of offshore agents seeking long positions in 
ringgit (Lifted on august 16, 1994)
8/19/94 Portfolio
investment
Restrictions on the sale of Malaysian securities were lifted. 
Residents were permitted to sell to non residents any Malaysian 
securities.
12/1/94 Borrowing & 
lending in domestic 
& foreign currency
Non resident-controlled companies were allowed to obtain credit 
facilities, including immovable property loans, up to RM 10 million 
without specific approval, provided that at least 60 percent of their 
total credit facilities from banking institutions were obtained from 
Malaysian-owned banking institutions. Short-term trade facility, 
guarantee, and forward foreign exchange facility were excluded from 
the computation o f  the RM 10 million limits in December 1994, 
while 60:40 rule continued to apply to total short-term trade facilities. 
Non residents with valid work permits may obtain domestic 
borrowing to finance up to 60 percent of the purchase price of 
residential property for their own accommodation;
Residents many borrow in foreign currency up to total of the 
equivalent of RM 5 million from non residents and from commercial 
and merchant banks in Malaysia.
6/27/95 Portfolio
investment
Corporate residents with a domestic credit facility were allowed to 
remit funds up to the equivalent of RM 10 million for overseas 
investment purposes each calendar year.
2/1/96 Payments for
invisible
transactions
The threshold for the completion of the statistical forms for each 
remittance to or receipt of funds from, no residents were raised from 
amounts exceeding RM 50,000 to 100,000 or its equivalent in foreign 
currency.
506 IMF, Malaysia: Selected Issues, Staff Country Report No.99/86 (1999), p.21
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[Appendix 5-5] Malaysia: Capital and Exchange Control Measures in 1997-99 507
Measure Motivation
August 4,1997: Controls were imposed on banks to limit outstanding 
noncommercial- related ringgit offer-side swap transactions (i.e., forward 
order/spot purchases of ringgit by foreign customers) to $2 million per 
foreign customer (hedging requirements of foreigners for trade related and 
genuine portfolio and foreign direct investments were excluded).
To delink the offshore 
ringgit market from its 
onshore counterpart and 
reduce the upward 
pressure on domestic 
onshore interest rates.
September 1,1998: A number of selective exchange control measures 
were introduced, including the following.
• A requirement was introduced to repatriate all ringgit held offshore 
(including ringgit deposits in overseas banks) by 10/1/98 (Bank 
Negara Malaysia approval thereafter); approval requirement was 
imposed to transfer funds between external accounts (freely 
allowed previously); and licensed offshore banks were prohibited to 
trade in ringgit assets (allowed up to permitted limits before).
• A limit was introduced on exports and imports of ringgit by 
resident and nonresident travelers, effective 10/1/99 (no limits 
existed before).
• Residents were prohibited from granting ringgit credit facilities to 
nonresident corresponding banks and stockbroking companies 
(subject to a limit previously).
• Residents were prohibited from obtaining ringgit credit facilities 
from nonresidents (subject to limits previously).
• All imports and exports were required to be settled in foreign 
currency.
• Malaysian banks were prohibited from conducting transactions in 
offer-side swaps with nonresident banks (effectively reducing the 
previous swap limit to zero), and from engaging in reverse repo 
transactions collateralized by ringgit instruments with nonresident 
banks.
• All purchases and sales of ringgit financial assets can only be 
transacted through authorized depository institutions; trading in 
Malaysian shares on Singapore’s Central Limit Order Book over- 
the-counter market became de facto prohibited as a result of a strict 
enforcement of the existing law requiring Malaysian shares to be 
registered in the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange and other
 authorized trades prior to trade.____________________
Aimed specifically at 
eliminating the offshore 
ringgit market and 
restricting the supply of 
ringgit to speculators that 
can be used to take 
positions against the 
ringgit.
September 1,1998: A number of additional measures were introduced, 
including the following.
• Approval requirement for nonresidents to convert the ringgit held 
in external accounts into foreign currency, except for purchases of 
ringgit assets (no such restrictions previously).
• A 12-month waiting period (from September 1, 1998 or the date of
Aimed at preventing 
heavy capital outflows by 
residents and 
nonresidents.
507 Ariyoshi et al. (1999), p.98.
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entry of funds, which-ever comes later) for nonresidents to convert 
ringgit proceeds from the sale of Malaysian securities held in 
external accounts (excludes foreign direct investment flows, 
repatriation of interest, dividends, fees, commissions, and rental 
income from portfolio investment).There were no such restrictions 
previously.
A prior approval requirement beyond a certain limit for all residents 
to invest abroad in any form (previously applied only to corporate 
residents with domestic borrowing).
A specific limit on exports of foreign currency by residents and up 
to the amount brought into Malaysia for nonresidents (previously, 
export of foreign currency required approval with no specific limit).
February 15,1999: The 12-month holding period rule for repatriation of 
portfolio capital was replaced with the following.
• A graduated system of exit levy on repatriation of the principal of 
capital investments (in shares, bonds, and other financial 
instruments, except property investments) made prior to 2/15/99, 
with the levy decreasing in the duration of investment, and thus 
penalizing earlier repatriations (the levy is 30 percent if repatriated 
in less than 7 months after the date of entry (or September 1,1998, 
whichever comes later), 20 percent if in 7-9 months, and 10 
percent if 9-12 months); no levy on principal if repatriated after 12 
months and no levy on profits, interest, dividend, or rental income;
• A graduated exit levy on the repatriation of the profits from 
investments made after 2/15/99 in shares, bonds, and other 
financial instruments, except property investments, with the levy 
decreasing in the duration of investment; no levy on principal and 
no levy on interest, dividend, or rental income (the levy is 30 
percent if repatriated in less than 12 months after the investment
 was made and 10 percent if repatriated after 12 months)._________
To encourage existing 
portfolio investors to take 
a longer-term view of 
their investments in 
Malaysia, attract new 
funds to the country, 
discourage destabilizing 
short-term flows, and 
allow for a smoother 
outflow of funds.
February 18,1999 and April 5, 1999: Property investments and investors 
in MESDAQ (where growth and technology shares are listed) were 
exempted from the exit levy.
To exclude from the 
controls certain types of 
investments that are 
either difficult to 
liquidate or resemble 
foreign direct 
investments.
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[Appendix 5-6] Malaysia: Modifications to the Exchange Control Rules in 2000 508
Date Subject
14 Mar 00 The Central Limit Order Book
The original non-resident holders of the Central Limit Order Book (GLOB) securities 
were freely allowed to repatriate all funds arising from the sale of such securities 
purchased by them without the payment of exit levy.
29 Jun 00 Administrative procedures were issued to facilitate the classification of proceeds from 
the sale of the GLOB securities as being free from levy.
24 Apr 00 Private Debt Securities (PDS)
In line with the objective of promoting the development of the domestic bond market, 
resident companies in Malaysia would be freely allowed to issue PDS for permitted 
purposes without prior written approval from BNM. Non-Resident Controlled 
Companies (NRCCs) raising domestic credit facilities by way of Private Debt 
Securities would be exempted from the RMIO million limit and the 50:50 requirement 
for issuance of PDS on tender basis through the Fully Automated System for 
Tendering (FAST).
30 Jun 00 Guidelines on PDS were issued to the Lead Arrangers.
27 Jul 00 Import and Export of Currency
Resident and non-resident would not be required to make a declaration in the 
Travellers Declaration Form (TDF) as long as they carry currency notes and/or 
traveller’s cheques within the permissible limits. For non-residents, the declaration 
has been incorporated into the Embarkation Card issued by the Immigration 
Department.
30 Sep 00 Licensed Offshore Banks in Labuan International Offshore Financial Centre
Licensed Offshore Banks in the Labuan International Offshore 
2000 Financial Centre would be allowed to invest in ringgit assets/ instruments in 
Malaysia for their own accounts only and not on behalf of their clients. The 
investments must not be financed by ringgit borrowing
23 Nov 00 Domestic Credit Facilities extended by Resident Banking Institutions to Non- 
Resident Controlled Companies
Effective 1 December 2000, foreign-owned banking institutions 2000 in Malaysia 
may extend up to 50% of the total domestic credit facilities to Non-Resident 
Controlled Companies (NRCCs), in the case of credit facilities extended by resident 
banking institutions. This is to fulfil Malaysia's commitment under the General 
Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS). Previously, foreign-owned banking 
institutions could only extend up to a maximum of 40% funding.
15 Dec 00 Ringgit Credit Facilities to Non-Residents
Effective 20 December 2000, licensed commercial banks and 2000 2000 Bank Islam 
Malaysia Berhad in Malaysia were freely allowed to extend in aggregate an intra-day 
overdraft facility of not exceeding RM200 million and an overnight facility of not 
exceeding RMIO million to non-resident stockbroking companies and non-resident 
global custodian banks. In addition, they can also enter into short-term currency swap 
arrangement to cover payment for purchase of shares on the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange subject to certain conditions.
Exit Levy System
As announced in the Budget 2001, the exit levy system was liberalised.
508 BNM, Annual Report 2000 (2001),p.l 1-12.
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Chapter VI 
Corporate Reform
1. Introduction
This chapter explores how much the political power of the Washington consensus affected 
corporate reform in Korea and Malaysia. The original version of the Washington consensus 
does not shed light on corporate governance system. One reason is that there was no 
serious debate on the role of corporate governance in economic development. Before the 
crisis, few studies shed light on corporate governance in developing countries. Another is 
that decades of economic growth misled both foreign and domestic investors to overlook the 
issue. On the face of it, the performance of East Asian firms in the mid-1990s was not bad.
For example, returns on assets (ROA) of East Asian companies were high even compared with 
those of the US and Germany. In the wake of the crisis, the crony capitalism thesis made 
corporate reform one of the most important policy agendas. For this reason, the IMF included 
many corporate reform policies in its programmes for the first time although its mandates 
have nothing to do with the issue.
As Table 6-1 presents, corporate governance system can be divided into two categories: 
relationship (German and Japanese) and arm’s length (Anglo-American).
Corporate governance is referred to as the rules, standards, and organisations that govern the 
behaviour of corporate owners, directors and managers and their duties and accountability to outside 
investors. See Oliver Hart, Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications, Economic Journal, 
Vol. 105 (May 1995)
Some exceptions are Ajit Singh and J. Hamid, Corporate Financial Structures in Developing 
Countries, International Finance Corporation Discussion Paper No.l (1992); Ajit Singh, Corporate 
Financial Patterns in Industrializing Economies, International Finance Corporation Discussion Paper 
No. 2 (1995) According to them, there are some significant differences between developed and 
developing countries. First, corporations in developing world tend to depend very heavily upon external 
finance while their counterparts of advanced economies prefer internal finance. Second, they use equity 
finance rather retained profits to fund new investment projects.
Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, and Lixin Colin Xu, Corporate Performance in the East Asian 
Financial Crisis, World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 15, No.l (February 2000)
The OECD has developed a guideline for good governance system since the OECD council meeting 
in April 1998. See OECD, OECD Corporate Governance Guidelines (OECD, 2004)
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[Table 6-1] Characteristics o f Relationship-based and Market-based System 513
Relationship Arm’s-length
Share of control-oriented finance High Low
Financial markets Small, less hquid Large, highly liquid
Share of all firms listed on exchanges Small Large
Ownership of debt and equity Concentrated Dispersed
Investor orientation Control-oriented Portfolio-oriented
Shareholder rights Weak Strong
Creditor rights Strong for close creditors 
Weak for arms length creditors
Strong
Dominant agency conflict Controlling vs. minority Shareholders vs.
investors management
Role of board of directors Limited Important
Role of hostile takeovers Very limited Potentially important
Role of insolvency Potentially important Potentially important
It was widely believed that there is no clear answer to the question of which is the best 
since each system has weaknesses and strengths. According to Rajan and Zingales, the 
arm’s length system is suitable for an economic environment where exists both high 
contractability and high capital opportunity, whereas the relationship-based system has been 
developed in a condition of low contractability and low capital opportunity.
In the 1980s when the Japanese and German economies flourished, the relationship model 
was widely regarded to be better than the Arm’s length one. After the financial crisis, the 
pendulum of public opinion swung back. The crony capitalism thesis privileged the Anglo-
Juzhong Zhuang, Some Conceptual Issues of Corporate Governance, EDRC Briefing Notes, No. 13 
(June 1999), p. 12.
See Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United 
States, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 102, No.8 (June 1993); Stephen Prowse, Corporate Governance in an 
International Perspective: A Survey of Corporate Control Mechanisms among Large Firms in the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Japan and Germany, BIS Economic Papers No.4 (July 1994); John 
Kay and Aubrey Silberston, Corporate Governance, National Institute Economic Review, No. 153 
(August 1995); Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, Journal o f 
Finance, Vol. LII, No.2 (June 1997); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and 
Robert W. Vishny, Law and Finance, Journal o f Political Economy, Vol. 106, No. 6 (December 1998) 
Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales, Which Capitalism? Lessons from the East Asia Crisis, 
Journal o f Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 11, No.3 (Fall 1998)
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American model on the ground that the crisis-affected countries had the relationship model, 
which is more prone to moral hazard problem than the Arm’s length one.
Despite the differences in legal and institutional settings, the corporate governance system 
of Korea and Malaysia had much in common. First, the separation of ownership and 
management was blurred. Second, the degree of concentration of ownership was very high. 
Third, big business was under the control of a few famihes and politicians. These allowed 
owners to treat their companies as family fiefdoms rather than publicly-listed companies.
To fix the problem, the IMF recommended the crisis-affected countries to adopt so-called 
global standards. The core of corporate reform was to enhance transparency and 
accountability. This objective could not be accomplished without changing the govemment- 
business relationship. The reason is that preferential treatments were given to politically- 
connected companies in return for their investment in strategic industries and political support 
for the ruling parties. In this respect, corporate reform required a systemic transformation from 
the Japanese model to the Anglo-American model.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Each case study of Korea and Malaysia 
outlines the evolution of the corporate governance system. Then it examines how the 
Washington consensus impinged on the patterns of corporate finance restructuring and 
governance system reform after the crisis. The final section assesses the role of the IFIs, 
policy makers, big business and political institutions in corporate reform in a comparative 
perspective.
Martin N. Bailey and Eric Zizewitz, Extending the East Asian Miracle: Microeconomic Evidence 
from Korea, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics (1998); Stephan Haggard, 
Governance and Growth: Lessons from the Asian Economic Crisis, Asian-Pacific Economic Literature^ 
Vol. 13, No, 2 (November 1999); Thomas Clarke, Haemorrhaging Tigers: The Power of International 
Financial Markets and the Weaknesses of Asian Modes of Corporate Governance, Corporate 
Governance, Vol.S, No.2 (April 2000); Simon Johnson, Peter Boone, Alasdair Breach, and Eric 
Friedman, Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis, Journal o f Financial Economics, Vol.58, 
No. 1-2 (October / November 2000); Todd Mitton, A Cross-firm Analysis of the Impact of Corporate 
Governance on the East Asian Financial Crisis, Journal o f Financial Economics, Vol. 64, No.2 (May 
2002)
Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov and Larry H. P. Lang, The Separation of Ownership and Control in 
East Asian Corporations, Journal o f Financial Economics, Vol.58, No, 1-2 (2000)
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2. Korea
1) The Chaebol System
The chaebol system is the offspring o f decades-long industrial policy. Heavy and chemical 
industries promotion policy in the 1970s was critical in the emergence of the chaebol system. 
Preferential treatment such as credit access, tariffs and tax benefits were also offered to 
several companies. In the system, close govemment-business relationships enabled them to 
strengthen their competitiveness in exporting markets. It is indisputable that the chaebol 
contributed to transforming one of the poorest countries into an industrial nation.
In a sense, the chaebol system might be a rational choice for a late industrialising country. 
According to Khanna and Palepus, business groups in developing countries are a way to 
overcome the underdevelopment of market mechanisms that facilitate efficient allocation of 
finance and resources. Nevertheless, the system has many problems. At the firm-level, 
internal markets in the groups can be abused as a tunnel for controlling shareholders to 
transfer the wealth from a company to another. At the national level, pro-chaebol industrial 
policy prohibited the development of small and medium-sized companies.
As Table 6-2 shows, there were several attempts to reform the chaebol system since the 
introduction of the Fair Trade Act of 1980. One of the most important measures was tight 
restriction on the bank ownership structure. In 1982 when the banking sector was privatised.
For the development of the chaebol system, see Myung Hun Kang, The Korean Business 
Conglomerate: Chaebol Then and Now, Korea Research Monograph, No. 21 (Berkeley: Institute of 
East Asian Studies, 1996); Bun Mee Kim, Big Business, Strong State: Collusion and Conflict in South 
Korean Developments, 1960-1990 (New York: State University of New York Press, 1997); Edward M, 
Graham, Reforming Korea's Industrial Conglomerates (Washington D.C.: Institution for International 
Economics, 2003); Sea-Jin Chang, Financial Crisis and Transformation o f Korean Business Groups: 
The Rise and Fall o f Chaebols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). For a comparison witii 
Japan and Taiwan, see Marcus Noland and Howard Pack, Industrial Policy in an Era o f Globalization: 
Lessons From Asia (Washington D C.: Institute for International Economics, 2003)
Tarun Khanna and Krishna Palepu, The Right Way to Restructure Conglomerates in Emerging 
Markets, Harvard Business Review (July / August 1999); Tarun Khanna, Business Groups and Social 
Welfare in Emerging Markets: Existing Evidence and Unanswered Questions, European Economic 
Review, Vol.44, No.4-6 (May 2000)
Kee-Hong Bae, Jun-Koo Kang, and Jin-Mo Kim, Tunneling or Value Added? Evidence from 
Mergers by Korean Business Groups, Journal o f Finance, Vol.LVII, No.6 (December 2002)
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no single shareholder was allowed to own more than 8 percent of commercial banks. The 
ceiling was reduced to 4 percent in 1994.
[Table 6-2] Industrial Restructuring and Rationalisation 522
Policy Measures
Company
rationalization
(1969-71)
Implemented in three phases
1) Readjustment of about 30 companies in the fields of PVC, auto-making, 
steel & chemical fibres
2) Denomination & adjustment of 56 insolvent companies
3) Denomination & adjustment of 26 insolvent companies_____________
Industrial 
rationalization 
(part of the 3 August 
1972 measures)
Carried out on 3 August 1972 to ease the financial distress of companies 
caused by the severe won devaluation and stringent monetary policy that 
had been implemented following IMF recommendations 
Designated 61 industries for industrial rationalization 
30 heavy industries including the steel, nonferrous metals, shipbuilding 
& electronics
PVC, fertilizer & petrochemicals
Financial & tax support given to industries that undertook capacity 
adjustment, business specialization, subcontract system 
improvement, M & As, financial re-capitalisation, and R & D 
Financial support by the industry rationalization fund 
Exemption of corporate tax and acquisition tax in M & A, and 
depreciation rate increase
Fiscal subsidy to capacity investment___________________________
Investment 
adjustment of heavy 
industries 
(late 1970s 
-early 1980s)
Downsizing and readjustment of the over-capacity of heavy industries, 
caused by the policy of heavy industry development through the 1970s 
Support for investment readjustment through M & A and production 
specialization 
Government support through bailout funds 
Interest rates lowed in 1982 to ease the financial costs to firms
Core business 
(early 1990s)
Indirect inducement policy aimed at reducing the level of chaebol 
business diversification
Bank credit limits lifted and other preferential treatments given 
exclusively to the two or three main companies which each chaebol 
designated as their core___________________________________
Heather Smith, The State, Banking and Corporate Relationship in Korea and Taiwan, in Peter 
Drysdale (ed.). Reform and Recovery in East Asia: The Role o f the State and Economic Enterprise 
(London: Routledge, 2000), p.68.
Jae-Woo Lee, Corporate Restructuring in Korea: Experience and Lessons, Korea Journal (Autumn 
1999), p.252.
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These policies did not have a serious impact on the chaebol system. Although some 
chaebols went bankrupt or were acquired by others, the system remained intact. First, the 
chaebol had become too large to be allowed to fail. In 1995, the share of the 30 largest chaebol 
accounted for 16 percent of GDP, 41 percent of manufacturing GDP (up from 20 percent a 
decade ago), 5 percent of employment, about half of all exports, and 14 percent of total 
commercial bank loans.^^  ^ A chaebol’s bankruptcy might have a negative impact on the 
national economy as a whole by reducing exports and increasing unemployment.
Second, the political influence of the chaebol grew as their economic size expanded. For 
example, Chung Ju Yung, the founder of Hyundai, formed a political party to run for the 1992 
presidential election. Although his attempt was unsuccessful, the unprecedented challenge 
illustrated that the chaebol’s economic supremacy could turn into political power.
Third, the chaebol developed various channels to deliver its policy preferences to policy­
makers and politicians. Traditionally, they provided the ruling party with campaign 
donations in exchange for their support for pro-chaebol policies. Business interest groups 
including the Federation of Korean Industries, Korean Employers’ Federation and the Korean 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry played a key role in promoting chaebol’s policy 
agenda.^^^ In addition, informal networks -  alumni networks and arranged marriages -  were 
employed to consolidate the links between politicians and big business. The frnancial scandals
IMF, Republic of Korea: Selected Issue, IMF Staff Country Report, No.98/74 (1998), p.6.
Chung-in Moon, Changing Patterns of Business-Govemment Relations in South Korea, in Andrew 
MacIntyre (ed.), Business and Government in Industrialising Asia (Ithaca; Cornell University Press, 
1994)
Chang-Hee Nam, South Korea's Big Business Clientelism in Democratic Reform, Asian Survey, Vol. 
35, No. 4. (April 1995); Won-Taek Kang, The Rise of a Third Party in South Korea: the Unification 
National Party in the 1992 National Assembly Election, Electoral Studies, Vol. 17, No.l (March 1998) 
David C. Kang, Bad Loans to Good Friends: Money Politics and the Developmental State in South 
Korea, International Organization, Vol. 56, No.l (Winter 2002) See also Kyong-Dong Kim, Political 
Factors in the Formation of the Entrepreneurial Elite in South Korea, Asian Survey, Vol. 16, No. 5 (May 
1976); Yeon-ho Lee, The State, Society and Big Business in South Korea (London: Routledge, 1997) 
Euiyoung Kim, The State’s Authority in the Organizing of the World of Business: Corporatist 
Business Interest Representation in South Korea, Asian Perspective, Vol.23, No.2 (1999)
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of two ex-Presidents, Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo are a good example to reveal how 
the chaebol supported plutocracy.
In contrast to previous authoritarian regimes, the Kim Dae Jung administration had many 
advantages in overhauling the chaebol system. First of all, his economic philosophy was very 
critical of chaebol-oriented development and suggested a pro-small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) policy. In relative terms. President Kim distanced himself from the chaebol 
because the chaebol’s donations to opposition parties were very small. In addition, there was 
nationwide consensus that the crisis arose from chaebol’s over-investment and poor corporate 
governance. For example, some non-governmental organisations (NGOs) -  such as People’s 
Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) and Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice 
(CCEJ) -  promoted shareholder activism against the chaebol system.
In addition to these political advantages, the IMF supported President Kim’s tough 
measures to reform the chaebol system. In its conditionality, top priority was given to 
corporate reform, because the IMF thought that chaebol’s reckless expansion was a major 
cause of the financial crisis. As Table 6-3 illustrates, the IMF suggested a comprehensive 
reform packages. Furthermore it imposed a strict time schedule on the government. According 
to the schedule, all the measures should be accomplished no later than 2000.
These tasks can be classified into two categories. One is refinancing that was intended to 
rescue ill-liquid companies from bankruptcy. The other is institutional restructuring that was 
aimed to overhaul the existing governance system. Although there is some overlapping 
between them, I analyse this separately for analytical reasons.
Byeong-Seog Park, Political Corruption in South Korea: Concentrating on the Dynamics of Party 
Politics, Asian Perspective, Vol. 19, No.l (Spring 1995); Kelly K. Hwang, South Korea’s Bureaucracy 
and the Informal Politics of Economic Development, Asian Survey, Vol.36, No.3 (March 1996)
Dae Jung Kim, Mass-Participatory Economy: Korea's Road to World Economic Power, Revised 
and Updated Edition (Lanham: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University and University 
Press of America, 1996)
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[Table 6-3] Five Principles for Corporate Reform 530
Objective Measures Schedule
Enhancing 
transparency in 
corporate 
management
Adoption of consolidated financial statements 
Adoption of international accounting principles 
Strengthening the voting rights of minority shareholders 
Compulsory appointment of outside directors 
Establishment of external auditors’ committee
FY 1999 
Oct 1998 
May 1999 
Feb 1998 
Feb 1998
Clearance of all 
cross-debt 
guarantees
Resolution of existing cross guarantees
Prohibiting new cross guarantees between subsidiaries
Prohibiting demand for cross guarantees from financial institutions
Mar 2000 
Apr 1998 
Apr 1998
Improvements in 
capital structure
Agreement with banks to improve the capital structure 
Removal of restriction on capital infusion with consideration 
Exclusion of income tax deduction on interest payments of 
excessive borrowings 
Introduction of asset-backed securities
Apr 1998 
Feb 1998 
FY 2000
Sep 1998
Concentration on 
core businesses
Adoption of corporate- split system 
Improving M & A procedures 
Liberalisation of foreign ownership of real estate 
Full liberalisation of M & As 
Streaming bankruptcy procedures
Jun 1998 
Jun 1998 
Jun 1998 
May 1998 
Feb 1998
Strengthened 
responsibility & 
accountability
Strengthening the legal liability of controlling owners 
Allowing voting rights to institutional investors 
Introduction of cumulative voting system
Jun 1998 
Sep 1998 
Dec 1998
2) Restructuring of Corporate Finance
Well before the crisis, the high leverage of the chaebol was a cause for concern. Just 
prior to the crisis, the problem went from bad to worse. The average debt-equity ratio of the 
30 largest chaebols (as determined by the Fair Trade Commission) was 347.5 percent in 1995, 
reaching 518.9 percent in 1997. Compared with the other crisis-affected countries, the ratio
Sung Hee Jwa, A New Paradigm for Korea’s Economic Development: From Government Control to 
Market Economy (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p.228.
The chaebol-affiliated firms were much more leveraged than non-chaebol companies. See Jong-Wha 
Lee, Young Soo Lee and Byung-Sun Lee, The Determination of Corporate Debt in Korea, Asian 
Economic Journal, Vol. 14, No.4 (December 2000)
Bonchun Koo, Corporate Restructuring and Financial Reform in Korea, in Le-Jay Cho, Yoon Hyung 
Kim, and Inseok Shin (eds.). Restructuring the Korean Financial Market in a Global Economy (Seoul: 
KDI, 2002), p.249.
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was exceptionally high. The average of the ratio from 1988 to 1996 was 346.7 in Korea, 112.9 
percent in Malaysia, 195.1 percent in Indonesia, and 200.8 percent in Thailand.
To make matters worse, many of them did not earn sufficient profits to cover the interest 
payments on their debts, let alone repay the principal. As Table 6-4 shows, the manufacturing 
sector recorded a net loss in 1997.
[Table 6-4] Profitability of Manufacturing Companies 534
1994 1995 1996 1997
Operating Profit to Net Sales 7.7 8.3 6.5 8.3
Normal Profit to Net Sales 2.7 3.6 1.0 -0.3
Return on Equity 7.6 11.0 2.0 -4.2
Return on Assets 1.9 2.8 0.5 -0.9
Despite their high leverage ratio and low profitability, the chaebol’s cross-holding system 
enabled them to have easy access to credit. This is the so-called ‘too big to fail’ logic. Because 
their debts were guaranteed by other heavily-indebted subsidiaries, default of an affiliate was 
highly likely to result in the collapse of the holding company. Under such circumstances, it 
was virtually impossible for financial institutions to stop lending to even an unprofitable 
affiliate.
To address the problem, the authorities introduced tough regulations that were designed to 
discourage commercial banks from lending to the chaebol. To this restriction, the chaebol 
developed various channels to finance their investment As Table 6-5 demonstrates, the 
chaebol established or acquired non-bank financial intermediaries (NBFIs). Being less 
regulated than commercial banks, the chaebol’s NBFIs were able to circumvent government 
controls.
Claessens, Djankov and Xu (2000), p.28.
Inseok Shin and Joon-Ho Hahm, The Korea Crisis: Causes and Resolution, in Cho, Kim and Shin
(2002), p.m.
Sung Wook Joh, Korean Economic Crisis and Corporate Governance System, in Takatoshi Ito and 
Anne O. Krueger (eds.). Governance, Regulation and Privatization in the Asia-Pacific Region 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004)
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[Table 6-5] Number o f NBFIs Owned by Top 70 Chaebols (as o f the end o f 1997) 536
Top 5 Top 6-30 Top 31-70 Non-chaebols
Merchant bank (29) 3 7 4 14
Securities (26) 6 5 1 12
Investment trust company (14) 2 2 1 5
Life insurance (31) 2 4 8 14
Fire & Marine Insurance (13) 2 3 0 5
Instalment Credit (26) 2 7 3 12
Mutual saving & finance (219) 1 5 12 18
Venture investment (56) 3 4 6 13
Card (7) 3 1 0 4
Finance & Factoring (46) 3 4 5 12
Total (477) 27 42 40 109
* Unit: number of firms
The chaebol also had internal channels to maintain the cross-holding system through 
various forms of internal business transaction: purchasing their subordinated bonds at 
unreasonably high prices, making deposits for equity transactions at lower interest rates than 
the market rate, and participating in paid-in capital increases. From the perspective of 
chaebol-owners, this intra-group transaction was a way to protect them from any hostile M & 
A. In some cases, internal capital markets permitted some chaebols to invest in capital- 
intensive industries like semiconductors. In terms of the national economy, however, it was 
likely to distort the efficient allocation of capital, and could eventually make healthy 
subsidiaries insolvent through the channel of cross-debt guarantees.
The financial crisis made the chaebol’s tricks ineffective. Deepening economic recession 
reduced their profits. Highly-leveraged companies became very vulnerable to high interest rate 
policy. As a result, many chaebols such as Hanbo, Kia and Daewoo went bankrupt. To deal
II Chong Nam, Joon-Kyung Kim, Yeongjae Kang, Sung Wook Joh, and Jun-Il Kim, Corporate 
Governance in Korea, the OECD Conference on Corporate Governance in Asia: A Comparative 
Perspective (Seoul: 3-5 March 1999), p.53.
Bong Joon Yoon, The Korean Financial Crisis, the Chaebol, and Economic Reform, Korean 
Observer, Vol.XXX, No.3 (Autumn 1999)
S. J. Chang and S. J, Hong, Economic Performance of Group-Affiliated Companies in Korea: Intra­
group Resource Sharing and Internal Business Transactions, Academy o f Management Journal, Vol. 43, 
No.3 (June 2000). See also Hyun-Han Shin and Young S. Park, Financing Constraints and Internal 
Capital Markets: Evidence from Korean ‘Chaebols’, Journal o f Corporate Finance, Vol. 5, No.2 (June 
1999)
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with corporate distress, the government suggested principles of corporate finance restructuring 
based on the London Approach. The case for the approach was that it can ensure common 
action and thus can prevent precipitate moves to start insolvency proceedings. To this end, it 
supposes equality of all lenders, the central lender acting as a neutral arbitrator, standstill on 
loan facilities, pending agreement and consideration given to the position of other creditors 
and shareholders.
According to the principles, each creditor bank set up a Decision Committee for Insolvent 
Enterprises (DCIE) in May 1998. Through comprehensive investigations, the Financial 
Supervisory Commission (ESC) announced in June 1998 a corporate “black list” naming 55 
firms, which were classified as insolvent and non-viable (including 20 affiliates of the top 5 
chaebols and 32 affiliates of the top 6 to 64 chaebols). Non-viable corporations, regardless of 
their size, were forced to restructure their operations or leave the market. As for the viable 
ones, there were various supports fi"om creditors and the government.
In order to facilitate efficient corporate restructuring, many restrictions on M & As and 
FDI were either revised or lifted. As a result of the liberalisation of M & As in May 1998, 
domestic M & As increased by 16 percent to 486 in 1998. More significantly, pro-FDI policy 
encouraged foreign investors to participate in corporate restructuring. As a result, the share of 
foreign companies accounted for a fifth o f M & A deals in 1998.
Different approaches were applied to the top five chaebols and the 6-64th largest chaebols. 
The top five chaebols (Daewoo being later excluded) and their affiliates were regarded as 
having sufficient resources to hedge their losses. Thus they were permitted to cany out ‘self-
Pen Kent, Corporate Workouts: A U.K. Perspective (Bank of England, 1997) available at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/londapp.htm^ Besides it, there are US (deposit insurance) and Spanish 
(guarantee fund) approaches. Cf. Ma. Socorro Gochoco-Bautista, Soo-Nam Oh, and S. Ghon Rhee, In 
die Eye of the Asian Financial Maelstrom: Banking Sector Reforms in the Asia-Pacific Region, in 
ADB, Rising to the Challenge in Asia: A Study o f Financial Markets, Vol.l (ADB, 1999)
Strictly speaking, it might be misleading to say that the Korean workout programmes used the 
London approach, since government involvement was so pervasive. See Gerald E. Meyerman, The 
London Approach and Corporate Debt Restructuring in East Asia, in Charles Adams, Robert E. Litan, 
and Michael Pomerleano (eds.). Managing Financial and Corporate Distress: Lessons from Asia 
(Washington D C.: Brookings Institution, 2000)
OECD, Economic Surveys: Korea (1999), pp. 108-09.
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directed business restructuring’, though the government provided a clear time schedule and 
guidelines. As shown in Table 6-6, all of them met the target (200 percent debt-equity ratio).
[Table 6-6] Business Restructuring Plan for the Top Five Chaebols
Hyimdai Samsimg Daewoo LG SK
A utom obiles, E lectronics, Trade, C hem icals, C hem icals, E nergy,
E lectronics, Financial Construction, E nergy, F inancial Services
H eavy and Services, A utom obiles, E lectronics, Inform ation and
C ore Industries
Chem ical Trade, Heavy T  elecom m unications, T  elecom m unications.
industries. O ther industry. F inancial Services C onstruction,
Financial Services Financial D istribution
Services Services
N o  o f  affiliates
Before R eduction 63 66 41 53 49
A fter R eduction 32 40 10 32 22
T arget o f  debt- 
equity  ra tio  (% ) * 199.7 184.0 196.0 199.8 199.7
N on-core  affiliate 
sold o ff* * 1,172 1,466 1,906 903 495
Induced foreign 
investm ent 79.8 35.8 40.3 47.2 14.6
By the end of 1999 ** Unit: Ten Billion Won ♦♦ Unit: $ 100 Million
Middle-sized chaebols (the 6- 64*) were orchestrated to enter into ‘workouts’ with their 
creditors. Many of them (the Daewoo Group companies later included) were subject to debt 
workouts with their respective creditor banks based on the principle of fair burden or loss 
sharing. Creditor banks took the lead in the workout plans by converting debt into equity, 
short-term loans into long-term loans, and allowing exemptions on interest payments. Table 6- 
7 shows that the progress of the workout was modest.
Dohyung Kim, IMF Bailout and Financial and Corporate Restructuring in the Republic of Korea, 
Developing Economies, Vol.XXXVII, Vol.4 (December 1999), p.504.
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[Table 6-7] Corporate Workout Programme (as o f the end o f 2000) 543
Nominated
(A)
Exc uded
Graduated
(C)
Remaining
(A-B-C)total
Dropped
out
Merged Ejected
Daewoo 12 1 0 0 1 1 10
6-64 chaebols 49 22 5 12 5 12 15
Middle-sized firms 43 11 3 3 5 23 9
Total 104 34 8 15 11 36 34
In the meanwhile, strong measures were employed to prevent the chaebol from using non- 
banking institutions as financial vehicles. In October 1998, a requirement on financial 
institutions was imposed to ease the concentration of capital. Commercial banks and 
investment trusts could not hold more than 10 and 15 percent (respectively) of bonds issued 
by the top five chaebols o f their total corporate bond holdings. And a tough stance toward the 
chaebols in the area of the privatisation of commercial banks remains intact. Further the 
government ordered them to dispose of excessive holdings of tiieir bonds by the end of 2000. 
Nevertheless, the dominance of the top five chaebols in capital markets did not diminish.
For all these efforts, there were limits to reduce their debts because many of their affiliates 
registered huge losses, in large part, over-investment. The government pressed the chaebols to 
reduce surplus capacity with business swaps, or the so-called ‘Big Deal’. The case for the 
policy is that chaebol’s diversification did not raise productivity through synergies of 
managerial know-how and technical expertise.
On 3 September 1998, the top five chaebols -  Hyundai, Samsung, Daewoo, LG, and SK -  
agreed to restructure themselves by swapping businesses in industries. According to the plan, 
they chose two or three areas as their core business where they would focus their competence. 
The final arrangement was approved by the 7 December 1998 agreement between the FKI,
OECD, Economic Surveys: Korea (2001), p. 135
MOFE, Chaebol Gaehyeok Husok Jochi Bangan [Additional Measures for Chaebol Reforms] (25 
August 1999)
Behind the decision lay the government, which saw it as a litmus test for their willingness to reform. 
See Far Eastern Economic Review^ Give Me Your Sick (2 July 1998)
World Bank, Republic o f Korea: Establishing a New Foundation for Sustained Growth (1999), p.44.
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creditor banks and the government. For the purpose of prudential regulation of the financial 
sector, a monitoring role was assigned to the ESC.
The chaebol and the GNP (main opposition party) opposed the policy on the ground that 
the policy clearly contradicts the underlying principle of economic reform: enhancing market 
mechanisms and reducing state intervention.
The government again interferes in the market by telling the chaebol what to do, only this time with 
the stated purpose of allowing the market to work properly. It is ironic to see Kim Dae Jung, the 
former dissent, using the heavy-handed tactics of dictator Park Chung Hee in order to dismantle the 
very economic infrastructure Mr, Park built.^^^
Despite the opposition, the government pushed ahead with the policy. In the Big Deal, the 
top five chaebols used two different approaches. One was to sell off their subsidiaries to more 
competitive companies (i.e., semiconductors, oil refining, and power generation facilities).
The other was to spin off the subsidiaries to independent companies (i.e., aircraft, rolling 
stock, petrochemicals, and vessel engines). The business swap was completed in nine core 
sectors by the end of December 1999. One-third of their total liabilities (8.9 trillion won) were 
lowered by the elimination of overlapping assets, swapping debts to equities, and attracting 
foreign investment.
As Table 6-8 indicates, the result of corporate finance restructuring appeared to be 
successful. Cross debt guarantees decreased substantially. And strict enforcement of combined 
financial statements made it difficult for the chaebols to guarantee the debts of their affiliated 
companies. It should be noted, however, that the recovery of stock markets contributed, to 
a considerable degree, to the reduction of the debt-equity ratio. In addition, there was 
scepticism that this achievement was helped by accounting tricks such as asset revaluation and 
the payment of equity issues by non-monetary means.
Wall Street Journal, The Chaebol Weight-Loss Plan (8 December 1998) 
For more details, see Appendix 6-1,
IMF, Korea: Selected Issues, Country Report No.01/101 (2001), p.l 19.
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[Table 6-8] Cross Debt Guarantee 550
96.4 97.4 (A) 98.4 99.12(B) B/A (%)
Top 1-5 13.4 11.8 11.1 0.9 92.4
Top 6-30 21.8 21.8 15.8 3.4 84.4
Total 35.2 33.6 26.9 4.3 87.2
* Unit: trillion won
3) Overhaul of the Ownership Structure
As far as the chaebol is concerned, there were few mechanisms to monitor and check the 
activity of boards of directors. Most directors of boards were de facto appointed by chaebol 
owners, which had sufficient shares to bloc any voting against their interests. Further, chaebol 
owners could avoid legal liability because they were not registered as the chief executive 
officer (CEO). The lack of a disciplinary turnover also protected the chaebol system. There 
was a very weak relationship between the turnover of the top executives of the chaebols and 
their performance.
The opaque cross-holding system made it possible for chaebol owners to abuse their 
power without considering the interests of other shareholders. For example, the top ten 
chaebol owners held a mere 1.30% of the equity of all the groups as of July 2001, but 
exercised virtually 100% control over group management. It should be noted that their real 
stakes might be bigger than that because chaebol owners distributed some of their stakes to 
their relatives, friends and employees who could not challenge their ownership.
Fair Trade Commission, Gongjeong Geolae Jeongchaegui Seonggwawa Vison [Fair Trade Policy: 
Achievements and Vision] (29 February 2000)
Joongi Kim, Recent Amendments to the Korean Commercial Code and their Effects on International 
Competition, University o f Pennsylvania Journal o f International Economic Law, Vol.21,No.2 
(Summer 2000)
Terry L. Campbell and Phylhs Y. Keys, Corporate Governance in South Korea: the Chaebol 
Experience, Journal o f Corporate Finance, Vol.S, No.4 (October 2002)
Korea Stock Exchange, 10 Dae Group Siga Chongaek Mit Hoejang Boyu Jusik Hyeonhwang 
[TopTen Chaebol Market Value and Ovmer’s Share: Recent Survey], (18 July 2001)
Kon Sik Kim, Corporate Governance in Korea, Journal o f Comparative Business and Capital 
Market Law, Vol.S, No.l (March 1986), p.23.
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Regulatory obstacles also prohibited outsider investors -  both institutional and individual 
-  from influencing corporate affairs. The Commercial Code restrained hostile M & As. 
Institutional investors’ influence was very limited because they could only execute shadow 
voting for customer accounts. And there were few legal protections to favour minority 
shareholders. For example, external shareholders with less than 5 percent of a company’s 
shares could not exercise their rights.
The backwardness of the corporate governance system had its origins in a family 
ownership structure. Family ownership has disadvantages as well as advantages. On the 
one hand, it can allow the board of directors to make quick decisions, and thus reduces so- 
called principal-agent problems between owner, directors and managers. On the other hand, it 
discriminates against minority shareholders. In extreme cases, the concept of corporate 
governance is not relevant, since majority-holders can make all the decisions at will.
The family ownership structure was a major obstacle to overhauling the corporate 
governance system. Even on the brink of bankruptcy, the chaebols were reluctant to accept 
any offer that would be likely to affect their family ownership. “The chaebol, when in need, 
welcomed the foreign investment, but management control... remained in the hands of 
mysterious family groupings whose inner workings and power relationships, rivalries, and 
trade-offs were largely hidden.”
Samsung, the flagship of Korean capitalism, was no exception. After the financial crisis, 
the biggest and most globalised chaebol was a main target for shareholder activists and
Jill Solomon, Aris Solomon, and Chang-Young Park, The Evolving Role of Institutional Investors in 
South Korean Corporate Governance: Some Empirical Evidence, Corporate Governance, Vol. 10, No.3 
(2002)
Meredith Woo-Comings, All in the Family: Reforming Corporate Governance in East Asia Current 
History (December 1998) See also see Dong-Woon Kim, Interlocking Ownership in the Korean 
Chaebol, Corporate Governance, Vol.l 1, No.2 (April 2003)
There is no systemic correlation between ownership and performance. See Harold Demsetz and 
Belén Villalonga, Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance, Journal o f Corporate Finance, 
Vol.7, No.3 (September 2001)
Donald Kirk, Korean Crisis: Unraveling o f the Miracle in the IMF Era (New York: St. Matin’s 
Press, 2000), p.232.
214
foreign investors. First, the role and status of the chairman was not clearly defined. In the 
group, the chairman retained unrestricted power but took no legal liability. By law, key 
decision should have been made by the board of directors. In practice, however, the board was 
nothing more than a rubber stamp. The failure of Samsung Motors was a good example. In the 
early 1990s, most directors were sceptical over the project because the car industry faced an 
over-capacity problem. Despite the warning, chairman Lee Kun Hee pushed ahead with his 
original plan until the car company was sold to Renault Motors in the wake of the crisis. 
However, the chairman was never punished for his misjudgement.
Second, chairman Lee gave considerable amounts of stock to his only son -  Lee Jae Yong 
-  using various methods to evade inheritance and transactions taxes. Later, the National 
Tax Service imposed fines on him. At the same time, mles and regulations on inheritance and 
gift tax evasion were more strictly enforced.
Third, Lee Jae Yong was appointed as Vice President in charge of the strategic planning 
office of Samsung Electronics Co. in March 2001. His promotion was designed to pass the 
wealth and control of the Samsung group to him. The company defended the chairman’s 
decision, noting that he had been on its payroll for 10 years. This explanation backfired 
because he did not work at Samsung during that period but took an MBA at Keio University 
and a DBA course at Harvard University. Moreover, the successor-in-waiting had no serious 
management experience in such a high position, only experience o f running an e-business 
company for a year. When the bubble of the internet boom burst, his company having lost 
many billion of won was sold to the parent company at an above-market price. In this 
respect, some minority shareholders were opposed to his appointment at the annual 
shareholders meeting in March 2000.
Hasung Jang and Joongi Kim, Nascent Stages of Corporate Governance in an Emerging Market: 
Regulatory Change, Shareholder Activism and Samsung Electronics, Corporate Governance, Vol. 10, 
No.2 (2002)
Far Eastern Economic Review, Spinning its Wheels (19 November 1998)
Financial Times, Samsung Heir in ‘Sweetheart’ Deal over Internet Companies (28 March 2001) 
Wall Street Journal, Samsung Electronics is Criticized for Promotion (12 March 2001)
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Hyundai was the largest chaebol before the crisis in terms of asset value. However, its 
governance system was one of the poorest. Before his death, Chairman Chung Ju Young 
chose his fifth son -  Chung Mong Hun, chairman of Hyundai Engineering & Construction and 
Hyundai Electronics Industries -  as his successor. The problem was that the decision was 
made by the Chairman alone, not the board of directors. It means that he regarded the 
succession as a family affair rather than a management decision. In other words, their main 
concern was the distribution of the family assets rather than the shareholders’ interests.
Because the decision was not made at a formal meeting of board of directors, it provoked 
a power struggle between Chung Mong Hun and Chung Mong Ku, his elder brother and 
chairman of Hyundai Motor. After a series of infighting, Chung Mong Hun succeeded in 
securing his position as the chairman of the group in 2000. As a result, key affiliates -  
especially Hyundai Motor -  were separated from the group because Chung Mong Ku did not 
want to stay in the group. The battle for succession between the two sons had a very negative 
impact on investor confidence. After failing to attract new capital to sustain their reckless 
investments, key companies -  including Hyundai Engineering & Construction -  of the group 
went bankrupt in 2000.
With respect to transparency and accountability, the collapse of Daewoo in August 1999 
was one of the most notorious corporate scandals. Daewoo’s collapse (with debts of 65 
billion dollars) was the largest ever bankruptcy in Korea’s history. This was a result of 
chairman Kim Woo Choong’s reckless expansion strategy. Even when high interest rates 
substantially increased the liquidity problem of the group, he acquired another highly-indebted 
company -  i.e., Ssangyong Motor Co. He pushed this deal on the assumption that special 
loans would be available from the government. However, his idea was not realised because the 
government did not prepared to commit itself unreservedly to the ‘too big to fail’ privilege any 
longer.
Far Eastern Economic Review^ Will Hyundai Find A Lifeline? (23 November 2000)
Dong Gull Lee, The Restructuring of Daewoo, in Stephan Haggard, Wonhyuk Lim, Euysung Kim 
(eds.). Economic Crisis and Corporate Restructuring in Korea: Reforming the Chaebol (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003) For a defence of Chairman Kim, see Fortune^ Wanted: Kim Woo 
Choong (22 January 2003)
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After the bankruptcy, chairman Kim was charged with accounting fraud; inflating the 
books through asset swaps within the group and double-counting sales. Nineteen Daewoo 
executives and accounting firms were convicted of falsifying company assets in July 2001. In 
responses to the charges, he maintained that ‘window dressing’ -  a euphemism for accounting 
tricks -  was common at the time. However, the Daewoo case was exceptional in that the 
chairman diverted some funds to his secret accounts (Daewoo's so-called British Finance 
Centre) in London.
To prevent these problems, the corporate governance system was comprehensively 
overhauled. As Table 6-9, top priority of the reform was given to three issues: enhancing 
transparency by introducing combined financial statement; strengthening minority shareholder 
rights; and toughening the role of directors.
[Table 6-9] Corporate Governance Reform
Measures
Improving
transparency
• Introduction of consolidated financial statements
• Obligation of establishing election committee for the assignment of outside 
auditors for listed companies and affiliates of the chaebols
Strengthening
financial
market
discipline
• Regulation in bank loans
Debt-equity ratio 200% became a de facto limit in provision of loans 
Prohibition of new loans with guarantee by affiliated firms 
Establishing a system for constant assessment of corporate credit risk, 
including introduction of forward looking criteria (FLC)
• Liberalization of M & A market
Permitting hostile takeovers
Abolition of regulations on foreigners’ shareholding
Strengthening
internal
governance
• Outside director system
One fourths of the board of directors should be outside directors
• Responsibility of major shareholders
Registration of the controlling shareholder as the representative director of 
leading affiliates
The removal of the chairman’s office
• Right of Minority shareholders
Loosening conditions for the inspection of accounting books, and request for
Chan-Hyun Sohn, Korea’s Corporate Restructuring since the Financial Crisis, Policy Analyses 
No.02-04 (Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, 2002), p.97. See also Jill Solomon, Aris 
Solomon, and Chang-Young Park, A Conceptual Framework for Corporate Governance Reform in 
South Korea, Corporate Governance, Vol. 10, No.l (2002)
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the dismissal of directors and auditors by shareholders 
Introduction of a cumulative voting system when appointing directors 
Right of institutional investors 
Allowing voting rights for shares in funds managed by investment trust 
companies and bank trust accounts_____________________________
Prohibiting
inappropriate
intra-group
relations
Strengthening punishment on unfair internal transactions
Revival of regulation on the amount of investing in related firms to 25 % of net
assets of a business group
Abolition of cross debt guarantee_____________________________________
Despite the reform, corporate restructuring remained deadlocked due to chaebol 
resistance. The chaebol’s strategy was two-fold. One is nationalist rhetoric. For example, 
Kim Woo Choong claimed that the IMF was the gunboat of foreign investors who wanted to 
impose Anglo-American corporate governance to undermine national competitiveness. 
Chaebol think-tanks echoed his argument that the only interest of foreign investors was to 
remove their competitors in global markets by destroying the industrial base of the chaebols.
This appeal to nationalist sentiment was very effective in capturing public attentions. In the 
general election, the GNP exploited the logic to criticise the government’s economic policy. 
But this kind of propaganda, implicit or explicit, backfired. For example, GM’s plan to 
acquire Daewoo Motors was blocked by this hostility from employers as well as trade unions.
On the other hand, some chaebols exploited the political weaknesses of the Kim Dae Jung 
administration. A notable case is Samsung Motors. The company was originally destined to 
close its Pusan factory after the failure of the negotiations with Daewoo. Since this was a 
region over which former President Kim Young Sam and the GNP (main opposition party)
Scepticism over the corporate reform has persisted among foreign observers. For example, see 
Business Week, Showdown in Korea: Can President Kim Get the Chaebol to Change? (14 December 
1998); Economist, The Chaebol Spurn Change (22 July 2000)
Hahn-koo Lee, IMF Sidaeui Misin [Fallacies of the IMF Era], Joongangllbo (7 April 1998), The 
author was the president of the Daewoo Economic Institute, and chaired the policy committee of the 
opposition party [GNP].
Washington Post, Big Korean Firms Set for Fight (10 June 1998) For a case for the chaebol, see 
Byong-Ho Gong, Hyeon Jeongbuui Gaehyeog Inyeom? [What is the Reform Ideas for Kim Dae Jung’ 
Government?], Wolgan Chosun (November 1999); le Dong Bae, Corporate Korea in Perspective, Far 
Eastern Economic Review (23 July 1998) This debate was reproduced between Japanese and American 
economists. See Kenichi Ohmae, Japanese Scholar Sparks Heated Debate over Korea's Reforms, Korea 
Herald (12 August 1999): Rudiger Dombusch, Ohmae’s Charges Lack Credibility, Korea Herald (20 & 
21 September 1999)
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had political influence, President Kim Dae Jung had to surrender the original plan to build 
electoral support in the 2000 general election.
In response to the chaebol resistance, President Kim declared in his address on Liberation 
Day, “I am determined to go down in Korea's history as a President who first accomplished 
corporate reforms and straightened things out in the economy for the middle and working 
classes.” At the same time, his advisors such as Kim Tae-Dong (former senior presidential 
secretary for economic affairs and head of the Presidential Commission on Policy Planning) 
and Hwang Tai-Youn (member of the commission) called for more radical reform of the 
chaebol system.
After the address, three complementary principles of corporate governance reform were 
introduced.
• To ensure the independent function and expertise of the board of directors, an external 
recommendation committee will name board members. At listed large corporations, iqj to 50% 
of all board members are to be named from the outside.
• Institutional investors will be given a greater role to monitor corporate management.
• Shareholder meetings, board meetings and auditor systems have been taking place practically 
in name only. These meetings will take on greater roles to achieve proper checks-and-balances.
Following these principles, comprehensive measures were introduced to reduce the power 
of the chaebol owners, eventually leading to the dissolution of family-dominated ownership. 
The details of the additional measures is summarised in Table 6-10.
Yeon-ho Lee, The Failure of the weak State in Economic Liberalization: Liberalization, 
Democratization and the Financial Crisis in Korea, Pacific Review^ Vol. 13, No.l (2000), pp.120-124.
Dae Jung Kim, Address by President Kim Dae Jung on the 54th Anniversary of National Liberation: 
To Open a New Millennium of Hope and Prosperity (15 August 1999)
Korea Herald, Public Confused over President Kim's Attitude toward Reform of Chaebol (20 
August 1999)
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[Table 6-10] Additional Measures for Chaebol Reforms (August 1999) 572
Measures
Improvement of 
Corporate Governance 
of Non-Banking 
Financial Institutions
• Increasing the role and number of outside directors
• Reinforcement of F ire walls
• Enhancement of Management Transparency
• Reinforcement of Accountability
Improving Corporate 
Governance
• Code of Best Practices of Corporate Governance
• Government's Regulatory Improvement Related to Corporate 
Governance
• Revision of Other Relevant Laws and Regulations
Prevention of 
Inheritance and Gift Tax 
Evasion
• The eligibility criterion for inheritance and gift taxes will be 
broadened and tax rates will be adjusted upward.
• High-income earners will be closely monitored to prevent them fi’om 
evading taxes.
• Measures will also be implemented to prevent tax evasion achieved 
through both legal grey areas and loopholes created by evolving 
financial systems technology.
• Non-profit foundations established by chaebol will be prohibited from 
owning stakes of related chaebol affiliates.
Curbing Indirect Cross 
Ownership
• Introduction of Limitation of Total Investment into Stocks
• Reduction of Debt Ratio by Demanding Consolidated Financial 
Statements from the Conglomerates
• Reinforcement of Monitoring the Agreement on Financial Structure 
Improvement
Cut Unfair Intra-Group 
Transactions
• System Improvement for the Prevention of Unfair Intra-Group 
Transaction
• Official Specifications of Types of Unfair Intra-Group Transactions
• Reinforcement of Investigation for Early Abolishment of Unfair Intra- 
Group Transaction Practices
In governance reform, the Fair Trading Commission (FTC) played a key role. In 
February 1999, the revision of the Fair Trade Act granted the Commission more power to 
regulate financial transactions. However, there were limitations on the scope of the FTC’s 
activities because extensive intervention might have provoked a controversy over the principle
MOFE, Cheabol Gaehyeo Husok Jochi Bangan [Additional Measures for Chaebol Reforms] (25 
August 1999)
Following the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act of 1980, the FTC was established as an 
office in the former Economic Planning Board (EPB), became independent in December 1994, and was 
made a ministerial agency in 1996. However, Anti-monopoly laws were not adequate to restrain the 
monopoly position of the chaebol. See Peter M. Beck, Revitalizing Korea’s Chaebol, Asian Survey^ 
Vol.38, No.l (November 1998)
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of economic reform: to transform the state-directed economy into a market-regulated 
economy.
It is civil activism that filled the void. The minority shareholders’ rights movement led by 
the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) and the Citizens’ Coalition for 
Economic Justice (CCEJ) won full support from both foreign and domestic investors. The 
PSPD’s Participatory Economy Committee organised small shareholders to curb the arbitrary 
management of the chaebol owners. At the 1998 annual shareholders meeting o f SK Telecom, 
the cash cow of the fourth largest chaebol, the PSPD demanded that the company have its 
books independently audited. In addition, they claimed that 270 million dollars used to 
support unprofitable affiliates should be returned to the company. This movement was backed 
by foreign funds owning 10 percent share of the company. Samsung, the largest chaebol,
faced their criticisms. Chairman Lee was accused of orchestrating unfair stock transactions to 
evade inheritance taxes at the 1999 annual shareholders’ meeting o f Samsung Electronics. At 
the same time, they also opposed the promotion of his son Lee Jae Yong as a director of 
board, pointing out his lack of management experience.
These challenges had a positive impact on corporate governance reform. However, the 
evaluation of the role of outside directors should be more cautious. Because more than 80 
percent of outside directors were still appointed by the chaebol owners or by their 
management, they tended to confirm decisions made by the management. In this respect, their 
role in monitoring management decisions on behalf of minority shareholder was not 
developed yet.
It is also controversial whether the government implemented these measures consistently. 
One example is the Hyundai case. The Kim Dae Jung administration gave special treatments
Ha-sung Jang, Corporate Governance and Economic Development: The Korean Experience, in 
Farrukh Iqbal and Jong-il Yoo (eds.), Democracy, Market Economics, and Development: An Asian 
Perspective (Washington, D C. : World Bank, 2001); Woon-Youl Choi, Sung Hoon Cho, Shareholder 
Activism in Korea: An Analysis of PSPD’s Activities, Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Vol.l 1, No.3 
(July 2003) Cf. Hyuk-Rae Kim, The State and Civil Society in Transition: the Role of Non­
governmental Organizations in South Korea, Pacific Review, Vol. 13, No. 4 (2000)
Asiaweek, Revolt of the Investor: Korean Conglomerates May Never be Ihe Same (3 April 1998)
576 For more details, see Appendix 6-2.
OECD, Economic Surveys: Korea (2001), pp. 140-45.
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to Hyundai group in exchange for its support for the so-called sunshine policy -  i.e., positive 
engagement with North Korea. In October 1998, the group won the third auction for control 
over Kia Motors and its sister company, Asia Motors even though it did not meet the 
government guideline for corporate governance: i.e., 200 % of debt-equity ratio.
To summarise, the Korean case demonstrates that the Washington consensus had a 
considerable effect on corporate reform. The crony capitalism thesis was an effective weapon 
that de-legitimised the chaebol system. Because corporate governance reform requires legal 
and institutional changes, the IFIs had a limitation in impinging its policy agendas on the 
country in a direct way. Nevertheless, their support for corporate reform made it easier for 
policy makers to overcome chaebol’s resistance in the name of compliance with global 
standards or “best practice”.
There is little doubt that the Kim Dae Jung government was less connected to the chaebol 
system than the previous governments. This allowed policy makers to undertake a more 
radical approach. It is also undisputable that pro-reform NGOs’ support was instrumental in 
reducing the power of chaebol’s nationalist rhetoric.
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3. Malaysia
1) The Bumiputera Business Community
Malaysia’s existing corporate governance system was widely regarded as a UK system 
because it based its legal principles on the British one. A closer look reveals that it was more 
Japanese than British in many ways. The corporate sector was dependent on bank rather than 
stock or bond markets and the development of the sector was heavily influenced by 
government’s industrialisation projects.
The New Economic Plan (NEP) was intended to support Malay businessmen at the 
expense of other ethnic groups. To this end, the UMNO took control over the Ministries of 
Trade & Industry and of Finance that had been under the influence of the Malaysian Chinese 
Association (MCA). Unlike other Asian countries, the bridge between them was the ruling 
party (the UMNO) rather than government agencies.
To improve the income and wealth of bumiputera, the Industrial Co-ordination Act was 
introduced in 1975. For example, bumiputera were given privileges such as job quotas in the 
public service, reservation of certain economic activities and guaranteed land rights. At the 
same time, special agencies were established to assist bumiputera business activities. For 
example, policy loans from Majlis Amanah Rakyat (MARA: Council of Trust for the 
Indigenous People), the Urban Development Authority (UDA), and the State Economic 
Development Corporations (SEDCs) were channelled to bumiputera businessmen. Foreign 
investment projects were approved only if the investors agreed the allocation of a proportion 
of equity to bumiputera. And Malaysian banks were required to offer loans at reasonable cost 
to priority sectors: i.e., all bumiputera groups, low-cost housing and small-scale enterprises.
Kean Ow-Yong and Cheah Kooi Guan, Corporate Governance Codes: A Comparison between 
Malaysia and the UK, Corporate Governance, Vol.S, No.2 (April 2000)
Kwame Sundaram Jomo, Southeast Asia's Misunderstood Miracle: Industrial Policy and Economic 
Development in Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia (Boulder: Westview, 1997) See also Kwame 
Sundaram Jomo, Industrializing Malaysia: Policy, Performance, Prospects (London: Routledge, 1993)
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As a result, bumiputera businesses had grown for the past two decades.
As Table 6-11 shows, however, the original target (30 percent of corporate assets) was not 
met by 1990 despite these efforts. First, the short-termism of many bumiputera entrepreneurs 
discouraged them from developing big businesses. In many cases, they sold their companies to 
the Chinese businesses after exploiting rental income (the so-called get-rich-quick mentality). 
Second, the Chinese business community adjusted to the policy: establishing Multi-Purpose 
Holding (MPHD), and hiring Malay politicians as functional directors to deal witii the 
government. Third, economic liberalisation in the 1980s led the government to introduce 
FDI-friendly policies and encourage Chinese investment. Accordingly, many favourable 
measures were withdrawn when the NEP was replaced with the National Development Policy 
(NDP) in 1990.
[Table 6-11] Ownership of Share Capital (at par value) o f Listed Companies (percent) 582
Ownership Group 1985 1990 1992 1995 1998
Bumiputera 18.5 19.2 18.2 20.6 19.4
Individual and institutions 11.3 14.1 15.9 18.6 17.7
Trust funds 7.2 5.1 2.3 2.0 1.7
Non- Bumiputera 49.5 46.8 40.0 43.4 41.1
Chinese 48.2 45.5 37.8 40.9 38.5
Indians 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.5 1.5
Other 0.4 0.3 1.1 1.0 1.0
Foreigners 24.0 25.4 32.4 27.7 31.8
Nominee companies 8.0 8.5 9.5 8.3 7.7
Total Value of Share capital (RM Billion) 83.1 108.4 130.9 179.8 294.6
While the industrial policy contributed to rapid industrialisation and a reduction in the 
economic disparity between bumiputera and the Chinese, it generated moral hazard and thus
Mei Ling Sieh Lee, The Transformation of Malaysian Business Group, in Ruth T. McVey (ed.). 
Southeast Asian Capitalists (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1992)
Peter Searle, The Riddle o f Malaysian Capitalism: Rent-seekers or Real Capitalists? (St Leonards: 
Allen & Unwin, 1999)
IMF, Malaysia: Selected Issues, Staff Country Report No.99/86 (1999), p.75. It should be noted that 
the proportion of Malay could be exaggerated by so-called ‘Ali-Baba schemes’: i.e., some Malay 
directors are appointed by Chinese owners who want to disguise their companies as Malay-owned. See 
David Seah, Malaysia: Dilemmas of Integration, Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 53, No. 1 (January 2000), 
p. 194.
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discouraged entrepreneurship. Because politically-linked businessmen were awarded 
government contracts, political connections were regarded as a necessary part of business in 
the Malay community. “Government leaders have used Malaysia preferences from the NEP to 
justify the awarding of contracts to UMNO-linked enterprises and individuals, creating in the 
process a large and influential group of domestic, bumiputera companies that are in fact the 
vehicles for ensuring continued UMNO political dominance.”
The privatisations of the mid-1990s underlined the political patronage system. In the cause 
of the promotion of bumiputera ownership, major privatisation contracts were allocated to 
Malay capitalists who acted as proxies for political patrons.
[A]s the boundaries between business, politics and the state have become increasingly blurred in 
the process of creating Malay entrepreneurs, so the distinction between other important categories 
of analysis have also become less clear. In the Malaysian context, as indeed elsewhere in Southeast 
Asia, it is no longer easy in many cases to distinguish between ‘rent-seeking’ and true ‘productive’ 
capitalism, between pariahs and entrepreneurs or between patrons and clients.
The ruling party (the UMNO) involved in various business activities through its holding 
company (Fleet Holding). Particularly after the appointment of Daim as chairman of the 
company in 1982, its size and influence rose substantially. In 1990, the company was taken 
over by Renong, which became the largest conglomerate.
Figure 6-1 is helpful in understanding the complex network between government, 
business and politicians. The network is relied upon mutual interests between politicians and 
their protégés in the business sector. The relationship is (re) produced when political leaders 
can give various favours to their protégés in the business sector in return for political
For an empirical research, see Megumi Suto, Capital Structure and Investment Behaviour of 
Malaysian Firms in the 1990s: A Study of Corporate Governance before the Crisis, Corporate 
Governance, Vol.l 1, No.l (Januaiy 2003)
Bowie (1994), p.l82.
Kwame Sundaram Jomo (ed.) Privatizing Malaysia: Rents, Rhetoric, and Reality (Boulder: 
Westview, 1994)
Searle (1999), p.l.
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donations. In the network, the government does not play an independent role because the 
government is a mere tool that politicians and businessmen use for their own interests rather 
than public interests.
[Figure 6-1] Political Patronage in Malaysia 587
Control over
Distribution of
Funds to secure these concessions from
Used by clients for
Resulted in
Bring about
Access to substantial frmds
Government
Political leaders / Political Parties
Government-owned or politically controlled banks 
and other financial institutions
Shares-for-assets swaps, reverse takeovers, 
mergers and acquisition of publicly listed companies
State-controlled concessions; 
government funding, licences, contacts, various 
types of privatised projects
Creation of politically linked ‘new rich’, inside trading, 
manipulation of share prices, conflict of interest situations, corruption, 
politicisation of the economy
Part of which is channelled back as political funds to
Under the system, senior politicians owned shares of leading companies as a means of 
political funding. This system was criticised for encouraging political favouritism rather than 
economic innovation. Even Megat Najmuddin Khas -  President of Malaysian Institute of 
Corporate Governance (MICG) and the Federation of Public Listed Companies (FPLC) -
Edmund Terence Gomez and Kwame Sundaram Jomo, Malaysia’s Political Economy: Politics, 
Patronage and Profits, second edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 190.
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conceded that the corporate government was veiy poor because of easy money, irresponsible 
diversification, over-expansion, weak supervision, over-heating and crony capitalism.
Table 6-12 shows that non-bumiputera businessmen also benefited fi"om the network. 
Among others, some Chinese tycoons had close relations with key Malay politicians as well as 
Chinese leaders in the MCA.
[Table 6-12] Key Corporate Elites Closely Linked to UMNO 589
Main shareholder Selected corporate interests
Bumiputra
Wan Azmi Wan Hazmah 
Halim Saad 
Samsudin Abu Hassan 
Tajudin Ramli 
Yahya Ahmad 
Ahmad Sebi Abu Bakar 
Azman Hashim 
Ibrahim Mohamed
Land & General, R. J. Reynolds
(Renong), United Engineers (M) Bhd
Aokam Perdana Bhd, Landmark Bhd
Technology Resources Ind., Malaysian Airlines (MAS)
(HICOM Holdings Bhd), Gadek Bhd
Advance Synergy Bhd
(Arab Malaysian Group)
(Uniphoenix Corp. Bhd)
Non-
Bumiputra
Vincent Tan Ghee Yioun 
T. Ananda Krishnan
Dick Chan 
T. K. Lim 
Ting Pek Khiing 
Quek Leng Chan 
Loy Hean Heong
(Beijaya Group), Sport Toto (M) Sdn Bhd
(Pacific State Investments), MAI Holdings, Usaha Tegas,
Tanjong
Metroplex Bhd
Kamunting Bhd
Ekran Bhd
(Hong Leong Group)
(Malaysian Borneo Finance Bhd)
The MCA’s holding company was Multi-Purpose Holdings Bhd (MPHB). The 
establishment of MPH was a political response to the Industrial Coordination Act (1975), 
which threatened the Chinese business community by providing special treatment to Malay 
entrepreneurs. The company aimed to mobilise human resources and funds to compete with 
Malay capitalists. However, it failed to gain support fi*om Chinese big business that preferred 
personal networks with UMNO politicians to the MCA. In addition, a power struggle in the 
MCA and corruption scandals in the early 1980s reduced the authority of the company in the
Straits Times, KL ‘to Blame for its Own Woes’ (7 June 2000)
John Hilley, Malaysia: Mahathirism, Hegemony and the New Opposition (London: Zed Books, 
2001), p. 64. For more details, see Appendix 6-3.
For the political status of the Chinese community, see Amy L. Freedman, The Effect of Government 
Policy and Institutions on Chinese Overseas Acculturation: TTie Case of Malaysia, Modern Asian 
Studies, Vol. 35, No. 2 (2001)
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Chinese community. More importantly, the Malay business community and senior Malay 
politicians were concerned about its growing influence as MPHB conflicted with bumiputera 
interests. As a result, MPHB did not evolve into a big conglomerate like Renong, whereas 
Hong Leong, Beijaya and MUI under Malay patronage rapidly expanded their business. In 
this regard, there were few fundamental differences between the Malays and Chinese in terms 
of politician-business relationship.
2) Restructuring of Corporate Finance
Many big conglomerates depended much more on banks than capital markets. Thus their 
indebtedness was generally high. In the early 1990s, the indebtedness became much higher 
due to massive inflows of capital and low interest rates. In such circumstances, the collapse 
of the stock market in 1997 put a number of big conglomerates in danger of bankruptcy. To 
deal with corporate distress, the government allowed non-bumiputera and foreign investors to 
buy bumiputera shares although the first option to purchase them was given to other 
bumiputera or bumiputera agencies. As a result, bumiputera’s share in the corporate sector fell 
below the 1995 level.
Fearing that the policy change would lead to the decline of bumiputera’s influence in the 
business community, the government, explicitly or implicitly, supported troubled bumiputera 
companies by urging public-contributed funds such as Perbadanan Nasional Berhad (PNB) to 
buy the shares of the companies. In addition, the government supported the stock market by 
injecting public funds (notably Khazanah Nasional). In addition, short-selling of 100 blue-chip 
stocks was prohibited from 28 August 1997. However, these temporary measures did not stop
For the influence of the Chinese in the business community, see also Malaysian Business, Clan 
Power (1 June 2001), pp.24-31.
IMF, Malaysia: Selected Issues, Staff Country Report No.99/86 (1999), pp.77-86.
Yougesh Khatri, Luc E. Leruth, and Jenifer Piesse, Corporate Performance and Governance in 
Malaysia, Working Paper No. 152 (IMF, 2002)
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the downward spiral of the stock market index because many investors -  both foreign and 
domestic -  saw it as a chance to sell their shares.
These poor results required the authorities to seek more radical solutions. To speed up 
debt restructuring by large borrowers (over RM 50 million), the Corporate Debt Restructuring 
Committee (CDRC) was established under the sponsorship of BNM in July 1998. As 
Figure 6-2 shows, the committee based its modus operandi on the London Approach, 
providing a platform for both creditors and borrowers to work out debt restructuring without 
having to resort to legal proceedings. After independent consultants examined the companies 
that voluntarily applied for CDRC assistance and drafted a restructuring proposal, the CDRC 
made a final decision based on the unanimity principle. If a creditor refused to accept the 
proposal, the CDRC requested Danaharta or Danamodal to take over the debt fi'om the 
creditor.
[Figure 6-2] Mechanisms of Corporate Restructuring 597
Loan & asset management
Danaharta Borrowers
SellNPLs Bonds/
Cash New loans Restructure debt
New loans/
CDRC
Special fund Bank
Resfructure
distressed Cash Inject capital
loans
Danamodal
594 Prema-chandra Athukorala, Crisis and Recovery in Malc^sia (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2001), 
p.64.
59!5
596
597
To resolve the NFL problem in SMEs, Enterprise Programme was launched in June 2000, 
Malaysian Business, CDRC in Action (16 January 1999)
BNM, Annual Report 1998 (1999), p. 147,
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As Table 6-13 shows, the performance of the CDRC was unsatisfactory. Compared 
with financial reform, the speed and extent of corporate restructuring was at best modest. It is 
not fair to attribute its poor performance solely to the CDRC because there were many 
obstacles in the way of its operations. Above all, the political patronage system made it 
difficult for the CDRC to restructure companies run by politicians’ cronies. In the name of the 
national interest, for example, companies that were involved in a large infrastructure project or 
had a large number of Malaysian employees would be rescued even if they failed to meet the 
minimum requirements for survival. Second, a lack of legal obligations was another 
limitation. The CDRC did not have any legal powers to push through management changes 
because it was a mere facilitator between creditors and debtors.
[Table 6-13] Performance of CDRC (as of the end of 2000) 600
No. of cases Amount (RM billion)
Received 75 47.2
Withdrawn / rejected 21 7.8
Resolved 42 27.3
Transferred to Danaharta 9 1.8
Completed & being implemented 33 25.5
Outstanding 12 12.1
To accelerate corporate restructuring, Azman Yahya -  former managing director and then 
chairman of Danaharta -  was appointed as chairman of the CDRC in August 2001. After 
then, the CDRC aggressively pushed ahead with restructuring plans. Before the closure in 
August 2002, the CDRC resolved 47 cases with total debts amounting to RM43.971 billion, 
which represented around 65 percent of the cases under its auspices. 11 cases (RM 2.47 
billion) were transferred to Danaharta. While 14 cases (RM 8.67 billion) were withdrawn, 14 
cases (RM 3.95) were rejected.
Far Eastern Economic Review, Slow off the Mark (8 April 1999) 
Malaysian Business, The Better Solution (16 Januaiy 1999)
600
601
602
BNM, Annual Report 2000 (2001), p. 13.
Malaysian Business, They Get Younger (16 December 2001) 
CDRC, Press Statement (15 August 2002)
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3) Overhaul of Corporate Governance
Regulations on corporate governance were upgraded to restore investors’ confidence. The 
authorities amended many clauses of the Companies Acts in October 1998.^°  ^The focus of the 
amendments strengthened the responsibilities o f disclosure and extended the power of the 
Securities Commission as the main regulator of capital markets in its investigative and 
enforcement roles. At the same time, the Ministry o f Finance set up the High Level
Finance Committee on Corporate Governance on 24 March 1998. The Committee, consisting 
of government and industry representatives, proposed a new Code of Corporate Governance in 
February 1999. Based on this, the Malaysian Securities Commission published the Finance 
Committee Report on Corporate Governance in March 1999. The core of the report is the 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance as a set of principles and best practice for good 
governance. ^
Clarifying the responsibilities of key corporate participants;
Enhancing obligations of key corporate participants, especially in related party transactions; 
Improving the accuracy and timeliness of disclosures;
Enhancing the value of general meetings;
Enhancing the efficiency of shareholder redress for grievances; and 
Enhancing enforcement of good corporate conduct.
Furthermore, the Securities Commission revised the rules on listing, reverse take-overs 
and back-door listings on the KLSE in April 1999. The revision was aimed to upgrade the
Malaysian Business^ Extraordinary Measures to Fit the Times (16 November 1998)
Ong Hong Cheong, Evolution of die Malaysian Financial System beyond the Financial Crisis, in 
Seiichi Masuyama, Donna Vandenbrink, and Chia Siow Yue (eds.), East Asia’s Financial System: 
Evolution and Crisis (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999)
Low Chee Keong, Corporate Governance in Malaysia, in Keong (2000)
^  Jeyapalan Kasipillai, Insights in Corporate Governance in Malaysia, in N, Balasubramaniam, A 
International Perspective on Corporate Boards and Governance (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Insurance 
Institute, 1999)
Securities Commission, Annual Report 2000 (2001), 2-3
231
quality of assets and the capitalisation level of listed companies. Although there were 
complaints that the new rules were too restrictive, the tightening o f the regulations was 
broadly accepted as a necessary step toward a full disclosure-based regulatory system.
Despite these improvements, scepticism prevailed over the enforcement of the new 
governance system. On the face of it, many complaints from the corporate sector appear to 
imply that the enhanced standards were strictly enforced. In reality, however, the 
authorities did not follow the rules they set up when dealing with politically well-connected 
companies. In particular, minority shareholders’ rights remained unprotected in large 
conglomerates. In June 1998, for example, when some minority shareholders tried to change 
old customs in the annual general meetings of Chase Perdana and Instangreen Corporation, 
the government had enforced bailouts of some politically well-connected firms to the 
detriment of minority shareholders. In addition, large institutional investors were de facto
state-controlled and played a passive role in corporate governance issues.
In terms of asset size and political significance, UEM-Renong Group was the most 
important case. The Renong group was one of the biggest conglomerates, consisting of more 
than 100 companies. Its 17 subsidiaries covered key industries from construction, 
telecommunications to banking. What distinguished the group from its competitors was its 
political prestige. Its political sponsors were Mahathir and Daim. Due to the political 
connection, the group was the biggest beneficiary of the NEP and privatisation policy.
This privileged status had a historical origin. Renong was an offspring of Fleet Group that 
was set up by Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah on behalf of Prime Minister Abdul Razak in 1972. 
Its primary objective was to drive out foreign media companies. To this end, the Group 
acquired New Strait Times Press (M) with the financial assistance of Bank Bumiputra 
Malaysia. After Daim Zainuddin had been inaugurated as chairman in the early 1980s, the
Malaysian Business, Appropriate Measures? (1 June 1999); KLSE Cracks the Whip (16 February 
2001)
^  Malaysian Business, On the Alert (16 March 2000)
Malaysian Business, Boardroom Moves (1 August 1998)
R. Thillainathan, Corporate Governance and Restructuring in Malaysia: A Review of Markets, 
Mechanisms, Agents and the Legal Infrastructure, paper prepared for tiie Joint World Bank / OECD 
Survey of Corporate Governance (1999)
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group expanded into publications, telecommunications, banking and insurance. The aftermath 
of the 1985 recession stopped the highly-leveraged group from expanding its business. In 
1990, Renong -  another UMNO investment arm -  took control over the group in exchange for 
shares. Under the control of Halim Saad -  Daim’s business partner -  the group became one of 
the largest conglomerates in the 1990s.
Despite its special position in the economy, Renong could not avoid to fall victim to the 
financial crisis. High interest rates and the cancellation of large infrastructure projects raised 
the group’s debts burden, estimated to be 20 billion ringgit, or approximately 8 percent of all 
loans made by the banking sector. To save the group, the government forced United 
Engineers (M) (UEM) -  one of Renong’s subsidiaries -  to take over a 32.6 percent stake of its 
holding company on 17 November 1997. The shares were purchased for RM 2.34 billion cash 
(almost 550 million dollars at the time) because no approval fi*om shareholders was required 
in the case of an acquisition in cash. To complete the deal, UEM had to borrow short-term 
loans to pay the amount although it had cash-cow companies including Projek Lebuhraya 
Utara Selatan Sdn (PLUS).
This deal was criticised for several reasons. First, UEM overvalued Renong’s share price. 
At that time, one Renong’s share was traded at RM 2.90. But UEM paid an average RM 3.26 
per share. Second, the company was granted by the Foreign Investment Committee (FIG) a 
waiver from providing a general offer to the other minority shareholders at an optimum rate.
In principle, a waver was permitted only in the defence of the national interest. For this 
reason, Anwar opposed the deal. Daim intervened to give the waiver to UEM on the condition 
that Halim Saad offered a put option to UEM and its shareholders (i.e., buying their shares in 
three years’ time at cost plus interest). Third, the disciplinary action was very soft although the 
companies violated many regulations on corporate governance: just a fine of RM 100,000 on 
the failure to give notice of change in a substantial shareholder’s interest.
Malaysian Business, Coming Full Circle (16 August 2001)
Wall Street Journal, Renong Plans to Offer Proposal to Settle Debts (9 October 1998) 
Kathryn Hanes, The Rescue of Renong, Global Finance, Vol. 12, No, 6 (June 1998)
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All in all, this was nothing short of a bail-out of Renong and its major shareholder, Halim 
Saad, at the expense of minority shareholders of UEM. Thus the market response to the deal 
was thus very negative. Disappointed investors -  both foreign and domestic -  sold the stocks 
of both companies. Within a day of the aimouncement, the share price of UEM and Renong 
fell by 38 and 20 percent respectively. As a result, the KLCI index recorded a 7 percent 
decline.
In 1999, UEM and Renong proposed a new restructuring plan because UEM’s interest 
burden for short-term borrowings sharply increased due to high interest rates. One of the key 
feature of the plan was the issue of bonds by PLUS. The government helped the company by 
allowing the CDRC to arrange its rescue plans and making concessions to PLUS. UEM 
issued RM 8.37 billion PLUS bonds and financial institutions exposed to Renong took up the 
zero coupon bonds with a yield of 9.4 percent. In other words, Renong debts were converted 
into PLUS bonds.
These measures were not enough to save the heavily-indebted group. Despite solid 
economic recovery, the share prices of UEM and Renong remained below the pre-crisis level. 
It meant that Halim Saad could not keep his promise to buy the put option (32.6 percent stake 
in Renong) from UEM by 14 February 2001. Thus he could not help deferring i t  This led the 
share prices of Renong and UEM to collapse by 13 and 11 percent respectively in December 
2000.
In July 2001 when it became evident that the group could not survive without additional 
funds, Khazanah Nasional -  the government’s investment arm -  announced that it would take 
over a 32 percent stake in UEM using the Employees Provident Fund (EPF). Because UEM 
held 32.6 percent stake in Renong that owned a 38 percent stake in UEM, Renong was under 
the control of KNB. The deal cost the EPF approximately RM 3.8 milhon (1 billion
Asiamoney, Malaysia's Brokers Get the Blues (April 2001)
Malaysian Business, Breaking up is Hard to Do (1 April 1999)
Malaysian Business, Attractive Bonds (1 October 1999)
Far Eastern Economic Review, A  Question of Honour (21 December 2000) 
Malaysian Business, Handing it to the State (16 August 2001)
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dollars).®^® Nevertheless, the deal drew some support from investors. The reason is that the bid 
price of RM 4.50 was well above the market value and Halim Saad was ousted from the 
group.
There are few better examples than Mahathir’s family to show how political 
considerations overwhelmed corporate governance principles. The Prime Minister had 
three sons, all of whom were involved in business. Mirzan, the eldest son, owned Konsortium 
Perkapalan Berhad (KPB) that consisted of shipping and trucking companies. Even though his 
qualifications -  a MBA degree from the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School and 
work experience at Salomon Brothers -  were good enough to enable him to become a 
successful CEO, it was widely acknowledged that state-run companies such as Petronas and 
Proton helped him to expand his business by awarding favourable contracts.
The debt restructuring arranged by government-controlled companies reinforced this 
impression. When the share price of KPB fell to RM 3.78 (at its peak of RM 17.30 in March
1997), MISC controlled by Petronas acquired KPB’s subsidiaries at an overvalued price. This 
politically-motivated bailout succeeded in saving Mirzan’s business empire. But it let 
investors’ confidence down, prompting further falls of the KL Stock Exchange Index.
Mokhzani, the second son, was the owner of Tongkah Holdings, whose subsidiaries 
provided services for 19 government-owned hospitals and supplied granite panels for Kuala 
Lumpur’s new international airport. In addition, he was one of the major shareholders of 
PhileAllied Bank. In the original plan of banking sector consolidation, the bank was to be 
merged into Multi-Purpose Bank controlled by Daim’s cronies after the downfall of Anwar. 
However, the bank strongly withstood the plan. According to Terence Gomez, Mokhzani 
persuaded his father to assign it to government-controlled Malayan Banking in order to 
avenge Daim’s opposition to the rescue of Mirzan’s business.
Asiamoney, Malaysia Inc moves in for Renong (September 2001)
Gomez and Jomo (1999), pp. 192-99,
Wall Street Journal, Premier’s Son Reins in Business Ambitions in Malaysia (30 December 1998) 
Far Eastern Economic Review, Read the Figures (14 May 1998)
Terence Gomez, Why Mahathir Axed Daim, Far Eastern Economic Review (5 July 2001)
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Concerned about a political backlash against the bailouts, Mahathir’s family steadily 
reduced their exposure to the business sector. In October 1998, for example, a 200-million- 
ringgit (52 million dollars) contract to implement the first phase of Malaysia’s smart-schools 
project was not awarded to Mirzan’s company. In April 2001, Mokhzani sold his stake in 
two listed companies at a discounted price. The main reason was to defend his father and 
himself from criticism of nepotism
One of the most controversial figures in the corporate sector is Daim, who had been 
Mahathir’s key lieutenant since the 1980s. Overseeing the whole process of corporate 
restructuring, he was accused o f putting his private interests before the public interests. In 
addition to his intervention in the selection of anchor banks, he violated the principles of 
corporate governance reform to assist his business associates who suffered from the financial 
crisis. Daim’s rescue of his cronies such as Halim Saad (UEM-Renong) and Tajudin Ramli 
(Malaysian Airlines) were criticised even by senior UMNO members.
Considering the close partnership between Mahathir and Daim, it is not fair to put the 
blame solely on Daim. Some of controversial bailouts could not be executed without 
Mahathir’s consent -  implicit or explicit. However, on many issues -  the selection of anchor 
banks, the choice of the governor of BNM, the control of New Strait Times and the sale of 
Time DotCom -  Daim had different opinions. One of the most important cases is the rescue 
of MAS. Rumours were circulated that Mahathir was very angry when Daim ordered state-run 
funds to over-pay for ailing companies. For example, government funds were used to pay 
Tajudin 1.8 billion ringgit for his 29 percent stake in 2000 and to buy a substantial stake of a 
Renong’s telecommunications unit in 2001. The rift with Mahathir was a catalyst for the
Far Eastern Economic Review, Sharing the Wealth (22 October 1998)
Far Eastern Economic Review, Final Sacrifice: Daim Bows Out (14 June 2001)
Far Eastern Economic Review, Parting ways? (25 May 2000) But Mahathir officially denied the rift 
between him and Daim, See New Straits Times, TdOik of Rift wiA Daim not New, says Dr Mahathir (12 
May 2000)
Far Eastern Economic Review, Behind Daim’s Fall (27 June 2002)
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exit of Daim in June 2001. His declining reputation among Malay voters left Mahathir with no 
alternative but for the Finance Minister to resign from all the position he held.
The departure of Daim had a positive effect on corporate restructuring. Most delayed 
restructuring plans including UEM-Renong and MAS were put back on course by ousting 
Daim’s protégés. In addition, the participation of young technocrats -  notably Azman Yahya 
(head of CDRC) and Nor Mohamad Yacob (special economic adviser to Mahathir) -  made it 
easy for Mahathir to erase the legacy of Daim’s cronyism.
To conclude, the Malaysian experience shows that the Washington consensus had some 
effect on corporate governance reform. Although the corporate sector was not severely hit by 
the crisis, the government upgraded institutional frameworks for corporate governance in the 
cause of compliance with global standards or “best practice”.
However, its political power was not strong enough to implement all the reform policy 
consistently. First, the division among top leaders prohibited policy makers from pursuing 
reform policies in a constant way. At the initial stage, Anwar’s supporters prepared a blueprint 
for governance reform. After his downfall, Mahathir and Daim did not follow it to save their 
cronies -  especially large bumiputera companies -  although they did not overturn key reform 
measures.
Second, lack o f regime change made it much more difficult for policy makers to 
implement the measures because the decades-long nexus between key politicians and big 
business withstood despite Anwar’s challenge. It is equally important that there were no 
NGOs -  equivalent to the CCEJ and PSPD -  that helped policy makers to offset the power of 
the bumiputera business community.
4. Conclusion
Far Eastern Economic Review, Surviving a Change of Guard (19 July 2001) 
Asiamoney, Change at last in Malaysia (December 2001/January 2002)
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This chapter have examined the political impact of the Washington consensus on 
corporate reform. In the wake of the financial crisis, the consensus extended its policy agenda 
to corporate reform that was ignored in the original version. By attributing the main cause of 
the crisis to crony capitalism, the consensus made it imperative for the crisis-affected 
countries to improve its corporate governance system.
In Korea, the chaebol resisted corporate reform in two ways. First, the chaebol employed 
nationalist rhetoric. A hidden agenda of corporate reform is that foreign competitors 
manipulated the IMF into reducing their capacities. Second, the chaebol accused the policy of 
anti-market-friendly policy. In particular, the Big Deal policy was criticised for heavy state 
intervention by them.
Nevertheless, corporate reform was implemented with relative success. IMF’s presence 
was instrumental in forcing the chaebol to accept corporate reform. It was equally important 
that President Kim Dae Jung was critical of the chaebol system. His economic philosophy was 
to give more favour to small- and medium-sized companies to check the monopolistic position 
of the chaebol. Policy makers also recognised that chaebol’s monolithic power was an 
obstacle to fair trade. Minority shareholders’ rights activities strengthened the legitimacy of 
anti-chaebol policy.
In Malaysia, policy makers were divided into two groups. On the one hand, Anwar’s 
supporters in the Treasury and the central banks supported the Washington consensus. In the 
wake of the crisis, Anwar withdrew many preferential treatments that privileged the 
bumiputera business community. On the other hand, Mahathir and Daim’s protégés in the 
NEAC minimised the change of corporate governance system on the ground that its change 
would de-stabilise racial harmony by widening the gap between Malays and the other ethnic 
communities. The bumiputera community also criticised Anwar’s policy for serving 
foreigners’ interests rather than Malaysia’s interests.
The debate was finished not by a theoretical competition but by a power struggles. 
Mahathir removed Anwar fi-om the cabinet and Daim took charge of economic policy. 
Although the government introduced upgraded sets of regulation to comply with international
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standards, there were many irregularities in the stage of implementation to protect Mahathir 
and Daim’s cronies. In this regard, the political power of the Washington was limited in 
Malaysia.
This divergence result can be explained by different govemment-business relationship. As 
Andrew MacIntyre points out, “in the Northeast Asian NICs... the formulation and 
implementation of economic policy has not been greatly constrained in a direct (or 
instrumental) way by the preferences of business... Southeast Asian bureaucracies have not 
been as insulated from distributional pressures or, apparently, as coherent or high calibre.”
In other words, the government confronted with the chaebol in Korea, big business was an 
integral part of the ruling party in Malaysia. This institutional difference can explain why 
Korean policy makers had a much tougher stance toward big business than Malaysian 
counterparts.
Andrew MacIntyre, Business, Government and Development: Northeast and Southeast Asian 
Comparisons, in Andrew MacIntyre (ed.), Business and Government in Industrialising Asia (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1994), p.6 & 7.
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[Appendix 6-1] Korea: The Big Deal - Business Swap Agreements between Top Five 
Chaebols
Industry Plan Controlling Body
Semiconductor
Samsung Electronic Co.
Hyundai Electronic Ind. 1 
LG Semiconductor Co. f
Samsung Electronic Co. 
Hyundai Electronic Ind. (July 
07)
Power-
generating
equipment
Hyundai Heavy Industries Co. | 
Korea Heavy Industries & Construction Co. | 
Samsung Heavy Industries Co.
Korea Heavy Industries & 
Construction Co (November 30)
Petrochemicals
SK, LG, Daelim, Lotte, Hanwha
Hyundai Petrochemical Co. r
Samsung General Chemical Co.
SK, LG, Daelim, Lotte, Hanwha 
New Entry (December 18)
Aircraft
manufacturing
Samsung Aerospace Industries Co. I 
Daewoo Heavy Industries Co. | 
Hyundai Space & Aircraft Co.
New entry (October 1)
Railroad
vehicles
Hyundai Precision & Ind. Co.
Daewoo Heavy Industries Co. L 
Hanjin Heavy Industries Co. J
Third-party professional 
manager (July 1)
Ship engines
Hyundai Heavy Industries Co.
Korea Heavy Industries & Construction Co. 1 
Samsung Heavy Industries Co. J
Hyundai Heavy Industries Co. 
Korea Heavy Industries & 
Construction Co. (November 30)
Oil refining
SK, LG, Ssangyong
Hyundai Oil Co. 1 
Hanwha Energy Co. J
SK, LG, Ssangyong 
Hyundai Oil Co. (May 30)
Cars*
Hyundai Motors 
Daewoo Motors ** 
Samsung Motors
Hyundai Motors (+ Kia Motors) 
Renault (April 27,2000)
Electronics*
Daewoo Electronics ** 
Samsung Electronic Co. Samsung Electronic Co.
* Car and electronics added in December 1998,
** Under court receivership, the government negotiated with foreign creditors to workout its debts.
Compiled from OECD, Economic Surveys: Korea (1999), p. 128; Kyeong-won Kim (ed.). Three 
Years after the IMF Bailout: A Review o f the Korean Economy’s Transformation since 1998 (Seoul: 
Samsung Economic Research Institute, 2001), p. 107.
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[Appendix 6-2] Korea; Minority Shareholders and Foreign Investors in Major Companies 633
Companies Major requirements Results
Korea First 
Bank
Filed a suit for the compensations for 
losses in regard to bad loans to Hanbo 
Steel (June 1997)___________________
Four current and former directors were 
ruled to recompense 40 billion won (June
1998) by the court___________________
SK Telecom Presentation of shareholder proposal by 
the Tiger Fund (January 1998)
Claimed compensation for losses 
created illegal internal transactions 
with other SK affiliates 
Claimed the guarantee of rights to 
recommend outside directors 
Claimed the promise to get 
approval when the company deals with 
other SK affiliates and makes overseas 
investment 
Opposition movements by the Tiger 
Fund and People’s Solidarity for 
Participatory Democracy on new stock 
issuance (January 1999)______________
Acceptance of shareholders’ proposal
Donation of 300 thousand shares of 
Daehan Telecom to SK telecom
The right to recommend three outside 
directors and one inspector was given to 
the Fund
Giving up of purchase of the new 
stock issuance of SK Securities
Approval of new stock issuance in the 
shareholders’ special meeting after the 
company’s purchase of shares owned by the 
Tiger Fund__________________________
Samsung
Electronics
Request to impose penalty on managers 
who refused to show record of the 
proceedings of the board of directors 
(March 1998)
Shareholders’ proposal by foreign funds 
(January 1999) and People’s Solidarity 
for Participatory Democracy__________
A penalty of 3 million won was imposed by 
the court
The bill of revised corporate charters was 
submitted to the general shareholders’ 
meeting in 1999______________________
Korea
Telecom
Filed a suit to compensate for losses 
created by interfering in the participation 
in the general shareholders’ meeting 
(March 1998)
Still pending in the Seoul District Court
Hyosung Opposition of the merger between 
affiliates (July 1998)________________
Hyosung’s purchase of shares owned by the 
Appaloosa Fund (a US hedge fund)_______
633 K. W. Kim (2001), p.96.
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[Appendix 6-3] Malaysia: Politically-connected Companies 634
Company Name Primary Connected Major Shareholder/Director Primary Political Connection
Advance Synergy Bhd Ahmad Sebi Abu Bakar Daim, Anwar
Antah Holdings Bhd Negeri Sembilan Royalty Mahidhir
Aokam Perdana Bhd Samsudin Abu Hassan Daim
Arab Malaysian Corporation Bhd Azman Hashim UMNO
Austral Amalgamated Hid Samsudin Abu Hassan Daim
Ban Hin Lee Bank Bhd Quek Leng Chan Anwar
Bandar Raya Developments Bhd Mca Mca
Beijaya Group Bhd Vincent Tan Chee Yioun Daim
Beijaya Sports Toto Bhd Vincent Tan Chee Yioun Daim
Cold Storage (Malaysia) Bhd Basir Ismail, Samsudin Abu Hassan Daim
Construction And Supplies House Joseph Ambrose Lee, Abdul Mulok Awang Damit Daim
Cycle & Carriage Bin tang Bhd Basir Ismail Daim
Damansara Realty Bhd Koperasi Usaha Bersatu Bhd UMNO
Datuk Keramat Holdings Bhd Koperasi Usaha Bersatu Bhd UMNO
Diversified Resources Bhd Yahya Ahmad, Nasaruddin Jalil Anwar, Mahathir
Ekran Bhd Ting Pek Khiing Daim, Mahathir, Abdul Taib Mahmud
Faber Group Bhd UMNO UMNO
Gadek (Malaysia) Bhd Yahya Ahmad, Nasaruddin Jalil Anwar, Mahathir
George Town Holdings Bhd Tunku Abdullah Mahathir
Golden Plus Holdings Bhd Ishak Ismail, Mohamed Sarit Haji Yusoh Anwar
Granite Industries Samsudin Abu Hassan Daim
Hicom Holdings Bhd Yahya Ahmad Anwar, Mahathir
Ho Hup Construction Company Bhd Halim Saad Daim
Hong Leong Bank Bhd Quek Leng Chan Anwar
Hong Leong Credit Bhd Quek Leng Chan Anwar
Hong Leong Industries Bhd Quek Leng Chan Anwar
Hong Leong Properties Bhd Quek Leng Chan Anwar
Hume Industries (Malaysia) Bhd Quek Leng Chan Anwar
Idris Hydraulic (Malaysia) Bhd Ishak Ismail Anwar
Kamunting Corporation Bhd T.K. Lim Daim
Kfc Holdings (Malaysia) Bhd Ishak Ismail Anwar
Kinta Kellas Public Limited Co Halim Saad Daim
Kretam Holdings Bhd UMNO Youth, Wan Azmi Wan Hamzah Daim
Kumpulan Fima Bhd Basir Ismail Daim
Land & General Bhd Wan Azmi Wan Hamzah Daim
Landmarks Bhd Samsudin Abu Hassan Daim
Magnum Corporation Bhd T.K. Lim Daim
MalakoffBhd Malaysian Resources UMNO
Malaysian Airline System Bhd Tajudin Ramli Daim
Malaysian Resources Coiporation Wan Azmi Wan Hamzah UMNO, Anwar
Metroplex Bhd Dick Chan Unspecified
Multi-Purpose Holdings Bhd T.K. Lim Daim
Mycom Bhd Mohd Tamrin Abdul Ghafar Ghafar Baba
Nanyang Press (Malaya) Bhd Quek Leng Chan Anwar
New Straits Times Press (Malaysia) Unspecified Anwar
O.Y.L. Industries Bhd Quek Leng Chan Anwar
Pacific Chemicals Bhd Ting Pek Khiing, Robert Tag Daim, Mahathir, Abdul Taib Mahmud
Pengkalen Holdings Bhd Joseph Ambrose Lee, Abdul Mulok Awang Damit Daim
Prime Utilities Bhd Ahmad Sebi Abu Bakar Daim, Anwar
Promet Bhd Ibrahim Mohamed Mahathir
R.J. Reynolds Bhd Wan Azmi Wan Hazmah Daim
Rashid Hussain Bhd Wan Azmi Wan Hamzah Daim
Renong Bhd Halim Saad Daim
Sapura Telecommunications Bhd Unspecified Mahathir
Setron (Malaysia) Bhd Penang Bumiputera Foundation, Kamaruddin Jaafar Anwar
Sistem Televisyen Malaysia Bhd UMNO Companies UMNO
Star Publications (Malaysia) Bhd Vincent Tan Chee Yioun Daim
Taiping Consolidated Bhd Vincent Tan Chee Yioun Daim
Tanjong Public Limited Company T. Ananda Krishnan Mahathir
Technology Resources Industries Tajudin Ramli Daim
Time Engineering Bhd Halim Saad Daim
Tongkah Holdings Bhd Moldizani Mahathir Mahathir
Uniphoenix Corporation Bhd Ibrahim Mohamed Mahathir
Uniphone Telecommunications Bhd Shamsuddin Bin Abdul Kadir Mahathir
United Engineers (Malaysia) Bhd Halim Saad Daim
United Merchant Group Bhd Ahmad Sebi Abu Bakar Daim, Anwar
United Plantations Bhd Basir Ismail Daim
Simon Johnson and Todd Mitton, Cronyism and Capital Controls: Evidence from Malaysia Journal 
o f Financial Economics, Vol.67, No.2 (February 2003), pp,378-79.
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Utusan Melayu (Malaysia) Bhd UMNO UMNO
Wembley Industries Holdings Bhd Ishak Ismail Anwar
Ytl Cement Bhd Yeoh Tiong Lay Unspecified
Ytl Corporation Bhd Yeoh Tiong Lay Unspecified
Ytl Power International Bhd Yeoh Tiong Lay Unspecified
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Chapter VII 
Labour Market Reform and Social Policy
1. Introduction
This chapter examines to what extent the political power of the Washington consensus 
affected labour market reform and social policy in Korea and Malaysia. The consensus argues 
that labour market rigidities are one of the underlying causes of the crisis. In this regard, the 
IMF recommended the crisis-affected countries to improve flexibility. First, competitive 
labour markets help to enhance productivity by improving the allocation of human capital of 
workers. Second, flexibility in the labour sector facilitates structural reform by lowering wage 
costs and allowing large-scale redundancy.
The post-Washington consensus points out that the pursuit of economic efficiency can be 
harmful for economic equality by causing various types of negative side effects: 
unemployment, increasing wage differences and worsening employment conditions. To 
mitigate these effects, labour market reform is accompanied with social policy such as 
unemployment insurance, public work and training programmes and minimum wages.
Traditionally, IMF-supported programmes were hardly helpful in addressing the 
problems. First, pro-cyclical policy constrained government’s capability to increase social 
spending. Second, structural reform increased unemployment at least in the short-term. For 
these reasons, critics of the IMF urged the crisis-affected countries to adopt expansionary 
fiscal policy and to postpone some reform policies until strong economic recovery.
Chris Manning, Labour Markets in the ASEAN-4 and the NIEs, Asia-Pacific Economic Literature, 
Vol. 13, No.l (1999)
T. Paul Schultz, Labor Market Reforms: Issues, Evidence, and Prospects, in Anne O. Krueger (ed.), 
Economic Policy Reform: The Second Stage (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000)
Giovanni Andrea Comia, Richard Jolly and Frances Stewart (eds.). Adjustment with a Human Face. 
Vol.l, Protecting the Vulnerable and Promoting Growth (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987); Giovanni Andrea 
Comia, Social Funds in Stabilization and Adjustment Programmes: A Critique, Development and 
Change, Vol.32 (2001); James Raymond Vreeland, The IMF and Economic Development (Cambridge:
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Nevertheless, the consensus pays little attention to the social dimension of economic 
development. The underlying rationales are two-fold: economic growth resolve poverty and 
income inequality; and social policy such as redistribution taxes can be harmful to economic 
efficiency. As Michel Camdessus said, “Reducing poverty depends on expanding employment, 
particularly among the less skilled. And this, in turn, requires an adaptable labor market that 
encourages mobility and keeps labor costs in line with labor productivity, as well as sustained 
efforts to improve workers’ skills.”
In East Asian developing countries, labour / social policy were subordinated (and often 
sacrificed) to economic / industrial objectives. In the name of economic development and
industrialisation, the governments repressed trade union movement and wage increases. In 
return, it imposed on strict regulations on lay-offs in order to guarantee Job security. Over the 
past decades, this system was successful because rapid economic growth kept unemployment 
rate low. In 1996, for example, unemployment rate in the crisis affected countries ranged from 
1.5 to 2.8 percent. In this respect, the East Asian social welfare regime is called a productivist 
model.
The dominance of the productivist model can be explained by three factors. First, income 
distribution was generally egalitarian although economic growth increased gradually 
inequality. The average Gini Coefficient of the crisis countries was lower than that of Latin 
American countries. Second, the absence of strong social democratic / labour parties 
explains partly the underdevelopment of social safety nets. Except Korea, there were few 
remarkable labour movements in the region because authoritarian regimes repressed industrial
Cambridge University Press, 2003) Despite this criticism, the IMF did not take social issues into serious 
consideration until recently. See Ke-young Chu and Sanjeev Gupta (eds.). Social Safety Nets: Issues 
and Recent Experiences (Washington DC: IMF, 1998); Sanjeev Gupta, Louis Dicks-Mireaux, Ritha 
Khemani, Calvin McDonald, and Marijn Verhoeven, Social Issues in IMF-Supported Programs, 
Occasional Paper No. 191 (IMF, 2000)
Michel Camdessus, Making Globalization Work for Workers, Address to the 24th Congress of the 
World Confederation of Labor (Bangkok: 2 December 1997)
Frederic C Deyo, Beneath the Miracle: Labor Subordination in the New Asian Industrialism 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Richard A. Higgott and Helen E. S. Nesadurai, 
Rethinking the Southeast Asian Development Model: Bringing Ethical and Governance Questions in, 
ASEAN Economic Bulletin, Vol. 19, No.l (April 2000)
Ian Holliday, Productivist Welfare Capitalism: Social Policy in East Asia, Political Studies, Vol.48, 
No.4 (2000)
ADB, Asian Development Outlook (2000), p. 118.
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actions. Finally, informal safety nets such as family-based assistances supplemented formal 
safety nets. In some cases, large conglomerates provided social and health benefits to their 
employees.
The financial crisis exposed weaknesses of the productivist model. ^  First, the downfall 
of currency value increased the price of importing goods such as food and fuel. This price 
inflation led to a low standard of living. Second, economic recessions froze labour markets 
and put downward pressure on real earnings. In particular, vulnerable groups including 
women, children, disabled, old age, ethnic minority and foreign workers were not fully 
protected from severe poverty. Finally, many households were victims of the collapse of asset 
and stock markets. This meant a massive reduction in the real value of household saving. 
Furthermore, high interest rates limited their access to credit.
The remainder of this chapter is structured into three sections. In the next two sections, I 
examine labour market reform and social policy in Korea and Malaysia respectively. The 
focus of each section is on how the Washington consensus and the post-Washington 
consensus shaped labour market reform and social policy. Although the two policies are 
closely related, I discuss them separately for analytical reasons. The final section assesses the 
influence of the international financial institutions, policy makers, big business and political 
institutions on the political power of Washington consensus.
Nancy Birdsall and Stephan Haggard, After the Crisis: The Social Contract and the Middle Class in 
East Asia, in Ethan B. Kapstein, and Branko Milanovich (eds.). When Markets Fail: Social Policy and 
Economic Reform (New York; Russell Sage Foundation, 2002)
Shahid Yusuf, Innovative East Asia: The Future o f Growth (World Bank, 2003), pp.36-38.
^  James C. Knowles, Ernesto M. Pemia and Mary Racelis, Social Consequences of the Financial 
Crisis in Asia, Economic Staff Paper No.60 (ADB, 1999); Emanuele Baldacci, Luiz R. De Mello Jr. and 
Maria G. Inchauste Comboni, Financial Crises, Poverty, and Income Distribution, Working Paper No. 
02/4 (IMF, 2002) Cf. Raymond K.H. Chan, The Sustainability of the Asian Welfare System after the 
Financial Crisis, Asian Journal o f Social Science, Vol.31, No.2 (2003)
For a general overview of social issue in East Asia, see Yun-Peng Chu and Hal Hill, The Social 
Impact o f the Asian Financial Crisis (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2001); Sanjeev Gupta, Calvin 
McDonald, Christian Schiller, Marijn Verhoeven, Z. Bogetic and Gerd Schwartz, Mitigating the Social 
Costs of the Economic Crisis and the Reform Programs in Asia, Papers on Policy Analysis and 
Assessments No.98/7 (IMF, 1998); Eddy Lee, The Asian Financial Crisis: The Challenge for Social 
Policy (ILO, 1998); Anne Booth, The Social Impact of the Asian Crisis: What Do We Know Two 
Years On?, Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, Vol. 13, No.2 (November 1999)
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2. Korea
1) Labour Market Reform
From the early 1990s, labour market reform emerged as one of the most significant issues 
in economic policy. Big business argued that high wages and costs of industrial actions 
reduced their competitiveness in exporting markers. Foreign investors also complained that 
strong trade unions were one of the major obstacles to invest in the economy. In fact, some 
labour-intensive industries moved product lines to Southeast Asian and China to reduce their 
labour costs.
Against this background, policy makers had a fundamental reassessment of industrial 
relations. To reform the labour sector, the government proposed a draft for new labour law in 
December 1996. Although they were approved in the National Assembly, the bills did not 
take effect due to nation-wide backlash against them. First, there was a procedural flaw in the 
way of legislation because the New Korea Party (NKP: the ruling party) passed them secretly 
in the absence of opposition parties: the National Congress for New Politics (NCNP) and the 
United Liberal Democrats (ULD). Second, the bills legalised lay-off for managerial reasons, 
which trade unions opposed thoroughly. For the first time, two rival trade unions -  the 
Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) and the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions 
(KCTU) -  co-operated to organise a two-day general strike in January 1997.
To ease the hostile response, the government suggested a new proposal that contained two 
important concessions to the unions: immediate legalisation of the KCTU and a two-year 
postponement of lay-offs for managerial reasons. At the same time, the government made 
some concessions for employers: 1) more than one union at a given workplace would not be 
permitted until 2002; 2) companies no longer have to pay striking workers; and 3) from 2001,
Hagen Koo, The Dilemmas of Empowered Labor in Korea: Korean Workers in the Face of Global 
Capitalism, Asian Survey^ Vol.40, No.2 (April / March 2000); Jonhgseok Bae, Dongwon Kimand 
Changwon Lee, Globalization and Labor Rights, in Young-Ki Choi, Social Dialogue and Economic 
Recovery in Korea, in Wonduck Lee (ed.). Labor in Korea (KLI, 2002)
Se-il Park, Managing Labor Reform Lessons from the Korean Experience, 1996-97 (KDI, 2000)
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full-time union officials will not be paid. Although the new bills were passed in March 1997, 
these even-handed concessions satisfied neither employers nor employees.
This fierce reaction from the trade unions could not be understood without considering the 
history of trade union movements. Until the late 1980s, the government repressed trade 
unions. Only one nationwide umbrella organisation (the FKTU) was allowed and its political 
activities were completely forbidden. Many chaebol companies also obstructed their 
employees from organising into trade unions. In particular, Samsung was notorious for 
prohibiting trade unions in its all subsidiaries. Démocratisation in the mid-1980s made the 
repressive system unsustainable. In many chaebol companies, trade unions were organised 
and there were remarkable labour movements in the late 1980s. By political and economic 
struggles, trade unions achieved big increases in wages and allowances.
In return for these suppressive policies, strict regulations were maintained to protect job 
security. Among others, lay-off was strictly prohibited by the Labor Standards Act without 
“right causes”. However, the real effect of the regulations was not significant because demand 
always exceeded supply in the labour markets. In this circumstance, lifetime employment 
became a social norm.
Against this background, the outbreak of the financial crisis changed the balance of power 
between big business and organised labour. There were two approaches to reform the labour 
sector. On the one hand, neoliberal economists in the Korea Development Institute (KDI) and 
chaebol’s research institutes including the Korea Economic Research Institute (KERI) 
preferred an Anglo-American model that give priority to labour flexibility. On the other hand.
Yong Cheol Kim, Industrial Reform and the Labor Backlash in South Korea, Asian Survey, Vol.3 8, 
No. 12 (December 1998)
For an overview, see Byung-Kook Kim and Hyun-Chin Lim, Labor against Itself: Structural 
Dilemmas of State Monism, in Larry Diamond and Byungkook Kim (eds,). Consolidating Democracy 
in South Korea (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000); Paul G, Buchanan and Kate Nicholls, Labour Politics 
and Democratic Transition in South Korea and Taiwan, Government and Opposition, Vol.3 8, No.2 
(April 2003)
Ju Ho Lee and Dae II Kim, Labor Market Developments and Reforms in Korea, Working Paper, 
No.9703 (KID, 1997)
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economists in the Korea Labor Institute (KLI) were interested in European models -  
particularly Dutch -  that stresses on social stability.
In the wake of the crisis, the Anglo-American approach prevailed over the European one. 
Neoliberal economists argued that market-oriented labour policy enabled the US and the US 
to achieve low unemployment and high labour productivity. This argument coincided with 
IMF’s policy recommendation that gave top priority to labour market flexibility.
It is worthwhile to note that President Kim Dae Jung relatively well-placed to pursue this 
reform agenda. First, his cabinets were not tainted by the failures of the previous Kim Young 
Sam government. Second, his pro-labour stance would be an advantage in persuading the 
trade unions to accept labour market flexibility.
The government revised the Labour Standards Act on 14 February 1998. As Table 7-1 
presents, the most important thing in the New Act was the legalisation of lay-off. It is equally 
significant that temporary worker agencies were also allowed to operate and regulations on 
private job placement agencies were lessened.
[Table 7-1] Employment Policies 655
Topic Measures
Increase the flexibility of 
employment
• Employment flexibility increased under new law
• Temporary worker agencies allowed since July for 26 occupations
Taxes and transfers
• Coverage of Employment Insurance System has been extended to 
70 percent of employees, while the duration of benefits has been 
lengthened
• Training programmes and public works jobs have also been used 
to provide income support
For the debate, see KLI (ed.), Models o f Industrial Relation: An International Comparison (KLI, 
2003). This book is written in Korean. For the model. Visser, Jelle and Hemerijck, Anton, A Dutch 
Miracle: Job Growth, Welfare Reform and Corporatism in the Netherlands (Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press, 1997)
For example, KDI, Djnomics: A New Foundation for the Korean Economy (KDI, 1999), p,l 15. 
However, its evidence is controversial. See Stephen Nickell, Unemployment and Labor Market 
Rigidities: Europe versus North America, Journal o f Economic Perspectives, Vol.l 1, No.3 (Summer 
1997)
David I. Steinberg, Korea: Triumph amid Turmoil, Journal o f Democracy Vol.9, No.2 (1998) 
Chung-in Moon and Song-min Kim, Democracy and Economic Performance in South Korea, in 
Larry Diamond and Byungkook Kim (eds.). Consolidating Democracy in South Korea (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner, 2000)
OECD, Economic Survis: Korea (1999), p. 152.
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• Livelihood protection has been expanded
Active labour market 
policies
• Deregulation of private-sector job placement agencies
• The Public Employment Service has been expanded and 
integrated with other services to make it a “one-stop shop”
• The number of unemployment being trained at public expense has 
increased from 42,000 to 340,000.
Enhance product market 
competition
• Almost half of the 11,000 existing regulations have been 
eliminated by the new administration
• The Import Diversifications Programme was abolished at the end 
of June 1999
In return for the lay-off legalisation, trade unions demanded that employers share the 
economic hardship. In a meeting with the personnel officers of the 30 largest chaebols, Labour 
Minister Lee Ki Ho threatened that the government would impose a penalty on companies that 
abused the lay-off policy. However, this was nothing more than a lip service. As Table 7-2 
shows, the number of dismissal increased from January and July 1998. However, it should be 
noted that these figures might not reflect the whole effect of lay-off because some companies 
preferred a so-called honorary retirement to lay-off to avoid trade unions’ protest.
[Table 7-2] Unemployment by Reason 656
January 98 July 98 July 99 July 00
No. of Unemployed 669 (100.0) 1,381 (100.0) 1,209 (100.0) 631 (100.0)
Personal reason 
Closing of business 
Dismissal
Business deterioration / end of contract 
Other reasons
179 (26.8) 
123 (18.4) 
97 (14.5) 
199 (29.7) 
71 (10.6)
289 (20.9) 
173 (12.5) 
234(16.9) 
602 (43.6) 
83 ( 6.0)
335(32.6) 
65 ( 6.3) 
123 (12.0) 
306 (29.7) 
199 (19.3)
285 (45.2) 
36 ( 5.7) 
38 ( 6.0) 
175 (27.7) 
98 (15.5)
* Unit; tiiousands, %
In addition to the legalisation of lay-off, the default of small- and medium-sized firms 
aggravated the unemployment problem. As result, the number of dismissal increased more 
than times in the first half of 1998. Against this background, the IMF was dubbed the
Jai-Joon Hur, Economic Crisis, Income Support, and Employment Generating Programs: Korea’s 
Experience, Quarterly Journal o f Labor Policy, Vol.2, No.4 (2002), p.42.
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abbreviation for “I’M Fired.” As Figure 7-1 shows, the yearly average unemployment rate 
soared to 6.8 percent in 1998. This figure is the highest ever since 1966.
[Figure 7-1] Unemployment Trend 658
Source: Bank o f Korea, Quarterly Bulletin (various issues)
Trade unions accused the government of pretending to force the chaebol to minimise lay­
offs. Two umbrella organisations -  the FKTU and KCTU -  co-operated in calling for 
nationwide industrial action. Among others, the case of Hyundai Motors is worthy of note. 
First, the company was the largest company to declare massive lay-offs. Second, its union was 
one of the most militant unions. Thus, the case was a first litmus test for the new industrial 
relations. After the employers announced 1,500 redundancies in June 1998, the workers 
occupied the plant and built huge barricades alongside it in the next month. The government 
deployed riot police to disperse them. In August, a last-minute mediation by the NCNP (the 
ruling party) MPs managed to prevent violent conflict. The company and the unions agreed to 
reduce the number of compulsory redundancies from 1,500 to 277. Instead, 1,261 took
The annual aggregate unemployment rate reduced from 8.1% in 1963 to 2.0% in 1996. The trend 
was reversed briefly during the 1979-1980 recession caused by the second oil shock and the political 
unrest after the assignation o f  President Park Jung Hee. See Yongsung Chang, Jaeryang Nam and 
Changyong Rhee, Trends in Unemployment Rates in Korea: A Search-matching Model Interpretation, 
Journal o f the Japanese and International Economies, Vol. 18, No.2 (June 2004)
It should be noted that, unlike the OECD standards, these statistics do not include those who are self- 
employed and whose business has gone bankrupt. Thus, the real rate might be higher.
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voluntary unpaid leave on condition that the company would re-hire them in 18 months’ time. 
All in all, this settlement was an uncomfortable compromise, not a victory for either 
employers or workers: on the one hand, its significance lay in the fact that it was the first case 
of lay-offs for managerial reasons; on the other hand, the union achieved some concessions 
from the government as well as employers. However, this was not repeated in other cases.
Mounting discontent over labour reform led policy makers to rethink the Anglo-American 
approach. To manage socio-political backlash, they took into consideration the European 
experience of social pact more seriously. Against this background, Kim Dae Jung proposed a 
Tripartite Commission on 26 December 1997. To develop a social consensus of economic 
reform, it consisted of trade unions (the FKTU and the KCTU), the chaebols’ umbrella 
organisations (the Federation of Korean Industries and the Korean Employers Federation), and 
government ministries and representatives of four major political parties.
At first, the chaebol suspected that the Commission was a vehicle to realise Kim’s pro­
labour policy because trade unions’ support helped him to win the presidential election. The 
largest trade union (the FKTU) formed a policy coalition with the NCNP even though political 
activities by trade unions were forbidden. For the first time in its history, the FKTU officially 
supported the opposition leader. Ironically, however, this strong support led him to persuade 
them to accept labour market reform.
Nevertheless, it was not easy to persuade trade unions to accept labour market reform 
because they suspected that neoliberal labour policies would be favourable for employers 
rather than employees. For this reason, they initiated public campaigns against neoliberalism.
Under such circumstances, Michel Camdessus met with leaders of the FKTU and the
Michael Neary, Hyundai Motors 1998-1999: The Anatomy of a Strike, Capital & Class, No.70 
(2000)
^  This was inspired by the Dutch model.
Some scholars warned of the plausible outcomes of neoliberal policies. See Byung-young Ahn, Kim 
Dae Jung Jeongbuga Ppajilsu Inneun Hamjeong [Beware the Trap of Neoliberalism], Shindonga (April
1999); Yeonho Lee, DJ Gaehyeokui Sinjayuuijeog Hangye [Limitations of Kim Dae Jung’s Neoliberal 
Economic Reform], Sasang (Summer 2001); Martin Hart-Landsberg and Paul B. Urkett, Economic 
Crisis and Restructuring in South Korea, Beyond the Free Market-Statist Debate, Critical Asian Studies, 
Vol.33, No.3 (2001); Hyun-chin Lim and Joon Han, The Social and Political Impact of Economic Crisis 
in South Korea: A Comparative Note, Asian Journal o f Social Science^ Vol,31, No.2 (2003)
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KCTU on Kim Dae Jung’s request. However, his attempt was fhiitless because they were 
not convinced that the neoliberal reform would undermine their rights and interests.
Through concessions from each of the social partners, they made the ‘Social Agreement 
for Overcoming the Economic Crisis’ on 6 February. In return for the legalisation of lay­
offs and temporary workers, some concessions were given to trade unions. The election law 
revision bill in April 1998 lifted the restrictions on trade unions’ political activities. Civil 
servants were allowed to form workplace associations from 1999, and teachers' unions were 
legalised in July 1999. In addition, the Labour Standards Law extended coverage to those who 
work for a company with four or fewer employees. More significantly, the militant KCTU, 
established in November 1995, was legalised. A minimum wage and industrial accident 
insurance were extended to all workplaces with more than five employees. Finally, the 
government promised not to use violence in response to industrial action. These concessions 
were not enough to meet their demand o f the trade unions because they believed that the lay­
off legalisation and workers’ dispatch system could not be compensated by any concessions.
Many concessions were finalised before the local election scheduled on 4 June 1998. To 
secure a national mandate for reform, the election was crucial for the incumbent ruling 
coalition. Although President Kim Dae Jung enjoyed a high rate of job approval, his party was 
in alliance with foe-tumed-ally Kim Jong Phil’s party to form a workable majority in the 
National Assembly. In the election, his ruling coalition won 10 out of 16 governorships and 
mayoralties. This good result encouraged the administration to push ahead with its reform 
agenda. ^
The policy shift was reflected in the activities of the Tripartite Commission. In the second- 
term, beginning on 13 June 1998, the Commission focused on the strengthening of the social 
safety net. To this end, unemployment insurance coverage and job training, and increasing
IMF, IMF Survey (26 January 1998), p. 18,
The Commission was granted legal status by a presidential decree on 28 March 1998. To execute the 
Tripartite Accord more efficiently, several committees and subcommittees were formed. On 1 July 
1998, tiie Committee for Financial Industry Development and an Ad Hoc Committee for Controlling 
Illegal Labour Practices were set up. See Young-Ki Choi, Social Dialogue and Economic Recovery in 
Korea, in Wonduck Lee (ed.). Labor in Korea (KLI, 2002)
^  Far Eastern Economic Review, A  Vote for Reform (18 June 1998)
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welfare benefits to tiie unemployed were expanded. For example, employment insurance 
coverage was extended to more than two-thirds of employees. For those who are not eligible 
for such benefits, a large-scale public works programme was established, and opportunities for 
vocational training were greatly increased. In 1998, about 444,000 public works jobs 
(equivalent to 1.2 percent of the working-age population) were created.
During the second-term sessions, two labour organisations boycotted the Commission, 
accusing the government and the employers of forcing workers to bear unilateral sacrifices. In 
February 1999, the militant KCTU withdrew itself from the Commission, demanding direct 
negotiations with the government on many issues: suspending economic restructuring, 
reducing working hours and replacing enterprise-level with industrial-level bargaining. Two 
months later, the moderate FKTU also decided not to participate in the Commission. Their 
demands included an end of lay-offs, the introduction of a job sharing system and a legal 
guarantee allowing unions to participate in management. In response, representatives of the 
chaebol also stepped down from the Commission, accusing the government of sidelining the 
chaebol in revising labour policies on compensation for full-time unionised workers and 
making cuts in legal work hours in favour of trade unions’ demands.
After the return of FKTU in September 1999, the Commission started its third term. The 
power of the commission was strengthened by the Act on Establishment and Operation of the 
Tripartite Commission enacted in May 1999. Unlike its first and second terms, the 
government was obligated to consult the Committee before announcing major economic 
policies that would affect workers'job security and working conditions. Nevertheless, their 
dissatisfaction with the government led the FKTU to break with the policy alliance with the 
NCNP in December 1999. This was a serious political setback for the ruling party.
For details, see Appendix 7-1.
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2) Productive Welfare
Labour market reform was not only the adverse impact of the financial crisis. Economic 
recession in the post-crisis brought a vicious circle to the economy: rapid appreciation of the 
currency, rising inflation and declining real income. Pro-cyclical policies worsened -  not 
relieved -  the vicious circle, which gave rise to many social problems.
In 1998, for example, urban household income fell 8 percent in real terms in the year. This 
was the first decline since 1970. Income distribution also worsened. As Table 7-3 
demonstrates, Gini coefficient -  zero implies perfect income equality and 1 means perfect 
inequality -  rose to 0.32 in 1998, up from 0.28 in 1997. This was the highest level since the 
government recorded the index in 1979. It means that mid- and low-income earners suffered 
more than high-income earners.
[Table 7-3] Changes in the Income Distribution
97 98 99/HI 99/H2
Upper 20 percent 37.2 39.8 40.4 40.0
Lower 20 8.3 7.4 7.3 7.4
Upper 20 percent / Lower 20 percent 4.49 5.38 5.54 5.41
Gini Co efficient 0.28 0.32 0.32 0.31
Compared with the other crisis-affected countries, Korea was believed to have a relatively 
better social welfare system. Besides a livelihood security system, four social insurance 
systems including the National Pension, Medical insurance. Employment Insurance and 
Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance were in place. However, these were not sufficient
^  Hyungpyo Moon, Hyehoon Lee and Gyeongjoon Yoo, Economic Crisis and its Social Consequences 
(KDI, 1999); Joung-Woo Lee, Social Impact of the Crisis, in Duck-Koo Chung and Barry Eichengreen 
(eds ). The Korean Economy beyond the Crisis (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2004)
OECD, Economic Surveys: Korea (1999), pp. 141-42,
^^/W ,p.l50.
Drawn from Ajai Chopra, Kenneth H. Kang, Meral Karasulu, Hong Liang, and Henry P. Ma, From 
Crisis to Recovery in Korea: Strategy, Achievements, and Lessons, Working Paper No.01/154 (IMF, 
2001), p.30.
For an overview of the welfare system, see Huck Ju Kwon, The Welfare State in Korea: The Politics 
o f Legitimation (New York: St. Martin’s, 1999); H. K. Lee, Globalization and the Emerging Welfare 
State: the Experience of South Korea, International Journal o f Social Welfare, Vol.8, No.l (January 
1999)
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to deal with the social consequences of the crisis. For example, the Employment Insurance 
System (EIS) -  introduced in July 1995 -  did not cover two-thirds of employees, because it 
was confined only to workers in firms with more than thirty employees. Moreover, the 
duration of benefits was very short: just one month for workers under 25, and up to seven 
months for workers over 50. Worse, benefits were not available to those who voluntarily left 
their jobs. “The gap between state-provided welfare and actually-received welfare was filled 
by a sort of neo- Confiician family politics.”
To address the problems, many measures were undertaken. As Table 7-4 shows, the EIS 
was extended to all companies regardless of their size in 1998. In addition, the National 
Pension broadened its coverage from firms with 10 or more employees to all firms in April 
1999. To provide living expenses for poverty-level households, the National Basic Livelihood 
Security Law was enacted in August 1999.
[Table 7-4] Extension of EIS Coverage 672
Date Unemployment insurance Job retention & occupational training
July 1995 30 employees 70 employees
January 1998 10 employees 50 employees
March 1998 5 employees 50 employees
July 1998 5 employees 5 employees
October 1998 1 employee 1 employee
In April 1999, a supplementary budget was arranged to finance the policy. The 
government raised subsidies to firms that kept workers. For large companies, this subsidy was 
the equivalent of just under 70% of such workers’ salaries, while for smaller companies it was 
equivalent to 75%. At the same time, state-own companies such as Korea Telecom and Korea 
Electric Power Corporation invested in infrastructure projects to create jobs.
These efforts were not very effective in reducing the inequality in income distribution. 
Social economic indices show that the lack of social safety nets made the poor, less educated.
671 Kyimg-Sup Chang, Compressed Modernity and Its Discontent: Souüi Korean Society in Transition, 
Economy and Society,Wo\2%,'Ho.\ (February 1999), p.46.
Hur (2002), p.52.
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female and young workers more vulnerable. Considering its good record of relatively even 
distribution of income, this deterioration posed a serious problem in terms of destabilising 
social cohesion.
Against this background, President Kim Dae Jung proposed a ‘productive welfare’ policy 
in August 1999. As Table 7-5 shows, the policy had three main elements: the improvement 
of the income distribution system by ensuring fair market discipline, such as equal job 
opportunities and fair compensation; the adoption of a redistribution programme to help those 
who lose in the market competition to maintain a basic quality of life; and support for the 
rehabilitation of the beneficiaries of this redistribution through job-creation and vocational
training. 675
[Table 7-5] Productive Welfare 676
Target of the measures Major contents
Reinforcement of the social 
insurance system
• Protection for all workers from unemployment
• Protection for all workers from industrial accidents
Job creation and job securing
• Job creation and employment maintenance
• Preventing unemployment and assisting prompt job 
placement
• Job training in accordance with industrial demand
• Offering fair opportunities for job training and expanding 
voluntary job training
Enhancement of the quality of 
life through the expansion of 
basic welfare infrastructure
• Legislation of the Basic Welfare of Workers Law
• Shortening working hours and enhancing working 
conditions
• Overhauling protection measures for the low-income class
Promotion of work-participation 
welfare and realization of 
industrial democracy
• Developing various worker-participation programs
• Co-operation of Labor/ Corporate/ Government for job 
securing and less unemployment
• Building a social partnership through the Tripartite 
Commission
Jong-Wha Lee and Changyong Rhee, Social Impacts of the Asian Crisis: Policy Challenges and 
Lessons, UN Human Development Programme, Occasional Paper No. 33 (1999)
For details, see Tai-youn Hwang Saengsanjeok Bokjireul Wihan Wonchig [Economic-Financial 
Principles of Korea’s ‘Productive Welfare’], Hankookllbo (5 July 1999); Young-Hwa Kim, Productive 
Welfare: Korea's Third Way?, International Journal o f Social Welfare, Vol. 12, No.l (2003)
MOFE, IMF 2 Nyeon, Gujo Gahyeok Noryeokgwa Geu Seonggwa [Structural Reform since the IMF 
Crisis: Efforts and Achievements] (December 1999), p.40.
Kyeong-won Kim (ed.), Three Years after the IMF Bailout: A Review o f the Korean Economy's 
Transformation since 1998 (Seoul: Samsung Economic Research Institute, 2001), pp. 124-25.
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The initiative did not bring direct results. Its clumsy definition of the role o f government 
notwithstanding, budgetary tightening constrained the materialisation of the whole agenda. As 
the economy bounced back, the need for the policy dwindled. Thus the policy was regarded as 
a political tactic to ease labour discontent.
In conclusion, the Washington consensus had a strong impact on labour market policy. 
IMF’s inclusion of labour reform in its conditionality clearly strengthened the political power 
o f the consensus. In particular, its emphasis on labour market flexibility helped the 
government to legalise lay-offs and temporaiy worker agencies in spite of ferocious resistance 
from trade unions. Chaebol’s support for the reform also increased its political power. Before 
the crisis, the chaebol press the government to deregulate the labour sector.
Nonetheless, it is hard to say that labour reform was entirely neoliberal. As the Tripartite 
Commission shows, policy makers introduced European models of industrial relations. One 
reason is that the social consequences o f the crisis led them to rethink the IMF-style policies. 
To ease socio-political backlash against neoliberal labour reform, the government established 
the Tripartite Commission. This gave rise to the productive welfare policy that shifted from 
neoliberalism to social democracy or social corporatism.
The policy shift was attributable, in part, to Kim Dae Jung’s political weaknesses. First, he 
could not disregard trade unions’ demands because the FKTU officially endorsed him in the 
presidential election. Second, his party did not have a majority in the National Assembly.
Thus there were electoral constraints on economic policy. The productive welfare policy was 
announced six months before the general election.
Jae Jin Yang, The Rise of the Korean Welfare State amid Economic Crisis, 1997-99: Implications of 
the Globalisation Debate, Development Policy Review, Vol. 18, No.3 (September 2000); Soonman 
Kwon, Economic Crisis and Social Policy Reform in Korea, International Journal o f Social Welfare, 
Vol. 10, No.2 (2001) However, there is a dissent that the crisis did not play a critical role in expanding 
social safety nets; it contributed to accelerating the implementation of the existing roadmap. See Huck- 
Ju Kwon, Advocacy Coalitions and the Politics of Welfare in Korea after the Economic Crisis, Policy 
and Politics, Vol.31, No.l (January 2003)
Tat Van Kong, Neo-liberalization and Incorporation in Advanced Newly Industrialized Countries: A 
View from South Korea, Political Studies, Vol.52, No.l (2004)
Tat Van Kong, Power Alternation in South Korea, Government and Opposition, Vol.35, No.3 (2000)
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3. Malaysia 
1. Employment Policy
The contraction of the economy led to a surge in the unemployment rate. As Figure 7-2 
shows, it reached to 4.5 percent in the first quarter of 1999 from 2.5 percent in 1996 and 2.6 
percent in 1997. The rise of unemployment was unprecedented in recent history. Because of 
labour shortages in export-oriented and agricultural industries, Malaysia was a labour import 
country before the crisis.
[Figure 7-2] Unemployment Trend 680
Î  2
98 1 98 2 98 3 98 4 99 1 9 9 .2  99 3 99 4 00.1 00 2 00 3 0 0 .4
Source: Ministry o f Treasury, Annual Report (various issues)
Table 7-6 presents various policies that were employed to address the problem. Financial 
and tax incentives were provided to companies to encourage investment and job training 
programmes that helped unskilled workers. At the same time, regulations on labour markets 
were relaxed to increase mobility in labour markets.
It should be noted that the official statistics did not reflect the reality, because it did not include 
foreign and illegal workers. This omission was considerable particularly in the construction sector 
where approximately one fourths o f the workforce was foreign labour and many o f them did not hold 
work permits. See Ishak Shari, The 1997-98 Financial Crisis in Malaysia and its Social Impact: Some 
Lessons, in Chris Nyland, Wendy Smith, Russell Smyth and Antonia Marika Vicziany (eds.), 
Malaysian Business in the New Era (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2001)
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[Table 7-6] Employment Policy
Objective Measures
Increasing
employment
• Encouraging tiie corporate sector to increase investment in import- 
substituting and export-oriented industries, thereby generating additional 
employment opportunities
• Setting up a graduate entrepreneur scheme to provide basic training to 
develop entrepreneurs among unemployed graduates. This scheme 
provides attachment in large corporations and loans to trainees to set up 
businesses
Institutional
reform
• Amendment of the Employment Act 1955, to encourage employers to 
institute part-time employment or flexible working hours and introducing 
guidelines on retrenchment which included pay cuts and reduction of 
working hours/days and shifts as alternatives to retrenchment
• Strengthening the labour market mechanism to facilitate mobility through 
the setting up of an electronic labour exchange for the registration, 
monitoring and placement of workers_____________________________
Training
Provision of a special fund of RM5.0 million under the Human Resource 
Development Fund (HRDF) to finance the retraining of retrenched 
workers. A total of 572 retrenched workers benefited from this fund 
Re-crediting unclaimed training funds by the HRDF to companies to 
encourage them to train and retrain their workers 
Exempting companies from contributing to the training levy for six 
months, beginning February 1998. A further six-month exemption was 
given to companies in industries still facing financial difficulties 
Establishment of a RM40 million fund to provide initial funding to firms 
which have exhausted their contributions, to assist them to defray the costs 
of training
Expansion of existing and establishment of new skill training institutes and 
polytechnics
Increasing accessibility to skill training through the setting up of the Skill 
Training Loan Fund of RM500 million_____________________________
Source: Economic Planning Unit, White Paper: Status of the Malaysian Economy (EPU, 2000)
It should be noted that Malaysia’s labour market policy was employer-friendly before the 
crisis. For example, the country did not ratified ILO Convention that protects freedom of 
association. The Promotion of Investments Act 1986 made negotiations o f working conditions 
more than the minimum standards illegal in pioneer industries. To attract EDI, increase of
There was little change in Malaysia’s business-fiiendly policy. This is contrasted with other Asian 
countries. See Stephen J. Frenkel and David Peetz, Globalization and Industrial Relations in East Asia: 
A Three-Country Comparison, Industrial Relations, Vol. 37, No. 3 (July 1998)
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wages and benefits in exported-oriented industries were repressed by the government. As a 
result, tread unions had veiy little power to challenge government policies.
Against this background, it is hardly surprising that there was no remarkable resistance to 
the banking reform from the trade unions. Even the National Union of Banking Employees 
(NUBE) did not protest against it, which resulted in laying off more than 10 percent of 
employees in the sector. Only compensation was Voluntary Separation Schemes (VSS) and 
the ban on the retrenchment of employees for two years after the merger exercise.
There is another reason that made industrial relations stable. The repatriation o f foreign 
workers contributed to relieving the political burden o f the government to push the policy. 
After the crisis, regulations on foreign workers -  particularly unskilled and semi-skilled -  
were tightened. Many of immigrants whose formal contracts were expired and who were made 
redundant were repatriated. Moreover, many illegal immigrants voluntarily left the country. In 
the early stage of the crisis, for example, more than 500,000 Indonesian workers forced to 
return to their country. Most of them were employed in the construction sector that suffered 
from the withdrawal or expiration of government contracts.
The repatriation of foreign labour was effective in reducing Malays unemployment 
Malaysia was among labour importing countries prior to the crisis. It was estimated that there 
were 700,000 (legal) and 500,000 ~ 1,000,000 (illegal) foreign workers in Peninsular 
Malaysia. Most of them came from Indonesia (around 70 percent), Philippines and 
Bangladesh. Their share of the total work force was 10 ~ 15 percent.
This kind of retrenchment of foreign workers was not criticised by Malaysian workers in 
many ways. First, the NEP guaranteed the privileged status of Malays in labour markets. 
Second, there was a perception that foreign workers increased social crimes. Finally some
Patricia Todd and David Peetz, Malaysian Industrial Relations at Century’s Turn: Vision 2020 or A 
Spectre of The Past?, International Journal o f Human Resource Management, Vol. 12, No.8 (December 
2001)
Malaysian Business, The People Factor (16 February 2000); Lay-off Poser (16 February 2001) 
Sunday Times, ‘No Layoffs’ for Two Years After Bank Mergers (27 February 2000)
Chris Manning, Structural Change, Economic Crisis and International Labour Migration in East 
Asia, World Economy, Vol.25, No.3 (March 2002), p.365.
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foreign workers were illegal immigrants and thus were not under proper legal protection.
From late 1999 when economic recovery was well under way, the demand for foreign workers 
rose, especially in the manufacturing sector. Thus the government relaxed the regulations on 
work permits.
2) Social Policy for Bumiputera
Malaysia did not have well-developed social safety nets to mitigate the social costs of 
economic reform because the basic strategy was ‘redistribution through growth*. The need 
for social protection was recognised by policy makers at the initial stage of crisis management. 
Many companies forced their employees to accept pay cuts to avoid redundancy. The price 
increase of key commodities such as foods also had a negative impact on standard of living. 
And the deterioration of public services such as education and heath care adversely affected 
the livelihood of the poor. In the National Economic Recovery Plan, the social agenda was 
one of the top priorities. However, the spending on poverty reduction, unemployment, health 
and education were limited by tight fiscal policy until the second half of 1998.
One of the most important social safety nets is the Employees’ Provident Fund (EPF) 
established in 1951. The EPF as a publicly managed mandatory savings scheme provides the 
main source of retirement income. It is compulsory for private sector employees aged 16 and 
over earning up to a maximum of RM 2000 a month to join the EPF. Public sector workers are 
covered by the EPF in the first 10 years of public sector employment. However, it covers
Bridget Welsh, Malaysia and Globalization: Contradictory Currents, Asian Perspective, Vol. 23, 
No.4 (1999), pp.279-30.
®*^ Azizah Kassim, Malaysia, in OECD, Migration and the Labour Market in Asia: Recent Trends and 
Policies (OECD, 2002) In Korea, foreign workers were not protected by laws. See Timothy C. Lim, 
The Fight For Equal Rights; The Power of Foreign Workers in South Korea, Alternatives, Vol.24, No.3 
(July / September 1999)
Ishak Shari, Globalisation and Economic Insecurity: A Need for a New Social Policy in Malaysia, 
Asian Journal o f Social Science, Vol.31, No.2 (2003)
262
about half of the work force, because agricultural workers (approximately on third of the work 
force) and casual workers are excluded from the scheme.
[Table 7-7] Social Safety Nets
Objective Measures
Poverty reduction
Retaining the original 1998 budget allocation for the Development 
Programme for the Hardcore Poor (PPRT)
Making smaller cuts to the 1998 budgets of ministries involved in the 
provision of social programmes, rural development and agriculture 
programmes which are mainly targeted for the poor and low-income 
group as well as ensuring that the budget for 1999 is sufficient to meet 
programme objectives
Allocating an additional RM 100 million to Amanah Ikhtiar Malc^sia for 
the provision of interest-free loans to more hardcore poor 
Allocating RM200 million for a new micro-credit scheme to provide 
assistance to petty traders and hawkers in urban areas._______________
Bumiputera
ownership
Allowing individual Bumiputera facing difficulties as a result of the 
financial crisis and economic slowdown to sell their shares or part of 
their interests to non-Bumiputera or foreign investors. However, other 
Bumiputera or Bumiputera agencies and institutions will be given the 
first option to purchase them
Encouraging Bumiputera agencies and institutions to evaluate and 
consolidate their investment as well as develop and maintain a more 
selective portfolio of investment, particularly in more strategic industries 
and viable companies
Providing necessary assistance to strategic companies, including 
companies controlled by Bumiputera that were well-managed and 
profitable before the economic downturn
Encouraging Bumiputera investors and entrepreneurs to participate and 
invest in companies established by foreigners to ensure that Bumiputera 
also benefit from EDI. At the same time, foreign investors will be 
persuaded to accept Bumiputera partners and transfer knowledge and 
technology to them.__________________________________________
Education • Increasing the allocation for the National Higher Education Loan Fund 
to cater for more students and thus, facilitate their access to higher 
education in public and private institutions.
• Providing loan for students from the low-income group, which covers 
tuition fees, books, subsistence and other allowances.
Source: Economic Planning Unit, White Paper: Status of the Malaysian Economy (EPU, 2000)
Norma Mansor and Halimah Awang, The Role of Social Safety Nets in Malaysia: Trends and 
Prospects, in OECD (eds.). Labour Migration and the Recent Financial Crisis in Asia (OECD, 2000)
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The EPF alone could not address the problems. As Table 7-7 presents, the government 
used various policy measures. Funds for poverty reduction were established and many 
education programmes were launched to unskilled job seekers.
Among others, support for bumiputera ownership reflected the legacy of the NEP. This 
policy was designed to deal with the unevenness of the impacts on different ethnic groups. 
Although the NEP’s affirmative actions were effective in reducing the gap between 
bumiputera and non-bumiputera, most bumiputera in the rural areas lived under tiie poverty 
line. The financial crisis widened the gap by worsening income distribution.
Bumiputera ownership had a political significance because it was a key foundation for 
political and economic stability. The pro-Bumiputera stance was enhanced by racial conflicts 
in Indonesia in 1998 that plunged the countiy into economic recession and political turmoil. 
These concerns had its origin in the NEP, because its primary objective was to achieve inter­
racial harmony by equitable economic development. To this end, many preferential treatments 
were offered to Bumiputera at the expense of other ethnics (especially Chinese).
In sum, there is no clear influence of the Washington consensus. Before the financial 
crisis, the government introduced an employer-friendly policy to attract FDI and to promote 
bumiputera entrepreneurs. Thus there was no significant change in the policy in the post-crisis 
period.
Meanwhile, social safety nets were strengthened to help vulnerable groups. The focus of 
the policy was on bumiputera, most of whom lived in dire policy. When Anwar challenged his 
authority, Mahathir reinforced a pro-bumiputera social policy to consolidate his power base. 
This strategy enabled Mahathir to manage social turmoil after the dismissal of Anwar and to 
win the general elections in November 1999.
Zainal Aznam Yusof, Income Distribution in Malaysia, in Colin Barlow (ed.), Modern Malaysia in 
the Global Economy: Political and Social Change into The 21st Century (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar,
2001)
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4. Conclusion
This chapter have reviewed the development of labour market reform and social policy 
after the financial crisis. The cases of Korea and Malaysia have showed that the political 
power of the Washington consensus was not resilient. The main reason is that the consensus 
had not paid attention to the social dimension of economic policy and its influence was limited 
by political considerations. As economic recession deteriorated, the post-Washington 
consensus gradually gained political support from policy makers.
In Korea, the influence of the Washington consensus was robust just after the outbreak of 
the crisis. The IMF included labour market reform in its conditionality. In addition, the 
chaebol endorsed the policy very enthusiastically. Despite this, policy makers did not push the 
reform agenda because of political backlash against the legalisation of lay-off. Equally 
important, they recognised that social safety nets were not sufficient to cope with the adverse 
consequences of the radical change of labour markets.
It was the Tripartite Commission that led big business and organised labour to reach a 
social pact. The commission was based on a consensual (European) approach rather than a 
confrontational (Anglo-American) one. The adoption of the European approach means that the 
political power of the Washington consensus diminished.
In Malaysia, the government maintained a pro-employer stance to attract FDI in Malaysia. 
In the post-crisis era, there was no significant change in the policy stance. If  any, the 
government encouraged the repatriation of foreign workers to protect Malay workers from 
unemployment. This policy was supported by the bumiputera business community as well as 
policy makers.
This pro-bumiputera stance was visible in social policy. The government gave top priority 
to the bumiputera community that were more vulnerable to the financial crisis than other 
ethnic communities. This policy preference is embedded in the NEP principles that are 
conflicted with the Washington consensus.
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[Appendix 7-1] Korea: Accomplishments o f the Tripartite Commission
(as of 31 December 1998) 691
Completed In Progress Remarks
Government
Tasks
Transparency o f management 
Consolidated financial statements
Bigger voice to minor shareholders 
Some outside board members 
Cross-debt guarantees banned
Funding for venture and new 
businesses (414.2 billion won as 
of 12/98)
Unemployment measures 
Expansion of unemployment fund 
Expansion of insurance 
Loans to the unemployed 
Payment guarantees for wage bonds
Studying ways to cut workdays to 
hire more workers
Labour unions 
Political activities allowed 
Teachers' union legalized 
Limited labour action allowed for 
civil servants
Cracking down illegal labour 
practices (886 business 
investigated)
Labour flexibility assured 
Lay-offs allowed 
Manpower outsourcing allowed
Revision of four insurance laws
Other
Medical insurance unified 
National pension improved 
Imprisoned labour activists released
Including labour and 
management
representatives in government 
commissions and councils
71 cases 51 cases 20 cases 72% completed
Labour - 
Management 
Tasks
Strengthened accountability of 
controlling shareholders and 
management
Labour to exercise greater role in 
management
Planning departments of 30 
conglomerates disbanded 
Top managers liable for company
Controlling shareholders to use 
personal wealth to pay off 
company debts
Laid-off workers must be hired first
Strategic alliances between big 
and small businesses 
Enhanced export competitiveness
17 cases 2 cases 15 cases 12% completed
Office of the President, Overcoming a National Crisis, The Republic of Korea Rises Up Again: A 
Year of Trials and Challenges for President Kim Dae Jung (February 1999)
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National
Assembly
Tasks
Held public hearings on the economy
Political parties to share the pain 
High-cost, low-efficiency
Politics to be reformed
2 cases 1 case 1 case 50% completed
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Chapter VIII 
Conclusion
1. Main Argument
This thesis has pursued two primary objectives. Empirically, it has examined a popular 
perception that Korea’s economic adjustment was orthodox whereas Malaysia’s was 
unorthodox. Detailed comparisons of the four policy areas have shown that the perception 
exaggerates the differences between the two countries, thereby downplaying the similarities. 
With the exception of capital controls, both countries employed a similar set of 
macroeconomic stabilisation and structural reform policies and experienced a similar pattern 
(i.e., V-shaped) of economic adjustment.
Theoretically, this thesis is a challenge to the dominance of interest-oriented and 
institution-oriented approaches in the literature on the East Asian financial crisis. There is no 
doubt that vested interests and political institutions played a role in choosing and 
implementing policy options. However, those approaches do not provide a convincing 
explanation of why Korea and Malaysia adopted a similar set of policy measures despite many 
differences in domestic politics and economic conditions. To answer the question, the thesis 
sheds light on the role of economic ideas in policy-making.
My argument is that the policy convergence between the two countries is attributable, in 
large part, to the political power of economic ideas. To prove the argument, I have advanced 
an ideational model of policy change that is drawn from the recent scholarship on ideas- 
oriented approaches in IPE: institutionalist, neo-Gramscian and constructivist. Based on the 
model, I have shown how the neoliberal economic ideas affected policy-making in Korea and 
Malaysia.
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In this chapter, I summarise the impact of the Washington consensus on the post-crisis 
economic adjustment in Korea and Malaysia. Then, I evaluate the policy convergence in the 
four policy areas. Finally, I discuss the effects of interests and institutions on ideas to explain 
the divergence between them
2. The Political Power of the Washington Consensus and Policy Convergence
To explain how economic ideas affect policy-making, I have suggested an ideational 
model of policy convergence. The core of the model is that the impacts of economic ideas are 
transmitted to policy-making through discursive practices and social learning. These 
ideational factors generate policy emulation, diffusion and harmonisation. In the aftermath of 
the financial crisis, the Washington consensus effectively de-legitimised the East Asian 
development model and offered a well-organised guideline for economic adjustment. This is 
why the crisis-affected countries accepted IMF style policies, whether they were under the 
IMF-supported programmes or not.
Before the crisis, Korea and Malaysia pursued a similar set of economic policies that were 
close to the Japanese model of economic development export-oriented strategy and strong 
state intervention such as financial repression and industrial policy. This model enabled them 
to achieve rapid industrialisation in a short period. However, the model had some fundamental 
weaknesses because close govemment-business relations generated moral hazard problem in 
the financial and corporate sectors. This problem was not seriously considered because of 
decades-long economic growth.
In the wake of the financial crisis, the de-legitimisation of the East Asian development 
model in the 1990s paved the way for neoliberal economic reform in the region. One the one 
hand, the East Asian development model was criticised by neoclassical economic theories, 
especially total factor productivity (TFP) theory. Among others, Paul Krugman’s review about 
the World Bank’s report played a key role in rethinking the advantages of the model. On the
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other hand, the crony capitalism thesis effectively criticised the normative foundation of the 
model.
It should be noted that neoliberalism was imported by liberal policy makers well before 
the crisis. In the 1980s, a growing number of liberal economists who were educated in 
American universities, implicitly or explicitly, affected the transformation of economic policy 
framework in Korea. The role of the Korean Development Institute (KDI) was crucial in 
formulating liberal economic policies in the 1980s: liberalisation of the banking sector and 
trade regimes. In particular, Kim Jae Ik and his colleagues in the Economic Planning Board 
(EPB) introduced monetarist macroeconomic policies and trade and financial liberalisation. 
However, their policy ideas were not fully accepted because interventionist policy makers in 
the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry were fiercely opposed to 
them. As a result, further liberalisation of the financial sector was not realised until the early 
1990s. Korea’s entry to the OECD in 1996 was a critical momentum that led the government 
to comply with global standards or best practices.
In Malaysia, liberal economic ideas gained momentum in the mid-1980s when the 
economy faced economic recession. Even though the government stuck to the New Economic 
Policy (NEP), liberal foreign direct investment (FDI) regimes and privatisation were 
undertaken to deal with the recession. As a matter of fact, some regulations that protected 
bumiputera workers were relaxed to attract foreign investors and trade unions were prohibited 
in foreign companies. The influence of liberal economic ideas was more visible in the 
National Development Policy (NDP) and Wawasan 2000 (Vision 2020) that replaced the NEP 
as a development plan.
Compared with Korea, there was no defining momentum of policy change in Malaysia. 
One reason was that the legitimacy of the NEP was not seriously challenged even during 
economic downturn because of its political and social implications. In addition, the Malaysian 
government did not have a liberal think tank like the KDI. Unlike Korea, moreover, there was 
no well-organised group of liberal economists in the government, although some policy
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makers had postgraduate degree in the US and UK. This is why Malaysia’s embrace of liberal 
economic ideas was pragmatic rather than dogmatic.
The political power of the Washington consensus was enhanced in the post-crisis period, 
because the consensus provided a set of policy alternatives to the East Asian development 
model. Against this background, it is much easier to understand why the crisis-affected 
countries followed IMF-style economic stabilisation programmes whether the IMF intervened 
or not.
When it comes to macroeconomic stabilisation, the political power of the Washington 
consensus was strong in Korea and Malaysia at the early stage of economic adjustment. The 
IFIs and policy makers supported a pro-cyclical policy. Although big business did not totally 
agree to the policy, they did not strongly oppose to it either. In September 1998, there was a 
policy reversal in Malaysia. After Anwar was expelled from the cabinet, Mahathir introduced 
a Keynesian stimulus package including temporary capital controls. It should be noted that 
Korea also shifted to a counter-cyclical policy in the second half of 1998.
In terms of financial restructuring, the Washington consensus had a strong impact on 
policy choice. The IFIs, policy makers and big business preferred a market-oriented solution 
(i.e., London approach) to resolve financial distress. In Korea, the focus of financial reform 
was on the whole overhaul of the financial system. In Malaysia, top priority was given to 
banking sector consolidation.
With respect to corporate reform, there was some remarkable difference between the two 
countries. In Korea, the legitimacy of the chaebol system was shattered by the crony 
capitalism thesis. The IFIs and policy makers pressed big business to comply with 
international standards or “best practice”. This strategy was very effective in transforming the 
corporate governance system. In Malaysia, the IFIs and policy makers tried to introduce a 
more transparent and accountable governance system. Apparently, their efforts yielded some 
positive results because regulations on the corporate sector was upgraded and strengthened. 
However, politically-well connected companies sought for special treatments by lobbying
271
their political patrons (particularly Mahathir and Daim). In this respect, it is hard to say that 
the new regulations were strictly implemented.
Finally, regarding labour market reform, the political impact of the Washington consensus 
differed across the countries. In Korea, the IFIs, liberal policy makers and big business 
supported a radical approach to increase flexibility in labour markets. However, this approach 
backfired because the outcome of the reform, directly or indirectly, deteriorated 
unemployment and poverty without sufficient social safety nets. To cope with the backlash, 
the government presented the productive welfare policy. In Malaysia, there was not much 
pressure on labour market reform because its policy stance was already employer-friendly, 
particularly in exporting industries. Although the social consequences of the financial crisis 
were severe due to insufficient social safety nets, the government managed to control political 
backlash. Malaysian workers were protected from unemployment by repatriating foreign 
workers.
Despite the substantial degree of policy convergence, Malaysia’s economic adjustment 
policy is widely regarded as very unorthodox. There are three reasons. First, Mahathir’s anti- 
Western rhetoric reinforced the perception. The Prime Minister frequently accused currency 
speculator of the main cause of the crisis and very critical of IMF-supported programmes. His 
accusations had two elements: religion and racism. Malaysia’s official religion -  Islam -  
affects Malaysia’s politics on a wide range of issues. Since the ethnic riots in 1969, the 
dominance of ethnic Malays has played a critical role in making religion a serious diplomatic 
issue. When Palestine and Afghanistan were attacked by Israel and the Soviet Union
It should be noted that Üiere are fundamental differences between modernists (i.e., UMNO) and 
fundamentalist (i.e., PAS) in terms of the role of religion in state and civil society. Before joining 
UMNO in 1982, Anwar was a leader of Malaysian Muslim Youth Movement {Angkatan Belia Islam 
Malaysia—ABIM), which supported PAS’s election campaigns. See David Camroux, State Responses 
to Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia: Accommodation, Co-Option, and Confrontation, Asian Survey, Vol. 
36, No. 9 (September 1996); Jan Stark, The Islamic Debate in Malaysia: The Unfinished Project, South 
East Asia Research, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2003) Since the September 11 terrorist attack, PAS was criticised 
for its support for al-Qaeda and its influence of the PAS diminished quickly. See Joseph Chin Yong 
Liow, Exigency or expediency? Contextualising political Islam and the PAS challenge in Malaysian 
Politics, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2 (2004); The Mahathir Administration’s War against 
Islamic Militancy: Operational and Ideological Challenges, Australian Journal o f International Affairs, 
Vol. 58, No. 2 (June 2004)
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respectively, the government expressed its support for the Islamic forces. Some 
transactions with Israel require approval from Bank Negara. And Mahathir frequently 
maintained that Jewish financiers in Western countries had manipulated speculative attacks in 
the recent financial crises. When the financial crisis took place, Mahathir insisted on a 
conspiracy theory whereby Jewish hedge fimds deliberately set out speculations to destroy 
East Asian capitalism.
A closer look reveals that his rhetoric was targeted at Anwar rather than Western 
capitalism. Mahathir’s discourse was intended to convince Malay nationalists and Islamic 
organisations that Anwar’s IMF-style policy measures would serve the interests of the US and 
IMF rather than Malaysia. This accusation was overstated by senior bumiputera business 
leaders who were estranged from Anwar. Their point was that market-oriented reform could 
not co-exist with the NEP that allowed special treatments of bumiputera at the expense of 
other ethnic groups (i.e., Chinese and Indian).
Second, there is an exaggeration of the role of capital controls. This is caused by several 
factors. Above all, the introduction of a fixed exchange regime and capital controls in 
Malaysia was in contrast with its neighbours who moved to free floating regimes. In addition, 
Mahathir’s provocative style made his policies look more unconventional. The coincidence of 
Anwar’s downfall with the introduction of capital controls drew more attention. Further, the 
IMF and the international financial community were very sceptical about the policy. Against 
this background, the modest success of the policy was hailed as a setback to the Fund and its 
policy. However, it should be noted that the policy was frequently used in the 1990s while 
removing restrictions on capital account transactions. More importantly, capital controls were 
imposed to reduce interest rates, not to reverse financial liberalisation.
Finally, Western observers regarded Anwar as a reformer. This perception gives rise to a 
conclusion that the downfall of Anwar means an end of economic reform. In a similar vein.
Shanti Nair, Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy (London: Routledge, 1998)
^  EIU, Country Profile 1990-2000 (1999), p.36.
One underlying purpose of his anti-Semitism is to prevent Islamic fundamentalists from accusing his 
outward-looking development of pro-Westem one. See Clive S. Kessler, A Malay Diaspora? Another 
Side of Dr Mahathir's Jewish Problem, Patterns o f Prejudice, Vol. 33, No. 1 (January 1999)
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Mahathir’s reform is dismissed as a corrupted attempt to save his cronies. It is hard to deny 
that political considerations played a part in restructuring the financial and corporate sectors. 
However, it is worthwhile to note that Mahathir was not opposed to all of the structural 
reform. In fact, some progress has been made in reforming institutional frameworks for 
prudential supervision and regulation especially after Daim’s departure.
3. Explaining Divergence between Korea and Malaysia: Ideas, Interests and Institutions
Although the Washington consensus had a great impact on policy-making in Korea and 
Malaysia, it did not generate policy convergence in all the policy area. In fact, there was some 
considerable divergence in foreign economic policy. One of the most significant reasons is 
that Korea embraced neoliberalism dogmatically, while neoliberal economic policies were 
driven, in large part, by pragmatism. This difference in terms of the influence of neoliberalism 
confirms that policy ideas are translated, not copied. In other words, translation is a path- 
dependent process. To understand the difference, it is necessary to examine how ideas interact 
with interests and institutions. To this end, I have evaluated the four hypotheses suggested in 
Chapter 2.
1) The political power o f economic ideas is likely to increase i f  external agencies support 
the ideas.
IMF’s intervention substantially increased the political power of the Washington 
consensus among policy makers and politicians in Korea. High-ranking officials of the IMF 
and US Treasury visited the country to promote the IMF-supported programme. Michel 
Camdessus met with the leaders of trade unions to persuade them to accept labour market 
reform. Foreign investors also reminded the government that its commitment to economic
For a pro-govemment assessment, see Ramon V. Navaratnam, Malaysia’s Economic Recovery: 
Policy Reforms For Economic Sustainability (Selangor Darul Ehsan: Pelanduk Publications, 2000)
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reform was one of the most significant factors in their investment considerations. These 
external pressures were instrumental in consolidating the legitimacy of economic reform in 
the bureaucracy.
In Malaysia, external pressures generated a mixed result. On the one hand, IMF’s 
endorsement of Anwar’s economic reform package was helpful in enhancing the authority of 
his reform policy package. On the other hand, it constrained his political power when his 
critics -  particularly senior bumiputera business leaders -  manipulated a nationalist backlash 
among the community that was dissatisfied with Anwar’s policies. Mahathir (and Daim) 
exploited this nationalist sentiment to remove Anwar from the cabinet by describing the IMF’s 
praise for Anwar as an imperialist attempt to colonise the economy.
2) The political power o f economic ideas is likely to increase i f  big business supports the 
ideas.
Chaebol’s support for market-oriented reform clearly enhanced the political power of the 
Washington consensus in Korea. Their pursuit for liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation 
is in line with IMF-supported programmes. However, their endorsement was not unreserved. 
Among others, big business opposed two policy measures. One is high interest rate policy that 
increased their interest burden substantially. Because most chaebol companies were heavily 
indebted, they demanded the authorities to lower the rates. The other is corporate governance 
reform, which ultimately limits chaebol owners’ rights by strengthening minority 
shareholders’ right. Their opposition was not powerful enough to avert the policies. The main 
reason is that the legitimacy of the chaebol system was effectively criticised by the consensus 
that attributes the main causes of the crisis to chaebol’s reckless investment. Consequently, the 
chaebol had no alternative to comply with international standards or “best practice”.
In Malaysia, the bumiputera business community did not give up the NEP-style 
development model so that the political power of the Washington consensus was fairly 
modest. IMF-style policies would conflict with the NEP principles on the ground that its
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emphasis on economic efficiency is not compatible with the NEP’s objective: i.e., a harmony 
between racial equality and economic development. Their disagreement with the consensus 
did not lead to resistance to institutional reform. The reason is that they could manage the 
adverse impacts of structural reform by seeking for special treatments from their political 
sponsors -  especially Daim.
S) The political power o f economic ideas is likely to be greater i f  high-ranking policy 
makers -  particularly finance minister and central banker -  support the ideas.
The existence of liberal policy makers was instrumental in building up the political 
support for the Washington consensus in Korea. It was also noteworthy that economists in 
government think tanks (notably the KDI) and the chaebol’s research centres such as the 
KERI and the SERI were sympathetic toward the consensus. The financial crisis gave them a 
chance for them to persuade politicians that were worried about the socio-political 
consequences of neoliberal policies: especially financial liberalisation and labour market 
reform.
In Malaysia, the division among policy makers limited the political power of the 
Washington consensus. Anwar’s supporters in the Treasury and BNM agreed to IMF’s 
interpretation of the crisis, whereas Mahathir’s followers did not accept it. After the 
establishment of the National Economic Action Council (NEAC) that were under control of 
Daim, the swing of the pendulum shifted from Anwar to Mahathir.
4) The political power o f economic ideas is likely to be greater in democratic regimes than 
authoritarian regimes.
The impact of elections was ambivalent in Korea. On the one hand, the 1997 presidential 
election was crucial in generating a political consensus over economic reform by making 
economic policy one of the most important issues. On the other hand, a host of elections
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between 1998 and 2000 had a constraining effect on the Washington consensus. The 
government retreated from its pledge to fundamental reform to deal with backlashes against 
neoliberal economic policies.
In Malaysia, the rise and decline of the Washington consensus was closely related to 
Anwar’s political power. This means that elections had very little impact on the policy 
debates. One reason is that the tradition of consensus-based decision-making process was an 
obstacle to the politicisation of debates. For this reason, the rift between Mahathir and Anwar 
did not attract much public attention.
In sum, the political power of the Washington consensus is likely to increase when the 
IFIs, policy makers and big business support the consensus. Among them, the most important 
is policy makers’ attitude because their policy preferences were critical in designing and 
implementing economic ac^ustment policies. The IFIs also had a considerable impact on 
policy-making. However, their influence was limited in the policy areas that were o f political 
sensitivity. In addition, their endorsement was sometimes unhelpful for reform-minded policy 
makers and politician because it was described as illegitimate interventions. Finally, the role 
of big business was critical. In Korea, the chaebol backed market-friendly reform that made it 
easier for the authorities to push ahead with structural reform. In contrast, bumiputera business 
community’s objection to economic reform substantially decreased the consensus over 
neoliberal reform. In the meanwhile, there is no meaningful correlation between regime type 
and the political power of the consensus.
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